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Hannover’de Politik Tutsaklarla Dayanışma Eylemi Gerçekleştirildi (ATIK Online)


HANNOVER| 19.03.2024| 18 Mart Politik Tutsaklar ile Dayanışma Günü’nde, Rote Hilfe (Kızıl Yardım) ve ATİF Hannover’in de içinde yer aldığı birçok devrimci demokrat kurumun katıldığı bir yürüyüş düzenlendi.

ATİF adına yapılan konuşmada emperyalist kapitalist düzen olduğu sürece zulüm ve sömürünün olacağı, buna karşı direnenlerin her daim olduğu ve tutsak ezilenlerin dışarıda ki sesi olmanın önemli olduğu vurgulandı. Saat 18.00’da da başlayan eylem yaklaşık iki saat sonra sona erdi.

 


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Acciones por el 8 de marzo (Nueva Democracia)



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Lucha popular y elementos de crisis en la política (Partido Comunista Revolucionario)


La dictadura con 30.000 detenidos desaparecidos no pudo lograr su sueño. ¿Y cuál era su sueño? Está vigente en este DNU y en esta mega ley: planchar a 30 millones de argentinos para que sean pobres obedientes. Algo de lo que queda en Brasil con 20 años de dictadura que te llevan la caipirinha al mar, cosa que difícil haga un gastronómico en Argentina.

O sea, un disciplinamiento social para poder explotar en forma permanente al pueblo, esa es la seguridad jurídica de esas inversiones extranjeras que soñó Martínez de Hoz y que sueña Milei. Ese es el objetivo del DNU. Fijate cómo eso va naufragando en la oleada de  lucha de estos 100 días de gobierno. Arrancamos con una pequeña jornada el 12 de diciembre, cacerolazos el 20 de diciembre, marcha del 27 de diciembre, paro del 24 de enero, nuevas jornadas en las puertas del ministerio de Capital Humano,  8 de marzo que fue contundente por parte de las mujeres, hoy estamos con los 500 cortes de ruta y es fundamental todo el pueblo en la calle el 24 de Marzo.

Ese proyecto que en la dictadura tuvo el foco en reprimir, meter en la cárcel y hacer desaparecer los cientos de miles de delegados de fábrica, y que sistemáticamente busca destruir la organización popular,  que busca sumir a la Argentina en esa dependencia y en esa sumisión del pueblo, oculta su cabeza y emerge sistemáticamente, y nunca lo lograron, ni con el genocidio.

Fijate vos que Kirschbaum el fin de semana dijo en el análisis de Clarín “No se puede vivir en una situación de crisis permanente. El apoyo que aun mantiene el gobierno no puede sostenerse de esta forma”. Y esa es la crisis que se vive ahora, después de la derrota con la votación en contra del DNU en el Senado, donde se sumó en contra del decretazo el federalismo. No podés tratar así a las provincias, esa ofensa  genera una resistencia popular, en un país que además es multicolor. Por ejemplo, en Santa Cruz hay además enojo porque la represa china ha cortado su inversión y tiene miles en la calle; podés maltratar a los señores del azúcar pero eso te va a generar problemas en el norte; podés tratar de liberar las inversiones en el litio y en la minería y vas a tener problemas con algunos que ya tienen negocios cerrados.

O sea, recibió un nuevo cachetazo y el DNU no logra aprobarse. Ese proyecto de planchar a millones de argentinos en una pobreza sumisa va naufragando con el DNU. Y esto es producto de esta lucha creciente del pueblo, que va avanzando a generar una crisis política.

En La Libertad Avanza estalló la contradicción entre Milei y Villarruel. Pequeño tema. Además también está la de Zago, presidente del bloque, y ahora Espert, que es un nuevo presidente del bloque. O sea, La Libertad Avanza misma está complicada. El PRO quedó  entre los que dicen que hay que fusionarse con LLA, que no pueden vacilar porque toda su suerte estaría atada a Milei, y los que dicen que tiene muchas posibilidades de fracasar y si quedan pegados naufraga todo el proyecto liberal, Macri resiste la fusión y buscó compartir  el gobierno, pero Milei no da lugar, y va cooptando figuras como Espert. O sea, está partido el PRO. En la UCR Lousteau fundamentando la inconstitucionalidad del decreto votó en contra y junto a Manes sumaría 11 votos en contra en diputados pero los gobernadores radicales  están negociando con el gobierno.

En el campo popular también hay un debate, una parte equivocadamente plantea que hay que hacer como con la pera, esperar a que madure el descontento e ir tejiendo una trenza electoral y una parte que sale con todo a resistir.

No hay que darle tiempo, hay que frenarlo, porque hay otra salida para la Argentina, esto también  estuvo en debate desde aquel momento del golpe. Desde ya, si se aplica otra política. Hoy preguntabas, si es otra política, ¿será otro gobierno? Sí, si es otra política, habrá que lograrla con otro gobierno. Alguna vez me hiciste esta pregunta, cuando se planteaban las críticas a la política de Alberto Fernández, y  te decía, “bueno, cambiando el rumbo”, porque a ese gobierno se le podía cambiar el rumbo;  pero a estos no,  estos están decididos, cada vez que reciben un tropiezo aceleran.

De Renzis: A estos es al revés,  hay que cambiar el gobierno para que no siga el rumbo.

Arnoldo Gómez: En primer lugar hay que frenarlo,  frenar el DNU, y sobre la base de torcerle el brazo, después ver cómo se sigue.

De Renzis: Tengo la idea de que están operando con mucha intensidad en Diputados,  porque no quieren un fracaso más, que sería muy contundente un nuevo fracaso.

Arnoldo Gómez: Si vos sumás todos los votos del PRO y de La Libertad Avanza  son 77, de la UCR dicen sumar 23, de acuerdo a cómo votaron los senadores, estarían en 100 votos; si le sumás Jaldo, Espert y Misiones, pueden llegar a 115 votos. Del otro lado, Unión por la Patria tiene 99 votos, más 11 que aportarían los radicales de Manes y Lousteau estaríamos en 110, más los 5 del FIT, los 2 de Santa Cruz, Natalia De la Sota, hay que ver Stolbizer y Lilitos suman 120. Ahí está muy pareja la cosa. Harían falta 129. Por lo tanto, no es secundario acá el tema de la presión en cada pueblo sobre cómo voten sus diputados. Los 500 cortes de hoy son significativos en esa dirección. Y un 24 de Marzo que sea resonante para trabar la mano de esos votos vacilantes en el Parlamento.

Por eso están en duda, porque no pueden recibir una derrota de ese tipo. Negocian para dar vuelta votos. Y DUDAN.  Entonces están también en la táctica de dilatar, o sea, de que no se discuta, no se vote, y sobre esa base sigue vigente el DNU. ¿Un DNU que tiene el rechazo del Senado y no logra discutirse en Diputado? ¿El DNU vigente puede hacer posible la seguridad jurídica, planchar al pueblo y lograr las inversiones? Es muy endeble eso.

De Renzis: Mientras tanto por más débil que sea tiene vigencia y se aprovecha, por ejemplo, las prepagas.

Arnoldo Gómez: Claro, tiene capacidad de daño. Aunque  el objetivo de planchar por años al pueblo ya está herido.

De Renzis: No está legalmente bien ubicado, pero mientras tanto perjudica.

Arnoldo Gómez: Por lo tanto, hay que derogarlo. O sea, no hay que frenar, hay que ir a un 24 de Marzo contundente. Es un paso muy positivo que la CGT convoque y encolumne con las dos CTA y los movimientos sociales. Sobre esta base avanzar y darle continuidad con un paro activo y marcha federal.

Después están algunas posiciones equivocadas de algunos sectores, que plantean dos actos. La mayoría va a salir y desbordar la Plaza, esto va creciendo día a día y tiene que venir el paro nacional activo para derogar el DNU.

 

Foto: Jornada Nacional del 18 de marzo en Rosario.

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Norwegian: 18TH OF MARCH – DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH POLITICAL PRISONERS -HONORING THE COMMUNIST AND REVOLUTIONARY PRISONERS (ci ic)


Proletarer i alle land, foren dere!

18. MARS – DAGEN FOR SOLIDARITET MED POLITISKE FANGER – TIL ÆRE FOR DE KOMMUNISTISKE OG REVOLUSJONÆRE FANGENE

18. mars er den internasjonale dagen for solidaritet med politiske fanger. Rød Hjelp ble grunnlagt av Komintern i 1920, og erklærte i 1923 18. mars, datoen for grunnleggelsen av Pariskommunen, som «den internasjonale dagen for solidaritet med politiske fanger» og viet den til de politiske fangene. 18. mars uttrykkes solidaritet med politiske fanger over hele verden.

I hver periode av historien har det vært stor motstand mot systemene for utbytting og undertrykkelse som vi har levd i i tusenvis av år, og en høy pris har blitt betalt. De herskende klassers reaksjon mot enhver kamp mot de herskende utbyttingssystemene, mot enhver motstand, har vært den samme: å knuse enhver bevegelse mot deres eksistens for å opprettholde sin eksistens og fremfor alt å ødelegge de som ledet disse bevegelsene. Som følge av raseriet som har bygget seg opp mot den herskende orden, kan dynamikken som springer ut av ønsket om og innsatsen for å endre den eksisterende orden bare styres i riktig retning under korrekt lederskap. Det er derfor de herskende klassene ønsker å ødelegge de som kanaliserer folkets sinne og ønske om forandring, og isolere dem som ikke kan ødelegges fra folket. Den andre dimensjonen ved de herskende klassers intoleranse og aggresjon mot de revolusjonære, kommunistiske og demokratiske folkelige bevegelsene er å sikre at de undertrykte folkemassene tier og ikke våger å gjøre opprør. Ved å massakrere og undertrykke folkets fortropp, sender de herskende klassene en beskjed til de undertrykte folkemassene: «Hvis dere handler mot oss, vil vi gjøre det samme mot dere».

«Filosofene har bare tolka verden forskjellig; men det det kommer an på, er å forandre den» sier Karl Marx, proletariatets store mester. Kommunister og revolusjonære kjemper for realiseringen av dette idealet, de blir myrdet for det, de blir fengslet for det. Kommunistiske og revolusjonære fanger har vist igjen og igjen i tortursentre og fengsler at så lenge livet fortsetter, kan det skapes gode eksempler for fortsettelsen av klassekampen under alle slags livsvilkår. Veien krever at man tar disse risikoene, og det er med denne bevisstheten kommunister og revolusjonære kjemper mot de herskende utbyttingssystemene. Kroppen til hver myrdet kommunist og revolusjonær, hver periode tilbrakt i fengsel, legger også grunnlaget for å bygge fremtidens samfunn. Borgerskapet og deres lakeier ønsker å sikre kapitulasjonen ved å sette de som ikke kan utryddes i fengsler under de mest undertrykkende forhold. De kommunistiske og revolusjonære fangene nøler derimot ikke med å gjøre fengslene, der fienden føler seg sterkest, til en arena for klassekamp. Av denne grunn må vi ikke definere de kommunistiske og revolusjonære fangene i fengslene som ofre, vi må definere dem på rettferdig grunnlag og omfavne dem. Kommunister og revolusjonære blir ikke bare myrdet, fengslet og torturert fordi de har alternative ideer til de eksisterende utbyttingssystemene, men også fordi de handler for å forandre disse ideene, for å organisere og forene folket. Det er først og fremst en ideologisk krig, legemliggjort av to fiendtlige og uforsonlige klasser. Siden de objektive forholdene i det imperialistiske systemet bevarer motsigelsen mellom undertrykkere og undertrykte konstant og aktuell, løser ikke mord og fengsling av kommunister og revolusjonære problemene for borgerskapet. Den eksisterende objektive situasjonen, de dypere motsetningene, gjenspeiles direkte i klassemotsigelsene, og tomrommet de myrdede og fengslede revolusjonære og kommunistene etterlater, fylles av nye.

I den grad det herskende systemets motsetninger fordypes og dets blindveier multipliserer, i den grad deres frykt for «de som graver deres grav» vokser, nøler ikke herskerklassene med å avsløre sin sanne karakter mer og mer konkret. Samtidig fører systemets fordypende og uløste krise borgerskapet og de utbyttende herskende klasser av alle slag, sterkere sentralisering av den den suverene statens mekanisme, både med sine lover og sine de facto organisasjoner, og til å sette undertrykkingsmekanismene mer i forgrunnen. I de imperialistiske kapitalistiske landene, som kaller seg «ideelle» og «progressive demokratier», viser innføringen av sikkerhetslovene, de nye lovene som utvider statens undertrykkende organers makt, konkret at borgerskapet har lagt bak seg evnen til å bære «den demokratiske masken». Borgerskapet gjenoppretter sin posisjon mot arbeiderklassen, de undertrykte arbeiderne og de undertrykte folkene med all sin reaksjon. I koloniale og halvkoloniale land dominert av imperialisme, er parlamentariske og utenomparlamentariske styreformer med ulike nyanser av fascisme og reaksjon de vanlige regimene. I disse landene blir alle opposisjonelle, først og fremst kommunister og revolusjonære, utsatt for systematisk og permanent statsterror. Dybden av motsigelsen mellom de herskende klassene og de undertrykte menneskene i disse landene bestemmer intensiteten i klassekampen. For de herskende klasser, som bare kan opprettholde imperialismens trelldom gjennom et tøylesløst terrorregime mot folket, er statsterror snarere en nødvendighet enn et alternativ. Lovene er bare et skalkeskjul for fascisme, reaksjon og statsterror. Fengsler, derimot, er en mekanisme for tortur og undertrykkelse. De herskende klassene i Tyrkia, India, Filippinene, Peru, Iran, Israel osv. fordyper de isolasjonen med nesten alle bokstavene i alfabetet for å isolere fangene i fengslene. Behandlingen av alvorlig syke fanger forhindres under ulike påskudd. Mange syke fanger blir etterlatt for å dø og det er gjentatte faktiske angrep på fanger. Tusenvis av medlemmer av den kurdiske nasjonen er fanget i fengsler som gjengjeldelse for den kurdiske nasjonale frigjøringskampen. I tyrkiske fengsler forhindres løslatelse av personer som har vært fengslet i mer enn 30 år med den begrunnelse at de «ikke gir opp sine ideer».

Den reaksjonære indiske staten har sperret inne over ti tusen kommunistiske, revolusjonære og politiske aktivister, deriblant Varavara Rao, Sanjoy Deepak Rao, Ayinoor Vasu, Rona Wilson og Gautam Navlakha, for å forhindre folkekrigen.

Georges Ibrahim Abdallah har vært fengslet av fransk imperialisme i 40 år og har ennå ikke blitt løslatt, selv om han har sonet sin straff. Mumia Abu-Jamal, medlem av Black Panthers, har vært fengslet av amerikansk imperialisme i over 40 år. Tusenvis av kommunister, revolusjonære og fanger av undertrykte folk fra forskjellige deler av verden har tilbrakt tiår i fengsler.

De herskende klassers frykt for de kommunistiske og revolusjonære fangene og klassehatet de føler mot dem, er så stor at de hensynsløst forhindrer kommunistene og revolusjonære de holder fanget i åpent brudd på sine egne lover fra å forlate fengslene. Mordet på formann Gonzalo i 2021, lederen av PCP, som mistet helsen etter 29 år i isolat og hvis død ble forårsaket fordi de nødvendige helsetiltakene ikke ble iverksatt, er veldig viktig for å forstå omfanget av frykten og klassehat som imperialistene og de servile eierne av herskersystemet føler på. De ansvarlige for formann Gonzalos død brente og ødela til og med kroppen hans.

De kommunistiske og revolusjonære fangene i fengslene streber etter å oppfylle klassekampens krav, med fare for eget liv ved å utfordre grensene for forholdene i fengslene. De nekter å kapitulere og nøler ikke med å stå imot all slags press, tortur og isolasjon. Vi må mobilisere for å støtte fangenes legitime kamp og motstand, for å kjempe mot enhver form for aggresjon mot fangene, for å være fangenes stemme utenfor murene, må vi støtte deres kamp under soningsforholdene som en del av klassekampen.

DE KOMMUNISTISKE OG REVOLUSJONÆRE FANGENE ER VÅR ÆRE!

Å STØTTE DE KOMMUNISTISKE OG REVOLUSJONÆRE FANGENE, BETYR Å STØTTE DEN REVOLUSJONÆRE KAMPEN!

LA OSS GJØRE DE KOMMUNISTISKE OG REVOLUSJONÆRE FANGENES MOTSTAND OG KAMP TIL VÅR EGEN, LA OSS VÆRE FANGENES STEMME!

Internasjonalt Kommunistisk Forbund
Mars 2024


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pc 18 marzo - Il Soccorso Rosso Internazionale cosa fu e cosa dovrà tornare al essere (proletari comunisti)


Il Soccorso rosso internazionale, noto anche con la sigla MOPR dalla denominazione originale (in russo Международная организация помощи борцам революции?, "Soccorso rosso internazionale per i combattenti della rivoluzione"), fu un'organizzazione internazionale connessa all'Internazionale Comunista fondata nel 1922 L'organizzazione condusse alcune campagne di solidarietà sociale a sostegno dei prigionieri comunisti e di supporto materiale ed umanitario in situazioni particolari. Fu guidata da Clara Zetkin, Elena Stasova e Tina Modotti

Il Soccorso Rosso Internazionale dichiarò il 18 marzo 1923 nell'anniversario della Comune di Parigi  'Giornata Internazionale di solidarietà con i prigionieri politici'

Elenco delle emanazioni nazionali

Al 1924, l'organizzazione aveva emanazioni nazionali in 19 stati. Fra di esse si annoveravano:[1][5][7][8][9]

  • Austria: Soccorso rosso austriaco (Österreichische Rote Hilfe)
  • Gran Bretagna: Soccorso internazionale per i prigionieri della lotta di classe
  • Bulgaria: Organizzazione per il supporto alle vittime della dittatura capitalista
  • Francia: Soccorso rosso internazionale (Secours Rouge International)
  • Germania: Soccorso rosso della Germania (Rote Hilfe Deutschlands)
  • Italia: Soccorso Rosso Italiano
  • Messico: Lega per il sostegno ai combattenti perseguitati (Liga Pro Luchadores Perseguidos)
  • Paesi Bassi: Soccorso rosso d'Olanda (Roode Hulp Holland)
  • Norvegia: Soccorso rosso di Norvegia (Norges Roede Hjelp)
  • Polonia: Commissione per il sostegno ai prigionieri politici
  • URSS: Soccorso rosso internazionali per i combattenti della rivoluzione (Международная организация помощи борцам революции)
  • Spagna: Soccorso rosso internazionale (Socorro Rojo Internacional)
  • Svezia: Soccorso rosso internazionale - sezione svedese (Internationella röda hjälpen – svenska sektionen)
  • USA: Difesa internazionale del lavoro (International Labor Defense)

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pc 18 marzo - Taranto manifestazione sabato 23 marzo ore 18 Piazza immacolata (proletari comunisti)


IsraeleCriminale/PalestinaImmortale

cessate il fuoco - fermare massacri e genocidio - delegazione internazionale/contingente internazionalista alla Corte di Giustizia dell'Aja e nei territori occupati

via le truppe imperialiste italiane dal Mar Rosso / dalla parte dei ribelli Huthi

la Puglia non è zona di guerra NO al G7 nella nostra terra

info/contatti/adesioni wa 3519575628

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Luiz Inácio deveria se preocupar com os ‘generais legalistas’ - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


Em reunião ministerial, hoje, o mandatário do País, Luiz Inácio, disparou contra Jair Bolsonaro: “Se há três meses quando a gente falava em golpe parecia apenas insinuação, hoje nós temos certeza que esse país correu sério risco de ter um golpe em função das eleições de 2022. E não teve golpe não só porque algumas pessoas que estavam no comando das Forças Armadas não quiseram fazer, não aceitaram a ideia do presidente, mas também porque o presidente é um covardão. Ele não teve coragem de executar aquilo que planejou, ficou dentro de casa chorando quase que um mês e preferiu fugir para os EUA do que fazer o que tinha prometido, na expectativa de que fora do país o golpe poderia acontecer porque eles financiaram as pessoas na porta dos quarteis para tentar estimular o golpe”.

Embora seja exata a descrição que faz de Bolsonaro, Luiz Inácio claudica conscientemente no combate ao golpismo. Embora não economize nos impropérios aos altos mandos militares que atuaram abertamente pela ruptura institucional, a verdade é que Luiz Inácio apazigua, faz vista grossa e concilia com aqueles para quem as Forças Armadas devem ser fiadoras da “democracia” – e, portanto, fiadoras da sua restrição ou suspensão.

Vejamos o atual comandante, Tomás Ribeiro Paiva, tratado por Luiz Inácio como nobre figura democrática. Em 18 de janeiro de 2023, dez dias depois do fatídico 8 de janeiro – quando centenas de “galinhas verdes” promoveram invasão na Praça dos Três Poderes – o general foi flagrado fazendo uma “análise da situação política” em uma reunião com seus subordinados. Na época, Tomás era comandante militar do Sudeste.

Em sua exposição, o general inicia avaliando o resultado das eleições: “Infelizmente foi o resultado que, para a maioria de nós, foi indesejado, mas que aconteceu”. Tomás defende que, apesar disso, é preciso seguir a vida.

Mais adiante, referindo-se ao 8 de janeiro, disse: “Aqui as cenas deploráveis e lamentáveis. A gente deu ferramenta para o cara chamar de terrorista”. O “cara” era Alexandre de Moraes, eleito arquirrival pelo próprio Bolsonaro. “Isso aqui é vândalo, isso é maluco, é cara que entrou em espiral de fanatismo que não se sustenta. O que produziu? Nada. O cara cagou na cadeira do Supremo. O que isso muda? Muda porra nenhuma”. Indignado, o general prossegue: “Que coisa infantil, burra, eles [os ‘galinhas verdes’] entregaram um salvo-conduto enorme para uma narrativa que a gente está vendo que está sendo estabelecida agora”. Mais adiante, ele conclui: “No dia 8, a gente teve um evento inaceitável em qualquer circunstância. Vandalismo. Projetou a imagem negativa do Brasil no mundo e, do ponto de vista estratégico, fortalece o adversário. Aí deu problema”.

Como se vê, o general Tomás Paiva, que ganhou o notório título de general democrata por defender que política e quartel não devem se misturar, faz exatamente isso na sua palestra. Por que revelou sua tamanha frustração com o fato dos “galinhas verdes” terem desprestigiado a causa da intervenção militar, agora chamada de “terrorismo” por essa “enorme narrativa que está sendo estabelecida agora”? Isso não parece uma explícita posição política de um alto oficial da ativa – sendo crime segundo o Regulamento dos militares? E, afinal, quem é o adversário favorecido estrategicamente? Seria a esquerda – ou o que o general identifica como “esquerda”? Ora, mas o Exército não seria uma “instituição de Estado”, “apartidária”?

O atual comandante do Exército vai mais longe e se queixa daqueles que pretendiam que ocorresse uma intervenção militar naquele momento. “Impossível de fazer. A gente viu as consequências disso. Vocês viram a repercussão mundial. Imagina se a gente tivesse enveredado para uma aventura? A gente não sobreviveria como País; a moeda explodiria. A gente ia levar um bloqueio econômico jamais visto. Você ia ficar um pária, e o nosso povo ia sofrer as consequências. Ia ter sangue na rua. Ou você acha que o povo ia ficar em casa. Não ia acontecer. Mergulharíamos o País no caos”. Como se pode notar, o que move sua objeção não é a defesa da nobre causa da “democracia”, tão amada por Tomás Ribeiro Paiva, mas sim a falta de apoio internacional (o Departamento de Estado norte-americano pronunciara-se, em abril, que não aceitaria golpe e imporia sanções econômicas) e de justificativa perante a opinião pública interna, ou mais exatamente, medo de levantar a resistência revolucionária à intervenção militar total.

Resta perguntar: e se essas variáveis não existissem? Será que Tomás Ribeiro Paiva e seus pares “legalistas” considerariam absurda a hipótese de desfechar um golpe militar agora se as massas estivessem em sublevação e se tivesse anuência do Departamento de Estado norte-americano? Ou será que Tomás Ribeiro Paiva encenaria o papel de Castelo Branco, o general ultrarreacionário liberal que, numa semana, jurou lealdade ao governo de Jango e, na outra, encabeçou o primeiro governo militar em sequência ao golpe de 1964, que depois seria engolido pela extrema-direita?

Luiz Inácio, empenhado em polarizar eleitoralmente com Bolsonaro, está esquecendo de cuidar da própria retaguarda. Mais perigosos do que Bolsonaro, são os próprios generais do Alto Comando.


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SP: Servidores públicos de Caieiras mobilizam paralisação geral em defesa de salários - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


No dia 20 de março, servidores públicos do município de Caieiras realizarão uma paralisação geral contra a redução de salários que chega a até 20%. Os servidores mobilizados também realizarão uma manifestação até a prefeitura de Caieiras, exigindo melhorias para a categoria.

Com uma defasagem salarial de muitos anos, os servidores públicos de Caieiras no fim de fevereiro sofreram mais um ataque com a retirada da Gratificação por Qualificação, que garantia um acréscimo de 10% nos salários dos profissionais com nível técnico e 20% aos profissionais com nível superior. Em resposta aos ataques, os servidores públicos se mobilizam a fim de recuperar seus direitos.

Assim como em Caieiras servidores públicos de São Paulo também iniciaram sua jornada de luta contra os constantes ataques, em greve desde o dia 13/03, os servidores públicos já realizaram protestos em frente a prefeitura que reuniram milhares de trabalhadores. A tendência é que mais municípios se unifiquem em greves em defesa dos seus salários.


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Ponencia en el 153 aniversario de la Comuna de Paris. (Periódico Mural)


Ponencia en el 153 aniversario de la Comuna de Paris.1

La Comuna de París ha conquistado la inmortalidad como una de las páginas más gloriosas de la clase obrera internacional, siendo el primer ensayo de la revolución proletaria y de la toma del poder político del Estado.

El 18 de marzo de 1871, la clase obrera y los trabajadores de París tomaron las armas abandonadas por el ejército monárquico de Napoleón III, que recientemente había sido derrotado en la guerra franco-prusiana. El segundo imperio francés, baluarte de la reacción y el oscurantismo europeo, era entonces el eslabón más débil en la cadena de dominación de las clases opresoras en contra del proletariado. Aquí dejamos algunos apuntes generales que nos permiten entender el por qué.

  1. El segundo imperio francés se formó tras un golpe de Estado del ejército monárquico en medio de la crisis política francesa. Esto es importante pues nos habla de cómo el poder de la burguesía surgió en medio de restauraciones y contra-restauraciones en medio de dura lucha de clases entre monarquía y burguesía.
  2. El Estado monárquico-absolutista se encontraba cada vez en una más profunda crisis estructural en medio de sus derrotas militares y el desarrollo del capitalismo en Europa y los Estados Unidos.
  3. Dentro de estas derrotas militares, el pueblo de México puede contar con orgullo la ejemplar lucha de liberación nacional contra la segunda intervención francesa, ideada por Napoleón III quien buscaba fortalecer política y militarmente al autoproclamado “2° imperio mexicano” de Maximiliano de Habsburgo con el apoyo y el dinero de las monarquías europeas. La ejemplar defensa de los pueblos del Anáhuac peleando en columnas guerrilleras junto al ejército republicano de Juárez, Díaz, Zaragoza, el Coronel Máximo Pineda y otros destacados personajes de la historia nacional, lograron expulsar al invasor en junio de 1867 luego de grandiosas batallas como la del 5 de mayo de 1862 en Puebla y el 5 de septiembre de 1866 en Juchitán de Zaragoza, Oaxaca.
  4. La guerra franco-prusiana librada entre dos imperios monárquicos y guerreristas (Francia y Prusia, hoy Alemania) entre 19 de julio de 1870 y el 10 de mayo de 1871 profundizó la crisis del segundo imperio francés; la burguesía francesa tomó el poder y restauró la Tercera República al mando de Adolfo Thiers, quién continuó la guerra sin escuchar el sentir de los soldados surgidos mayoritariamente de las clases trabajadoras. El ejército francés fue derrotado por los alemanes en marzo de 1871.
  5. Este fue el llamado inequívoco que convocó al proletariado y los trabajadores parisinos a tomar en sus manos la antorcha de la revolución proletaria, expropiando las armas abandonadas por la Guardia Nacional francesa y reclutando para su causa a los hijos de la clase obrera vestidos con uniformes militares que aspiraban a la paz, el pan y la libertad.

Del 18 de marzo al 28 de mayo de 1871, la clase obrera y las masas trabajadoras tomaron el cielo por asalto y emprendieron el primer ensayo de la dictadura revolucionaria del proletariado: la Comuna de París. Durante 71 días la clase obrera en el poder llevó a cabo los más impresionantes cambios de la sociedad, estableciendo la igualdad de derechos entre el hombre y la mujer, tanto en lo económico como en lo político y social; se proscribieron el trabajo infantil y la prostitución, que además ya no tuvo mayor razón de ser al reconocerle y garantizarle plenos derechos a la mujer trabajadora. Se establecieron la jornada de 8 horas y comedores comunitarios para todos; se estableció la educación pública y gratuita; se decretó la anulación de las deudas y el pago de rentas que lastimaban a los trabajadores; se estableció el derecho universal a la vivienda; se decretó la separación de la iglesia y el Estado expropiándose la gran propiedad del clero y el latifundio formándose escuelas, bibliotecas y centros comunitarios en iglesias y edificios abandonados por las clases parasitarias; se disolvió el ejército reaccionario y la guardia nacional creándose sistemas de milicias populares; se expropiaron las fábricas, talleres y centros de trabajo abandonados o de patrones sanguinarios y se pusieron en manos directas del proletariado. Durante poco más de dos meses la clase obrera demostró que su marcha emancipadora no solamente es posible, sino también inevitable.

Aterrorizadas, las monarquías y la burguesía europeas entendieron que la Comuna de París encerraba en sí mismo el germen de la destrucción de la propiedad privada sobre los medios de producción. Algo en lo que coincidió incluso el imperio prusiano. Todos, sin excepción, prestaron ayuda económica y militar a la monarquía y la burguesía francesas para reorganizar un ejército blanco con tropas propias y prestadas para aplastar a la Comuna. Así lo hicieron, el 21 de mayo de 1871 comenzó la contraofensiva militar reaccionaria con más de 150 mil soldados mercenarios en contra de un proletariado orgulloso y desafiante, que prontamente erigió barricadas para pelar calle por calle.

Hombres, mujeres, niños, jóvenes y ancianos, el proletariado completo se alzó con heroicidad y bravura como un verdadero ejército rojo, devolviendo cada golpe y causando severas bajas en el ejército blanco hasta la última barricada que logró mantenerse de pie hasta el 28 de mayo de 1871. Se estima que el número de masacrados es alrededor de 30mil compañeros, muchos de cuyos nombres se han perdido en la historia. En su memoria, y rindiendo homenaje a 147 fusilados en dicho lugar, se construyó el muro de los comuneros en el Cementerio de Pere-Lachaise.

De la Comuna de París es importante recordar a los grandes héroes del proletariado, muchos de ellos miembros del gobierno obrero que fueron fusilados en el cementerio mientras gritaban ¡Viva la Comuna!

Hoy queremos destacar al compañero Eugene Pottier, obrero poeta, autor del más hermoso de los trabajos de la literatura titulado: La Internacional, la cual ha sido musicalizada por otro obrero, Pierre Degeyter, y se ha convertido en el himno de guerra del proletariado y los pueblos oprimidos alrededor del mundo.

El gran Lenin nos dice: “Esta canción ha sido traducida a todos los idiomas de Europa, y no sólo de Europa. Cualquiera sea el país en que se encuentre un obrero con conciencia de clase, cualquiera sea la suerte que el destino le depare, por mucho que pueda sentirse un extraño, sin idioma, sin amigos, lejos de su país natal, puede encontrar camaradas y amigos con el familiar estribillo de La Internacional”.

Los pueblos del México debemos saber con orgullo que nuestra grandiosa lucha de liberación nacional contra la segunda intervención francesa está ligada históricamente a la heroica lucha del proletariado francés, sirviendo como factor externo para su triunfo en marzo de 1871. El ejemplo de la Comuna de París también nos ha marcado como lo pudimos ver en la rebelión popular del 14 de junio al 25 de noviembre de 2006 con la heroica Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca y su Comuna, erigida precisamente en esta histórica plaza.2

La clase obrera y los pueblos del mundo debemos recordar la gran historia de la Comuna de Paris, debemos retomar su legado histórico tal como lo enseña el gran Federico Engels: “Se han llenado de terror al escuchar las palabras: Dictadura del Proletariado. ¿Quieren saber cómo es esta dictadura? Miren la Comuna de Paris. Eso fue la Dictadura del Proletariado”.

¡Viva el 153 aniversario de la Comuna de Paris!

Notas.

  1. Ponencia del Centro Cultural y de Estudios de la Ciencia para la Revolución Proletaria con motivo del 153 aniversario de la Comuna de París. Presentada en el plantón de la Jornada de Lucha en Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo, en Oaxaca, el 4 de marzo de 2023. ↩︎
  2. En referencia al zócalo de la Ciudad de Oaxaca, desde donde la APPO lanzó sus primeros bandos de gobierno, el primero de ellos decretando la desaparición de poderes (ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial), concentrando todos estos en el Consejo de la APPO. ↩︎

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AM: Liderança camponesa é presa após denunciar crimes do latifúndio - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


Em um processo claramente persecutório, o dirigente camponês Paulo Sérgio Costa de Araújo, uma das lideranças da Comunidade Marielle Franco foi preso no dia 5 de março, acusado de integrar uma “organização criminosa”, após denunciar torturas contra os camponeses e apontar ligações da polícia civil e militar com o latifundiário Sidnei Sanches Zamora que, segundo os camponeses, têm intensificado as investidas contra a terra que os trabalhadores residem.

Os camponeses da Comunidade, que residem no sul do Amazonas, afirmam que o conflito agrário tem se intensificado na região nos últimos meses, tendo sofrido diversos ataques de pistoleiros em conjunto com forças policiais civis e militares. A Comunidade abriga cerca de 200 famílias, que iniciaram a ocupação da área em 2015.

Após a última ofensiva do latifúndio, onde dirigentes da comunidade foram sequestrados e torturados, Paulo Sérgio teria denunciado para jornalistas não apenas a tortura e o sequestro, mas também que os camponeses teriam flagrado Zamora em um esquema de extração ilegal de madeira na região.

Acampamento Marielle Franco. Foto: Reprodução/Facebook.

Poucos dias após o covarde ataque, Paulo foi preso por determinação do juiz Danny Rodrigues Moraes, da 1ª Vara da Comarca de Lábrea, acusado de comandar uma “organização criminosa”. No texto da decisão judicial que levou à prisão do ativista, o juiz chegou a afirmar, para justificar o caráter de urgência da prisão que: “(…) Paulo não só se prepara para a invasão dos postos da fazenda, como também na possibilidade de que se haja uma eventual chacina contra os funcionários desta. (…) Paulo Sérgio é conhecido por ser ‘peitudo’, ‘ perigoso’ e que ‘teria coragem de mamar em onça e deixar os fatos [sic] com fome”.

Antes da prisão, entretanto, em entrevista para o portal Amazônia Real, o dirigente camponês afirma que Zamora teria grande influência dentre as autoridades locais: “Ele [Sidnei Zamora] tem uma área de 10.400 hectares só de pastagem, mas ele não quer abrir mão da área da mata. Lá, o fazendeiro tem um tráfico de influência muito grande com a polícia de Boca do Acre [município do Amazonas], com a polícia do Acre”, disse o ativista.

Sobre a comunidade construída pelos camponeses, o dirigente afirma: “Ele tem apoio das autoridades. E ele tem o maior ódio pelo nome da nossa comunidade ser Marielle Franco. Lá ele é o dono da situação. Para registrar uma queixa contra ele, ninguém consegue.”

Paulo Sérgio ainda complementa, reiterando o compromisso com a justa luta pela terra: “Aqui é uma cidade sem lei. Manda quem tem dinheiro, obedece quem não tem. Só que eu não tenho [dinheiro] e nem quero obedecer. Eu não vou obedecer a lei do terror”, afirma ele.

Segundo o advogado da CPT, Afonso Chagas, que acompanhou a audiência de custódia onde a prisão por tempo indeterminado foi mantida: “A gente vai preparado para tudo, inclusive para que, havendo uma negativa no tribunal, a gente recorra imediatamente ao Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ). O Paulo é preso por liderar uma organização criminosa, ou seja, criminaliza-se novamente o povo que luta pelo direito à terra, sendo que a terra é pública”, finaliza Afonso.

O superintendente do Incra no Amazonas, Denis da Silva Pereira, reitera que a área, de fato, é pertencente à União. Segundo ele, após um estudo cartográfico, o Incra identificou que a área, que conta com cerca de 48 mil hectares, está dentro da Gleba Novo Natal e é terra devoluta.

O latifundiário em questão, Zamora, que afirma ser dono da terra, nunca teria comprovado com nenhum título as autoridades em questão, mesmo sendo indagado várias vezes sobre a questão. O homem, de origem paulista, teria declarado ainda em 2010, possuir ao menos 3 fazendas na região do Acre e pelo menos 30 mil cabeças de gado, tendo inclusive composto uma comitiva de latifundiários que viajou à China a fim de aumentar a exportação da sua “carne verde/ecosustentável” para o país.


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AM: Brigadistas vendem jornais na UFAM - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


No dia 15/03, ativistas do Comitê de Apoio ao Jornal A Nova Democracia – Manaus, realizaram uma vitoriosa brigada, durante a qual venderam às massas estudantis a edição 254 do AND.

Durante as intervenções, os ativistas ressaltaram não apenas a defesa da heroica Resistência Nacional Palestina, mas também o papel de cúmplice que o monopólio de imprensa tem perante o genocídio em curso.

Os ativistas foram muito bem recebidos pelas massas, que ouviram com entusiasmo suas explicações. Os estudantes que não tinham condições de comprar a edição no momento fotografaram a capa do Jornal para que pudessem procurar na internet posteriormente.


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Los "ninis" y la necesidad de la organización revolucionaria de la juventud | Revolución Obrera (Revolucion Obrera)


Los "ninis" y la necesidad de la organización revolucionaria de la juventud 1

Los jóvenes, especialmente las mujeres, estamos siendo víctimas de una despectiva y estigmatizadora etiqueta: «los ninis» (jóvenes que ni estudian ni trabajan); con este remoquete se nos caracteriza de flojos, perezosos, vagos…

Esta narrativa que nos persigue y señala es uno de los tantos crímenes del capital y, a pesar de que no es nueva, hoy es más frecuente en las cenas familiares, en las redes sociales y en los medios de comunicación.

Al mismo tiempo, este es un tema del que los jóvenes no hablamos, por dos razones: pues no se comprende bien por qué fracasan nuestras aspiraciones en esta sociedad; y porque reconocer dicho fracaso no es fácil y resulta doloroso. La capacidad de entender por qué el capitalismo frustra nuestras aspiraciones la adquiriremos luego de superar el subjetivismo narcisista, que nos impide estudiar la realidad.

Según un estudio de la Universidad del Rosario «Aproximadamente 3 de cada 10 jóvenes colombianos entre 18 a 29 años se encuentran en el grupo de ninis» Este estudio también revela que en los departamentos donde abunda el desempleo, el subempleo y la guerra reaccionaria: Atlántico, Bolívar, Boyacá, Caldas, Caquetá, Casanare, Cauca, Cesar, Córdoba, Huila, Guajira, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño, Risaralda y Sucre el porcentaje de mujeres que no estudian ni trabajan llega a superar el 75 % respecto de los hombres; lo que agrava aún más su condición de sometimiento, y aumenta o crea mayores riesgos sobre sus vidas.

Entre las principales razones por las que los jóvenes no accedemos ni al trabajo formal ni a la educación, se encuentran: los bajos salarios, las precarias condiciones laborales, los contratos temporales o por horas, la pésima educación escolar que recibimos los más pobres hacinados en escuelas o colegios públicos, la ausencia o poca oferta de universidades e instituciones universitarias públicas, la carestía de los productos necesarios para sostener un estudiante, las enfermedades mentales que genera las crisis del capital, entre otros.

Y esto ocurre en todo el mundo, pero se exacerba en los países oprimidos como el nuestro, ya que el capital necesita de un ejército industrial de reserva, pues gracias a este ejército puede despedir trabajadores si estos se organizan o paran la producción, dado que cuentan con miles de manos dispuesta a tomar el lugar abandonado; sumado a esto, y es algo recurrente, puede ponernos a pelear por un mismo puesto, debilitando la fuerza de nuestra clase.

Además, dicho ejército de reserva puede vincularlo a las fuerzas armadas que están a su servicio o a las bandas criminales, fortaleciendo los negocios capitalistas e imperialistas que se benefician del narcotráfico.

Todas estas condiciones le dan oxígeno a la sobreproducción del capital, aumentan la opresión sobre nosotros, otorgándole a los imperialistas y a la burguesía nacional magnánimas ganancias sin la necesidad de hacer grandes inversiones en educación o desarrollo tecnológico; además, fomentando que los jóvenes que sí logran estudiar busquen migrar a otro país que les pueda garantizar un mejor estilo de vida, colocando al servicio del imperialismo su conocimiento y su fuerza de trabajo, construyendo la soga con la que oprimen a sus compañeros de clase.

Y esto es así, porque las causas modernas del desempleo en jóvenes tienen relación con la sobreproducción y la automatización del trabajo que desplaza fuerza de trabajo y desplaza hacia la miseria a los jóvenes de la clase obrera, ya que aumenta la intensidad de nuestro trabajo, y al mismo tiempo cierra puestos laborales.

Pero esto no quiere decir, en ningún sentido, que los avances tecnológicos sean los culpables; no, el problema principal radica en que dicha tecnología no está al servicio de nuestra clase, ni mucho menos —como dirían algunos nacionalistas— es por la vinculación al sector productivo de migrantes pobres, que desplaza la fuerza de trabajo local. No, estos migrantes son nuestros compañeros de clase y el enemigo es el capital que los usa contra nuestros intereses.

El imperialismo, en alianza con la burguesía colombiana, impone políticas que han convertido a nuestro país en un complejo industrial en el que solo se compra mano de obra barata, principalmente joven; en el que, en la división del trabajo internacional, es la producción de psicotrópicos, la extración de los recursos naturales, donde la educación solo busca el embrutecimiento y la sumisión, dejándonos pocas opciones. Todas estas políticas, solo benefician a la burguesía.

Pero ante este panorama ¿Qué hay que hacer? En primer lugar, es necesario que la juventud se piense la organización política como la base y el principio de la transformación de su realidad, pasar a la acción colectiva desde organizaciones juveniles revolucionarias, hasta la organización de Partido. Fundamental entonces para esto, es conocer en qué etapa se encuentra la revolución en Colombia, y esto empieza por aceptar que no existe un partido verdaderamente revolucionario que organice al pueblo en busca del poder popular, por lo cual los jóvenes que nos vemos afectados debemos sumarnos a los esfuerzos de la Unión Obrera Comunista (MLM) por la creación del partido revolucionario en Colombia.

En segundo lugar, comprender que la lucha armada no es la lucha de un pequeño grupo de hombres y mujeres que deciden efectuar pequeños golpes. No, es la lucha del pueblo en armas, dirigido por su partido. El partido manda a las armas, y los intereses de las masas vigilan, presionan, componen y financian al partido.

Y la lucha armada no es un capricho, responde a la conciencia de que la única forma posible de llegar a derrotar a nuestros enemigos es por medios no pacíficos. Por ello es imprescindible que los jóvenes empecemos a investigar seriamente el porqué del fracaso de las guerrillas de nuestro país, las experiencias del levantamiento popular de 2021 y el posterior rebalse de la lucha revolucionaria, y requiere sobre todo que estudiemos el Programa para la Revolución en Colombia, la Línea Militar para la Revolución en Colombia y la Línea de Masas de la Unión Obrera Comunista (mlm).

Debemos crear células y esas células deben ser disciplinadas en el estudio, que es el que guía la práctica, y la práctica es la que complementa el estudio. El tiempo es corto y se necesita de las más fuertes, hábiles y grandes mentes de nuestra clase para profundizar en los aciertos y corregir los errores.

Los jóvenes debemos organizar la revolución, y eso solo se logra concentrando todas las fuerzas en contra de los principales enemigos del pueblo, aprendiendo de la revolución junto a las masas, comprobando al calor de la lucha quién sí nos acompaña en este duro y justo camino de la transformación de la sociedad y la construcción de un mañana nuevo.

¡Compañeros jóvenes a impulsar la crítica en las asambleas, a impulsar verdaderas asambleas populares, a construir nuestro Partido!
¡El comunismo no es un fantasma, está vivo y está luchando por la construcción del partido! ¡Jóvenes apuntar a la revolución empieza por crear el partido!

Jóvenes Unionistas


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Video: Konfrontasjonen av sionistene på 8. mars (Tjen Folket)


Av en kommentator for Tjen Folket Media.


Vi gjengir her en video fra 8. mars i Oslo i år, delt av Kampkomiteen, fra massenes konfrontasjon og blokkade mot en gruppe sionistiske provokatører.


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El 8M en Bogotá sí tuvo un componente rojo | Revolución Obrera (Revolucion Obrera)


Aunque a primera vista la marcha del Dia Internacional de la Mujer pareciera estar dominada por el feminismo burgués, es necesario y muy importante mencionar que una parte de la movilización del 8M en Bogotá contó con la presencia de un factor diferenciador. No se puede negar la combatividad y beligerancia, la actitud desafiante en sus voces y la numerosa asistencia de las mujeres que salieron a marchar desde el Ministerio de Trabajo hasta la Plaza de Bolívar, sin embargo, tampoco se pueden negar las limitaciones que a este movimiento le impone el feminismo burgués.

Galería de fotos:

Durante la marcha de 8 de Marzo en Bogotá, se pudo ver un pequeño pero significativo Bloque de mujeres y hombres manifestándose con un carácter combativo y revolucionario, en el cual también participaron activistas de Revolución Obrera. Con consignas que van más allá de las justas reivindicaciones en general contra el patriarcado, contra la violencia, los feminicidios, el abuso, más allá de las demandas de igualdad y de algunos coros contra los hombres; el discurso de este Bloque recordó que el sistema capitalista es el causante de la opresión a la mujer e hizo el llamado a que las reivindicaciones de las mujeres debían apuntar contra la doble explotación que sufren las obreras, la libertad económica, el reconocimiento de su labor también en el hogar, la participación política de la mujer de manera independiente y sobre todo por la organización de su lucha en un Movimiento Femenino Revolucionario.

Desde el bloque independiente convocado por activistas del Movimiento Femenino Revolucionario (MFR) se recordó que la mujer para su emancipación debe marchar bajo la roja bandera del proletariado, que las mujeres proletarias están dispuestas a seguir en la lucha organizada, se recordó la memoria de las mujeres palestinas asesinadas por el sionismo y el imperialismo, así como la de importantes revolucionarias como Betsabé Espinal y Clara Zetkin, entre otras. Al mismo tiempo entregó una cantidad considerable de propaganda escrita, casi la única que se vio en la marcha, en la que se incluye la Plataforma de Lucha del MFR, como propuesta de base de unidad para la organización de los Comités de Mujeres.

Otro de los elementos que resaltaron de este Bloque, fue la participación de hombres; los hombres que comparten en la práctica la lucha de la mujer desde su posición de esposos, hijos, padres, parejas, compañeros de lucha y principalmente, como sus hermanos de clase. Esta participación, hasta ahora vetada por el feminismo, también resalta la importancia de que la lucha debe ser codo a codo entre hombres y mujeres, al tiempo que demarca una nueva tendencia en estas movilizaciones.

Sin duda, la participación de este rojo componente en la marcha de la ciudad, es un gran avance en la construcción de otro tipo de movimiento femenino y demuestra la necesidad de una dirección revolucionaria para este. El llamado es a conformar Comités de Mujeres en todas las regiones y en todos los sectores, la bandera de la emancipación de la mujer debe ser levantada y dirigida por el movimiento obrero, recordando que es precisamente en este movimiento donde tiene los orígenes esta conmemoración. Así que, se plantea esta tarea a las mujeres proletarias, pero también a las estudiantes, a las campesinas y a todas las mujeres de los sectores populares.

Saludamos desde aquí a esas mujeres obreras que acogieron el llamado y se dispusieron a organizar la participación en la marcha y las motivamos a continuar este trabajo, porque sabemos que muy pronto, este embrión del nuevo Movimiento Femenino Revolucionario demostrado en Bogotá, crecerá en las principales ciudades y pueblos del país, podremos ver bloques rojos en todas las marchas y tanto las consignas, como las banderas se tornarán en un rojo caudal de miles de mujeres por su emancipación de la opresión y explotación del capital y contra el capitalismo imperialista.

Un reportero distribuidor de Bogotá


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El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París | Revolución Obrera (Revolucion Obrera)


La Comuna de París proclamada el 18 de marzo de 1871, representa un capítulo significativo en la historia del movimiento obrero. Fue el primer ensayo social del proletariado revolucionario para tomar el poder político, desatando una guerra civil contra los explotadores, instaurando una forma embrionaria de democracia obrera directa. No solo fue una acción revolucionaria significativa en sí misma, sino que también proporcionó un modelo práctico para el futuro de la lucha proletaria.

El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París 1

El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París 2

Este gobierno emergió espontáneamente durante la guerra franco-prusiana, como una respuesta al descontento general contra la burguesía, que había desencadenado la guerra y ejercido una defensa mediocre de la patria. La Comuna fue elegida el 26 de marzo y proclamada dos días después, implementando políticas para atender las necesidades inmediatas de las masas laboriosas y disolviendo el viejo Estado de los explotadores.

Las medidas adoptadas por la Comuna incluyeron la abolición del ejército permanente y la policía, la elección democrática y revocable de los funcionarios con salarios de obrero, y la separación de la iglesia y el Estado. Estos actos demostraron cómo las masas resolvían en la práctica el problema de la dictadura del proletariado, una dictadura para las clases opresoras, con el ejercicio democrático de las masas explotadas y oprimidas.

El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París 3

El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París 4

El Estado tipo Comuna se caracteriza por ser un nuevo tipo de Estado que niega al Estado burgués. Su poder proviene de la iniciativa directa de las masas desde abajo, sustituyendo las instituciones represivas por el armamento general del pueblo y reemplazando la burocracia por funcionarios elegibles y removibles. Sirve al proletariado como clase dominante para ejercer su dictadura sobre los antiguos opresores y explotadores, pero al mismo tiempo, es el comienzo de la negación de todo Estado.

Las mujeres, desde el inicio de la revolución el 18 de marzo, fueron fundamentales en la defensa de la ciudad, enfrentando a las tropas del gobierno y demostrando su firmeza no solo en las labores de apoyo, sino con las armas en las barricadas; sobre todo durante la última semana. Las mujeres de La Comuna no se limitaron a un “movimiento feminista” tradicional, sino que se involucraron activamente como obreras y esto se pudo ver en la organización de Comités, Clubes, cooperativas, como la Unión de Mujeres para la Defensa de París fundada por Louise Michel.

El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París 5

El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París 6

La derrota militar de la Comuna se produjo gracias a la alianza de las fuerzas prusianas que ayudaron a cercar la ciudad y las fuerzas de Thiers que fueron nutridas por la liberación de los prisioneros en manos de Prusia, derrota ayudada por la ingenua benevolencia de los dirigentes obreros que no tomaron las medidas rápidas y urgentes para “expropiar a los expropiadores” como lo fue el Banco de Francia, medidas que dieron el tiempo necesario y los recursos para que la reacción se levantara y uniera internacionalmente.

A pesar de su caída el 28 de mayo de 1871, la Comuna de París dejó enseñanzas históricas que aún orientan la praxis de los destacamentos revolucionarios de la clase obrera y sus auténticos partidos. Las lecciones de la Comuna son de estudio obligatorio y su comprensión y aplicación es decisiva para los comunistas en el mundo, especialmente tras las experiencias de la dictadura del proletariado en Rusia y China y su temporal derrota.

El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París 7
El legado revolucionario de La Comuna de París 8

“¡La Comuna ha muerto! ¡Viva la Comuna! La clase obrera no esperaba de la Comuna ningún milagro. Los obreros no tienen ninguna utopía lista parar implantarla par recret du peuple (por decreto del pueblo). Saben que, para conquistar su propia emancipación, y con ella esa forma superior de vida a la que tiende irremisiblemente la sociedad actual por su propio desarrollo económico, tendrán que pasar por largas luchas, por toda una serie de procesos históricos, que transformarán completamente las circunstancias y los hombres. Ellos no tienen que realizar ningunos ideales, sino simplemente dar rienda suelta a los elementos de la nueva sociedad que la vieja sociedad burguesa agonizante lleva en su seno.”

Karl Marx

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YDG’den İstanbul Yenikapı Newrozu’nda yaşananlara ilişkin değerlendirme (kaypakkaya partizan)


 

Açıklamada Filistin bayraklarına dönük yapılanlara, YDG’nin ve Mücadele Birliği’nin flamalarına ve özellikle de lubunyalara dönük açığa çıkan nefret saldırılarına değinen YDG, “Yenikapı’da gerçekleştirilen İstanbul Newrozu’nda açığa çıkanlar, yaşananlar ve doğrudan yaşadıklarımız üzerine bir tavır belirlemek, gerekli eleştirileri yapmak ve özeleştirel bir tutum takınmak olayların boyutu itibariyle bir zorunluluktur” dedi.

YDG’nin “İstanbul Yenikapı Newrozu’nda Yaşananlara İlişkin Değerlendirmemiz” başlıklı açıklamasının devamı şöyle:

‘Coşku ve umut dolu gün gerçekleştirilen provokasyonlarla gölgelenmek istendi’

“Filistin bayraklarına dönük yapılanlardan, kurumumuzun ve Mücadele Birliği’nin flamalarına ve özellikle de lubunyalara dönük açığa çıkan nefret saldırılarına kadar önemli bir dizi konuyu etraflıca tartışmak gerekmektedir. Bunların hepsini meseleleri yerli yerine oturtarak özetle yapmaya çalışacağız.

LGBTİ+’lara dönük nefret saldırılarıyla başlayan ve neredeyse miting bitene kadar arkası kesilmeyen bu sürece ilişkin Newroz Tertip Komitesi’nin açıklaması da dahil şu ana kadar yapılan açıklamaların tamamı yetersiz ve her kurumun sadece kendi durduğu yerden ve kendi yaşadıklarıyla sınırlı, kendi sorumluluklarını görmeyen bir içeriğe sahiptir. Konu, miting içerisinde ciddi düzeyde küçük bir azınlık olan, kendilerine Nasyonal Kürtler diyen grubun provokasyonlarına indirgenmektedir. Ancak sorun bu grubun gittikleri her yerde sonsuz provokasyon çabalarına girişmiş olmalarına rağmen ideolojik ve pratik olarak bundan çok daha köklüdür.

Geçtiğimiz yıllara göre en geniş katılım ve coşkuyla geçen ezilenlerin direniş günü Newroz, bu özü itibariyle sistemin doğrudan ve dolaylı saldırılarının hedefi olmuştur. Bu coşkun ve umut dolu olan gün, gerçekleştirilen provokasyonlarla gölgelenmek istenmiştir.

‘Yetersizlik hepimizin içinde tarihsel bir yara açtı’

Miting alanında açığa çıkan saldırganlık LGBTİ+’ların alanda gökkuşağı ve trans bayrakları açmasıyla Nasyonal Kürt’ler LGBTİ+’lara dönük nefret saldırılarını başlatmış ve bu saldırılar miting içerisinde bu gruptan bağımsız birçok Kürt gencini içerisine alarak, suçuna ortak ederek büyümüştür. Saldırılar başlar başlamaz, Tertip Komitesi’nden az sayıda görevli, YDG, Partizan, SMF, Halkevleri, BDSP, EKA, Aralık Feminist Kolektif faaliyetçileri ve gencinden yaşlısına yüzlerce yurtsever Kürt, sahiplenici bir tavır geliştirerek LGBTİ+’lar ile saldırgan gruplar arasına geçmiş ve saldırıyı engellemeye çalışmıştır. Fakat, süreç boyunca yüzlerce insanın saldırgan gruplara karşı barikat olması, LGBTİ+’ları alanda güvenli bir şekilde tutmaya yetmemiş, psikolojik ve fiziki saldırıları sonlandıramamıştır. Nitekim LGBTİ+’ların kendi Newroz alanlarını bu şekilde terk etmek zorunda kalışı, LGBTİ+’ları savunanların bu denli çaresiz ve yetersizliği hepimizin içinde tarihsel bir yara açmıştır.

‘Tertip Komitesi’nin ve yurtsever hareketin geçiştirmeci yaklaşımı’

Tertip Komitesi’nin ve yurtsever hareketin açığa çıkan nefret saldırılarına karşın sorunu örgütlü ele almayışı ve olabildiğince sessizce geçiştirmeci yaklaşımı, bu saldırıların engellenememiş olmasının, güvenli bir alan yaratılamamasının kaynağıdır.

LGBTİ’+lara dönük nefret tutumu bir yanda devam ederken, miting alanındaki birçok noktada Filistin bayrakları taşıyanlar küçük küçük grupların tehditvari söylemleri ile karşılaşmış, Filistin bayrakları indirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu kaotik ve gergin ortam içerisinde Mücadele Birliği’nin Türkiye devrimci hareketi önderlerinden Deniz Gezmiş’in resminin olduğu flamaları güya Kemalizm düşmanlığı üzerinden yakılmış ve aynı ateş üzerine sözde davaları “Kürtlük” olan bu Türk devlet işbirlikçisi grup tarafından trans ve gökkuşağı bayrakları ile yan yana taşıdığımız için üzerinde Kürtçe ismimizin de yazılı olduğu flamamız kaçırılarak atılmıştır.

‘İşbirlikçi grup provokasyonların sorumlusu’

İcraatlarıyla, işbirlikçi tutumlarıyla kendilerine Nasyonal Kürtler yakıştırması yapan ama gericiliklerinin niteliği ve içinde bulundukları bölge itibariyle kendilerine İttihatçı Kürtler demeleri gereken bu sözde M. Kemal karşıtı KDP çizgisindeki işbirlikçi grup devlet tarafından örgütlendiği açık olan provokasyonların sorumlusudur. Bu provokasyonlar içerisinde fiili olarak bizzat yer alanlar hesap soracaklarımız arasındadır, ancak onların an itibariyle beklemeleri gereken bir sıra bulunmaktadır. Öfkemiz, kinimiz, ellerimiz ve gözlerimiz bu düşmanca saldırıları da örgütleyen birincil düşmanımız üzerinedir. Türk hakim sınıflarından köklü bir şekilde hesap sorana kadar halka karşı düşmanlık yapan her diğer oluşum sırasını beklemek zorundadır, bu sırayı değiştirmek bu işbirlikçi grupların kendi faaliyetlerine bağlıdır.

Türk devleti egemenliğinin olduğu her yerde ve devrimci mücadeleyi bitirmeyi amaçladığı her karış coğrafyada Kürt’ü Kürde, göçmeni yerliye, birini ötekine yani özetle ezileni başka bir ezilene kırdırmak için elinden geleni yapmaktadır. Irak Kürdistanı’nda Kürt Ulusal Özgürlük Hareketi’ne dönük saldırılara KDP olabildiğince ortak edilmeye, işbirlikçi çizgisi derinleştirilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Aynı bölücü politikalar coğrafyamızda da hayata geçirilmek istenmektedir. Bu nedenle saldırıyı gerçekleştirenin kimliğinden daha çok ve önce, saldırıyı gerçekleştirme zemini bulduğu çelişkiler ve ideolojik konular üzerine gitmeli ve doğru çizgiyi yakalayabilmeliyiz. Aksi durumda bugün Nasyonal Kürtler olarak kendisini gösteren bu işbirlikçi grup yarın alanlara sokulmadığında, kabuk değiştirerek Hilafetçi Kürtler ya da Gamalı Kürtler olarak yeniden alanlarda boy göstermeyeceğinin hiçbir garantisi yoktur. Bu nedenle işbirlikçi düşman çizgisi ile fiziki hesap sorma temelinde mücadele etmeden çok daha önce bu provokasyoncu çizginin zemin bulduğu LGBTİ+’lar ve Filistin bayrakları üzerinden yükselmesinin nedenlerine yönelmeliyiz. Bu saldırıların buradan büyütülmesinin ve ateşlenmesi boşuna değildir.

‘Özeleştirisini pratikte vermeye çalıştığımız, veremediğimiz ama vereceğimiz bir sorunumuz’

Yıllardır platform, eylem birliktelikleri ve benzeri kurumlarda LGBTİ+’ların kurumsallaşmasının önüne bizzat Kürt Ulusal Özgürlük Hareketi tarafından geçilirse, ortak açıklamalarımızda bayraklarının indirilmesi söz konusu edilirse, tüzüklerden isimleri çıkartılırsa ve kitle ilerletilmek yerine toplumun gerici, azınlık ama baskın ve saldırgan olan yanıyla uzlaşılırsa üç – beş işbirlikçi büyük bir kitleyi nefret saldırısında suç ortağı yapabilir. Bizim açımızdan ise LGBTİ+’ların örgütlenebileceği yeterli güvenli alanları kurumlarımızda oluşturmayarak, soruna dokunan istikrarlı politikalar üretmeme durumuyla LGBTİ+’ların büyük ölçüde içimizde örgütlenebileceği bir yer olamayarak, sorunu kitleler içerisinde derinlemesine bir eğitim konusu yapmayarak suçun bir parçası oluyoruz. Bu bizim özeleştirisini pratik olarak vermeye çalıştığımız, veremediğimiz ama vereceğimiz bir sorunumuzdur. Filistin direnişi için de durum farklı yanlarıyla beraber ortak bir zemin üzerine yükselir: geri olanla uzlaşmak.

‘Her toplumsal özneyle büyümek, örgütlenme olanaklarını yaratmak zorundayız’

Burada seçilmesi gereken şey basitçe alanlar yaratıp yaratmamak değildir, geleceği her yerde bugünün direniş çizgisini yükseltenler örüyor. LGBTİ+’lar varlığını, kimliğini gümbür gümbür kabul ettirmek için mücadeleyi yükseltiyor, ve gelecek kaçınılmaz olarak bunun kabulüyle sonuçlanacaktır, herkes kendisini ona uyum sağlayarak yenilemek zorunda kalacaktır. Şimdi sorun gelecek olandan, hakim sisteme, onun statükosu ve yapı taşlarına karşı mücadele edenden yana olup onla büyüyüp, yenilenip yenilenmeme sorunudur. Türkiye devrimci hareketinin ve özelde de örgütümüzün tarihi geçmişiyle tutucu bir şekilde aynı ezber yerlere basanların yaşadığı tıkanmayı aşamayarak gerilemesinin örnekleriyle doludur. İlerlemek ve amaçlarımızı gerçekleştirmek istiyorsak, direnişle buluşan her toplumsal özneyle büyümek, örgütlenme olanaklarını yaratmak zorundayız.

Geri olanla uzlaşmak, Yenikapı Newrozu örneğinde de olduğu gibi provokasyon saldırılarına, saldırıların önünün alınamayacağı kadar büyük kitlesel bir zemin sunmaktadır. İş bu noktaya geldiğinde, Türk devletinin bizzat o noktada olmasına gerek bile kalmamaktadır.

Tüm bunlara ve saldırıların engellenmemiş olmasına karşın, provokasyoncuların gittikleri her yerde tüm örgütsüzlüğü ile kitlenin kendiliğinden tepkisiyle karşılaşmaları, sisteme karşı mücadelenin ortak zeminlerinin ne derece güçlü olduğunu, kitlenin doğru olan ile yakınlaşma eğiliminin ne denli büyük olduğunun göstergesidir. Yönümüzü dönmemiz gereken yer ve umut buradadır.

‘Kürt Ulusal Özgürlük Hareketi’ni ve Tertip Komitesi’ni daha tutarlı bir özeleştiri vermeye davet ediyoruz’

Bu Newroz’da ne yazık ki provokasyon saldırılarını engellemeyi başaramadık, fakat devletin bu konuda durmayacağının farkında olur, ve basitçe şiddetle hesap sormanın ötesinde, ideolojik mücadeleyi, kendimizi ve kitleleri olası çelişkiler üzerinden eğitmeyi ve ilerletmeyi başarabildiğimiz sürece biçimleri ne olursa olsun provokasyonları bir girişimle sonuçlanacaktır. Aksi halde, sayıları gerçek anlamda çok çok az olan yeminli işbirlikçilerin suçlarına alet olan kitleler, içerisinde bulundukları yanlış yoldan çekilemezler. İdeolojik, politik ilerlemeden bağımsız olarak sadece şiddet ve olay yaşandığı sıradaki engelleme girişimleri provokasyoncu çizgi sahiplerinin sıkılaşmasına, birbirine kenetlenmesine vesile olur. Bu nedenle yanlış yolu inşa eden ile bu yola yanlışlıkla gireni birbirinden ayırabilmek için uzun süreli ve çok yönlü ideolojik bir mücadeleyi önümüze koymamız gerekir, diğer mücadele araçları buna eklemlenmelidir.

Tüm bu noktalarda kendi üzerimize düşen sorumluluklar bakımından özeleştirimizi veriyor, başta LGBTİ+’lar olmak üzere saldırının hedefi haline gelen her kesimin her alanda yanında olmayı sürdüreceğimizi ifade ederek, Kürt Ulusal Özgürlük Hareketi’ni ve Tertip Komitesi’ni kendi sorumlulukları itibariyle daha tutarlı bir özeleştiri vermeye davet ediyoruz.”


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Wehrkunde 2.0 – Militarisierung der Schulen (Dem Volke Dienen)


Bundesbildungsministerin Bettina Stark-Watzinger sieht die Schulen in Deutschland in der Verantwortung, junge Menschen auch auf den Kriegsfall vorzubereiten. „Die Gesellschaft muss sich insgesamt gut auf Krisen vorbereiten - von einer Pandemie über Naturkatastrophen bis zum Krieg“, postulierte die FDP-Politikerin über die Funke-Mediengruppe. „Zivilschutz ist immens wichtig, er gehört auch in die Schulen. Ziel muss sein, unsere Widerstandsfähigkeit zu stärken.“

 

Selbst die Jüngsten sollen nun nach dem Willen der Regierung sowohl einem paramilitärischen Feindkunde-Unterricht unterworfen werden und entsprechende Abwehrmaßnahmen geschult bekommen. „Die Bedrohungen der Freiheit kennen und mit den Gefahren umgehen“ wird dies im modernen liberalen Politiker-Deutsch heute genannt. Das soll nach dem Willen von Stark-Watzinger noch kein eigenes Schulfach, wohl aber Lerninhalt werden.

 

Was das genau für die Schulen bedeutet bleibt zunächst unklar, denn eigentlich ist der Schulunterricht keine Sache des Bundes, sondern der Länder. Allerdings sind die Vorstöße hin zu mehr Zentralisierung, das heißt mehr Macht und Befugnisse für den Bund, weniger für die Länder, in allen möglichen Aspekten deutlich. Der Föderalismus an sich ist nämlich ein Hindernis für den deutschen Imperialismus in seinem Streben sich zu einer Supermacht zu entwickeln, auferlegt von den westlichen Alliierten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.

 

Doch auch in den Ländern ist man an dieser Front nicht untätig. So plant die bayrische Staatsregierung bereits, den Schulbesuch von Jugendoffizieren im Rahmen einer Gesetzesänderung verbindlich zu gestalten. Vereinfacht sollen die speziell dafür geschulten deutschen Soldaten künftig im Unterricht Aufgaben der politischen Bildung übernehmen und zum Beispiel erklären, welche Aufgaben der Bundeswehr zukommen. Ganz besonders wichtig wird dabei hervorgehoben, dass dies mit Anwerben nichts zu tun haben, denn dafür seien die Karriereberater der Bundeswehr und nicht die Jugendoffiziere zuständig.

 

Auch die ehemalige Staatssekretärin für Integration in NRW und heutige Bundestagsabgeordnete Serap Güler von der CDU lässt die Fanfaren erklingen. Sie hat mit ihrer Fraktionskollegin Kerstin Vieregge ein sogenanntes Konzeptpapier zur Bundeswehr vorgelegt. Darin werden von den beiden Unionspolitikerinnen verpflichtende Schulbesuche von Jugendoffizieren ab der 9. Klasse gefordert. Aber nicht nur das. Außerdem solle jeder Schüler einmal in seiner Schulzeit eine Kaserne von innen gesehen haben.

 

Die NRW-FDP wünscht sich ebenfalls, dass die Jugendoffiziere viel häufiger an Schulen die trommel rühren. Für den stellvertretenden Vorsitzenden der Landtagsfraktion, Marc Lürbke, ist dabei lediglich die Frage, ob dies mit Zwang oder „freiwillig“ geschehe. Lürbke wird im Gegensatz zu seinen Kollegen allerdings in einem anderen Aspekt deutlich: In jedem Fall müsse die Bundeswehr neben der Teilnahme am Unterricht auch mehr Möglichkeiten bekommen für sich zu werben.

 

Lehrergewerkschaften und auch Schülervertretungen stellen sich im Allgemeinen noch relativ entschlossen gegen den Vorstoß zur Militarisierung der Schulen, allerdings hatte der Deutsche Lehrerverband unmittelbar nach den Veröffentlichungen der Pläne der Bundesbildungsministerin explizit für eine Einbeziehung der Bundeswehr in den Schulunterricht plädiert.

 

„Der Ukraine-Krieg schafft ein neues Bewusstsein für militärische Bedrohung, das auch an Schulen vermittelt werden muss“, behauptete Verbandspräsident Stefan Düll. „Ich erwarte von der Bundesministerin, dass sie jetzt das Gespräch mit den Bildungsministern in den Bundesländern sucht. Eine Absichtserklärung reicht nicht, jetzt muss im Politik-Unterricht zum Ukraine-Krieg und zur gesamteuropäischen, ja globalen Bedrohungslage gelehrt werden.“ Eine klare Ansage, nicht nur für eine Wehrkunde 2.0, sondern unverhohlene konkrete Vorbereitungen auf einen erneuten Fall Barbarossa.

 

Dies alles geschieht natürlich auch in dem Lichte, dass die Zahl der Zeit- und Berufssoldaten, sowie freiwillig Wehrdienstleistenden sinkt. Aktuell gibt es rund 180.000 aktive deutsche Soldaten, bis zum Jahr 2031 sollen es deutlich über 200.000 sein. Aber die Nachwuchswerbung der deutschen Armee kommt offenbar nicht voran.


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CASR: 18th of March – Public Gathering on Political Prisoners and Wrongful Incarceration – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


We publish a press release we have received.

Press Release

Campaign Against State Repression (CASR) Press Conference cum Public Gathering on Political Prisoners and Wrongful Incarceration of Hem Mishra, GN Saibaba, Pandu Narote Prashant Rahi, Mahesh and Vijay Tirki

On 18th March 2024, Campaign Against State Repression (CASR), a joint platform of 35+ organizations celebrated the ‘International Day of Solidarity with Political Prisoners’ by holding a public gathering cum press conference titled “Life in Anda Cell: Political Prisoners and Wrongful Incarcerations” at Press Club of India, Delhi. The event was to mark the acquital and prison experience of cultural activist Hem Mishra and his family, after the Bombay High Court’s verdict cleared him of all charges along with Delhi University professor Dr. GN Saibaba, journalist Prashant Rahi, Adivasi activists Vijay Tirki, Mahesh Tirki and Pandu Narote. The event started with 2 minutes of silence for Pandu Narote who died in prison due to neglect of his medical conditions by the authorities at the young age of 33.

From Delhi University’s department of political science and member of Forum Against Corporatization and Militarization (FACAM), Dr. Saroj Giri started the conference by pointing out how the arrests and imprisonment of political prisoners like Hem Mishra is not a matter of legal victories or individual political parties. Instead, Giri believes that it is because Hem Mishra raised the issues of corporate loot of natural resources, displacement of Adivasis, caste-based oppression and the exploitation of workers and peasants, that he was imprisoned. Saroj Giri said, “the electoral bonds case has exposed that all parties trying to maintain the facade of electoral democracy are allies in using the labour of workers and the resources of Chhattisgarh as ATMs for their class rule. Voices like Hem Mishra who opposed this were silenced.”

Hem Mishra’s father, Mr. K.D. Mishra spoke next, discussing the experience of Hem’s family during the ordeal of his false incarcerations. He discussed how legal procedures were violated when his son was abducted by the police and how his disability was ignored. He discussed how his son was always interested in fighting for the interests of the people. He said, “my son has a disability that restricts the usage of his hand. We made a lot of effort to get it treated when he was young but in jail, even getting him medicine was difficult. All we heard was that our son was a Naxalite, a Maoist which supposedly made him worse than any other criminal. My wife said he was fighting for the interests of the people and was fighting for a noble cause but it took a long time for me to accept it.”

St. Stephen’s College, DU professor and ex-Delhi University Teachers Union (DUTA) President Dr. Nandita Narain brought up how even those who defended the interests of political prisoners, like Prof. Hany Babu who was a member of the Committee for the Defense and Release of G.N. Saibaba and Rona Wilson of the Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners (CRPP) who both find themselves in prison under the charges of being associated with the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist) under the fabricated Bhima Koregaon-Elgaar Parisha case. She also argued that merely carrying Maoist literature and raising the demand for Jal-Jangal-Jameen (Our Water, Our Forest, Our Land) does not make one liable for arrest under UAPA. She said, “we are students, scholars, educators. Reading and carrying Maoist literature is no crime but our right, for we must study all thoughts, ideologies and philosophies and come to our understanding.”

Cultural activist Hem Mishra, who was incarcerated for 10 years under the charges of being a “Maoist courier” spoke next. He said, “I wanted to visit an activist working on Adivasis issues to understand the issues on ground, beyond my understanding as a student. This dream cost me 10 years.” He said, “what they claimed as Maoist literature was study material for my Junior Research Fellowship exam and the publicly-circulated Outlook magazine. The police grabbed me in plain clothes and tortured me for 3 days, letting nobody know of my whereabouts as they kept asking me to identify various people as Maoists.” “People keep asking me, do you still have faith in the justice system? I want them to ask the judges, how can they wrongfully keep a student in prison for 10 years studying in a premier university and still claim to dispense justice,” he implored. Even his lawyers were not spared, with their offices being raided by the police too and the former lawyer on his case, Surendra Gadling of the Indian Association for People’s Lawyers (IAPL), himself being arrested under the charges of being a Maoist!

Hem Mishra talked further of how he was continuously moved from one jail to another, making lawyers inaccessible to him and draining his family of its limited finances by forcing them to find new lawyers in different jurisdictions. Inside the closed anda cell’s spartan conditions where political prisoners are often kept in isolation, even the jail staff appealed to the police authorities and judges to remove Hem out of the anda cell but it fell upon deaf ears. He discussed how the plight in prison compelled him to lead a hunger strike against the brutal conditions for all prisoners and the pending court dates. “The government claims that prisoners have the right to meet their families and loved ones, for this they have set up an ‘e-mulaqaat’ video conferencing system. But political prisoners were continually denied it. I lived on my books and reading material in prison, which they would randomly seize anytime any issue happened in the prison. It is against this that we went on a hunger strike. So many of my fellow inmates died without medical treatment, like Pandu Narote. It is against this apathy that we went on strike.” He concluded his discussion by saying, “it is not about just the 6 of us in my case. It is about all political prisoners. As long as the fight for jal-jangal-jameen remains, as long as the fight of Dalits, Adivasis, workers, peasants, oppressed nationalities remains, as long as the question of creating a better world for all people and a better state for all people remains, the fight of all political prisoners will rage on. At the end of the day, I am a bard who sings the songs of the people and I will continue to echo their cries. I am out of prison, but as long as all other political prisoners like Rona Wilson, Surendra Gadling, Sudhir Dhawale are inside prison, I feel I am only out from a smaller cage into a bigger one.”

Hem’s mother spoke next, tearfully bringing up her ordeal during his incarceration. She said, “we are people of the Himalayas. We did not come here to have our son be labeled a terrorist and an enemy of the state. I am only happy that the decade of harassment has ended.”

Veteran lawyer and activist Prashant Bhushan addressed the press next, highlighting how agencies like the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Enforcement Directorate (ED) have been given extra-legal impunity under the current government to criminally loot the country and file fabricated cases against activists who fight against all this. “Political prisoners are stuck in this situation due to the draconian UAPA law being used against them where bail becomes an exception and jail becomes the rule, even when one is not guilty,” he said.

Democratic rights activist Devika Menon followed suit, condemning draconian laws like UAPA and upholding the demand for release of all political prisoners. She harkened back to United Nations resolutions and covenants which guarantee rights to political prisoners but have not been realised in Indian society. She recalled the words of Prof. R.S. Rao, adding, “rights are determined by people and for the people. They cannot be conditional in a country claiming to be a democracy.”

CAMPAIGN AGAINST STATE REPRESSION
(CASR)

Constituents: AIRSO, AISA, AISF, APCR, BASF, BSM, Bhim Army, bsCEM, CEM, CRPP, CTF, DISSC, DSU, DTF, Forum Against Repression Telangana, Fraternity, IAPL, Innocence Network, Karnataka Janashakti, Progressive Lawyers Association, Mazdoor Adhikar Sangathan, Mazdoor Patrika, NAPM, Nishant Natya Manch, Nowruz, NTUI, People’s Watch, Rihai Manch, Samajwadi Janparishad, Smajwadi Lok Manch, Bahujan Samjavadi Manch, SFI, United Against Hate, United Peace Alliance, WSS, Y4S

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THE GAZA STRIP FAMINE IS IMMINENT AS 1.1 MILLION PEOPLE, HALF OF GAZA, EXPERIENCE CATASTROPHIC FOOD INSECURITY Overview The IPC acute food insecurity analysis conducted in December 2023 warned of a risk that Famine may occur by the end of May 2024 if an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access for the provision of essential supplies and services to the population did not take place. Since then, the conditions necessary to prevent famine have not been met and the latest evidence confirms that Famine is imminent in the northern governorates and projected to occur anytime between mid-March and May 2024. CURRENT: 15 FEBRUARY - 15 MARCH 2024 2.13M 95% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTIONPhase 5 677,000 People in Catastrophe Phase 4 876,000 People in Emergency Phase 3 578,000 People in Crisis Phase 2 96,000 People Stressed Phase 1 0 People in food security PROJECTED: 16 MARCH - 15 JULY 2024 2.23M 100% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTIONPhase 5 1,107,000 People in Catastrophe Phase 4 854,000 People in Emergency Phase 3 265,000 People in Crisis Phase 2 0 People Stressed Phase 1 0 People in food security IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS 15 FEBRUARY - 15 JULY 2024 Published on 18 March 2024IPC Global Initiative - Special Brief IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in Palestine. This analysis factors in all data and information available up to 10 March 2024 and does not take into account the latest developments on the ground. Key Drivers Restricted humanitarian access Extremely limited humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip continues to impede the safe and equitable delivery of life-saving multi-sector humanitarian assistance critical for Famine prevention and response. This includes severe limitations to the supply of goods as well as basic services.Hostilities Hostilities continue to involve the besiegement of the entire population and widespread, intense and sustained ground and air operations and clashes. This has caused over 31,000 deaths and injured 73,000 people, displaced about 1.9 million people, damaged or destroyed over half of the buildings, and devastated assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival, including across the food, health and water systems.Current Acute Food Insecurity | 15 February - 15 March Projected Acute Food Insecurity | 16 March - 15 July
According to the most likely scenario, both North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine) with reasonable evidence, with 70% (around 210,000 people) of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Continued conflict and the near-complete lack of access to the northern governorates for humanitarian organizations and commercial trucks will likely compound heightened vulnerabilities and extremely limited food availability, access, and utilization, as well as access to healthcare, water, and sanitation. The famine threshold for household acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and, given the latest data showing a steeply increasing trend in cases of acute malnutrition, it is highly likely that the famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. In North Gaza, acute malnutrition (by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference - MUAC) moved from a pre-escalation estimated of 1 percent to 6.8 – 9.1 percent in January and 12.4 to 16.5 percent in February (weighted for children 6-59). Acute malnutrition (by MUAC) among children 6-23 months old increased in the same period from 16.2 percent to 29.2 percent. The upward trend in non-trauma mortality is also expected to accelerate, resulting in all famine thresholds likely to be passed imminently. The southern governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and the Governorate of Rafah, are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). However, in a worst-case scenario, these governorates face a risk of Famine through July 2024. The entire population in the Gaza Strip (2.23 million) is facing high levels of acute food insecurity. From mid-March to mid-July, in the most likely scenario and under the assumption of an escalation of the conflict including a ground offensive in Rafah, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1.11 million people) is expected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5), the most severe level in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. This represents an increase of 530,000 people (92 percent) compared to the previous analysis. Between the current and the projection period, around 400,000 more people are expected to slide into IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The rest of the population faces Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (854,000 people, 38 percent of the population) or Crisis (IPC Phase 3) (265,000 people, 12 percent of the population). The escalation of the hostilities has caused widespread damage to assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival. About 50 percent of buildings - and more than 70 percent in the northern governorates - have been damaged or destroyed. This has included dwellings, shops and infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, as well as water, sanitation and other facilities. Assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limiting the functionality of the food system. From a pre-escalation average of 500 trucks a day of which 150 carrying food, in the period between 7 October 2023 to 24 February 2024, only 90 trucks per day, of which only 60 carrying food, entered the Gaza Strip. Consequently, virtually all households are skipping meals every day and adults are reducing their meals so that children can eat. In the northern governorates, in nearly two thirds of the households, people went entire days and nights without eating at least 10 times in the last 30 days. In the southern governorates, this applies to one third of the households.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF3 CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (15 February - 15 March 2024 ) Population table for the current situation: 15 February - 15 March 2024 Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.GovernorateTotal population analysedPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 3+Area Phase#people % #people % #people % #people % #people % #people % Deir al-Balah & Khan Younis governorates600,000 0 030,000 5120,000 20 270,000 45 180,000 30 570,000 95 4 North Gaza & Gaza governorates300,000 0 0 0 0 60,000 20 75,000 25 165,000 55 300,000 100 4 Rafah governorate1,326,544 0 066,327 5397,963 30 530,618 40 331,636 25 1,260,217 95 4 Grand Total 2,226,544 0 096,327 5 577,963 26 875,618 39 676,636 30 2,130,217 95
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF4 CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (15 February - 15 March 2024) Vulnerabilities and Acute Events Prior to the current hostilities, vulnerability was high in the Gaza Strip due to prolonged blockade and periodic escalations in hostilities that severely damaged the food system in the area. At 5,900 residents per square kilometre, one of the most densely populated areas in the world even before the concentration of most of the population in only one of five governorates, the Gaza Strip population is extremely reliant on the cross-border movement of goods and utilities like electricity and water. In 2022, the Gaza Strip faced an unemployment rate of nearly 45 percent 1 and, by September 2023, the poverty rate was at 60 percent 2, among a population that included nearly 70 percent of refugees. 3 Due to severely constrained livelihood opportunities, in 2022, over half of the population was relying on humanitarian assistance as their main income source and about one-third on casual labour, 4 with 70 percent of the population food insecure. 5 Conflict . As of 14 March 2024, the ongoing hostilities have reportedly caused nearly 105,000 casualties within the Gaza Strip – nearly 5% of the total population. 6 This includes over 73,000 people injured, about half of them women and children, and over 31,000 deaths. The escalation of hostilities within the Gaza Strip began with heavy bombardment on 7 October 2023. 7 On 27 October, major ground operations and clashes reportedly began within the Gaza Strip. 8 These started in the northern governorates and continued through 23 November, with a humanitarian pause from 24 November through 30 November. 9 Hostilities subsequently resumed at high intensity, with major ground operations and bombardment by air, land, and sea. This included the continued expansion of a ground operation in Khan Younis Governorate, centred on Khan Younis city. 10 Another large ground operation began in Deir al-Balah Governorate on 24 December 2023, 11 expanding across multiple though not all refugee camps and urban areas in the governorate. These operations were accompanied by continued clashes among armed actors. Clashes in the northern governorates, especially some neighbourhoods of Gaza city like Zeitoun, re-escalated in late February 2024. 12 Bombardment by air, land, and sea of all areas of the Gaza Strip has continued throughout this period, intensifying particularly before and during major ground operations. Humanitarian access. Conflict continues to place severe limitations on the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving food, nutrition, health, water, hygiene, sanitation and other life-saving assistance to the besieged population. Commercial traffic is similarly impeded. Humanitarian access, and the ability of the most vulnerable populations to access and participate in humanitarian activities safely is highly limited and uneven across the Gaza Strip. Once humanitarian assistance and commercial goods enter the Gaza Strip, onward access to the northern governorates is extremely limited and unavailable for extended periods, while access is relatively higher for the southern governorates, particularly Rafah Governorate. While there has been improvement in access to the Gaza Strip relative to early October 2023, including the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing in Mid-December 2023, access to the Gaza Strip continues to fluctuate and remains insufficient for meeting the basic needs of the overall population. Severe limitations and attacks on humanitarian staff and assets forced major providers of humanitarian food and other assistance to the northern governorates to suspend convoys to these areas, including the World Food Programme, on 20 February. 13 Since the previous IPC analysis on the Gaza Strip in December 2023, access denial increased significantly, especially in the northern governorates. In January 2024, only nine humanitarian missions to the northern governorates were facilitated, dropping to six missions in February. 14 Figure 1. Casualties in the Gaza Strip reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health as of 14 March 2024. Source: Health Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF5 According to OCHA, constraints on humanitarian action throughout the Gaza Strip include direct strikes with explosive weapons on humanitarian convoys, detention of humanitarian staff, road closures, checkpoints, and related blockages or delays on main transportation corridors. Swarming of humanitarian convoys subsequently increased, including at several hotspots throughout the Gaza Strip, such as immediately after crossing Wadi Gaza into the northern governorates. Physical access constraints further limit the movement of humanitarian and commercial traffic, including road damage from bombardment and traffic of heavy military vehicles as well as the accumulation of an estimated 12,000 metric tons of debris that may take up to four years to fully clear. 15 Displacement and Movement Restrictions. Displacement continues to be driven by conflict. An evacuation order was issued to the entire population residing north of Wadi Gaza (1.1 million people) on 13 October, 16 followed by orders and accompanying maps indicating to move as far south as Khan Younis Governorate. 17 After the humanitarian pause on 24- 30 November 2023, new evacuation orders covering at least 30 percent of the entire Gaza Strip were issued. 18 The unilaterally declared Al-Mawasi “Humanitarian Zone” was first announced on 18 October 2023, however, humanitarian agencies did not agree to the establishment of such zones. 19 The proposed area has limited pre-existing services, with OCHA reporting there is “almost no sheltering capacity” . 20 In addition to the closure of some of the main transportation corridors within the Gaza Strip, other movement restrictions have also been announced, including a ban on movement from southern to northern governorates. 21 Additional restrictions imposed on populations affect livelihoods and food access, such as a de facto prohibition on fishing and movement within one kilometre of the border fence, which covers a significant proportion of farmland. 22 The movement of livestock together with displaced populations has not generally been reported and livestock abandonment is likely high.Map 1. Missions planned, facilitated and denied, October 2023 to Mid-February 2024. Source: OCHA Map 2. Distribution of IDPs staying in Collective Centres. Source: Shelter Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF6 As new evacuation orders are issued alongside with continuation of bombardments and ground operations, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are constantly moving in search of safety. Most of them have moved south, largely to Rafah Governorate. 23 The population in Rafah has increased about five-fold as a result, rapidly rising from 276,000 pre-escalation to over 1.3 million as of February 2024. A large proportion of the displaced population is from Gaza and North Gaza Governorates, which have seen their population decrease by 84 percent and 75 percent respectively. 24 Rafah Governorate, which spans over 65 km 2, now hosts around 1.3 million people. 25 In Rafah, there are 35 UNRWA shelters hosting 882,800 people and another 30 informal shelters hosting 506,300 people, 26 corresponding to over 30 percent of the population staying in shelters. The formal shelters managed by UNRWA are overcrowded with severely limited access to safe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and other services. People in informal shelters face even more difficulties accessing health, food and non-food services. The lack of Non-food Items (NFIs) provision in informal settlements has led people to set up makeshift shelters and tents, which are subject to flooding on rainy days, further exacerbating the suffering of displaced people. 27 Damages . Destruction and damage of buildings, particularly from bombardment by air, land, and sea, is evident in all governorates of the Gaza Strip. According to the recent satellite assessments, by late February 2024, at least 54 percent of all buildings in the Gaza Strip were likely damaged or destroyed. The largest scale destruction is in Gaza Governorate where more than 73 percent of buildings are estimated to be destroyed, followed by North Gaza (70 percent), Deir al-Balah (44 percent), Khan Younis (52 percent) and Rafah (28 percent). 28 This has included dwellings, shops and various types of infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, and other public buildings, as well as WASH infrastructure and storage facilities, among others. Food Availability Production . The escalation of hostilities and mass displacements have caused food shortages and unavailability throughout the Gaza Strip as the food system and agriculture value chains have collapsed or are marginally surviving through the informal market. A significant portion of agriculture land, encompassing orchards, greenhouses, and farmlands has suffered extensive destruction. According to the UNOSAT, the percent of damaged agriculture land has increased from 25 percent to 60 percent, between November 2023 and January 2024.29 Extensive damage has been inflicted on the local food system, including agricultural infrastructure. More than 300 home barns, 100 agricultural warehouses, 46 farm storages, 119 animal shelters, 200 farms, as well over 600 wells used for irrigation have been destroyed, amongst other agriculture facilities.30 According to the FAO damage assessment of February 2024, damage to wells was found to be most concentrated in the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates; and in some areas, all the wells were damaged. Additionally, over 26 percent (336) of all greenhouses have been damaged across all governorates. The governorates with the highest Map 3. Gaza Damage Mapping 26.02.2024. Source: Decentralized Damage Mapping Group Map 4. Damage to Agriculture Areas Imagery Analysis Maps - November 2023 (left), December 2023 (middle) and January 2024 (right). Source: UNOSAT, 2023-2024
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF7 damage are Gaza (55 percent), North Gaza (48 percent), Khan Younis (35 percent), Deir al-Balah (20 percent) and Rafah (16 percent). The Governorate of Khan Younis had the largest area of damaged greenhouses (149 hectares), followed by Rafah (89 hectares). More than 40 percent (6,694 ha) of all croplands has been damaged since 7 October, with the highest reported damages in Gaza (55 percent, 1,941 ha), Deir al-Balah (51 percent, 1,408 ha), North Gaza (45 percent, 1,402 ha), Khan Younis (33 percent, 1,492 ha) and Rafah (25 percent, 451 ha) Governorates. In terms of cropland type, 41 percent of irrigated land, 43 percent of orchards and 42 percent of rainfed land have been damaged.31 The hostilities have not only led to the destruction of agricultural assets and infrastructure, they also resulted in the displacement of populations away from agricultural land and constrained access for agricultural activities. Other assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limited the functionality of the food system. Although some local production, primarily of vegetables, is still ongoing, it is very limited. Lack of access to land and destruction of crops are compounded by a lack of access to essential agriculture inputs (fuel, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides). Most livestock were abandoned during the large-scale displacement in October 2023. Remaining livestock are being slaughtered or sold due to the lack of fodder and water or due to the need for cash or other resources. Similarly, poultry lack animal feed, and the availability of poultry meat and eggs is reduced throughout the Gaza Strip. The comparison among the preliminary reports from the FAO Loss and Damage assessment and the baseline figure from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), shows about 70 percent of livestock and other animals have been lost since 7 October 2024. Fishing production is largely halted due to the damage of boats, lack of fuel and security/safe access. Some fishing is still happening, but it is only available to those who still possess equipment and have access to fuel. Food security assessments indicate32 that, due to the lack of food availability, some households are resorting to eating wild foods. These range from mallow ( khebbayze in Arabic) to unconventional food sources such as animal fodder and other unsafe foods. Figure 2. Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 15 February 2024. Source: FAO
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF8 Imports . Between January and September 2023, a daily average of 150 food trucks entered the Gaza Strip. Between 8 October 2023 and 9 March 2024, this number decreased to an average of 65 trucks per day33 and the availability of food commodities has dramatically declined. Since the escalation of the hostilities, the number of trucks allowed into the Gaza Strip has been severely restricted, reducing the inflow of humanitarian assistance and preventing the entry of commercial goods completely until 8 December 2023. Since then, there was an initial increase in the flow of food and non-food commodities, facilitated through the opening of a second border crossing (Kerem Shalom). However, in February, the flow of commodities decreased again and has been intermittent from late January through February. The month of February in particular saw major variations highlighted in figure 3. The entry of humanitarian and commercial trucks into Gaza is significantly limited to the southern governorates, mainly Rafah. Conversely, there are very few items reaching the northern governorates and other areas in the rest of the south of Gaza Strip.34 OCHA estimates that less than 5 percent of all the food trucks have reached North Gaza and Gaza Governorates in the past four weeks, while 45 percent remained in Rafah and about 50 percent reached Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis. An in-depth analysis of the border crossing manifest allowed to generate approximate kilocalories values per truck and per unit of analysis then distributed per area, using information provided by OCHA and the Food Security Sector. This reveals that in most days, the quantity of food translated in kilocalories entering in Gaza has been extremely below the requirements in North Gaza Governorates, and mostly half the requirements in Rafah. The only areas appearing to have benefited from an almost sufficient amount of kilocalories (although irregular) are in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates (with higher quantities in the later). This may suggest that most Figure 3. Reanalysis of food-only trucks entering Gaza through Kerem Shalom and Rafah border crossing. Source: UNRWA Figure 4. Reanalysis of the Kcal availability per unit of analysis. Source: UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF9 requirements in Rafah. Based on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 21 October 2023 to 3 March 2024, the proportion of average kilocalories per day (using a 7-day rolling average) has been consistently below the daily kilocalorie requirements (calculated using demographic data considering variations by age and gender), with the exception of a short period of time around mid-January. A survey conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP)35 highlights that interviewed shop owners are faced with a significant shortage of basic food items, with 81 percent indicating depletion. Furthermore, 19 percent highlighted that the available food items are in short supply, and not expected to last more than a week. The formal market has been heavily impacted with a non-functioning supply chain, and severely damaged shops. Consequently, the informal market has surged. Informal markets, provide 1 or 2 types of foods (canned foods mainly), and are supplied by the beneficiaries of assistance (selling or bartering). The WFP market monitoring indicates that most respondents have stocks inferior to 1 week or inexistent for the vast majority of the food commodities, with the exception of vegetables. All respondents have exhausted dairy products.36 Despite the presence of at least a hundred bakeries in northern Gaza, few are able to operate due to significant challenges. The main obstacle is the persistent shortage of flour, other bakery inputs, and fuel. In early January, WFP began supporting 12 bakeries in Rafah and Deir al-Balah.37 Access Market functionality. Informal markets now dominate both food and non-food item transactions across the Gaza Strip as formal markets have collapsed following the depletion of stocks and damage to primary places of business. Selling and buying is mostly taking place in the street along with potential barter activities. People, and more particularly vulnerable groups, are increasingly facing protection risks to access markets with the lack of social order and high levels of food insecurity. There is a risk associated to transporting and carrying food in the street, especially in Northern Gaza and Gaza Governorates where people have resorted to going out in groups to buy food and/or carrying knives to protect themselves. The scarcity of items is driving food prices up and reducing household purchasing power. The overall Consumer Price index (CPI) was approximately 49 percent higher in December 2023 compared to the onset of the conflict; the CPI for food and soft drinks was 76 percent higher.38 Food aid. The flow of humanitarian assistance into and across the Gaza Strip continues to be severely disrupted. Between 1 January and 12 February 2024, 51 percent of aid missions planned for the north of Wadi Gaza and 25 percent of those planned for the areas requiring coordination south of Wadi Gaza were denied access..39 In February, the UN and its humanitarian partners planned only 24 missions to areas north of Gaza, of which six (25 percent) were facilitated. This stands in stark contrast to January, when 61 missions were planned to the north, with nine (15 percent) facilitated.40Figure 5. Stocks availability at shops as of 21 January (% of respondents). Source: WFP
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF10 Based on data from UNRWA,41 the maximum number of trucks entering daily from both the Kerem Shalom and the Rafah crossings was 300 (compared to an average of 500 daily pre-escalation), approximately 70 percent of these trucks carried food or a mixture of food and non-food items. On 20 February 2024, WFP decided to suspend its food aid deliveries to northern Gaza as a result of chaos and violence.42 On 5 March, a 14-truck food convoy, the first by WFP to the north since it paused deliveries on 20 February, was denied access after a three-hour wait at the Wadi Gaza checkpoint and then looted on its way back.43 On 7 March, 11 food trucks from private sector were allowed to enter. In total, from 5 February to 5 March, 10-15 food trucks were allowed into the Gaza Governorate to feed about 300,000 people (less than 1 Kg per person for a full month). Given the spread of the conflict, restrictions on movement and the displacement of the population, the humanitarian space is constantly decreasing, and humanitarian food assistance is being distributed unequally among areas. Airdrop operations of food aid along the Gaza Strip coastline began on 26 February 2024. Airdrops mainly consist of ready-made meals that do not require cooking methods and are of high nutritional value. However, they are erratic, small-scale, cover a limited geographic area, and are primarily accessible to populations located near the coast, including those physically able to recover food pallets and packages from the sea in a context of heightened civil unrest. Airdrops without ground coordination are also dangerous and falling assistance may strike civilians, as occurred on 8 March when Figure 6. Food CPI in Gaza Strip (December 2022 - December 2023). Source: WFP/ PCBS Figure 7. Inflation rate (September 2023 vs. December 2023). Source: WFP/ PCBS
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF11 OCHA reported that five civilians died.44 In light of this, airdrops account for a negligible share of the humanitarian food security assistance in the Gaza Strip compared to what is trucked in overland. Cash Assistance. The functionality of cash assistance in the Gaza Strip is limited. As of 15 February 2024, cash actors had delivered emergency multi-purpose cash assistance to over 125,000 households (over 828,000 people) since the onset of the conflict.45 According to the most recent Cash Post Distribution Monitoring,46 about 71 percent of the respondents reported that the cash assistance received helped them to either access urgent/basic items and services needed. Most expenditures were on food (89 percent), followed by medicines, debt repayment, water and hygiene products, and transportation. In Rafah, cash liquidity is a significant challenge47 because of the high number of displaced individuals and the logistical difficulties banks face in transferring cash. Poor electricity supply and connectivity are also affecting the ability of financial service providers to make cash accessible. Figure 8. Planned aid missions by month. Source: OCHA Figure 9a. Use of cash, since 7 October 2023 and January 2024. Source: Cash Working Group
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF12 Figure 9b. Challenges in use of cash, since 7 October 2023 and January 2024. Source: Cash Working Group Figure 10. Quantity of Diesel and Domestic Gas imported per day. Source: UNRWAUtilization Before the escalation of hostilities, electricity was unreliable and only available for a few hours each day. The lack of electricity negatively affected all aspects of life, including food safety, and made it almost impossible to operate food processing units effectively.48 The main water and electricity networks, fuel and food supplies are now almost completely suspended.49 Frequent communication blackouts make it extremely challenging to coordinate the distribution of aid, and let people know how to access it, and when. The complete electricity blackout that began on 11 October 2023 continues, with only limited electricity generated inside the Gaza Strip from generators and solar panels. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip continue to prevent the delivery of fuel to the Gaza power plant, which remains non-functioning, and block cross-border electricity distribution.50 This severely impacts all aspects of daily life, including the processing and storage of food, pumping and distribution of drinking water, treatment of wastewater, and the functionality of telecommunications and financial systems.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF13 The lack of electricity and damage to telecommunication systems has also limited the ability of populations to communicate and access information like evacuation orders or humanitarian assistance delivery. There have been rolling telecommunication blackouts since 7 October, with several lasting around one week.51 Fuel was not permitted to enter the Gaza Strip from 7 October until 15 November 2023. UNRWA reported that for only the bare minimum of critical services in which it is involved, 160,000 litres per day of diesel fuel are needed. This minimum requirement, which is still insufficient for a full restoration of humanitarian operations and other basic services, has been met only about 10 percent of days from 7 October through 9 March. No fuel was permitted to enter the Gaza Strip from 20 December 2023 through 7 January 2024, a period of new or expanding major ground operations, including in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates. From 24 January through 6 March, fuel was permitted to enter the Gaza Strip only on alternative days.52 Even once inside the Gaza Strip, the onward movement of diesel fuel faces the same extreme challenges as other humanitarian and commercial goods, with little fuel reaching the northern governorates. Regarding fuel to North Wadi Gaza, two (10 percent) of 21 planned missions were facilitated. Both deliveries were facilitated to a single hospital, leaving other hospitals and WASH facilities without fuel. For fuel to areas South of Wadi Gaza, 15 (71 percent) of 21 planned missions to areas requiring coordination were facilitated. A total of 300,600 litres were delivered. However, convoys to Nasser hospital were denied access five times in a row. Fuel shortages in hospitals force them to cease most operations and may lead to preventable deaths.53 About 250 tons of cooking gas entered the Gaza Strip per day on average from January to August 2023.54 Daily entry into the Gaza Strip from 24 November 2023 through 10 March 2024 has consistently been roughly 30-40 percent of that pre- escalation amount.55 This has further challenged the ability of the Gaza Strip population to cook food that they are able to access, presenting challenges to physical and biological utilization. As of January-February 2024, nearly 80 percent of the population in all governorates reported using firewood as their primary cooking fuel, covering any form of wood available. Around 10-15 percent of the population across governorates reported burning waste as their main cooking fuel, while almost no respondents reported using cooking gas. Between 7 and 10 percent of respondents reported that there was no cooking fuel available.56 This is a particular concern as these populations face major challenges with consuming food that they may still have access to, in particular flour. Stability Continued conflict and worsening acute food insecurity and nutritional status also contribute to civil unrest, which further lowers the stability of all food security dimensions. Civil unrest is a major challenge to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to humanitarian staff, and hampers their ability to reach the people in need as well as for the most vulnerable to access and make full use of assistance. Recent deaths related to the airdrops and swarming of the trucks entering the Gaza Strip are key evidence of the level of desperation and acute hunger among the people of Gaza. These also show that even a minimal degree of order to facilitate access to food and other essential supplies, such as medicines, cannot be guaranteed, given the absence of civil authorities or organized police. Social cohesion in Gaza is strained, exposing the most vulnerable, such as children - particularly those who are unaccompanied, women, the elderly, the chronically ill and people living with disabilities to extreme levels of food and water deprivation. Food Security Outcomes The most recent WFP survey relied on data collected through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) between 6 December 2023 and 19 February 2024. The number of observations were: For North Gaza and Gaza Governorates: 104 observations; for Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates: 369 observations; for Rafah Governorate: 892 observations. Households were randomly selected from a master list of 320,000 WFP pre-conflict beneficiary households representing 80 percent of the total pre-conflict population in the Gaza Strip. Overall, 10,320 households were selected and called. Of them, 1,365 respondents completed the questionnaires (success rate of 13.3 percent - in line with the 10 percent to 20 percent typical of CATI analyses in the region), while 19 (0.2 percent) answered the call but hung-up and did not complete it. The rest did not answer.57
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF14 Food Consumption Score (FCS). According to the survey, most households across the Gaza Strip have inadequate food consumption with almost 88 percent of households in the North reporting Poor Food consumption (indicative of IPC Phase 4 and 5, Emergency and Catastrophe) and 9 percent reporting Borderline food consumption (indicative of IPC Phase 3, Crisis). An additional disaggregation of the FCS ‘poor’ category (<14) shows that in the North Gaza Governorates, 36 percent of the respondents are not even able to eat cereals daily. In Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah around 53 percent of households reported poor consumption and 31 percent reported borderline consumption, among them 11 percent had a value below 14. In Rafah, around 48 percent of households reported poor food consumption and 31 percent reported borderline consumption of which 5 percent had a value below 14.58 Across all governorates, the food consumption gaps are clear as most households are unable to consume cereals daily. In the north, the mean number of days of cereal consumption is 4.4 per week, in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates and Rafah Governorate the mean number of days is 5.14 and 5.15, respectively. Consumption of protein rich food is extremely low in Northern Gaza at 0.33 days a week and a little over one day a week in the rest of the Gaza Strip. Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI). Results from reduced coping strategies index indicates that nearly 100 percent of respondents in the Gaza Strip are engaging in extreme coping strategies. The indicator assesses the frequency with which households resorted to coping strategies that altered their consumption patterns such as reducing meals, restricting consumption by adults for children to eat, and borrowing food, in the previous week to cover gaps in their consumption. Household Hunger Scale (HHS). An increase in the proportion of households facing extreme food consumptions gaps is observed across all analysed governorates when compared with November 2023 data. About 84 percent of households in Northern Gaza (Gaza and North Gaza) experienced ‘very severe hunger’ , indicative of IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), while 8 percent of households reported ‘severe hunger’ , indicative of IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Compared with the previous survey round, the deterioration has been significant. In November the proportion of households with ‘very severe hunger’ was estimated at 40 percent showing a doubling of households facing extreme food consumption gaps indicative of IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, 57 percent of households reported experiencing ‘very severe hunger’ , while 24 percent reported to experience ‘severe hunger’ , compared with November 2023 when only 22 percent of households faced ‘very severe hunger’ . In Rafah, the proportion households reportedly experiencing ‘very severe hunger’ was 56 percent and 21 percent reporting ‘severe hunger’ .59 Livelihood coping. Some indirect evidence on livelihood coping mechanisms was collected focusing on emergency strategies contextualised for the very specific conditions of Gaza. The data indicates the highest use of extreme coping strategies in the North with 18 percent of households reporting that they bartered/exchanged clothing for food, while 12 percent reported begging for food. As estimated 3 percent reported scavenging due to lack of food, and 18 percent reported gathering wild foods. Around 23 percent reported looting food from debris, and 74 percent indicated that they sought food outside their shelter, facing potential security risks. In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, the reported proportions were similar: 24 percent of households reported that they bartered/exchanged clothing for food, and in Rafah the proportion was 27 percent. Around 7 percent in Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah and Rafah Governorates reported begging for food. An estimated 1.8 percent reported scavenging due to lack of food and 15 percent gathering wild foods. Around 5 percent in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, and 6 percent in Rafah Governorate reported looting food from debris. Finally, 65 percent of the households in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and 59 percent in Rafah Governorate reported that they sought food outside their shelter facing potential security risks. The survey detected a high level of non-applicable strategies, which might indicate the pure exhaustion of these coping mechanisms. Household Economy Approach (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA): Preliminary HEA Outcome Analysis was made available by FEWS NET for this IPC analysis. For the northern governorates (North Gaza and Gaza urban area), for the period of February – August 2024, all the wealth groups categories living in these governorates are expected to face high level of Survival Deficits (SD), indicative of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The SD is calculated compared to a survival threshold defined as the amount of food and cash income needed by the households to meet the 2,100 Kcal per day per person. This also include the cost of preparing and consuming food plus any cash expenditure on water for human consumption.60 The only exception in these results appear for the Better Off (BO) wealth group living in the Semi Agriculture Gaza (SAG) livelihood zone with livelihoods more related to crops sales, livestock sales or self-employment, that will experience SD Indicative of an IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), at the limit of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). For Southern Gaza, the level of deficit for the projected period of April – August 2024 for the households living in urban areas (URB livelihood zone), will be indicative of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). For the households living in this governorate with livelihoods more related to agricultural labour, crop and livestock sales or self-employment, (SAG livelihood zone) – that represent a small portion of the population living in this governorate -, the Very Poor and the Poor wealth groups will face SD indicative of an IPC
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF15 Figure 11. Summary of food security outcome indicators. Source: WFP/ FEWS NETPhase 4 (Emergency). The Middle and the Better Off categories won’t face any SD or Livelihood Protection Deficit. This last deficit is calculated compared to a Livelihood Protection basket that include all the sources of food and income needed for the households to maintain their local livelihoods. Gender lens. Food insecurity has a multidimensional impact on women, as it not only relates to unequal access to, distribution of, consumption of, and control over food, but it also has long-term health and safety risks. UN Women data shows that the escalation in food insecurity has also increased the vulnerability of women to food insecurity. More than 4 out of 5 women (84 percent) interviewed by UN Women report that their family eats half or less of the food they used to before the conflict began, with mothers and adult women being those tasked with sourcing food, yet eating last, less, and least than everyone else. Moreover, 4 in 5 women (84 percent) in Gaza indicate that at least one of their family members had to skip meals during the past week. In 95 percent of those cases, mothers are the ones going without food, skipping at least one meal to feed their children. Nearly 9 in 10 women (87 percent) report finding it harder to access food than men. Some women are now resorting to extreme coping mechanisms, such as scavenging for food under rubble or in dumpsters.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF16Area Governorate % of total Gaza populationURB LZ SAG LZ % of governorate HHs with kcal gaps indicative of IPC 5 % of area (northern/southern) with kcal gaps indicative of IPC 5Estimated % of population in the LZ (URB) Very Poor (24% of the LZ population) Survival Deficit (SD), Indicative IPC Phase Poor (33%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Middle (41%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Better Off (4%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Estimated % of population in the LZ (SAG) Very Poor (32%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Poor (37%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Middle (25%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Better Off (7%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase SCENARIO 1 (FEBRUARY - AUGUST 2024) SCENARIO 1 (FEBRUARY - AUGUST 2024)Northern Gaza North Gaza5% 100%85%, Phase 585%, Phase 587%, Phase 555%, Phase 50% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0%Gaza5% 94%85%, Phase 585%, Phase 587%, Phase 555%, Phase 56%86%, Phase 587%, Phase 584%, Phase 549%, Phase 4100%Southern Gaza Deir al Balah (or middle Gaza)10% 99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1% N/A N/A N/A N/ATo be inferred To be inferred based on Khan Younis and Deir al Balah assumptions and convergence of other data higlighting where and to what extent conditions resemble Rafah vs. Northern GazaKhan Younis21% 99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1% N/A N/A N/A N/ATo be inferredRafah59% 97%33% survival deficit, Phase 432% survival deficit, Phase 445% survival deficit, Phase 427% survival deficit, Phase 43%13% survival deficit, 100% liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 30% survival deficit, 89% liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 30% survival/ liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 10% survival/ liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 10,0% SCENARIO 2 (APRIL - AUGUST 2024) SCENARIO 2 (APRIL - AUGUST 2024)simulation - Rafah invasion 59% 97%67% 64% 63% 54% 3%42% 31% 0% 0% Phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 5Phase 4 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 1
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF17 NUTRITION SITUATION Inadequate dietary intake According to the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster in December 2023-January 2024,61 in North Gaza, 98 percent of the children (47 observations) included in the analysis had consumed two or fewer food groups in the 24 hours preceding the survey. Among the main food groups reported, breastmilk was mentioned for 39 children (83 percent), and eggs for 17 (36 percent). The consumption of all the other food groups, such as legumes, vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables, other vegetables, grains, meat and dairy products, had almost completely disappeared from their daily diet, indicating an extremely worrying situation in terms of diet quality. 95 percent of the pregnant and breastfeeding women had consumed two or fewer food groups the previous day. The main food groups mentioned were non-vitamin A rich vegetables, grains and eggs. This situation highlights critically insufficient micronutrient intake before and during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which can affect both women and the development of their infants. In Khan Younis, 90 percent of young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women consumed two food groups or fewer in the last 24 hours. For young children, the food groups most frequently mentioned were breastmilk and eggs, while grains, pulses and eggs were the food groups most frequently mentioned for pregnant and breastfeeding women. In Deir al-Balah, 86 percent of young children had eaten two or fewer food groups during the day before the survey, while only 3 percent had consumed five food groups. The food groups most consumed were breastmilk, followed by eggs and grains. Among pregnant and breastfeeding women, 67 percent consumed only one food group the day preceding the survey, while 26 percent consumed two food groups. Pulses, grains and other vegetables were the food groups most frequently mentioned by respondents. In Rafah, 88 percent (UNICEF) – 89 percent (CATI) of young children had consumed two or fewer food groups within the past 24 hours, breastmilk, eggs and grains were the main food groups consumed by young children. Only 3 percent had eaten more than two food groups in the last 24 hours. Infant and young child feeding practices Neonates face deteriorating nutritional status if mothers are unable to breastfeed due to stress, poor mental health and/ or inadequate breastfeeding privacy, and lack of counselling and support by healthcare providers.62 Further, the high pre- conflict prevalence of formula use among Gazans (58 percent among under six-month-old infants) raises concerns with regards to potential supply disruptions. Under poor WASH conditions, keeping formula water, teats, and bottles sterile is very challenging. These disruptions can result in increased incidence of diarrhoea and other infectious diseases, both of which further exacerbate malnutrition. The prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding is projected to average between 25 percent to 35 percent under a ceasefire scenario (lower than the pre-conflict baseline of 42 percent, reflecting ongoing disruptions including overcrowding and worsened mental health), falling to 20 percent to 30 percent under a status quo scenario and 5 percent to 15 percent under the escalation scenario. These disruptions have enduring consequences on infant and child health. Based on interviews that WFP conducted with eight key informants (four interviews were held on 11 January, and the remaining interviews were conducted on 22-23 January), widespread weight loss, diseases, and malnutrition prevail due to insufficient food supplies, intensifying the health crisis in the Gaza Strip.63 Health There are now only four hospitals and two clinics remaining in Gaza Governorate and two hospitals and two clinics in North Gaza. All of them operate at a very low level and information on the health status of children under five is close to absent. The survey conducted did not reach a minimum sample allowing exploitation of the information. In Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, according to the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis, more than 97 percent of children under five reported having had one or more diseases in the past two weeks. 56 percent of the children under five had experienced Acute Respiratory Infections within the past two weeks, 70.5 percent had experienced diarrhoea, and 82.3 percent had had a fever. This shows the extremely critical health conditions children face, exposing them to high-risk nutritional deterioration. Trends from WHO corroborate these findings, showing a 55 percent increase in diarrhoea cases in children under five between November-December 2023. While the three hospitals in the Governorate of Deir al-Balah were still operational in late November, nine of the 16 Primary Health Care Centres (PHCCs) were no longer functioning, seriously impeding access to health services. On average, 0.49 litres of drinking water
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF18 was available per person per day in the households surveyed, which is far from the minimum humanitarian standard (2L/ person/day).35 The scale of needs is staggering with 100 percent of the 49 households in need of food and hygiene items, 78 percent in need of water, 69 percent shelter, and 65 percent health assistance. In Rafah, the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis also shows extreme health conditions with almost 93 percent of children under five having one or more disease within the past two weeks, 79 percent had had a fever and 56 percent had experienced vomiting. The level of diarrhoea is extremely critical with 70 percent of children under five having had one episode in the past two weeks, and almost 60 percent having ARI (Acute Respiratory Infection).64 Since mid-October, 388,200 cases of acute respiratory infections have been recorded, along with 246,000 cases of diarrhea and 3,300 cases of bloody diarrhea, 84,000 cases of skin rashes, 12,000 cases of Acute Jaundice (including confirmed Hepatitis A).65 As per OCHA, 1.9 million IDPs face at high risk of communicable disease due overcrowding of IDP sites and lack of access to proper water sanitation and hygiene facilities.66 In Gaza, cases of Hepatitis A have been confirmed in January 2024 and WHO warned that inhumane living conditions will enable Hepatitis A to continue to spread.67 Health system functionality. In February 2024, attacks against healthcare facilities, infrastructure and services continued resulting in 58 percent of the hospitals are not functioning in the Gaza Strip, especially in the northern governorates (75 percent of the hospitals not functioning). According to the Health Cluster, as of 5 March 2024, only 2 hospitals and no Primary Health Care Centres were fully functioning; 14 hospitals and 20 Primary Health Care Centres were partially functioning; while 23 hospitals and 62 Primary Health Centres were not functioning. Only 141 medical points in shelters were available, while 264 informal, public and UNRWA shelters did not have a medical centre available.68 In the northern governorates, hospitals have been offering limited maternity, trauma, surgery and emergency care services. They also face challenges such as a shortage of medical staff, including specialized surgeons, neurosurgeons, and intensive care staff, as well as a lack of medical supplies, and have an urgent need for fuel, food, and drinking water.69 In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, according to OCHA, since January 2024, three hospitals – Al Aqsa, Nasser, and Gaza European – were at risk of closure due to the issuance of evacuation orders in adjacent areas and the ongoing conduct of hostilities nearby. In Rafah, 5 hospitals are still functioning. The influx of IDPs migrating to Rafah has overwhelmed the bed availability in hospitals, leading to insufficient capacity to meet the healthcare needs of the population. There is also high need for primary health services in informal shelters hosting IDPs. The continued besiegement around some hospitals is significantly affecting their case management capacity. Referring patients outside of Gaza remains a challenge, as the waiting list continues to grow.70 In addition, people are unable to effectively access healthcare due to the lack of laboratory equipment and reagents needed for accurate diagnosis and testing.71 The risk to public health is intensified due to an acute scarcity of hygiene materials and adequate sanitation infrastructure. Persistent anecdotal reports of Hepatitis A cases in Gaza, as recorded by UNRWA and the Health Cluster, highlight ongoing concerns. Limited access to proper WASH facilities is hindering prevention of diseases. The high number of surgeries and procedures has led to increased demand for anaesthetic and analgesic medications which are in short supply. Blood and blood products in hospitals are needed for emergencies and medical procedures to ensure that patients receive timely transfusions.72 Figure 1. Gaza disease surveillance Source: WHO, Health Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF19 UNRWA stocks of medicines continue to decrease, with around 15 days’ supply remaining overall and one week’s supply of insulin; some items may run out sooner based on needs at shelters. Therefore, there is an urgent need to restock medical supplies given the depletion of stocks in the local market. Stocks of fuel and medicines continue to be at risk of depletion halting UNRWA operations at the health centres. Essential medicines and other critical medical supplies remain difficult to bring into the Gaza Strip due to strict control of allegedly dual-use items at border crossings and wider challenges with importing controlled drugs. As basic and specialty healthcare services in Gaza continue to deteriorate, an increase in excess deaths due to traumatic injuries that would otherwise be survivable with timely and appropriate care is expected. In December 2023, UNICEF delivered 962,550 doses of essential vaccines, including for measles, pneumonia, and polio. Opening of stabilization centres for acute malnutrition cases with medical complications are also planned notably in Tal as Sultan (Rafah) and another in one of the field hospitals.73 Heightened insecurity and limited access to health facilities continue to present major challenges for partners to respond and partner operations continue to be negatively affected by the displacement of staff, social stresses and telecommunication challenges.74 Water, sanitation, and hygiene Prior to the escalation of hostilities, the majority of the water supply in the Gaza Strip came from groundwater sources and the rest (around 20 percent) from desalination plants and cross border pipelines. The over pumping of groundwater in Palestine led to severe water pollution and salinization, especially in the Gaza Strip. More than 97 percent of the water pumped from the coastal aquifer in the Gaza Strip did not meet the water quality standards set by WHO (PCBS and PWA, 2021).75 Figure 13. Health system functionality. Source: WHO, Health Cluster Damage to WASH facilitiesSewage facilityWater facilityTotal% of Sewage facilities % of Water facilities% of Sewage and Water facilities Destroyed 9 68 77 7% 14% 13% Severe damage 23 64 87 19% 14% 15% Moderate damage 36 131 167 30% 28% 28% Possible damage 16 51 67 13% 11% 11% No visible damage 38 156 194 31% 33% 33% Total 122 470 592Figure 14. WASH facilities damaged, February 2024. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF20 Nitrate levels already exceeded 150 mg/litre in most areas of the Gaza Strip, which made the water undrinkable, given the World Health Organization (WHO) acceptable limit of 50 mg/litre. In 2019, the daily allocation of water per capita for domestic purposes was 77 litres/ capita in the Gaza Strip.77 Taking the high percentage of water pollution in the Gaza Strip and calculating the quantity of water suitable for human use, the per capita share of fresh water was 22.4 litres per day.78 Damage to WASH facilities. Based on satellite damage assessments on WASH infrastructure dated 21 February,79 13 percent of all sewage and water facilities have been destroyed (7 percent and 14 percent respectively), while in total over 56 percent have been either destroyed or damaged (13 percent and 34 percent respectively). Another 11 percent are assessed to have possible damage. Overall, this assessment identifies 77 facilities destroyed and 254 facilities damaged, with another 67 facilities with possible damage. Northern Gaza and Gaza Governorates have the highest concentration of reported damaged or destroyed infrastructure. The functionality of, or access to, the 194 facilities (38 and 156 respectively) that were found with no visible damage is conditional to access to fuel and spare parts, which are in very limited supply, as well as availability of technicians and access to areas with these assets. The combined damaged and conditional access to the remaining WASH infrastructure is expected to have a profound impact on the availability of water, water quality and presence of unsafe water or contaminants for populations in these areas. Water availability and drinking water. Water availability continues to be a major concern across the Gaza Strip. In February 2024, the water produced from all the water sources in Gaza accounted for only 5.7 percent of the pre-escalation production levels.80 According to OCHA, only 17 percent of the 284 groundwater wells are operating with limited hours and 39 wells have been reported as destroyed and 93 as moderately to severely damaged.81 Still according to OCHA, only one of the three cross border water pipelines is operating, functioning at 47 percent of its capacity. Plans to repair the non-functioning pipelines face challenges in terms of access, communication, or repair coordination considering the current context. The United Arab Emirate’s small desalination plant located on the Egyptian side of Rafah, operates at full capacity, providing 2,400 cubic metres per day, following the construction of a 3-kilometre transmission line. In addition, only two out of the three main water desalination plants are partially functional, mainly in the southern governorates.82 Water quality appears low due to lack of processing facilities or other way of contamination. According to another study (sample size of 1,200 people)83 conducted in the Gaza Strip in February 2024, access to water for drinking, bathing and cleaning, is estimated at 1.5 litre per person per day compared to the 15 litres minimum amount of water required for survival as per as the international SPHERE standards. Similar results from the WASH cluster rapid assessment conducted in 41 sites indicate a median value of 2 litres per person per day.84 Water production and distribution is a fuel intensive process and the overall WASH fuel allocation is currently 30,000 litres per day. From 24 January through 4 March, the WASH sector in the Gaza Strip accounted for 30 percent to 60 percent Map 5. WASH facilities damaged, February 2024. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF21 of all fuel entering the Gaza Strip, with limitations on diesel fuel entry a major impediment to meeting minimum water requirements throughout the Gaza Strip, especially in the northern governorates.85 In the northern governorates, water supply remains limited and no access to clean water has been reported.86 According to OCHA, as of 12 January 2024, the combination of water trucking, water from the functional desalination plant, and the restoration of one of the three main water supply lines on 30 December 2023, has yielded only seven percent of water production in Gaza, compared with the pre-October 2023 supply.87 In Rafah Governorate, according to the WASH cluster rapid assessment, the majority of the sites rely mainly on water trucking and piped water in scattered sites, and collective centres rely more heavily on wells.88 More than half of the sites provide water that is unsafe for drinking (67 percent in collective centres) and only 12 percent can provide water treatment at source. According to the Euromed study, in Rafah Governorate out of the 15 litres minimum amount of water a day required as per sphere standard, only 8 litres are available on average across sites (3 litres in collective centres), with a median of 2 litres per person per day, indicating high level of disparities among sites. Hygiene. According to the WASH cluster, in Rafah, 61 percent of the sites in collective centres and 71 percent in scattered sites have no shower89 and the average number of showers per person is about 3,500 in collective centres and 1,050 in scattered sites. Access and protection of most vulnerable population is also of high concern, with only 12 percent of the showers being accessible for people living with disabilities and only 24 percent of the sites having separated showers for women (14 percent in collective centres). Figure 15. Quantity and type of water sources per site. Source: WASH cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF22 An NRC assessment90 conducted in nine shelters in Rafah also stated that every assessed location had reported cases of “hepatitis A, gastroenteritis, diarrhoea, smallpox, lice, [and] influenza.” Solid Waste Management. In terms of waste management, most of the wastewater treatment systems have been suspended and non-functioning since November 2023, due to damage, lack of fuel/power supply, and lack of maintenance.91 Regarding solid-waste management, which was already a crucial issue before the escalation, the last UNRWA update on 16 January states that solid waste management continues in Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates and partially in Deir al-Balah Governorate, where approximately 45 truck loadings were transferred to temporary sites.92 However, according to the WASH cluster,93 93 percent of the sites (89 percent in collective centres and 100 percent in scattered sites) have some type of visible waste, mainly solid waste or trash and 68 percent of all the sites present informal or uncontrolled dumping areas. The accumulation of tens of thousands of tons of solid waste on the streets, around hospitals, IDP shelters, and various random dump sites, represent high public health risks. The Gaza Municipality also estimates that approximately 50,000 tons of solid waste remain unmanaged.94Figure 16. Quantity and type of water sources per site. Source: WASH cluster Figure 17. Waste management. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF23 Sanitation. Sanitation situation continues to deteriorate and remains a major issue in all governorates. Despite significant efforts by UNICEF and its partners to construct family latrines, sanitation coverage remains very low and efforts to increase coverage are hindered by a lack of cement and other construction materials, including due to constraints on the entry of items considered to be dual use into the Gaza Strip.95 With wastewater treatment plants non-functioning and many sewage facilities destroyed, especially in Gaza city, flooding has been a major health hazard through the rainy period as floodwater mixes with untreated sewage in urban areas with dense displaced populations.96 This is further compounded by the enduring fuel shortage, which impedes the operation of remaining sewage stations and wastewater treatment plants. According to the WASH Cluster, there is also an increasing concern about the potential for additional flooding of already contaminated rainwater harvesting lagoons, particularly if rainfall intensifies. This situation poses a critical threat to both the environment and public health.97 In early 2023, UNICEF reported that “insufficient safely managed water supply to households, poor sanitation, limited public WASH services, and risk of flooding expose 1.36 million Palestinians to water-related diseases risks” .98 The situation is exacerbated by continuous restricted access to essential sanitation supplies and services in Gaza.99 The inability to transport sufficient fuel into the Gaza Strip, and especially to the northern governorates, also significantly compounds the challenges faced by the WASH response.100 A rapid assessment of displacement sites, including scattered sites and collective centres, in Rafah Governorate was conducted by the WASH cluster in February 2024.101 63 percent of assessed sites reportedly had access to a sewer connection (78 percent in collective centres and 36 percent in scattered sites). Few sites reported using buckets/plastic bags, flush to open drain, septic tank, or flush to elsewhere as a sanitation facility. The median number of persons per toilet across all sites was 341, though 994 in collective centres and 57 in scattered sites. 80 percent of the 41 sites had non-functional latrines (74 percent in collective centers and 93 percent in scattered sites). Only 15 percent of sites had handwashing facilities near latrines. 24 percent of assessed sites offered safe and private latrine access and 51 percent had separate facilities for men and women. Sanitation facilities in collective centres and informal sites are overcrowded also due to the high number of displaced populations. According to UNRWA, on average, there are 1,109 IDPs per toilet in shelters in Rafah Governorate, 619 IDPs per toilet in shelters in Deir al-Balah Governorate, and 1,349 IDPs per toilet in Khan Younis Governorate.102 UNRWA also reports that there are at least 486 people per toilet in UNRWA shelters in Rafah Governorate.103 Figure 18. Sanitation quantities. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF24 Figure 19. Sanitation facilities. Source: WASH Cluster Summary of Acute Malnutrition Drivers According to the Nutrition Vulnerability Study,104 conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster, over 90 percent of children aged 6-23 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women are eating two or fewer food groups each day, often those of the lowest nutritional value. At least 90 percent of children under five have had at least one infectious disease, with 70 percent having had diarrhoea in the previous two weeks. Against a minimum standard of 15 litres per person, 81 percent of households lack safe and clean water, with average daily household access to water reportedly less than one litre per person per day. This extreme lack of safe water access is especially concerning for the greater number of infants now reliant on infant formula than before the most recent escalation. Low clean water availability and access further exposes young children to infection and subsequently malnutrition. Figure 20: Acute malnutrition drivers. Source: Global Nutrition Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF25 Nutrition Outcomes There is very limited data on acute malnutrition available in Gaza since the start of the conflict on 7 October 2023. The only data that is available on acute malnutrition as of 9 Mar 2024 come from Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) screenings conducted in the three IPC AFI units of analysis, i.e. northern, middle and southern governorates. While some screenings included children 6-59 months, others almost exclusively measured only children between 6 and 23 months of age. Additionally, although some screenings contained individual MUAC and age data, others only had MUAC data at aggregate level. Of the screening data made available for the analysis, one set only included 45 children and therefore was not considered in the analysis. The remaining screening datasets were analysed as follows: Figure 21. Metadata, MUAC screening results. Source: Various - reanalysis conducted by the Global Smart Team For every screening that contained only aggregate MUAC data on children 6-59 months, first, unweighted prevalence estimates were calculated for the following age groups: (i) 6-59 months, (ii) 6-23 months, and (iii) 24-59 months. Secondly, weighted prevalence of MUAC among children between 6-59 months were calculated from the unweighted prevalence estimates of children 6-23 months and 24-59 months by applying weights of 0.33 and 0.66,105 respectively. Finally, the weighted prevalence estimates of 6-59 months were compared with the IPC Acute Malnutrition (IPC AMN) reference table and the IPC AMN Phases were determined. For each screening that only contained aggregate MUAC data on children 6-23 months, the MUAC prevalence of children between 23-59 months and weighted prevalence of MUAC among children 6-59 months were estimated using the following procedure. First, using data from screenings that contained MUAC data on children 6-59 months, the ratio between the MUAC prevalence of 6-23 months and 24-59 months was determined (this ranged from 3.07 to 9.68). Secondly, using sensitivity analysis, expected ranges of MUAC prevalence among children between 24-59 months were calculated using the lowest (3.07) and the highest (9.68) empirically observed ratios. Thirdly, a weighted analysis was performed, and a range of weighted prevalence estimates of children 6-59 months were obtained. Finally, the weighted prevalence estimates of 6-59 months were compared with the IPC Acute Malnutrition (IPC AMN) reference table and the possible IPC AMN Phases were determined.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF26 In conclusion: • In North Gaza Governorate , MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 2 - 3 (Alert - Critical) in January, having rapidly deteriorated to an indicative IPC AMN Phase of 4 - 5 (Critical - Extremely Critical) in February 2024. • In Khan Younis Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 3 - 4 (Serious - Critical) in February 2024. • In Deir al-Balah Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 1 - 2 (Acceptable - Alert) in February – early March 2024. • In Rafah Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 1 - 2 (Acceptable - Alert) in late January – early March. Figure 22. MUAC screening results. Source: Various - reanalysis conducted by the Global Smart Team
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF27 Mortality The analysis could not benefit from representative evidence of non-trauma mortality as intended by IPC Protocols (Crude Death Rate and Under Five Death Rate). The data available consisted in death counts issued by the Gaza Ministry of Health and reported by the Health Cluster, and interview data collected during CATI surveys conducted by WFP . Furthermore, a study on mortality and public health106 was conducted to inform humanitarian and other decision-makers working on the Gaza crisis by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Center for Humanitarian Health at Johns Hopkins University (LSHTM). The mortality data collected by the Ministry of Health are not disaggregated by area and appears to only be those attributable to conflict related violence. The WFP CATI survey data results can be disaggregated by area but not by cause of death. Therefore, no direct measurements of CDR or U5DR after trauma exclusion are currently available. Nonetheless, it worths noticing that the modelled projections published by LSHTM, while considered useful for indicating the expected direction of travel and scale of the expected excess mortality, the IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) found some of the assumptions factored in the study published in early February might have evolved in different directions, especially regarding food intake estimates and acute malnutrition. The absence of usable mortality data in both governorates leaves a high degree of uncertainty on the translation of these acute malnutrition rate into children and adult mortality in the current period in North Gaza. It is likely that these extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet translated into 2/10,000/day Crude Death Rate. The likelihood of having surpassed U5DR thresholds (4/10,000/day for children) is higher but impossible to ascertain.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF28 PROJECTED SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (16 March - 15 July 2024 ) Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.GovernorateTotal population analysedPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 3+Area Phase#people % #people % #people % #people % #people % #people % Deir al-Balah & Khan Younis governorates600,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 300,000 50 300,000 50 600,000 100 4 North Gaza & Gaza governorates300,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 90,000 30 210,000 70 300,000 100 5 Rafah governorate1,326,544 0 0 0 0265,309 20 464,290 35 596,945 45 1,326,544 100 4 Grand Total 2,226,544 0 0 0 0 265,309 12 854,290 38 1,106,945 50 2,226,544 100 Population table for the projected situation: 16 March - 15 July 2024
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF29 PROJECTED SITUATION OVERVIEW (16 March - 15 July 2024 ) In the most likely scenario, the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine), with reasonable evidence. Famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months. The Governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and the Governorate of Rafah, are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). During the projection period (16 March - 15 July), in the most likely scenario and under the assumption of an escalation of the conflict including a ground offensive in Rafah, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1,107,000 people) is expected to face IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), the most severe level in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. The rest of the population is likely to be either in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (854,000 people, 38 percent of the population) or in Crisis (265,000 people, 12 percent of the population). During this period, the whole population of the Gaza Strip (2,230,000 people) will face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). North Gaza and Gaza Governorates In the most likely scenario, the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine), with reasonable evidence. Famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months. In terms of magnitude, 70 percent of the population is likely to be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and 30 percent in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Continued conflict and the near-complete lack of access to the northern governorates for humanitarian organizations and commercial trucks will likely compound heightened vulnerabilities and extremely limited food availability, access, and utilization, as well as access to healthcare, water, and sanitation services. People’s ability to exit the northern governorates and move to locations with relatively greater food availability and access is likely to be very limited. Within the north, displacements are likely to remain frequent and localized; yet conditions in the shelters will continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs. As food stocks or sources (wild foods, livestock, or other types of food – from domestic stocks, shelters or agricultural assets) will continue to reduce, food availability is expected to be limited. With the very few humanitarian and commercial trucks entering these governorates, it is unlikely that households will be able to restock or stabilize their food consumption patterns. Due to scarce food availability, the vast majority of markets are either not functioning or availing very few Assumptions for the most likely scenario in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates Conflict: In the most likely scenario, the pop - ulation will likely remain fully exposed and highly susceptible to conflict. Conflict and related casualties will likely continue at simi - lar levels to January-February 2024, including the wider besiegement, neighbourhood-lev - el clearing operations, occasional armed actor clashes, and a comparable rate of bombardment (air, land, sea). Basic services infrastructure will likely remain extremely de - graded, and the proportion of all buildings damaged or destroyed will likely continue to steadily approach 100%. Humanitarian access to provide food, water, medicines, and provision of health and WASH services: The northern governorates are likely to be mostly inaccessible and intermittently hard-to-reach, given continued ground operations, bombardment (air, land, sea), civil unrest, bureaucratic impediments, and physical obstruction. The humanitarian space in the northern governorates will continue to be extremely restricted, thereby hampering the provision of the necessary supplies and services to the most vulnerable population. It will also hamper the capacity of humanitarian actors to monitor closely the situation on the ground and to intervene promptly to provide relief. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely continue to worsen, including due to intense and widespread conflict, largely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will increasingly inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance within the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely remain frequent and localized and conditions in shelters will continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs. food commodities at excessively high prices. As a result, communities’ coping capacity and social cohesion will be further strained. Social tensions are also likely to increase putting the most vulnerable at higher risk of exposure to violence and lower access to food. Physical access to markets is also of concern, due to restrictions of civilian mobility and conflict intensity. Utilization of food resources will also be heavily impacted as seasonal higher temperatures reduce food storage options in a context of no or extremely limited access to electricity, fuel and/or gas to preserve, process or cook food. The lack of access to sufficient and safe water, sanitation facilities and health services is likely to increase the risk of cholera and the spread of infectious diseases impacting people’s nutrition and health status and increasing mortality from non- trauma related causes. The restoration of public services will be a major challenge given that the majority of WASH facilities and infrastructure are damaged or destroyed.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF30 FRC analysis of acute malnutrition trends A detailed analysis of the drivers (risk factors) for acute malnutrition and the available data on nutritional status was provided by the Global Nutrition Cluster report on Nutrition Vulnerability in February 2024.7 Based on this report and their own analysis the IPC Analysis Team concluded that the key driver of acute malnutrition in the North Gaza governorate was the highly inadequate dietary diversity in Children 6–23m, with 79% consuming ≤2 food groups, 8 and also in Pregnant and Breastfeeding Women, with 95% consuming ≤2 food groups. The main food groups mentioned were non-vitamin A rich vegetables (24 affirmations), grains (20) and eggs (17). This situation highlights critically insufficient diet diversity and micronutrient intake before and during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which can affect both the women and the development of their infants. Infant and Young Chil - dren Feeding practices are highly constrained by the lack of resources and health seeking behavior is also highly constrained. Interviews conducted by the FRC with key informants and a review of available reports confirmed that the situation in the northern governates during the current analysis period was similar to that reported by the Analysis Team. The health and WASH situations are also considered separately belo w. Figure 23: Trends in GAM by MUAC Prevalence in North Gaza (children aged 6-59 mo.) Within the IPC unit of analysis, MUAC screening data9 was available from the North Governorate but not from Gaza City. The available data was collected as part of a vaccination programme and measurements were only taken from children aged 6-23 months. The FRC explored different methods for using this data to estimate the prevalence of GAM by MUAC in children aged 6-59 months. This was a necessary step to allow the classification of malnutrition according to IPC Phases. To provide a starting point for the trend analysis the prevalence of GAM by MUAC in North Gaza in 2023, before October 7th, was estimated at 1%. This is consistent with previous studies.11 Age-adjustment of the MUAC screening data resulted in a GAM by MUAC prevalence in January 2024 of 6.8% to 9.1%. By February this had risen to give a range of 12.4% to 16.5%, indicating a very steep increase in the incidence of acute malnutrition in children 6-59 mo. To estimate what the prevalence would be at the time of the current analysis in March 2024, two nowcasting scenarios were examined. Given the extremely poor situation regarding the drivers of malnutrition, the best-case scenario was that there had been a continued linear increase in prevalence, while the more likely scenario was that the rate of increase would have followed the observed trend and have increased further in the time since the February screening. These two scenarios were then applied to the high and low estimates for age-adjusted GAM by MUAC prevalence, resulting in the four dotted lines shown in Figure 2. This analysis indicates that in all scenarios the GAM by MUAC prevalence had passed the IPC Phase 4/5 threshold (Critical/Extremely Critical) in the current analysis period. Given the current trajectory in MUAC prevalence data it is clear that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition prevalence, measured using weight-for-height Z-scores, may have already been crossed or will be crossed imminently. These data were collected exclusively in North Gaza governorate.Healthcare availability and access will likely continue to decline, including due to lack of humanitarian access and inadequate delivery of critical supplies, as well as a decline in the functionality of the few remaining health centres. The risk of infectious diseases will likely continue to increase due to the extreme deterioration of the overall health environment. In line with the Famine Review Committee findings, people’s livelihoods and food consumption are likely to continue deteriorating, resulting in more than two thirds of the population (70 percent) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Acute Malnutrition will increase at a high pace as already observed in the past few weeks (current period) and mortality levels will likely breach the Famine thresholds (extremely critical) - by the end of May 2024.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF31 Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates These Governorates are projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), though with half of the population (300,000 people) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), up from 30 percent in the current period; and the other half (300,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). While this unit of analysis includes both Governorates, the conditions for the population in Khan Younis Governorate are expected to be worse than those in Deir al-Balah. The onset of a major ground operation in Rafah Governorate will likely be a major driver of deterioration in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, including through an influx of displaced populations – many already displaced multiple times – into parts of these Governorates and the impact of the ground operation on humanitarian access. Ground operations are likely to continue throughout Khan Younis Governorate and in eastern Deir al-Balah Governorate. Displacement will likely escalate with large populations moving into the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis Governorate and into Deir al- Balah Governorate, especially in and around Deir al-Balah city and camp. Further displacement will likely stress already highly limited resources and basic services, exacerbating existing conditions. Shelter conditions are likely to deteriorate with continued deprivation of basic needs. Food availability and access are expected to further decline as the major ground operation in Rafah Governorate reduces humanitarian and commercial traffic into and throughout the Gaza Strip. This will be exacerbated by continued civil unrest outside the Kerem Shalom crossing, which will likely further reduce humanitarian and commercial truck entry. Fewer humanitarian convoys to these governorates are expected, including those unsuccessfully attempting to reach the northern governorates and offloading assistance in Deir al-Balah instead. The already limited agricultural production, mostly of vegetables, observed in the current period will likely continue to decline as ground operations are pursued within and near production areas of both governorates, especially in all areas of Khan Younis Governorate; and the harvest period for several vegetables comes to an end. Market functionality is likely to continue falling as agricultural production and humanitarian and commercial truck arrivals decline. Civilian mobility is likely to be severely constrained, further reducing access to food, including through coping strategies like gathering wild foods or scavenging. The end of the typical rainy period may also limit wild food availability. Compared to other governorates, Deir al-Balah Governorate had higher food availability in the current period, including due to higher deliveries of humanitarian food assistance (proportional to estimated Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Deir al Balah and Khan Younis Governorates Conflict: Conflict and related casualties will likely continue at similar levels to February 2024, including ground operations in mul - tiple but not all urban areas of Deir al-Balah and throughout Khan Younis governorate, frequent armed actor clashes especially in Khan Younis governorate, and a compa - rable rate of bombardment (air, land, sea). The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip will likely continue. Humanitarian access: Humanitarian access to Khan Younis and Deir al Balah governorate - including for the delivery of life-saving multi-sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations - is likely to be intermittently reduced, especially relative to the higher proportional delivery of assistance made to Deir al- Balah Governorate compared to other governorates in early 2024. This decrease in access is likely due to the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis governorate, bombardment (air, land, sea) in these governorates and within Deir al-Balah Governorate, and worsening civil unrest. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely escalate, driven by intense and widespread conflict as well as largely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will likely increasingly inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance throughout the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely escalate, with large populations moving into the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis governorate and into Deir al Balah governorate, especially the area of Deir al Balah city/camp. Shelter conditions will likely continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and increased sheltering in open spaces. population) in parts of January and February 2024. These deliveries appear to have partially resulted from the offloading of humanitarian food assistance that could not be delivered to the northern governorates. Any accumulated stocks in markets and households will provide at least a short-term buffer to some of the people in the early part of the projection period. Khan Younis Governorate received lower levels of humanitarian food assistance during that period, resulting in households likely to face larger food consumption gaps from the beginning of the projection period. With no major improvements in the availability of electricity, fuel, cooking gas, and safe water, food utilization will likely be a major limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates. This includes challenges to the safe storage and preparation
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF32 Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Rafah Governorate Conflict: Conflict will likely escalate, in - cluding the continuation of the wider besiegement, the onset of a new, major ground operation throughout Rafah gov - ernorate and concentrated on Rafah city, with armed actor clashes, and an increase in bombardment (air, land, sea). Humanitarian access: Humanitarian access to Rafah Governorate, including for the delivery of life-saving multi- sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, will likely be intermittently reduced, though without total access loss to the Rafah Governorate portion of the Al-Mawasi area, where an extreme concentration of displaced people is likely. Loss of access will be particularly high to populations remaining within Rafah city during the major ground operation likely to occur there. This disruption will likely result from the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), and civil unrest. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely continue, including due to intense and widespread conflict and severely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will continue to inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance within the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely increase substantially, with most of the current population of Rafah city forced into the Al-Mawasi area of Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates and into Deir al-Balah Governorate, especially the area of Deir al- Balah city/camp. Conditions in shelters will likely continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and increased sheltering in open spaces.of food, lack of safe access to water, and an increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. Full resumption of cross border water pipeline activity is unlikely, and the functionality of remaining wells and water distribution systems will likely decline. Wastewater treatment plants are likely to remain non-functioning. Solid waste management will continue to be limited. Healthcare availability and access will likely continue to decline, including due to lack of humanitarian access and inadequate delivery of critical supplies as well as a decline in the functionality of remaining health centres. Infectious disease risk will continue to increase due to the extreme deterioration of the overall health environment. Low and declining food availability, access, and utilization will likely lead to extreme gaps in food consumption and a collapse of coping capacities for the estimated 300,000 people (50 percent of the population) experiencing IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe); while large food consumptions gaps are expected for the 300,00 people (50 percent of the population) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). With the drivers of acute malnutrition expected to worsen (infectious diseases expected to increase, dietary diversity still severely restricted), the nutritional status of the people of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis will likely continue to deteriorate towards critical levels of acute malnutrition (IPC AMN Phase 4) during this period. Rafah Governorate The onset of a major ground operation in Rafah Governorate will likely drive a significant increase in acute food insecurity alongside other severe humanitarian consequences. The situation is projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), though with nearly half (45 percent) of the population (around 600,000 people) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), up from 25 percent in the current period. The whole population of Rafah will likely be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, including over one third (about 464,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 12 percent (about 265,000 people) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Relative improvement in access into and within Rafah have been observed compared to the previous analysis, with the opening of a second border crossing in Kerem Shalom allowing more humanitarian and commercial supply for aid and markets, However, for the projection period, considering the most likely scenario of a major ground operation in Rafah, the humanitarian access and space are likely to reduce due to the escalating hostilities and populations will face continued and repeated displacement in search of “safer” areas. As many IDPs already face poor food security, nutrition, health and WASH outcomes, further displacement will likely cause further deterioration. Existing mitigation measures from humanitarian services or programmes are likely to be disrupted by conflict or sizeable displacements and may cause further family separation or marginalization of the most vulnerable. Local production will be minimal and difficult to access and agricultural activities (crop production, livestock herding or fishing) will either not be pursued or remain very limited due to lack of agricultural inputs, access to assets or land and geographical concentration of displaced populations. Further disruptions to market supplies and prices are likely to continue and decrease access to food through markets. Markets or traders may be displaced along with the population, impacting their ability to restock or remain functional, especially as populations move further away from border crossings and fewer trucks enter the Gaza
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF33 Strip. Market-based interventions will continue to be challenged by high levels of displacement, including of the staff of financial service providers, and a wider loss of enabling condition, including an adequate electricity supply and functional telecommunications services, physical cash availability and access, and functioning markets able to absorb any rapid increases in demand. Physical access to humanitarian assistance and markets will be hindered. There will likely be a disruption in social support systems (e.g. community kitchens) and increased tensions within the community. Rising temperatures and declining access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene will likely lead to challenges in safe food storage and preparation, and a rise in waterborne diseases or food borne illnesses. Scarcity of firewood will force people to resort to using unsafe materials, increasing health risks. Explosive remnants will raise concerns about personal, food and water safety. Health outcomes and morbidity are expected to deteriorate in this period and even more so with increased overcrowding, further displacement and/or lower access to health services. A major decrease in food availability, access, and utilization will likely cause extreme gaps in food consumption and the exhaustion of people’s coping strategies. Acute malnutrition is likely to increase towards IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) as food insecurity, the health environment, and infant and young childcare and feeding practices deteriorate due to conflict escalation, displacement, and reduced delivery of, and access to multi-sector humanitarian assistance.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF34 COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS In comparison to the previous analysis (projection period December 2023 – 7 February 2024), the total share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) across the Gaza Strip continues to increase, from 26 percent to 30 percent in the current period (mid-February to mid-March 2024) and 50% in the projection period (mid-March to mid-July). In the northern governorates, the share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) increased from 30 percent to 55 percent in the current period and 70% in the projected period, representing an increase of about 100,000 people and 530,000 people, respectively. Figure 24. Population phase classifications in the Gaza StripFigure 25. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in the Gaza Strip Figure 27. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Northern Governorates Figure 29. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Southern GovernoratesFigure 26. Population phase classifications in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates Figure 28. Population phase classifications in Southern Governorates
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF35 From the first WFP survey of November-December 2023 to its second survey of December 2023-February 2024, the proportion of households reporting a Poor FCS increased 14 percentage points to 66 percent in the northern governorates, nine points to 27 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and remained steady at 22 percent in Rafah Governorate. Over the same two surveys, the proportion of households reporting Severe and Very Severe HHS results increased by 44 percentage points to 84 percent in the northern governorates, 35 percentage points to 57 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and 37 percentage points to 56 percent in Rafah Governorate. 107 Figure 30. FCS in the Gaza Strip Figure 31. HHS trends in the Gaza Strip
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF36 RISK OF FAMINE ANALYSIS As per the IPC tools and technical guidance, an IPC statement on the risk of Famine differs from a Famine classification. While a projected Famine classification is based on the most likely scenario, the risk of Famine refers to the worst case scenario that has a reasonable and realistic chance of happening. The risk of Famine is only a statement and not a classification and was designed to complement the standard IPC projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of a potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated. The elements considered when developing the worst case scenario are described below. Factor/element Risk of Famine Scenario - Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis GovernoratesRisk of Famine Scenario – Rafah Governorate Primary Drivers ConflictConflict would escalate to levels seen in December 2023-January 2024 when a major ground operation was conducted in Bureij and Maghazi camps of Deir al-Balah Governorate. This would include expanding and intensified ground operations across all central camps alongside neighbourhood-level clearing operations throughout Khan Younis Governorate, frequent armed actor clashes, and increased bombardment (air, land, sea).. Expanded ground operations within Deir al-Balah Governorate would not necessarily be concurrent with a major ground operation on Rafah. The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip would intensify.Conflict would rapidly escalate, including the onset of a new, wide-ranging, and large- scale ground operation throughout Rafah Governorate and concentrated on Rafah city, intense and frequent armed actor clashes, and a large increase in bombardment (air, land, sea). The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip would intensify. Humanitarian AccessHumanitarian access, including for the delivery of life-saving multi-sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, to Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorate would severely reduce, including due to the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, the later resumption of major ground operations in Deir al-Balah Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), the closure of the Rafah border crossing and reduction in crossings at Kerem Shalom, and public order collapse.Humanitarian access to Rafah Governorate, including for the delivery of life-saving multi- sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, would severely reduce. Access to populations remaining within Rafah city during the major ground operation would be completely lost, while access to the extreme concentration of displaced people in the Rafah portion of the Al-Mawasi area would be intermittent. This disruption would result from the onset of major, rapid ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), the closure of the Rafah border crossing and reduction in crossings at Kerem Shalom, and public order collapse.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF37 Factor/element Risk of Famine Scenario - Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis GovernoratesRisk of Famine Scenario – Rafah Governorate Secondary Drivers Civil unrestAlready strained, public order would collapse, involving widespread and intense civil unrest, including looting, riots, vigilantism, escalating violence among various social groups, and a wider breakdown of social cohesion. This collapse would heavily constrain humanitarian operations through reducing access and inhibiting the ability to conduct critical activities like distributions, especially to the most vulnerable population groups. The United Nations presence within the Gaza Strip, including offices and storage facilities, would be particularly impacted, including by violence and looting. The loss of social cohesion would involve the loss of most remaining socially- based coping, such as receiving food or cash through social networks outside of immediate family.Already strained, public order would collapse, involving widespread and intense civil unrest, including looting, riots, vigilantism, escalating violence among various social groups, and a wider breakdown of social cohesion. This collapse would heavily constrain humanitarian operations through reducing access and inhibiting the ability to conduct critical activities like distributions, especially to the most vulnerable population groups. The United Nations presence within the Gaza Strip, including offices and storage facilities, would be particularly impacted, including by violence and looting. The loss of social cohesion would involve the loss of most remaining socially- based coping, such as receiving food or cash through social networks outside of immediate family. DisplacementRapid mass displacement would occur, mostly to the Al-Mawasi area across Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates, with an extreme concentration of IDPs there. Outflow to Deir al-Balah Governorate would be limited. No mass exit of civilians from the Gaza Strip is considered. Rapid mass displacement would occur, mostly to the Al-Mawasi area across Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates, with an extreme concentration of IDPs there. A small civilian population in Rafah city would be isolated and inaccessible. Outflow to Deir al-Balah Governorate would be limited. No mass exit of civilians from the Gaza Strip is considered. Shelter conditionsShelter conditions would deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and a large increase in sheltering in open spaces. Shelter conditions would collapse, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and widespread sheltering in open spaces.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF38 Impact on Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition elements Food availability (from assistance, private sector and production)Food Availability would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates, including due to intensified besiegement, severe humanitarian access constraints, conflict escalation, severely reduced market functionality, and extreme population concentration. Food Availability would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate, including due to intensified besiegement, severe humanitarian access constraints, conflict escalation, severely reduced market functionality, and extreme population concentration in the Al-Mawasi area. Food access (physical, social, prices)Food Access would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates due to declining food availability, freedom of movement, and reduced humanitarian and commercial traffic. Food Access would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate due to large declines in food availability, freedom of movement, and humanitarian and commercial traffic, including for populations remaining within Rafah city during conflict escalation and those in extremely crowded conditions within the Al-Mawasi area. UtilizationUtilization would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates. This includes challenges to the safe storage and preparation of food, lack of access to water, and a rapidly increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. Utilization would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate. This includes severe challenges to the safe storage and preparation of food, extreme lack of access to water, and a rapidly increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. HealthThe provision of healthcare would largely end, driven by extremely inadequate delivery of critical supplies and a final collapse in the functionality of the remaining health centres. The provision of healthcare would largely end, driven by extremely inadequate delivery of critical supplies and a final collapse in the functionality of the remaining health centres. WASHAccess to water – safe or unsafe – would be extremely limited, with no cross-border water distribution, a limited number of functional wells, and limited water trucking. Wastewater treatment facilities would remain non-functioning. Access to water – safe or unsafe – would be extremely limited, with no cross-border water distribution, a limited number of functional wells, and limited water trucking. Wastewater treatment facilities would remain non- functioning.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF39 Conclusions on the Risk of Famine Following the Famine Review Committee Recommendations, the risk of Famine conclusions for the two unit of analysis has been merged. Given the continued catastrophic food security situation across the entire Gaza Strip, a risk of Famine analysis was done for Deir al Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah Governorates. This analysis considered whether Famine will occur under a reasonable worst-case scenario during the projection period through 15 July 2024. An analysis for the northern governorates was not performed as the FRC is projecting Famine in those areas under the most likely scenario. The FRC considered the assumptions for the worst-case scenario made by the Analysis Team regarding the evolution of the conflict and the expected impacts on food security and acute malnutrition to be plausible for all three governorates. The intensity of the conflict and the extent of humanitarian space will determine the magnitude and directions of population movement within the Gaza Strip. It is currently impossible to ascertain the destination(s) of these human-made displacements, however any further concentration of population in any already highly populated area, for instance as a consequence of an escalation in the Rafah Governorate driving hundreds of thousands towards Al-Mawasi and the surrounding areas, will significantly increase the risk of Famine. The FRC considered the risk of Famine statement made by the Analysis Team about Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates to be plausible. Given the high degree of uncertainty and fluidity of the situation with displacements likely forcing people to move to and from multiple localities, the FRC felt it was appropriate to group together all three of the southern governates for a risk of Famine analysis rather than to separate the governates as different units of analysis. Forced displacement will increase the risk of Famine because of overcrowding, poor supply of food, water, and medicines, and limited provision of health and wash services, which will expose the displaced population to epidemic outbreaks. The FRC reached technical consensus that, under a reasonable worst-case scenario, there is a risk of Famine across the entire middle and southern areas of the Gaza Strip during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July 2024. The cessation of hostilities together with the restoration of humanitarian space to deliver multi-sectoral assistance and restore services are essential steps in mitigating the risk of Famine.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF40 CONCLUSIONS OF THE FAMINE REVIEW COMMITTEE (FRC) This report is the second time that the Famine Review Committee has reviewed analysis conducted by a multi-agency, multi-sectoral Analysis Team to determine the current and projected food security situation in the Gaza Strip. The first analysis, conducted in December 2023, determined that there was a risk of Famine within the projection period of December 2023 to May 2024, and that the risk would increase for each day that the intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened. The findings of the FRC’s latest review confirm that Famine is now projected and imminent in the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates and is expected to become manifest between mid-March 2024 and May 2024. The Famine threshold for acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and the steeply increasing trend in malnutrition data indicates that it is highly likely that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. The FRC expects the upward trend in non-trauma mortality to accelerate and for all Famine thresholds to be passed imminently. It is vital to note that the projected Famine can be prevented or alleviated. All evidence points towards a major acceleration of deaths and malnutrition. Waiting for a retrospective Famine classification before acting is indefensible. The FRC concludes that Famine is imminent unless there is an immediate cessation of hostilities and full access is granted to provide food, water, medicines, and protection of civilians as well as to restore and provide health, water, and sanitation services, and energy (electricity, diesel, and other fuel) to the population in the northern governorates. In the current period (leading up to mid-March), the FRC finds the conclusions of the IPC Analysis Team for the northern governorates to be plausible (IPC Phase 4 Emergency). However, the FRC highlighted that: (i) Famine thresholds for acute food insecurity have already been surpassed; (ii) Famine thresholds for acute malnutrition (Extremely Critical) have likely already been surpassed; (iii) It is likely that these extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet translated into a Crude Death Rate above 2/10,000/day. The likelihood of having surpassed Under-Five Death Rate thresholds (4/10,000/day for children) is higher but impossible to ascertain. For the Governorates of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah , the FRC considers the findings of the Analysis Team for the current period (IPC Phase 4 – Emergency) to be plausible. The projection period identified by the Analysis Team is mid-March 2024 to mid-July 2024. The FRC considers the most likely scenarios and conclusions of the Analysis Team for the projected period (IPC Phase 4 – Emergency) to be plausible. However, given the high uncertainty over how the situation will evolve and a high degree of fluidity given the intensity of the conflict, forced displacements, and constricted humanitarian access in the next 4 months, the FRC recommends grouping all southern governates together for a risk of Famine analysis . Thus, for the combined southern and middle governates, the FRC concludes that there is a risk of Famine during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July in a worst-case scenario with a reasonable chance of occurring. The primary drivers of the food security, nutrition, and mortality situation in Gaza Strip are the conflict intensity and highly constrained/restricted access, defined as the ability of humanitarian and private actors to deliver the necessary supplies and services to the most vulnerable population. Only an immediate and sustainable cessation of hostility, accompanied by a sustained supply of food, water, medicines, protection services, and provision of health and sanitation services to the population can reduce acute malnutrition and excess mortality. Provision of electricity/fuel supplies for water trucking, pumps, health services, restoration of agricultural production, and other essential needs are also critical, along with support for unrestricted civilian communications within and outside of the Gaza Strip. The actions needed to prevent Famine require an immediate political decision for a ceasefire together with a significant and immediate increase in humanitarian and commercial access to the entire population of Gaza. If this does not happen fully and immediately, even if Famine is avoided in the near term, the impact on mortality and the lives of Palestinians now, and in future generations, will increase markedly with every day.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF41 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION Famine can be halted. The rapidly escalating hunger crisis in the Gaza Strip must immediately be curbed. This requires putting an end to the hostilities, mobilizing necessary resources and ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza. Response Priorities Overall recommendations • Restore humanitarian access to the entire Gaza Strip. • Stop the fast-paced deterioration of the food security, health and nutrition situation leading to excess mortality through: (i) the restoration of health, nutrition, and WASH services and the protection of civilians; and (ii) the provision of safe, nutritious, and sufficient food to all the population in need. • The sustained supply of sufficient aid commodities, including but not limited to food, medicines, specialist nutrition products, fuel, and other necessities should be allowed to enter and move throughout the entire Gaza Strip by road. Traffic of commercial goods should also be fully resumed to meet the volume of commodities required. Programmatic recommendations • Deliver acute malnutrition treatment services, specifically CMAM and IYCF-E services throughout the Gaza Strip, with a particular emphasis on opening stabilization centres in the north. • Supply ready-to-use formula for non-breastfed infants and ensure sufficient access to safe drinking water if preparation is required. • Provide complimentary foods and micronutrient supplements for young children, as well as pregnant and lactating women, the chronically ill, and the elderly. • Restore the functioning of market infrastructures and bakeries combined with cash-based interventions where feasible. • Rehabilitate food production systems as soon as possible, including horticulture, livestock, and fishing. Situation Monitoring and Update Considering the volatility of the context and the changing environment, the following risk factor elements should be monitored continuously: • Intensity and extension of hostilities • Humanitarian access to supply food, water medicines, non-food items • Functionality and access to the health system and WASH supplies and services • Entry of commodities though the Gaza Strip whether through commercial trucks or food assistance by truck or airdrops • Population displacements and conditions in collective centres and scattered sites • Morbidity and disease outbreaks • Acute malnutrition and mortality, with a distinction of the trauma and non-trauma causes
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF42 PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY Similar to the previous analysis conducted in December 2023, the IPC Global Partnership completed an IPC analysis for the Gaza Strip to inform critical humanitarian information needs. Country led IPC analyses are the cornerstone of the IPC process and will continue to be so. In the case of the Gaza Strip, with the onset of the conflict and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe, there was a critical need for an IPC analysis. Without an active country Technical Working Group, the IPC Global Partnership made use of its non-TWG led analysis process to inform decision-making around the crisis in the Gaza Strip. The analysis was conducted remotely from 26 February to 1 March by over 40 experts from 18 agencies, applying standard IPC protocols, and made use of publicly available data from a wide range of courses on the conditions in the Gaza Strip (see below). Based on IPC protocols, the level of evidence of this analysis was assessed as “Medium” (level 2) for each of the three units of analysis. At the analysis completion, the Famine Review Committee was activated to review the Analysis Team’s findings. Their conclusions were adopted by the Analysis Team. Sources The main sources of data used to conduct this analysis include: • FAO, A rapid geospatial damage assessment of the 2023 conflict in the Gaza Strip on agricultural land and infrastructure , February 2024. • Food Security Sector, Sitrep #7 - 13 , 1 December 2023 to March 2024, FSS Gaza Updates. • Gaza Cash Working Group, Emergency MPCA – Gaza 2023, Joint PDM results overview , 15 February 2024. • Global Nutrition Cluster, Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis / Gaza , February 2024. • Health Cluster, Dashboard . • iDMC, Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip , February 2014. • London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024 • OCHA, Damage to Gaza’s agricultural sector , 30 September 2014. • OCHA, Flash Updates #70 - 136 , 15 December 2023 – 11 March 2024. • OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshots - Gaza Strip , March 2024. • OCHA, Population Estimates , February 2024. • Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey , 2022 - Annual Report , 2022. • Shelter Cluster Palestine, Shelter in Crisis: Joint Advocacy Statement , 24 November 2023. • UNICEF, Post-distribution Monitoring Repor t, 29-31 January 2024. • UNITAR and UNOSAT, I mpact of the 2014 Conflict in the Gaza Strip , September 2014. • UNOSAT, Agricultural damage assessments , 17 November 2023, 13 December 2023, 31 January 2024. • UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch tracking , March 2024. • Van den Hoek, J. and Scher, C., Gaza Strip Damage Maps, 2023-2024, Decentralized Damage Mapping Group. • WASH Cluster, Rapid WASH Assessment Preliminary Findings, 21 February 2024. • WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #4-7 , December 2023 – March 2024. • WFP , mVAM Survey , 19 February 2024. • World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy , December 2023.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF43 What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity? The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on interna - tional standards. The IPC consists of four mu - tually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consen - sus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and compa - rability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and pro - gramming. For the IPC, acute food insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity. Contact for further Information IPC Global Support Unit www.ipcinfo.org IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in the Gaza Strip. Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Contre la Faim, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC, FAO, FEWS NET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP , UNICEF, WFP , WHO and the World Bank. Phase 1 None/Minimal Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.Phase 2 Stressed Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress- coping strategies.Phase 3 Crisis Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.Phase 4 Emergency Households either: • have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidationPhase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine Households experience an extreme lack of food and/or cannot meet other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For Famine Classi cation, area needs to have extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.Acute Food Insecurity Phase name and descriptionLimitations of the Analysis Given the major access constraints, data on food security outcomes was collected using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). Quality concerns regarding the use of this methodology including the representativeness, and potential biases associated with mobile network coverage and ownership were discussed at length during the previous round of IPC analysis (for data collected in November 2023). The Analysis Team concluded that the data meets the requirements set by the IPC and were the same for this analysis, especially considering the number of observations. Through the efforts of partners, gaps in nutrition information were filled through screening information. The high degree of volatility around the conflict limits the ability to consider longer analysis periods. Scenarios on the evolution of the conflict were developed in conjunction with conflict experts to the best of their knowledge and expertise.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF44 ENDNOTES 1 PCBS Labour Force Survey, 2022 - Annual Report , 2022, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2658.pdf 2 World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy , December 2023, https://thedocs. worldbank.org/en/doc/7600aee6c75eff4cf9b71ea1fe4016db-0280012023/original/NoteWBG-dec11-CLEAN.pdf 3 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Occupied Palestinian Territories , January 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ humanitarian-needs-overview-2023 4 OCHA and REACH, Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 2022 conducted in the occupied Palestinian territory , July 2022, https://www.ochaopt.org/msna/2022/MSNA-Cross-cutting-Report-2022.pdf 5 WFP , Palestine Country Brief , September 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/wfp- palestine-country-brief-september-2022 6 Health Cluster Dashboard, Occupied Palestinian Territory , March 2024, Microsoft Power BI 7 OCHA, Escalation in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #1 as of 18:00, 7 October 2023, https://www.unocha. org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/escalation-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-1-1800-7- october-2023 8 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #21, 27 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-21 9 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #56, 1 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-56 10 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #116, 12 Feb 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-116 11 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update , 26 December 2023, https://www.understandingwar.org/ backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2023 12 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update , 28 February 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ iran-update-february-28-2024 13 WFP , UN Food Agency pauses deliveries to the North of Gaza , 20 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/un-food- agency-pauses-deliveries-north-gaza 14 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024 6 March 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024 15 ACAPS, Palestine - Humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip: five months into the recent hostilities , 8 March 2024, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240308_ACAPS_Palesstine_Gaza_humanitarian_ access_note.pdf 16 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #8, 14 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-8 17 IDF Spokesman, IDF evacuation route announcement (Tweet), 13 October 2023, X, https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/ status/1712846493747495223 18 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #56, 1 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-56 19 IASC, Statement by Principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Humanitarian chiefs will not take part in unilateral proposals to create “safe zones” in Gaza , 16 November 2023, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/about-inter- agency-standing-committee/statement-principals-inter-agency-standing-committee-humanitarian-chiefs-will-not- take-part 20 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #20, 26 October 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-20-enarhe 21 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #49, 24 November 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-49
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF45 22 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #6, 12 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-6 23 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #117, 13 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-117 24 OCHA, Shelters and IDPs dashboard , February 2024. 25 UNHCR, Gaza Crisis 2023 Shelter Situation Update , 7 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-crisis-2023-shelter-situation-update-7th-january-2024 26 OCHA, Shelters and IDPs dashboard , February 2024 27 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #117, 13 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-117 28 Van den Hoek, J. and Scher, C., Gaza Strip Damage Maps , Decentralized Damage Mapping Group, 2023-2024, https:// www.conflict-damage.org/ 29 UNOSAT, Agricultural damage assessments , 17 November 2023, 13 December 2023, 31 January 2024, https://unosat. org/products/ 30 FAO, A rapid geospatial damage assessment of the 2023 conflict in the Gaza Strip on agricultural land and infrastructure , February 2024, https://www.nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition- vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf 31 FAO, Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 15 February 2024 , 28 February 2024, http://www.fao.org/3/cc9792en/cc9792en.pdf 32 WFP , mVAM Survey , 19 February 2024 33 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch tracking , March 2024. 34 WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #6 , 2 February 2024, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP- 0000156177/download/?_ga=2.88114139.1989739434.1710023558-981095887.1696492379 From 19 December 2023 to 21 January 2024, WFP sought to contact 72 shops but received a response from only 11 shops, of which 7 were operational. This limited response was attributed to frequent telecommunication disruptions in the Gaza Strip during the mentioned period. The primary focus was on Rafah, where 6 shops participated in the WFP survey on January 21, and one in Khan Younis. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Food Security Sector (Palestine), Sector Update #13 , 19 January 2024, https://fscluster.org/state-of-palestine/ document/fss-gaza-updates 38 Gaza Cash Working Group, Meeting Minutes , 6 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 39 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact , 19 February 2024 at 15:00, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-19-february-2024-1500 40 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024, 6 March 2024, https://www. ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024?_gl=1*tdp1i0*_ ga*MTEwNjk4NDg0LjE3MDk3NDIwNzg.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwOTgwMDIxOC4yLjEuMTcwOTgwMTI3OS41NS4wLjA 41 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 42 WFP , UN Food Agency pauses deliveries to the North of Gaza , 20 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/un-food- agency-pauses-deliveries-north-gaza 43 WFP , WFP food deliveries to northern Gaza face further setbacks, 5 March 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-food- deliveries-northern-gaza-face-further-setbacks 44 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #136 , 11 March 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-136
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF46 45 Gaza Cash Working Group, Emergency MPCA – Gaza 2023, Joint PDM results overview , 15 February 2024, https://drive. google.com/drive/folders/17wI2GlSITludiA126Bry6L37E4aO0Plx 46 Ibid. 47 Gaza Cash Working Group, Meeting Minutes , 13 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 48 FAO, European Union and CIRAD, Food Systems Profile - Palestine, 2023, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc7323en 49 ECHO, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Palestine, 19 December 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/humanitarian-implementation-plan-hip-palestine-echopsebud202491000-version-1 50 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #71 , 16 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-71 51 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #71 , 16 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-71 ; OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #99, 22 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-99 52 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 53 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-January 2024 , 5 February 2024, https://www.unocha.org/ publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-january-2024 54 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #54 , November 2023, https://www.unocha.org/publications/ report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-54 55 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 56 WFP , mVAM Survey, 19 February 2024. 57 In the November - December mVAM survey of WFP , the sampling design was not designed to be representative at governorate-level for Rafah, nor for any other single governorate. Only 63 completed questionnaires were recorded in that survey round for Rafah governorate. Comparisons between the November-December 2023 survey round and the December 2023-February 2024 survey round for Rafah governorate are only indicative given the non- representative sample from the first round. Additionally, the continued displacement recorded in the governorate of Rafah after 5 December 2023 calls for additional caution when comparing Rafah governorate results across the two survey rounds. 58 WFP , mVAM Survey , 6 December 2023 and 19 February 2024. 59 Ibid. 60 Food Economy Group, The practitioner’s guide to the Household Economy Analysis , p 141. https://foodeconomy.com/ wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-Practitioners-Guide-to-HEA.pdf 61 This paragraph is uniquely informed by the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster. Most of the text is a direct quote. The report is based on: (1) UNICEF, Post-distribution Monitoring Report , 29-31 January 2024. In North Gaza, the UNICEF PDM survey gathered responses on the diet diversity for 47 children aged 6-23 month in North Gaza; in Khan Younis: PBW=31, children aged 6-23 month = 31; Deir Al Balah: PBW = 34, children aged 6-23 month = 103, Rafah: PBW = 299, children aged 6-23 month = 270. (2) WFP , mVAM CATI Survey. 62 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario- Based Health Impact Projections (gaza-projections.org) 63 WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #6 , 2 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/publications/202324-wfp- palestine-monthly-market-dashboard 64 Ibid. 65 WHO, oPT emergency Situation Update Issue 22 , 30 January 2024, https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/Sitrep_-_ issue_22.pdf?ua=1
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF47 66 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #88 , 9 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-88 67 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #97 , 19 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-97 68 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 69 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #89 , 10 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-89-enar#:~:text=A%20total%20of%2019%20 homes,demolished%20and%2078%20people%20displaced 70 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incidents 71 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #115 , 9 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-115 72 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incident) 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 FAO, Food systems profile on Palestine, 2023 https://www.fao.org/3/cc7323en/cc7323en.pdf ; PCBS and PWA, Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day, 22 March 2021, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post. aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4468 76 Fanack Water, Why is there a water crisis in Gaza? , 201521, https://water.fanack.com/why-gaza-is-running-out-of-fresh- water/ 77 PCBS and PWA, Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day, 22 March 2021, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post. aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4468 78 FAO, Food systems profile on Palestine, 2023 , https://www.fao.org/3/cc7323en/cc7323en.pdf 79 WASH Cluster, Gaza Strip: WASH facilities damage assessment , February 2024. 80 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 14 February 2024 , Meeting minutes -URL 84 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting minutes - URL 85 Ibid. 86 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #124 , 22 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-124 87 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #91 , 12 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-91 88 WASH Cluster, Rapid WASH Assessment Preliminary Findings, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 89 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 90 NRC, Gaza: Israel’s military operation in Rafah would be fatal for displaced civilians and humanitarian aid, 8 February 2024, https://www.nrc.no/news/2024/february/gaza-israels-military-operation-in-rafah-would-be-fatal-for-displaced- civilians-and-humanitarian-aid/
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF48 91 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incident 92 UNRWA, UNRWA Situation Report # 80 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, 21 February 2024, https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation- report-80-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-Jerusalem?__cf_chl_tk=Fbky2q_ a29r0Fy3TD8TlVYbtpJ1PGIxBrGSYCIw7nMw-1710157363-0.0.1.1-1727 93 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 94 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #105 , 30 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-105-enarhe 95 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 96 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #124 , 22 February 2024, https://www.unocha.org/ publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-124 97 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 24 January 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 98 UNICEF, State of Palestine Humanitarian Situation Report No. 3 : 1 January to 31 December 2022, March 2023, https:// reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unicef-state-palestine-humanitarian-situation-report-no-3-1- january-31-december-2022 99 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 100 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 24 January 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 101 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 21 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 102 WASH Cluster. Sanitation data in collective centers shared with the IPC Analysis Team , 28 February 2024. 103 UNRWA, Situation Report #64 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem , 15 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unrwa-situation-report-64-situation-gaza-strip-and- west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-all-information-11-13-january-2024-valid-13-january-2024-2230-enar 104 Global Nutrition Cluster, Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis / Gaza , February 2024, https://www. nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition-vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf 105 In an age-balanced sample, approximately two thirds (~66%) of the sample is over 2 years old. 106 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario- Based Health Impact Projections (gaza-projections.org) 107 In the November - December mVAM survey of WFP , the sampling design was not designed to be representative at governorate-level for Rafah, nor for any other single governorate. Only 63 completed questionnaires were recorded in that survey round for Rafah governorate. Comparisons between the November-December 2023 survey round and the December 2023-February 2024 survey round for Rafah governorate are only indicative given the non- representative sample from the first round. Additionally, the continued displacement recorded in the governorate of Rafah after 5 December 2023 calls for additional caution when comparing Rafah governorate results across the two survey rounds.

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Naxalite Killed During Encounter With Security Personnel In Dantewada District - Redspark (Redspark)


Dantewada District, March 19, 2024: A Naxalite was killed in an encounter with security personnel in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district on Tuesday, a police official announced to the press today.

The firefight took place in the morning in a forest near Purangel village under Kirandul police station area when a joint team of personnel from different security forces was out on an anti-Naxal operation, Dantewada Superintendent of Police Gaurav Rai declared.

Personnel belonging to the District Reserve Guard, Bastar Fighters, both units of the state police, and the Central Reserve Police Force’s 111th, 230th, 231st battalions were involved in the operation, the police official remarked.

After the exchange of fire stopped, the body of a Naxalite, a weapon, some explosives and other Naxal items were recovered from the spot, the police official stated.

A number of Naxalites were also reported to be injured in the gun battle, the police official said.

The identity of the slain Naxalite was yet to be ascertained, the SP commented, adding that a search operation was still underway in the area.

Source : https://www.deccanherald.com/india/chhattisgarh/naxalite-killed-in-encounter-with-security-personnel-in-chhattisgarh-2943011


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pc 19 marzo - Sbirri torturatori nel carcere di Foggia (proletari comunisti)



Arrestati 10 agenti penitenziari

Dieci agenti di polizia penitenziaria sono stati arrestati con l’accusa di tortura, abuso d’ufficio e abuso di autorità su due detenuti nel carcere di Foggia

Due detenuti sarebbero stati pestati l’11 agosto 2023 nel carcere di Foggia. Dopo le percosse, secondo quanto emerso dalle indagini della Procura, gli agenti arrestati avrebbero predisposto e sottoscritto atti

falsi finalizzati a nascondere le violenze compiute e a impedire che venissero emesse diagnosi ospedaliere per le lesioni riportate dai due carcerati. Per questo motivo, i dieci agenti in questione sono accusati anche di omissione di atti d’ufficio, danneggiamento, concussione, falsità ideologica commessa da un pubblico ufficiale in atti pubblici, soppressione, distruzione e occultamento di atti veri.

Nel corso delle indagini sarebbero state inoltre accettate anche minacce e promesse di ritorsioni attraverso le quali gli indagati avrebbero costretto le vittime a sottoscrivere falsi verbali di dichiarazioni in cui fornivano una versione dei fatti molto diversa da quella poi appurata dalle indagini. Gli agenti arrestati avrebbero fatto in modo che le due vittime, pur avendo riportato evidenti lesioni dopo le violenze, attestassero di essersi feriti in altri modi e che non vi fosse stata nessuna aggressione da parte delle autorità all’interno del carcere di Foggia.

I dieci agenti arrestati si trovano al momento in custodia cautelare in carcere e devono rispondere tutti, a vario titolo, di tortura, abuso di autorità, abuso di ufficio e omissione di atti d’ufficio, oltre che di soppressione, occultamento e distruzione di atti veri.


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8. mars: Massene aksepterer ikke støtte til folkemord! (Tjen Folket)


Av redaksjonen i Tjen Folket Media.


På 8. mars forsøkte provokatører i Oslo og i Sandefjord å bruke arbeiderkvinnenes internasjonale kampdag til å støtte folkemordet staten Israel begår i Gaza.

I Oslo møtte en pro-israelsk gruppe opp for å spre anklager om overgrep mot israelske kvinner av den palestinske nasjonale motstandsbevegelsen. Dette er ingenting annet enn et forsøk på å legitimere folkemordet i Gaza, gjennom å dehumanisere palestinerne og fremstille dem som dyr som må bli utryddet for å sikre staten Israels eksistens. De sprer den samme gamle reaksjonære forestillingen om at det ikke er rett å gjøre opprør. Denne provokasjonen ble konfrontert og beseiret av hundrevis av 8. marstog-deltakere.

I Sandefjord møtte to personer opp med et israelsk flagg. Det er rapportert at de ble konfrontert og stanset. Sionistflagget ble beslaglagt og tent på av masser. Ifølge rapporter fra borgerlig media og pro-israelske grupper ble en av provokatørene slått og sparket av flere folk. Han ble deretter sendt til sykehuset i Tønsberg, hvor han måtte være ett døgn angivelig med store smerter i hode og nakke – ifølge de som støtter folkemordet i Gaza var dette et «brutalt angrep».

Hva er det mest «brutale», å angivelig banke opp en reaksjonær pro-israelsk aktivist, eller å drepe mer enn 31.000 mennesker, inkludert mer enn 12.000 barn?

Hver time siden 7. oktober er 15 personer drept i Gaza – seks av dem barn og 12 bygninger er blitt ødelagt. Dette skjer fortsatt, og palestinerne blir presset inn i en mer og mer desperat situasjon. Befolkningen på Gaza blir tvangsforflyttet til et mindre og mindre område, under tung israelsk bombing og beleiring, med en økende desperat mangel på mat og rent drikkevann. Barn har allerede begynt å dø av sult og alt peker frem på et kommende sprang i omfanget av folkemordet, eller en tvangsforflytning av befolkningen i Gaza til Egypt.

Imperialistene kommer ikke til å gjøre noe for å stoppe folkemordet. Deres internasjonale lover, definisjoner av krigsforbrytelser og forbrytelser mot «menneskeheten», er ikke verdt papiret de er skrevet på, så fort de ikke tjener imperialistenes egne interesser. Støtte til det palestinske folket og fordømmelse av folkemordet blir slått hardt ned på av imperialistiske stater og lakei-statene deres i den tredje verden, til og med i de arabiske landene.

Yankee-imperialismen er den politiske, økonomiske og militære hovedstøtten til folkemordet, og det er deres interesser staten Israel i hovedsak tjener. Russisk imperialisme vil fokusere på sin angrepskrig mot Ukraina og de vil unngå en regional krig i Midtøsten. Kinesisk imperialisme vil forsøke å dempe den tilspissede situasjonen i Rødehavet, ettersom Jemens angrep mot Israel og imperialistene er en trussel mot de kinesiske økonomiske interesser. Tysk imperialisme, som til ingens overraskelse gir full støtte til folkemord, har etablert Israels sikkerhet som Tysklands «raison d’état» – et juridisk begrep som betyr at dette spørsmålet står over alle statens lover og all moral. Norsk imperialisme er tilsluttet krigen på Israelsk side, gjennom sin militære deltakelse i imperialismens operasjoner i Rødehavet, og den bidrar politisk til folkemordet ved å fordømme den palestinske motstanden.

Lakei-regimene i Palestinas naboland, og flere andre arabiske land hvor folket viser en enorm støtte til og solidaritet med det palestinske folket, har ikke mer enn tomme ord å gi til støtte for det Palestina. Flere av dem slår hardt ned på solidaritetsdemonstrasjoner, for eksempel Jordan, hvor herskerne bruker tåregass og opprørspoliti mot folket for å beskytte den israelske ambassaden. Egypt gjør det samme, og er også delaktig i blokaden av Gaza. Den Israel-utpekte quislingregjeringen på Vestbredden ledet av Mahmoud Abbas, har til og med skutt palestinske masser som protesterte mot folkemordet i Gaza. Deres forbrytelser mot folket inkluderer mordet av 12 år gamle Razan Nasrallah, som ble skutt av styrkene til «de palestinske selvstyremyndighetene».

Det palestinske folket fortsetter sin heltemodige motstand etter flere tiår med israelsk beleiring av det som har blitt verdens største konsentrasjonsleir. Den palestinske væpnede nasjonale motstandsfronten fortsetter den militære kampen mot okkupanten. Israel har ikke klart å tilintetgjøre kampviljen til det palestinske folket eller deres væpnede styrker. Nord-Israel og israelske mål i de okkuperte Golanhøydene blir konstant beskutt med rakker av libanesiske Hizbollah. Regjeringen i Jemen, som kalles «Houthi-militsen» av imperialistene, slår harde slag mot Israel og imperialismen i Rødehavet. Verdens folk og spesielt de arabiske folkene støtter det palestinske folket med kraftfulle solidaritetsmarkeringer og aksjoner.

Internasjonalt Kommunistisk Forbund – IKF skriver det følgende i sin uttalelse til støtte for det palestinske folkets uovervinnelige væpna nasjonale motstandskamp 8. oktober 2023:

«Ingen grusomhet eller terror fra staten Israel vil være i stand til å stanse den heroiske motstanden, men vil øke vreden til verdens folk, som vil reise seg for å bekjempe dem til de er druknet i havet. Våg å kjempe, våg å vinne!»

Vreden til verdens folk kan ikke temmes, og vil bare vokse sterkere så lenge staten Israel fortsetter å utvikle sitt folkemord i Gaza. Skal man kunne føle seg trygg om man offentlig støtter eller legitimerer folkemord? Skal de som politisk, økonomisk eller militært bidrar til folkemord føle seg trygge? Verdens folk kommer ikke til å glemme forbrytelsene som blir begått av imperialistene og deres lakeier! Ingen motstand mot dette folkemordet er for «brutal»!

Det er rett å gjøre opprør!

Proletarer, verdens undertrykte folk og nasjoner, foren dere og kjemp mot imperialismen og alle dens lakeier!

Død over inntrengeren! Leve det palestinske folkets væpna nasjonale motstandskamp!

Ned med den imperialistiske krigen! Leve de nasjonale frigjøringskampene!


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pc 19 marzo - Turchia - sciopero della fame dei prigionieri politici Tipo F - info proveniente dai compagni turchi (proletari comunisti)



Sciopero della fame dei detenuti nel carcere tipo F n.1 di Tekirdağ

I prigionieri del TKP-ML e del MLKP nel carcere tipo F n. 1 di Tekirdağ hanno iniziato uno sciopero della fame a sostegno dello sciopero della fame dei prigionieri del PKK contro l'isolamento nell'isola di İmralı e le violazioni dei diritti nelle carceri da novembre.

I prigionieri del TKP-ML e del MLKP nel carcere tipo F n.1 di Tekirdağ tipo hanno organizzato uno sciopero della fame di 3 giorni per sostenere lo sciopero della fame dei prigionieri del PKK e contro le crescenti violazioni dei diritti nelle carceri.

Secondo le informazioni che abbiamo ricevuto attraverso le famiglie dei prigionieri, Murat Deniz, Yaşar Eriş, Bülent Kapar, Ahmet Doğan, Ümit Emrah Köse, Ercan Görtas, Özgür Dinçer hanno iniziato uno sciopero della fame di 3 giorni il 12, 13 e 14 marzo.

Nel messaggio che hanno inviato, i prigionieri hanno detto: "Abbiamo iniziato questo sciopero della fame in solidarietà con lo sciopero della fame che è in corso da novembre e contro le crescenti violazioni dei diritti nelle carceri".

Fonte: https://ozgurgelecek51.net/tekirdag-1-nolu-f-tipi-hapishanesindeki-tutsaklardan-aclik-grevi/





Hunger strike by prisoners in Tekirdağ F Type Prison No 1

TKP-ML and MLKP prisoners in Tekirdağ F Type Prison No 1 went on a hunger strike in support of the hunger strike by PKK prisoners against the isolation in İmralı Island and violations of rights in prisons since November.

TKP-ML and MLKP prisoners in Tekirdağ F Prison No 1 organised a 3-day hunger strike to support the hunger strike of PKK prisoners and against the deepening violations of rights in prisons.

According to the information we received through the families of the prisoners, Murat Deniz, Yaşar Eriş, Bülent Kapar, Ahmet Doğan, Ümit Emrah Köse, Ercan Görtas, Özgür Dinçer went on a 3-day hunger strike on 12,13,14 March.

In the message they sent, the prisoners said, "We went on this hunger strike in solidarity with the hunger strike that has been going on since November and against the increasing violations of rights in prisons."

Source: https://ozgurgelecek51.net/tekirdag-1-nolu-f-tipi-hapishanesindeki-tutsaklardan-aclik-grevi/


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pc 19 marzo - Il governo Meloni vuole militarizzare le università contro le proteste (proletari comunisti)



di Valeria Casolaro da L’Indipendente

Dopo la cacciata del direttore del quotidiano La Repubblica, Maurizio Molinari, da parte degli studenti dell’Università di Napoli, che hanno voluto impedire un suo convegno accusandolo di essere complice del genocidio israeliano su Gaza, nel governo Meloni si levano le voci di chi vorrebbe usare l’occasione per imporre un giro di vite repressivo anche all’interno degli atenei. Il ministro dell’Interno Piantedosi avrebbe infatti elaborato un piano che prevede accessi “limitati e controllati” agli atenei e di porre le forze dell’ordine all’ingresso delle aule dove si tengono convegni e appuntamenti per bloccare le contestazioni. L’indiscrezione segue le durissime dichiarazioni del ministro dell’Agricoltura, nonché cognato di Giorgia Meloni, Francesco Lollobrigida, che ha dichiarato nientemeno che un «eccesso di tolleranza» verso le contestazioni potrebbe portare a rischi terroristici nel Paese.

Non prendere provvedimenti contro episodi come quello di Napoli, ha infatti dichiarato Lollobrigida, «in passato ha poi portato al terrorismo e al suo rafforzamento fino all’episodio di Aldo Moro, che, con il suo sacrificio, creò un allarme democratico talmente ampio che ci permise di sconfiggere quel fenomeno brutale che è l’eversione». Nonostante l’accostamento tra gli eventi sembri a dir poco fantasioso, il Viminale starebbe già correndo ai ripari. A scatenare la preoccupazione del governo

sarebbero infatti una serie di incontri che dovrebbero tenersi nelle Università italiane nei prossimi giorni e che potrebbero essere fortemente contestati dal “fronte pro Palestina” e contro Israele. Per tale motivo, secondo le indiscrezioni rese pubbliche dal Corriere della Sera, il governo starebbe ipotizzando misure di sicurezza più stringenti sugli ingressi nelle aule dove si dovranno svolgere gli incontri, che da ora in poi potrebbero anche essere posti sotto la lente dei Comitati provinciali per l’ordine e la sicurezza pubblica in Prefettura, oltre che dei Questori e dei tavoli tecnici relativi. Dato il carattere non prevedibile di tali tipi di proteste, poi, potrebbe essere aumentata la sorveglianza prima dei convegni, ipotesi che preannuncia la presenza di contingenti delle forze dell’ordine a presidiare le aule. Dal canto suo, la ministra dell’Università Anna Maria Bernini ha frenato l’ipotesi avanzata dal Viminale, ma ha convocato un incontro con i rettori per il prossimo giovedì, per concordare con loro le modalità di repressione delle proteste.

Se le misure dovessero essere messe in pratica, ci si ritroverebbe di fronte all’ennesimo tentativo di questo governo di banalizzare le proteste e le rivendicazioni sociali. Il “fronte pro Palestina” diventa così un’etichetta che trasforma in un mero problema di ordine pubblico una battaglia sociale dalla forte dimensione politica, che chiede la fine dell’aggressione militare israeliana nella Striscia di Gaza (che ha causato la morte di oltre 30 mila civili, la maggior parte dei quali donne e bambini) e del supporto italiano e occidentale a Israele. E ad aderire a questa richiesta non sono solamente gli studenti: sono oltre 1300 gli accademici che hanno sottoscritto una lettera indirizzata al ministero degli Affari Esteri, nella quale si chiede un completo stop agli accordi di cooperazione industriale, scientifica e tecnologica in vigore con Israele. Un documento che segue quello siglato da quasi 5 mila docenti universitari che, per le stesse ragioni, chiedevano già a novembre scorso il boicottaggio di Israele.

da osservatorio sulla repressione

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pc 19 marzo - Massimo sostegno alla posizione del fronte della Resistenza palestinese unita nei confronti della posizione capitolazionista e collaborazionista di ANP/Al Fatah (proletari comunisti)


Dichiarazione congiunta di Hamas, Jihad islamica palestinese, Fronte popolare per la liberazione della Palestina e Movimento di Iniziativa Nazionale palestinese:

“Nel nome di Allah, il Compassionevole, il Misericordioso

Alla luce del decreto emesso dal Presidente dell’Autorità Palestinese, che nomina il dottor Mohammad Mustafa a formare un nuovo governo, le organizzazioni nazionali palestinesi affermano quanto segue:

1. La massima priorità nazionale ora è affrontare la barbara aggressione sionista, il genocidio e la guerra per fame condotta dall’occupazione contro il nostro popolo nella Striscia di Gaza, e affrontare i crimini dei suoi coloni in Cisgiordania e Al-Quds occupata, in particolare La Moschea di Al-Aqsa e i rischi significativi che la nostra causa nazionale deve affrontare, in prima linea il rischio continuo di sfollamento.

2. Prendere decisioni individuali e intraprendere passi formali e privi di sostanza, come la formazione di un nuovo governo senza consenso nazionale, rappresenta un rafforzamento della politica di unilateralismo e un approfondimento della divisione, in un momento storico in cui il nostro popolo e la causa nazionale hanno più bisogno di consenso e unità, nonché della formazione di una leadership nazionale unificata, che prepari elezioni libere e democratiche con la partecipazione di tutte le componenti del popolo palestinese.

3. Questi passi indicano la profondità della crisi all’interno della leadership dell’Autorità [palestinese], il suo distacco dalla realtà e il divario significativo tra essa e il nostro popolo, le sue preoccupazioni e aspirazioni, il che è confermato dalle opinioni del vasto maggioranza dei nostri cittadini che hanno espresso la loro perdita di fiducia in queste politiche e orientamenti.

4. È diritto del nostro popolo mettere in discussione l’utilità di sostituire un governo con un altro e un primo ministro con un altro, provenienti dallo stesso ambiente politico e partigiano.

Alla luce dell’insistenza dell’Autorità Palestinese nel continuare la politica dell’unilateralismo, e ignorando tutti gli sforzi nazionali per unire il fronte palestinese e unirsi di fronte all’aggressione contro il nostro popolo, esprimiamo il nostro rifiuto della continuazione di questo approccio che ha danneggiato e continua a danneggiare il nostro popolo e la nostra causa nazionale.

Chiediamo al nostro popolo e alle sue forze viventi di alzare la voce e di affrontare questa follia con il presente e il futuro della nostra causa e con gli interessi, i diritti e i diritti nazionali del nostro popolo. Chiediamo inoltre a tutte le forze e fazioni nazionali, in particolare ai fratelli del movimento Fatah, di intraprendere azioni serie ed efficaci per raggiungere un consenso sulla gestione di questa fase storica e cruciale, in un modo che serva la nostra causa nazionale e soddisfi le aspirazioni del nostro popolo a estrarre i loro diritti legittimi, liberare la loro terra e i luoghi santi e stabilire il loro stato indipendente con piena sovranità e la sua capitale come Al-Quds”.

Movimento di resistenza islamica – Hamas

Movimento della Jihad islamica

Fronte Popolare per la Liberazione della Palestina

Movimento di Iniziativa Nazionale Palestinese


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ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ | Ανταπόκριση από τη συγκέντρωση αλληλεγγύης στους 49 στα δικαστήρια (Resistance in the neighbourhood)



Με μαζικότητα εκατοντάδων ανθρώπων, κυρίως φοιτητών, πραγματοποιήθηκε σήμερα το πρωί στα δικαστήρια η συγκέντρωση αλληλεγγύης στους 49 συλληφθέντες του Σαββάτου, παρά το ότι ήταν Καθαρά Δευτέρα.

Η προσπάθεια τρομοκρατίας συνεχίστηκε και σήμερα. Δεκάδες αστυνομικοί ήταν μπροστά στις πύλες του δικαστηρίου, οι οποίοι μπλοκάραν οποιονδήποτε σχεδόν προσπάθησε να μπει στα δικαστήρια για να δει τους δικούς του ανθρώπους, με εξαίρεση μόνο κάποιους(!) γονείς, αφού πρώτα τους έγινε εξονυχιστικός έλεγχος. Είναι σαφές ότι προσπαθούν να δημιουργήσουν κλίμα τρομοκρατίας και διώξεων ενάντια στους φοιτητές που αγωνίζονται για την ανατροπή του νόμου. 

Στη συγκέντρωση συμμετείχαν Φοιτητικοί Σύλλογοι, οργανώσεις και συλλογικότητες της Θεσσαλονίκης και ακούστηκαν συνθήματα ενάντια στις διώξεις, για ανατροπή του νόμου Πιερρακάκη ενάντια του οποίου παλεύουν οι φοιτητές εδώ και 2μιση μήνες. 

Οι φοιτητές σε αφέθηκαν ελεύθεροι, νωρίς το μεσημέρι και ακολούθησε δυναμική πορεία στο κέντρο της πόλης που κατέληξε στη ΣΘΕ. Η δικάσιμος πήρα αναβολή για τέλη Μαρτίου.

Δε μας τρομοκρατούν! 

Συνεχίζουμε τον αγώνα για την ανατροπή του νόμου Πιερρακάκη μέσα από τους φοιτητικούς μας συλλόγους!




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4 CPI (Maoist) Cadres Killed In Gun Battle With Security Forces In Gadchiroli District - Redspark (Redspark)


Gadchiroli District, March 19, 2024: Four cadres of the CPI (Maoist), including Mangi-Indravelli Area Committee secretary Vargeesh from Telangana, were killed in an exchange of fire with security forces in Kolamarka hillocks under Aheri tehsil of Maharashtra’s Gadchiroli district early on Tuesday.

Police had credible intelligence inputs that some members of the CPI (Maoist) Telangana State committee have crossed Pranahita river to carry out subversive activities ahead of the ensuing Lok Sabha elections, police sources revealed to the press today.

Joint teams of local police and the Central Reserve Police Force’s (CRPF) Quick Action Team personnel launched a search operation in Kolamarka forest area late on Monday. One of the team members came under fire from the Maoists, leading to an exchange of fire in Kolamarka hillocks in the early hours of the day, police sources stated.

Gadchiroli SP Neelotpal told The Hindu: “In the early hours of Tuesday, our teams came under indiscriminate fire from cadres of the Maoist party while conducting a search operation in the Kolamarka mountains near Repanpalli, which promoted a response from our men.”

The bodies of four Maoists were recovered and an AK-47, a carbine, two country-made pistols, Maoist literature, and other items were seized from the spot, the Gadchiroli SP commented.

Police identified the slain Maoists as Divisional Committee Member Vargeesh, who is also secretary of Mangi-Indravelli Area Committee and Member of Kumram Bheem Asifabad-Mancherial Divisional Committee; Magtu, Secretary of Sirpur-Chennur Area Committee from Telangana; and Platoon members Kursang Raju and Kudimetta Venkatesh.

Source : https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/two-maoist-divisional-committee-members-of-telangana-among-four-killed-in-exchange-of-fire-in-maharashtras-gadchiroli/article67967265.ece


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HKI: Maalaus poliittisten vankien puolesta (Punalippu)


Lukijan kuva.

Dokumentoimme Helsingissä tehdyn maalausaktion, jossa vaaditaan vapautta poliittisille vangeille.


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TRE: Maalaus poliittisille vangeille (Punalippu)


Julkaisemme saamamme kuvat maalauksesta poliittisille vangeille kansainvälisenä solidaarisuuspäivänä:

“VAPAUS KAIKILLE POLIITTISILLE VANGEILLE”

“VAPAUS KAIKILLE POLIITTISILLE VANGEILLE”

 


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pc 19 marzo - ORE 12 Controinformazione Rossoperaia - La Comune di Parigi e la lotta per il potere operaio - Le donne della Comune (proletari comunisti)


 


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Contra a criminalização da luta popular: Julgamento dos 23 presos políticos do RJ ocorrerá hoje - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


Ocorrerá no dia de hoje, 19 de março, o julgamento do pedido da defesa dos ativistas populares pela anulação dos processos. Motivado pela existência de provas produzidas por um infiltrado ilegal, o apelo ocorreu após a condenação em primeira instância dos 23 processados políticos das Jornadas de Junho de 2013 e da luta contra a Copa do Mundo em 2014.

Movimentos populares, organizações classistas e entidades de advogados denunciam que as provas ilegais ainda não foram retirados do processo. Como parte da denúncia, está sendo convocada uma manifestação que terá início às 13h em frente ao local do julgamento, o Tribunal de Justiça do Rio de Janeiro.

Uma das convocações para a manifestação, realizada pelo Centro Brasileiro de Solidariedade aos Povos (Cebraspo) conta com um resumo do que representa o processo:

“Condenados absurdamente em 1ª instância a penas que chegam a 7 anos em regime fechado, por um processo contaminado de ilegalidades e que não apresenta nenhuma prova contra qualquer um dos processados, este processo e sua sentença tem o intuito não só de criminalizar os 23 ativistas e sim o direito de manifestação e livre organização. O Centro Brasileiro de Solidariedade aos Povos convoca todos os democratas e entidades em defesa dos direitos do povo a a se posicionarem em defesa dos 23, e contra a criminalização da luta popular.”

A audiência ocorrerá na sala de sessões da e. Sétima Câmara Criminal – Beco da Música 175 – Lâmina 4 – sala 205. Também pode ser acompanhada através do link.

O Jornal A Nova Democracia seguirá fazendo a cobertura de mais essa luta contra a criminalização da luta popular.


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Ηράκλειο | Συγκέντρωση καταγγελίας όλων των πολιτικών διώξεων εναντία σε εκπαιδευτικούς και σε φοιτητές οι οποίες είναι σε εξέλιξη, 21/3 Λιοντάρια 6:30μ.μ. (Resistance in the neighbourhood)




Ως Αγωνιστικές Κινήσεις καλούμε την Πέμπτη 21/3/2024 στις 6:30 μ.μ. στα Λιοντάρια όλους τους εκπαιδευτικούς και όλα τα σωματεία σε συγκέντρωση καταγγελίας

1)Όλων των πολιτικών διώξεων εναντία στους εκπαιδευτικούς οι οποίες είναι σε εξέλιξη .

2)Των συλλήψεων των 49 φοιτητών της σχολής θετικών επιστήμων του ΑΠΘ, που έχουν οδηγηθεί στα δικαστήρια με βαριές κατηγορίες επειδή αγωνίζονται εναντία στην ίδρυση των ιδιωτικών πανεπιστήμιων.

Αναλυτικά από την συνέντευξη τύπου στην Αθήνα από: Συνδικαλιστικές οργανώσεις & κινήσεις συλλογικότητες - κινήσεις γειτονιάς

Το τελευταίο διάστημα έχει ανοίξει μια βιομηχανία συνδικαλιστικών και πολιτικών διώξεων ενάντια σε εκπαιδευτικούς. Από άκρη σε άκρη σε όλη τη χώρα αξιοποιούνται όλοι οι διοικητικοί και δικαστικοί μηχανισμοί προκειμένου αγωνιστές εκπαιδευτικοί να βρεθούν όμηροι σε πειθαρχικά και δικαστικές αίθουσες. Αξιοποιούνται διάφορες αντιδραστικές διατάξεις του Δημοσιοϋπαλληλικού Κώδικα καθώς και το αντισυνδικαλιστικό νομικό πλαίσιο που έχει ψηφιστεί τα τελευταία χρόνια (νόμοι Χατζηδάκη, Γεωργιάδη κτλ)

Συγκεκριμένα υπάρχουν:

4 διώξεις (πειθαρχικές και ποινικές) για συμμετοχή στην κινητοποίηση της ΕΛΜΕ Πειραιά (με στάση εργασίας της ΑΔΕΔΥ) ενάντια στις εξετάσεις PISA.

 2 ποινικές και πειθαρχικές διώξεις εκπαιδευτικών για «ανάρμοστη συμπεριφορά εκτός υπηρεσίας», λόγω συμμετοχής σε κινητοποίηση στην επέτειο της δολοφονίας του 15χρονου Γρηγορόπουλου, με βάση τις (χουντικής έμπνευσης) απαγορεύσεις στην πανδημία.

3 ποινικές διώξεις εκπαιδευτικών για την κινητοποίηση της ΕΛΜΕ Πειραιά ενάντια στη φιέστα-φιάσκο του ΔΔΕ Πειραιά υπέρ των ιδιωτικών σχολείων και για κινητοποιήσεις του Σωματείου στα γραφεία της ΔΔΕ Πειραιά. Σε αυτή την μήνυση που έγινε από τον ΔΔΕ Πειραιά διωκόμενος είναι επίσης ο πρόεδρος του Εργατικού Κέντρου Πειραιά που συμμετείχε και συμπαραστάθηκε στην κινητοποίηση.

 2 πειθαρχικές διώξεις (παραπομπή από την ΔΔΕ Πειραιά στο Πειθαρχικό) για «κακόβουλη κριτική της προϊστάμενης αρχής», με αφορμή δημόσια(!) κριτική στις πολιτικές του Υπουργείου.

1 δίωξη εκπαιδευτικού Πρωτοβάθμιας Εκπαίδευση στη Θεσσαλονίκη γιατί συμμετείχε σε κινητοποιήσεις ενάντια στους πλειστηριασμούς κατοικιών.

1 πειθαρχική δίωξη συναδέλφου (ΕΔΕ) από τη Διεύθυνση Δευτεροβάθμιας Εκπαίδευσης Ημαθίας για «την συμπεριφορά του στη ΓΣ της Ε’ ΕΛΜΕ-Θ στις 4/5/2022 στο 1ο Γυμνάσιο Σταυρούπολης», της οποίας εκείνη την περίοδο ήταν μέλος και συμμετείχε στη ΓΣ.

3 παραπομπές σε Πειθαρχικό Περιφερειακής Εκπαίδευσης συναδελφισσών στην Αθήνα για συμμετοχή τους στην προκηρυγμένη από τα εκπαιδευτικά σωματεία Απεργία-Αποχή από Μέντορες-Συντονιστές.

Ανάμεσα σε όλα αυτά κατά καιρούς συνάδελφοι καλούνται σε απολογία στις Διευθύνσεις Εκπαίδευσης για έγγραφες εξηγήσεις, απειλούνται με ΕΔΕ, καλούνται σε αστυνομικά τμήματα γιατί συμμετείχαν σε Απεργία (Ρέθυμνο).

Συνδικαλιστικές διώξεις όμως υπάρχουν και εκτός εκπαίδευσης: η πρόσφατη απόλυση διοικητικού υπαλλήλου του ΕΚΠΑ, αλλά και η διενέργεια ΕΔΕ κατά των μελών ολόκληρου του Διοικητικού Συμβουλίου Διοικητικών Υπαλλήλων του ΕΚΠΑ, για την κινητοποίηση και συμβολική κατάληψη του κτιρίου «ΚΛΕΙΔΙ» του πανεπιστημίου. Οι διώξεις συνδικαλιστών της ΠΕΝΕΝ με την κατηγορία της παρεμπόδισης εκτέλεσης των δρομολογίων των πλοίων σε ημέρα πανεργατικής απεργίας. Η δίωξη της προέδρου του σωματείου εργαζομένων του νοσοκομείου Αγ. Σάββας, από την Διοίκηση του Νοσοκομείου ενάντια στην απεργία των συμβασιούχων καθαριότητας. Στον Πειραιά επίσης διώκονται ο Πρόεδρος του Εργατικού Κέντρου και Πρόεδρος του σωματείου των εργαζομένων της COSCO με αφορμή τον απεργιακό αγώνα των εργαζομένων στην COSCO (25-31/10/2021., καθώς και ο Πρόεδρος του σωματείου εργαζομένων της Πειραϊκού Φαρμακευτικού Συνεταιρισμού (ΠΕΙΦΑΣΥΝ).Και πολλές άλλες διώξεις συνδικαλιστών και εργαζομένων σε αρκετούς κλάδους που η δράση και η στάση τους έχει ενοχλήσει την εργοδοσία.

Είναι γεγονός ότι όλες αυτές οι διώξεις είναι κομμάτι του συνολικότερου χτυπήματος στη δράση των σωματείων, στο δικαίωμα στη διαδήλωση, στην απεργία και την κινητοποίηση.

Δεν αφορά μόνο τους διωκόμενους αλλά όλους τους εργαζόμενους, τη νεολαία, τον λαό που θα θελήσουν να αντισταθούν στις πολιτικές που χτυπούν και διαλύουν τα δικαιώματα στην εργασία, στην εκπαίδευση, στην υγεία.




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RJ: Falta de luz no CIEP do bairro Vista Alegre, em Barra Mansa, prejudica a formação dos estudantes há 4 meses - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


O Ciep do Bairro de Vista Alegre, em Barra Mansa, está sem luz há mais de quatro meses, segundo denúncias dos moradores da região feitas ao correspondente local de AND. A denúncia foi inicialmente feita durante uma brigada do Comitê de Apoio de Volta Redonda na região de Barra Mansa, e confirmada por uma visita do correspondente ao Ciep. 

Em entrevista no dia 7 de março, estudantes do terceiro ano denunciaram os prejuízos da falta de luz à formação. Somado aos problemas do ensino em si, causados principalmente pela aplicação do Novo Ensino Médio (NEM) na escola, os estudantes sofrem pela falta de perspectiva sobre o futuro profissional. Segundo eles, o NEM impede uma grade curricular robusta que permita a entrada dos estudantes na universidade, e a falta de luz prejudica o resto que poderia ser aproveitado. Alguns funcionários da escola, cientes dos problemas dos estudantes, não deram entrevistas sob alegação de que eram proibidos de falar. 

Responsáveis dos alunos preocupados com a formação dos filhos buscaram respostas na prefeitura, mas foram respondidos com a velha justificativa da “falta de verbas”. Segundo os moradores, os burocratas também teriam tentado colocar a culpa da manutenção para a Light, a empresa responsável pela energia elétrica na cidade. A empresa, por sua vez, coloca a responsabilidade na prefeitura, deixando a população com a impressão de estarem de mãos atadas e sem perspectiva de ação para a resolução desse problema. 

O descaso com a Educação não afeta somente alunos, mas também professores. Isso é visível pela decisão do SEPE – RJ (Sindicato Estadual dos Profissionais de Educação do Estado do Rio de Janeiro) pela greve no ano de 2023. Durante a mobilização, eles denunciaram os salários muito abaixo do piso salarial em comparação a outros estados do Brasil.  


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Viva le eroiche donne della Comune di Parigi (femminismo proletario rivoluzionario)




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Declaración del 18 de marzo (PCESol Rojo)


 


¡Proletarios de todos los países, uníos!

 

18 de marzo  – Día de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos – ¡honra a  los prisioneros comunistas y revolucionarios!

 

El 18 de marzo es el Día Internacional de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos.  El Socorro Rojo, fundado por la Comintern en 1920, declaró el 18 de marzo, día de la fundación de la Comuna de París, como “Día Internacional de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos” en 1923 y lo dedicó a los presos políticos.  El 18 de marzo se expresará la solidaridad con los presos políticos en todo el mundo.

 

En cada período de la historia ha habido una gran resistencia a los sistemas de explotación y opresión en los que hemos vivido durante millas de años, y se ha pagado un alto precio por ello.  A cada lucha contra los sistemas dominantes de explotación y opresión, a cada resistencia, la reacción de las clases dominantes ha sido similar: destruir todo movimiento que se dirige contra su existencia para asegurar su existencia y, sobre todo, aquellos para destruir a quienes  lideran este. movimiento.  Porque la ira que se ha acumulado contra el orden prevaleciente,  el  impulso  que surge  del  deseo y los esfuerzos por cambiar el orden prevaleciente,  sólo pueden dirigirse en la dirección correcta bajo un liderazgo adecuado.  Por eso las clases dominantes quieren destruir a quienes canalizan la ira y el deseo de cambio del pueblo, y aislar del pueblo a quienes no pueden ser destruidos.  La otra dimensión de la intolerancia y agresión de las clases dominantes contra los movimientos populares revolucionarios, comunistas y democráticos es garantizar que las masas populares oprimidas permanezcan en silencio y no se atrevan a rebelarse.  Al masacrar y oprimir a los campeones  del pueblo, las clases dominantes envían un mensaje a las masas oprimidas: “Si os oponéis a nosotros, haremos lo mismo con vosotros”.

 

 Los filósofos sólo han interpretado el mundo de otra manera;  Lo que importa  es cambiarlos”,  dijo Karl Marx, el gran maestro del proletariado.  Los comunistas y revolucionarios luchan  por la realización de este ideal, por ello son asesinados, encarcelados por ello.  Una y otra vez los prisioneros comunistas y revolucionarios en centros de tortura y prisiones han demostrado  que mientras la vida continúa, se pueden dar grandes ejemplos de la continuación de la lucha de clases bajo cualquier condición de vida.  El camino requiere asumir estos riesgos, y es con esta conciencia de que los comunistas y revolucionarios luchan contra los sistemas de explotación imperantes.  El cuerpo de cada comunista y revolucionario asesinado, cada tiempo que pasó en prisión, también sienta las bases para la construcción de la sociedad del futuro.  La burguesía y sus lacayos quieren garantizar la rendición sometiendo a las condiciones más violentas a aquellos que no pueden ser masacrados en las cárceles.  Los presos comunistas y revolucionarios, a su vez , no dudan en transformar las cárceles, donde el enemigo se siente más fuerte, en un escenario de lucha de clases.  Por lo tanto, no debemos definir a los presos comunistas y revolucionarios en las cárceles como víctimas, sino que debemos definirlos como justos y estosaludar .  Los comunistas y revolucionarios son asesinados, encarcelados y torturados no sólo porque tienen ideas diferentes sobre los sistemas de explotación existentes, sino también porque hacen algo para cambiar esas ideas, para organizar y unir al pueblo.  Es principalmente una guerra ideológica, encarnada por dos clases hostiles y mutuamente incompatibles.  El asesinato y encarcelamiento de comunistas y revolucionarios no resuelve el problema de la burguesía, ya que las condiciones objetivas del sistema imperialista mantienen constante y presentan la contradicción entre opresores y oprimidos.  La situación objetiva existente, las contradicciones cada vez más profundas se reflejan directamente en las contradicciones de clase , y el vacío dejado por los revolucionarios y comunistas asesinados y encarcelados se llena con otros nuevos.

 

En  la medida en que las contradicciones del sistema dominante se profundizan y  los callejones sin salida en los que cae se multiplican,  en la medida en que crece su miedo al “sepulturero”, las clases dominantes no dudan en volverse cada vez más  concretas  para revelar su verdadera identidad. rostro.  Al mismo tiempo, la crisis cada vez más profunda y no resuelta del sistema está moviendo  a la burguesía ya las clases explotadoras dominantes de todo tipo  a centralizar más el mecanismo del Estado soberano,  tanto con leyes como con organizaciones de facto,  ya  seguir avanzando en los  instrumentos. de opresión  .  En los países capitalistas imperialistas  que se autodenominan "democracias ideales" y "progresistas",  las sucesivas leyes de seguridad, las nuevas leyes que amplían el poder de los órganos represivos del Estado, nos muestran  concretamente que la burguesía tiene la capacidad de... Llevar la “máscara de la democracia” ha perdido.  La burguesía está restableciendo  su posición contra la clase obrera, contra los trabajadores oprimidos y los pueblos oprimidos, con todo  su  reaccionarismo  .  En los países coloniales y semicoloniales dominados por el imperialismo,  los regímenes habituales son  formas de gobierno parlamentarias y extraparlamentarias con distintos  matices de fascismo y reacción.  En estos países, todos los miembros de la oposición, comenzando por los comunistas y los revolucionarios, están expuestos a un terrorismo de Estado sistemático y permanente.  La profundidad de la contradicción entre las clases dominantes y los  pueblos  oprimidos  en  estos países determina la intensidad de la lucha de clases.  Para las clases dominantes,  que  sólo pueden mantener la esclavitud del imperialismo a través de un régimen de terror irrestricto, el terrorismo de Estado es más una necesidad que una opción.  Las leyes son sólo una fachada para el fascismo, la reacción y el terrorismo de Estado.  Las cárceles, a su vez, son instrumentos de tortura y opresión.  Las  clases dominantes de Turquía, India, Filipinas, Perú, Irán, Israel, etc. están profundizando  el aislamiento, que utilizan  de todas las formas posibles  para mantener a los prisioneros en prisión.  Se impide  el tratamiento de reclusos gravemente enfermos utilizando diversos pretextos,muchos prisioneros enfermos mueren y hay repetidos ataques virtuales contra los prisioneros.  Miles de miembros de la nación kurda están encarcelados como precio de la lucha de liberación nacional kurda.  Las cárceles turcas impiden la liberación de personas que  llevan  más de  30 años encarceladas  porque  “no abandonan sus pensamientos”.

 

El  reaccionario Estado indio ha encarcelado a más de diez mil comunistas, revolucionarios y activistas políticos para reprimir la guerra popular, entre ellos Varavara Rao, Sanjoy Deepak Rao, Ayinoor Vasu, Rona Wilson y Gautam Navlakha.

 

Georges Ibrahim Abdallah ha estado encarcelado por  el imperialismo francés  durante 40 años  y aún no ha sido liberado, a pesar de haber cumplido su condena.  Mumia Abu-Jamal,  miembro de las Panteras Negras, ha estado  atrapado  por el imperialismo estadounidense durante más de 40 años  .  Miles de comunistas, revolucionarios y prisioneros de pueblos oprimidos de diferentes partes del mundo han pasado décadas en prisión.

 

Las  clases dominantes temen a los prisioneros comunistas y revolucionarios, y la hostilidad de clase que se sienten dirigidas contra ellos es tan grande que  impiden sin escrúpulos que salgan de las cárceles los comunistas y revolucionarios a quienes mantienen cautivos en abierta violación de sus propias leyes.  El asesinato en 2021 del presidente Gonzalo, líder del  CPP  ,  quien  perdió su salud después de 29 años en régimen de aislamiento y cuya muerte se produjo porque no se tomaron las necesarias,  es  muy  importante para comprender el alcance del miedo y el odio de clases, que sienten  los imperialistas y  los  sumisos servidores del sistema  gobernante  .  Los responsables de la muerte del Presidente Gonzalo quemaron e incluso destruyeron su cuerpo.

 

Los  presos comunistas y revolucionarios  en prisión  están tratando de satisfacer las demandas de la lucha de clases,  arriesgando sus vidas superando los límites de las condiciones carcelarias.  Se niegan a rendirse y no dudan en resistir todas las formas de presión, tortura y aislamiento.  Debemos movilizarnos para apoyar la lucha y resistencia justificada de los presos,  para  luchar contra cualquier tipo de agresión contra los presos, para ser la voz de los presos afuera, debemos  apoyar su lucha en las condiciones de cautiverio como parte de la lucha de clases afuera. . .

 

¡LOS PRESOS COMUNISTAS Y REVOLUCIONARIOS SON NUESTRO HONOR!

 

¡APOYAR A LOS PRESOS COMUNISTAS Y REVOLUCIONARIOS SIGNIFICA APOYAR LA LUCHA REVOLUCIONARIA!

 

HAGAMOS NUESTRA LA RESISTENCIA Y LA LUCHA DE LOS PRESOS COMUNISTAS Y REVOLUCIONARIOS.  ¡SEAMOS LA VOZ DE LOS PRESOS!

 

 

Liga Comunista Internacional

marzo 2024



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Le donne della Comune di Parigi - da Controinformazione rossoperaia del 19/3 (femminismo proletario rivoluzionario)




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Δίκη των 11 Τούρκων αγωνιστών. Συζητήθηκε η αίτηση αναίρεσης της εισαγγελίας του Αρείου Πάγου (Resistance in the neighbourhood)



Πραγματοποιήθηκε σήμερα 19/3 η προγραμματισμένη συζήτηση της αίτησης αναίρεσης της εισαγγελίας του Αρείου Πάγου κατά της αθωωτικής απόφασης του 5μελους εφετείου για τους 11 αγωνιστές από την Τουρκία. Η εισαγγελέας της έδρας, άνευ περαιτέρω προφορικών επιχειρημάτων, ζήτησε να γίνει δεκτή η αίτηση αναίρεσης. Οι δύο συνήγοροι υπεράσπισης των αγωνιστών, εκπροσωπώντας ορισμένους εκ των κατηγορουμένων που όλοι τους απουσίαζαν, ανέπτυξαν προφορικά τα νομικά και πραγματικά τους επιχειρήματα προς αντίκρουση της εισαγγελικής πρότασης. Σχετικά έγγραφα κατατέθηκαν κ θα κατατεθούν και από τις δύο πλευρές. 

Η δικαστική αίθουσα ήταν γεμάτη από αλληλέγγυους - μετά από κάλεσμα της Επιτροπής Αλληλεγγύης που έχει συγκροτηθεί για συμπαράσταση και αμετάκλητη αθώωση των αγωνιστών αυτών - που παραβρέθηκαν στηρίζοντάς τους. Είναι χαρακτηριστικό ότι για όλες τις άλλες υποθέσεις που δικάζονταν παρευρίσκονταν μόνο οι εμπλεκόμενοι δικηγόροι και κάποιοι λίγοι διάδικοι, ενώ για την συγκεκριμένη έγινε απολύτως αισθητή από την έδρα του δικαστηρίου η διευρυμένη παρουσία ακροατηρίου. 

Στη συνέχεια, όλοι συγκεντρώθηκαν έξω από το κτήριο του Αρείου Πάγου, άνοιξαν πανό και κόκκινες σημαίες και φώναξαν συνθήματα στα ελληνικά και στα τουρκικά. Μέλη του ΚΚΕ(μ-λ) που συμμετέχει στην Επιτροπή Αλληλεγγύης παραβρέθηκαν καθ' όλη τη διάρκεια της διαδικασίας, τόσο εντός όσο κι εκτός της δικαστικής αίθουσας. Η μηνιαία απεργία πείνας των δύο αγωνιστών του Λαϊκού Μετώπου έληξε σήμερα, ενώ συνεχίζουν επ' αόριστον οι τρεις κρατούμενοι στις φυλακές.

Η εκτίμηση για το αποτέλεσμα της δίκης έχει άμεση συνάρτηση με τις σχέσεις-αντιθέσεις ανάμεσα στις άρχουσες τάξεις των δύο χωρών και την έκφραση τους στη σημερινή φάση, καθώς και τις επιδιώξεις των ιμπεριαλιστών ΗΠΑ και ΕΕ. Ο χρονικός ορίζοντας έκδοσης απόφασης επίσης δεν είναι σαφής και εξαρτάται από την επικείμενη επίσκεψη Μητσοτάκη στην γείτονα αλλά και το εάν θα θελήσει η ελληνική κυβέρνηση να κάνει ένα ακόμα "δώρο" στην τουρκική ενόψει της προαναφερθείσας συνάντησης κορυφής ή θα προκρίνει το ζήτημα να "σέρνεται", κρατώντας τους αγωνιστές σε ομηρία. 

Από την αρχή η συγκεκριμένη δίωξη ήταν καθαρά πολιτικού χαρακτήρα, συνεχίζει να είναι και προφανώς η δικαστική απόφαση του Αρείου Πάγου θα έχει ακριβώς τον ίδιο χαρακτήρα. 

Να απορριφθεί η αίτηση αναίρεσης! Να αθωωθούν αμετάκλητα όλοι οι αγωνιστές!

Σ.Π.



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ΞΑΝΘΗ | Βιβλιοπαρουσίαση: "200+1 χρόνια μετά" (Resistance in the neighbourhood)


 


Ενόψει της 203ης επετείου της επανάστασης του 1821, η Ομάδα βιβλίου της Ρωγμής παρουσιάζει το βιβλίο "200+1 χρόνια μετά" των Δημήτρη Μάνου και Γρηγόρη Ανδρεάτου, την Παρασκευή 22 Μάρτη στις 19:00, στο βιβλιοπωλείο "Δύο" (Ελ. Βενιζέλου 29). Από τους συγγραφείς, θα παραβρεθεί και θα εισηγηθεί ο Δ. Μάνος.


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ΠΑΤΡΑ | Εκδήλωση των Αγωνιστικών Κινήσεων στο στέκι Ανάστροφα (Resistance in the neighbourhood)


 



Ο δίκαιος αγώνας των φοιτητών μπορεί να είναι νικηφόρος! Να μην σταματήσει τώρα! Οι Αγωνιστικές Κινήσεις καλούμε όλους σε εκδήλωση την τετάρτη 20/3, 7:00 μμ στο στέκι Ανάστροφα για να συζητήσουμε την ανάγκη συνέχισης του αγώνα των φοιτητών μέχρι την ανατροπή του νόμου Πιερρακάκη.


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SITUACIÓN ACTUAL: NOTAS SOBRE LA CRISIS MUNDIAL (8 Los movimientos agrarios en la UE III) (Association New Democracy)


Los movimientos agrarios en la UE III

Hemos dicho, al comenzar con este tema de “Los movimientos agrarios en la Unión Europea  (UE)”, que hoy continuamos, que lo hacíamos para plantear nuestra posición y deslindar con los representantes oficiales y los monopolio de la prensa sobre la protesta o demostración de los agricultores ( Bauerkampf), donde meten de todo a manera de cajón de sastre bajo ese concepto de agricultores, esto es a los grandes  monopolistas y demás capitalistas  de los países imperialistas de la UE, que explotan la agricultura como un especial campo de la inversión del capital y a los verdaderos agricultores, al proletariado agrario y a los campesinos

 

Nuestro propósito principal, en el marcos de estas notas, que no tienen la pretensión de artículos, no obstante, nos lleva a diferenciar, como bien Marx lo estableció, a los verdaderos agricultores -los obreros del agro y los pequeños campesinos (campesinos pobres)-, de los empresarios capitalistas que invierten su capital en la explotación de la agricultura.

 

Asimismo, a diferenciar los países imperialistas de los países oprimidos dentro de la “UE”. Y, tratar de explicar a qué responde la “reforma“ de la Política Agraria Común (PAC) y del Modelo Agrícola Europeo (MAE), las pugnas y la situación de las diferentes clases frente a esta “reforma”.

 

Los cambios en el Modelo Agrícola Europeo (MAE) y de la Política Agraria Común (PAC) -el problema de las subvenciones, mercados y precios agrícolas, etc.-, algunos puntos por el momento, según la versión oficial:

 

- El MAE se catalogó como un marco que engloba la diversidad de regiones, tradiciones y sistemas agrícolas europeos.

 

- Agricultura en pequeña escala y cambio estructural, hacia una diversidad creciente de modelos agrícolas, tiene importantes implicaciones para la gobernanza, pero también debería permitir una adaptación de los sistemas agrícolas conforme a su emplazamiento en todas las regiones europeas.

 

- El MAE se conformará mediante estrategias de adaptación adoptadas en cada explotación y a lo largo de las cadenas de valor para responder a los retos específicos de cada sector y externos que se vayan planteando.

 

La “reforma” del PAC”  y el nuevo MAE, es un proceso en marcha para  reestructurar la producción agrícola a las cadenas de valor de los monopolios (integración vertical), como ellos mismos lo escriben, para responder a los retos específicos de cada sector y externos. Es la política agraria de las potencias imperialistas de la UE, en colusión y pugna, que “abarca los tres elementos del desarrollo sostenible (económico, ecológico, social), que “atenúa los efectos de los mecanismos de mercado en el ajuste estructural y la resiliencia de los sistemas alimentarios”.

 

La mal llamada “reforma” son en realidad medidas políticas para concretar en las actuales condiciones los objetivos enunciados en el párrafo anterior,  y que persigue la mayor penetración del capital financiero  y los monopolios por el generados en la agricultura de la Europa Oriental (el este y sur de Europa), no solo pertenecientes a la UE, sino también a países europeos de fuera de la “Unión” como Ucrania o los demás países del Tercer Mundo, a través de la “ayuda” o los nuevos tratados comerciales como el UE-Mercosur, UE-India, etc. Para condicionar la agricultura de los paises oprimidos a las necesidades del imperialismo.

 

Este proceso, no es desde ahora. Proceso, que según las necesidades imperialistas, combina proteccionismo con “apertura” del mercados (“liberalismo”), precios y subvenciones, que cobra más fuerza desde comienzos de los 80, se acrecienta en los 90 y tiene gran impulso en los 2000 y 2013 para “adaptarse” a las normas de la Organización Mundial de Comercio (WTO o OMC) y a las nuevas condiciones internacionales de la disputa inter-imperialista. Es necesario, en relación a lo anterior, estudiar mejor sobre los controles de origen, de pesticidas, la agricultura biológica y los llamados productos regionales, etc.

 

Es importante tener en cuenta las relaciones entre la industria y la agricultura en el desarrollo del capitalismo, el empleo de las maquinas en la agricultura y su desarrollo como mercado interior y exterior para la industria.

 

Sobre este proceso, los representantes de los partidos reaccionarios y los comentaristas de los medios, dicen que se ha roto el consenso político sobre la política agraria de la UE, que antes era fácil llegar a un consenso con los representantes agrarios, que ahora eso es más difícil.

 

 Luego pues, el proceso marcha en medio de fuertes contradicciones entre los intereses contrapuestos de los grandes monopolistas en convergencia con otros sectores capitalistas y los campesinos conservadores de los propios pises imperialistas de Europa Occidental, similar al caso de los EEUU con los “tratados” comerciales de los EEUU con Mexico, Brasil, Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Apunta  contra el proletariado y el pequeño campesino.

 

Una de las formas, en que se manifiestan estas contradicciones, es la protesta de los campesinos (Bauerkampf), entre los cuales se cuentan los grandes monopolistas del sector y otros grandes productores agrarios, que como ha trascendido, son los que más se benefician de las políticas proteccionistas y de las subvenciones en Alemania, Francia, Bélgica, Italia, España, etc. mientras la Comisión Europea y su PAC actúan como el representante del conjunto viendo la necesidad de “reformar” el PAC para “el cambio estructural” y “los nuevos retos internos y externos”.

 

Citamos de la Comisión Europea, en forma resumida, la historia del PAC de sus orígenes a la actualidad, para mostrar en qué nos basamos para decir lo anterior:

 

1958 El Tratado de Roma sitúa la agricultura en el centro de las actividades de la

nueva Comunidad Económica Europea y le asigna la tarea de lograr una mayor

productividad agrícola, un nivel de vida justo para los agricultores,

disponibilidad de suministros, mercados estabilizados y una cadena de

suministro segura con precios razonables.

 

1962 Ponen en marcha la PAC, establecen las Organizaciones Comunes de Mercado (OCM)

de cereales, porcino, avícola, vitivinícola y hortofrutícola, y el Fondo Europeo de

Orientación y Garantía Agrícola (FEOGA). Se establece un sistema de garantías

basado en el apoyo a los precios de producción para asegurar la venta de la

producción agrícola.

 

1968 Dado que ahora no solo se ha alcanzado la autosuficiencia, sino que también se

ha superado en gran medida, el enfoque se desplaza hacia la creación de un

mayor equilibrio entre las medidas dirigidas a los mercados agrícolas y las

destinadas a modernizar las estructuras agrícolas.

 

Notas:  Después de la crisis de posguerra y la aplicación del proteccionismo de los mercados y luego la dentro de la PAC, “se alcanzo la autosuficiencia agrícola y ganadera al bloque comunitario y surgió el problema de la sobreproducción. Se generaban excedentes de los principales productos agrarios, causando la acumulación de stocks, los cuales debieron exportarse (con ayuda de subvenciones) en el mejor de los casos, donados a países en vías de desarrollo y otras veces almacenados o destruidos dentro de la UE”.

 

Esto es, la crisis de sobreproducción de los países imperialistas de la UE se exportaba (y se sigue haciendo) a los países del Tercer Mundo, siguiendo el ejemplo del imperialismo yanqui, contribuyendo a mantener la miseria y el atraso de la agricultura del Tercer Mundo, Es decir la situación semicolonial o colonial y la semifeudalidad, desenvolviendo sobre esa base el capitalismo burocrático al servicio de sus intereses imperialistas.

 

Modernizar las estructuras agrícolas: para elevar la productividad (agricultura intensiva) en los países imperialistas y desplazar la agricultura intensiva en mano de obra y baja productividad (agricultura extensiva) a los países oprimidos. Esto incluye el reordenamiento del tamaño de las fincas, es decir el desarrollo del capitalismo en la agricultura necesita ampliar el tamaño de las fincas, disminución del número de fincas de menos de cinco y de dos hectáreas en beneficio de las más grandes, una nueva estructura agraria, para el uso intensivo de las maquinarias agrícolas y el desplazamiento de la fuerza de trabajo, lo que afectó principalmente a las mujeres, e intensificación de la cría de ganado en establos, antes que en pastura; proceso que en Alemania, en lo fundamental, culminó en la década de los 60 y comienzos de la década de los 70. En España tuvo su impulso con la “transición” y su incorporación a la UE. Sobre la situación en España son importantes los trabajos de Martín Martín, Victor O., La semifeudalidad y el atraso de España. Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2007b. Y, más actual, sobre la lucha de los jornaleros agrícola y el problema de los trabajadores inmigrantes en el campo español en el Blog Servir al Pueblo.

 

1984 Se introduce un sistema de cuotas para limitar la sobreproducción y administrar

los suministros para productos como la leche. Los productores que excedan su

cuota ahora están obligados a pagar un impuesto por excedentes.

 

1985 El Libro Verde sobre las perspectivas de la PAC presenta ideas para un mayor

debate, como la reducción del apoyo a los precios y la diversificación de las

medidas de apoyo a las rentas agrícolas. Estas ideas incluyen el reconocimiento

de que además de asegurar nuestro abastecimiento alimentario, la agricultura

contribuye al mantenimiento del tejido social en las zonas rurales, la protección

de la tierra y la conservación de los recursos naturales.

 

Nota: necesidad de las pequeñas explotaciones agrícolas para el resto de las explotaciones capitalistas en la agricultura capitalista para la fuerza de trabajo agrícola en condiciones como ellos mismos dicen, de limitaciones a la inmigración de fuerza de trabajo del Tercer Mundo. Necesidades de poblamiento de zonas agrestes y alejadas.

 

1992 La reforma MacSharry  introduce un nuevo enfoque de apoyo a

los agricultores, con el objetivo de reducir el presupuesto de la PAC, recortar la

sobreproducción y cumplir con las obligaciones en virtud del comercio

internacional. Acuerdos.

 

1999 El programa Agenda 2000 allana el camino para la reforma de la política

regional de la UE y la PAC, y busca fortalecer la capacidad de la UE para recibir

nuevos miembros y continuar cumpliendo con las reglas de la Organización

Mundial del Comercio sobre comercio internacional.

 

2003 La reforma Fischler, también conocida como "revisión

intermedia", revisa la PAC. Introduce el innovador régimen de pago único

(RPU),  que elimina el vínculo entre lassubvenciones y los volúmenes de producción

para una gran parte de las ayudas de la PAC


 Reforma de 2013: La reforma de 2013 definió las líneas generales de la PAC para el período 2014-2020.
( Resumido de: 1962-2022: La política agrícola común de la UE a los 60 ' en las

páginas del Think Tank del Parlamento Europeo)

Nota: Reforma 2022-2027: Es la que ha entrado a colusión y pugna

Visto lo anterior, pasamos a ver someramente el desarrollo de la agricultura capitalista en los países avanzados (imperialistas) y en los países atrasados (semicoloniales) de la UE, partiendo de las mismas fuentes de la comisión con nuestros comentarios.

 

1. Avanza el desplazamiento de la pequeña producción por la gran producción en la agricultura en los países avanzados y de la concentración de la tierra en los países atrasados de la UE

 

El desarrollo de la agricultura en la UE 27 es considerado y definido por la UE en el llamado Modelo Agrícola Europeo, del cual uno de sus documentos dice:

 

“ (...) como un marco que engloba la diversidad de regiones, tradiciones y sistemas agrícolas europeos reflejados en la amplia variedad de estructuras agrícolas, tipos de cultivo de la tierra y gama de productos”

 

“ (…) proceso de cambio estructural a largo plazo”, como:

 

Un cambio hacia una diversidad creciente de modelos, que debería permitir una adaptación de los sistemas agrícolas conforme a su emplazamiento en todas las regiones europeas.

 

Ponen de relieve una disminución sustancial del número de explotaciones agrarias en casi todas las regiones NUTS 2 de la UE-27 (La NUTS son las abreviaturas para Nomenclatura de las Unidades Teritoriales Estadísticas 2).

 

Un incremento significativo del tamaño o la intensidad de las explotaciones restantes y/o una mayor dependencia de la Unión respecto a las importaciones agrícolas, esa es su proyección.

 Esta tendencia a la concentración agrícola resulta especialmente evidente en las regiones meridionales y orientales. Las zonas montañosas también corren un elevado riesgo de abandono.

 

Sus proyecciones predicen una mayor polarización de la estructura agrícola, con un abandono y una especialización continuos en todos los escenarios.

 

Los factores impulsores del declive de las explotaciones agrícolas son principalmente estructurales,

económicos y sociales y, en menor medida, medioambientales.

 

Sobre los efectos del PAC, dicen: Factores como las subvenciones y los precios agrícolas, y las variables macroeconómicas y demográficas desempeñan un mayor papel en los nuevos Estados miembros y afectan de forma diferente a los distintos tipos de explotaciones.

 

 Los estudios de caso, demuestran que el principal factor estructural de la disminución del número de explotaciones es una estructura de mercado que favorece la producción intensiva y las explotaciones a gran escala, vinculada a unos márgenes cada vez más reducidos y a la escasa capacidad de negociación.

 

Además, las barreras a la entrada agravan los problemas del cambio demográfico (envejecimiento de las poblaciones) y el éxodo rural.

 

Aunque existe preocupación por el sistema de subvenciones de la Unión (PAC), se mantiene el consenso

respecto a que tales ayudas son indispensables, pero que deben adaptarse aún más para revertir los

efectos negativos” (De Síntesis: Investigación para la Comisión AGRI − El futuro del modelo agrícola europeo: repercusiones socioeconómicas y territoriales del descenso del número de explotaciones agrarias y agricultores en la UE)

 Nuestros comentarios:

 

Europa es ante todo un concepto geográfico, pero si hablamos de la Europa Occidental y la Europa Oriental, ya no estamos hablando de conceptos geográficos sino económico-sociales. Como dijo Engels a fines del siglo XIX y se reafirmó Lenin, después de 1905, Europa Oriental no es un concepto geográfico sino económico-social. Esto es necesario adelantar porque vamos a encontrar esta realidad al tratar el problema agrario en Europa, además, que entre los países hay diferencias de grado y también al interior de cada país,en cuanto a este problema hay diferencias regionales, mas marcadas en España e Italia. En los mismos países de Europa Oriental existen diferencias entre ellos.

 

Importante para no dejarse confundir cuando los estudios e informes oficiales tratan el “cambio estructural” en las explotaciones agrícolas de la UE generalizan sobre el proceso de desaparición de la pequeña agricultura en beneficio de la grande en los países capitalistas desarrollados o imperialistas, y de los minifundios en beneficio de la gran propiedad latifundista en el desarrollo del capitalismo burocrático en el agro en los países oprimidos o atrasados.

 

Marx estableció la ley del desplazamiento de la fuerza de trabajo no solo en términos relativos sino absolutos con el desarrollo de la agricultura capitalista a diferencia de la disminución de la población obrera relativa en la industria mientras crece el empleo en forma absoluta.

 

 Problema es que, en muchos casos, la clasificación o determinación de la estructura agraria se hace como si en la UE 27 existiera un solo mundo económico en la agricultura, sin diferencias de desarrollo del capitalismo, partiendo de esto, algunas veces se clasifica las empresas agrarias no por su inversión y acumulación de capital, sino por su tamaño medido en hectáreas. Esto lleva a que se confunda a los verdaderos productores agrarios, los obreros y pequeños campesinos, con los capitalistas que invierten su capital en la agricultura.

 

Tener en cuenta, también, la necesidad de las pequeñas explotaciones agrícolas para el resto de las explotaciones capitalistas en la agricultura capitalista para la fuerza de trabajo agrícola en condiciones como ellos mismos dice, de limitaciones a la inmigración de fuerza de trabajo del Tercer Mundo.

Lo anterior está detrás de los términos como diversidad, pequeña producción, zonas montañosas abandonadas, etc.

 

Necesitan, en los países de Europa Occidental, fijar en el campo una determinada cantidad de población para la agricultura y el poblamiento; así, como en los países atrasados de Europa Oriental, el desarrollo del capitalismo burocrático en el agro sobre la base del latifundio, necesita el minifundio para mantener el campesinado para que le provea de fuerza de trabajo como semiproletariado y proletariado rural

 

Comentando lo antes citado: en los países antes citados se busca mantener el binomio latifundio-minifundio, para que sean los pequeños campesinos los que provea de fuerza de trabajo barata, de bajos salarios, para la seguridad alimentaria y de la industria de los países imperialistas de la misma,así como, pequeña agricultura en los países imperialistas, para las zonas alejadas y de montaña para estos por razones de poblamiento y atraso.

 

La política agraria de la UE persigue subordinar la producción agrícola de los países semicoloniales a sus necesidades imperialistas. La forma será a través de los tratados desiguales. La “ayuda” a Ucrania o “tratados de libre comercio” para traer la soja barata de Brasil, Argentina, Bolivia y otros países. Mientras ellos exportan capitales, insumos, maquinarias y conocimientos, organizando sus cadenas de valor bajo sus monopolios en estos lugares, inundando esto países con sus mercancías baratas.

 

Importante tener siempre presente de los dos aspecto que implica la penetración del imperialismo en los países oprimidos o atrasados del Tercer Mundo, que penetra hasta la misma Europa (Presidente Gonzalo).

 

 El Presidente Mao, aplicando el marxismo-leninismo, al estudio concreto de la Historia y de la sociedad China, estableció el carácter de la sociedad y de la revolución china. Cuando trata el carácter de la sociedad china y los cambios operados por la penetración del imperialismo en China, establece los dos aspectos que son inseparables de dicha dominación:

 

“ Sin embargo, el nuevo fenómeno del que hemos hablado, el surgimiento y desarrollo del capitalismo, constituye sólo un aspecto del cambio operado a raíz de la penetración del imperialismo en

China. Hay otro aspecto que es concomitante con el primero y que, a la vez, lo obstaculiza : la colusión del imperialismo con las fuerzas feudales chinas para impedir el desarrollo del capitalismo chino.

Al penetrar en nuestro país, las potencias imperialistas de ningún modo se proponían transformar a la China feudal en una China capitalista. Su objetivo era todo lo contrario: hacer de ella una semicolonia o colonia.

Para ello, las potencias imperialistas han utilizado y siguen utilizando todos los medios de opresión militar, política, económica y cultural, lo que les ha permitido convertir gradualmente a China en una semicolonia y colonia”.

 

El capitalismo nacional se ha desarrollado hasta cierto punto y desempeña un papel considerable en la vida política y cultural de China. Sin embargo, no ha llegado a convertirse en la forma principal dentro de su régimen económico-social ; es muy débil, y en su mayor parte está (más) o menos asociado con el imperialismo extranjero y el feudalismo interno” ( Presidente Mao Tsetung, LA REVOLUCIÓN CHINA Y EL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CHINA , Diciembre de 1939).

 

 2. LA SITUACIÓN DE LOS PAÍSES DE EUROPA ORIENTAL ANTES DE SU INGRESO A LA UE Y EN LA ACTUALIDAD

Continuará....


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pc 19 marzo - I compagni turchi commemorano il compagno 'Orso' a due anni dalla sua morte (proletari comunisti)


 

I combattenti internazionali commemorano il compagno Orso (Tekosher Piling)



I combattenti internazionali del TIKKO hanno commemorato il combattente internazionale italiano Lorenzo Orsetti (Tekoşer Piling) con un video che hanno pubblicato.

Il 18 marzo 2019, l'anarchico italiano Tekoşer Piling, martirizzato come combattente TIKKO nell’attacco di Baxuz contro l'ISIS, è stato commemorato nell'anniversario della sua immortalità.

Un video è stato pubblicato dai combattenti internazionali del TIKKO per commemorare Tekoşer Piling. Il video inizia con un'immagine pubblicata da Tekoşer Piling. "Compagni, compagni ciao. Io sono Tekoşer" in italiano, seguito da un video di Tekoşer Piling che dice nella sua ultima lettera "Tutte le tempeste iniziano con una semplice goccia. Cerca di essere quella goccia". Poi ci sono le immagini dei combattenti che disegnano una sagoma di Tekoşer Piling e scrivono "Un partigiano non muore mai" accanto ad essa. Poi, nel discorso fatto a nome del TIKKO, "Oggi commemoriamo il nostro compagno Martire Tekoşer. È diventato immortale 5 anni fa nella guerra contro l'ISIS a Deir-ez Zor. Lorenzo Orsetti partecipò alla lotta antifascista in Rojava e contribuì all'internazionalismo non solo con le armi, ma anche con il suo cameratismo e la sua sensibilità combattiva. Il suo calore e la sua simpatia sono stati l'ultima cosa che ha lasciato a molte persone intorno a lui".

Sottolineando che gli attacchi al Rojava continuano, il discorso continua: "Lo Stato turco continua ad attaccare il Rojava ogni giorno. Minaccia di distruggere la rivoluzione con i suoi attacchi su larga scala. Prende di mira i rivoluzionari e gli spazi abitativi civili con il terrore della ricognizione. Condanna il popolo alla fame, alla sete e alla morte. Hanno occupato Efrîn, Serêkaniyê e Girê Spî con mercenari e hanno terrorizzato la popolazione locale. Ma non possono spezzare la volontà del popolo che resiste per la vittoria della rivoluzione e delle sue terre. Gli immortali da Kobanê ad Afrin, da Serêkaniyê e Girê Spî alla Palestina sono la nostra fonte di ispirazione. Difenderemo la rivoluzione contro il fascismo, come hanno dimostrato i nostri immortali".

Il discorso, in cui si afferma che la resistenza contro la crescente ondata di aggressione imperialista e fascista non può essere spezzata, si conclude con le seguenti parole: "Distruggeremo l'imperialismo e la barbarie con l'unità dei popoli oppressi. L'internazionalismo è l'arma del proletariato. E Lorenzo Orsetti, Barbara Anna Kistler e Nubar Ozanyan ci hanno insegnato come usare quell'arma. Lorenzo Orsetti lasciò l'Italia e si unì alla lotta per la liberazione dei popoli del Medio Oriente. Sentendo l'internazionalismo del proletariato, si unì alla lotta di liberazione popolare e alla lotta armata in quelle parti del mondo dove le contraddizioni imperialiste sono più gravi. Promettiamo a lui e a tutti i nostri martiri: continueremo la loro lotta, distruggeremo l'imperialismo, il fascismo e ogni tipo di reazione. Viva l'internazionalismo del proletariato, viva la rivoluzione del Rojava".

Infine, c'è una delle immagini di Tekoşer Piling nel video. In questa immagine, Tekoşer Piling dice: "Se stai guardando questo video, probabilmente le notizie non sono buone. Probabilmente sono morto. Ma non c'è niente di sbagliato in questo. So di aver fatto la scelta giusta. Avrei fatto questa scelta mille volte perché è quella giusta".

segue traduzione inglese

Fonte: https://www.tkpml.com/enternasyonal-savascilar-tekoser-pilingi-andi/?swcfpc=1




International Fighters Commemorate Tekosher Piling

International fighters from TIKKO commemorated the Italian international fighter Lorenzo Orsetti (Tekoşer Piling) with a video they released.

On 18 March 2019, Italian anarchist Tekoşer Piling, who was martyred as a TIKKO fighter in the Baxuz move against ISIS, was commemorated on the anniversary of his immortalisation.

A video was released by International TIKKO fighters to commemorate Tekoşer Piling. The video begins with an image published by Tekoşer Piling. "Comrades, comrades hello. I am

Tekoşer" in Italian, followed by a video of Tekoşer Piling saying in his last letter "All storms start with a simple drop. Try to be that drop". Then there are images of the fighters drawing a silhouette of Tekoşer Piling and writing "A Partisan never dies" next to it. Then, in the speech made on behalf of TIKKO, "Today, we commemorate our comrade Martyr Tekoşer. He became immortal 5 years ago in the war against ISIS in Deir-ez Zor. Lorenzo Orsetti participated in the anti-fascist struggle in Rojava and contributed to internationalism not only with weapons but also with his comradeship and fighting sensitivity. His warmth and sympathy was the last thing he left to many people around him."

Pointing out that the attacks on Rojava continue, the speech said, "The Turkish state continues to attack Rojava on a daily basis. It threatens to destroy the revolution with its wide-scale attacks. It targets revolutionaries and civilian living spaces with reconnaissance terror. It condemns the people to hunger, thirst and death. They occupied Efrîn, Serêkaniyê and Girê Spî with mercenaries and terrorised the people there. But they cannot break the will of the people who resist for the victory of the revolution and their lands. Immortals from Kobanê to Afrin, from Serêkaniyê and Girê Spî to Palestine are our source of inspiration. We will defend the revolution against fascism as our immortals have shown."

The speech, in which it was stated that the resistance against the rising wave of imperialist aggression and fascism cannot be broken, ended with the following words: "We will destroy imperialism and barbarism with the unity of oppressed peoples. Internationalism is the weapon of the proletariat. And Lorenzo Orsetti, Barbara Anna Kistler and Nubar Ozanyan taught us how to use that weapon. Lorenzo Orsetti left Italy and joined the struggle for the liberation of the peoples of the Middle East. Feeling the internationalism of the proletariat, he joined the people's liberation struggle and armed struggle in geographies where the imperialist contradictions are the most severe. We promise to him and all our immortalised ones; we will continue their struggle, we will destroy imperialism, fascism and all kinds of reaction. Long live the internationalism of the proletariat, long live the Rojava revolution".

Finally, there is one of the images of Tekoşer Piling in the video. In this image, Tekoşer Piling said, "If you are watching this video, the news is probably not good. I'm probably dead. But there is nothing wrong with that. I know I made the right choice. I would have made this choice a thousand times because it is the right one."

Source: https://www.tkpml.com/enternasyonal-savascilar-tekoser-pilingi-andi/?swcfpc=1


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FN: Flere barn drept i Gaza enn på fire år med kriger (Tjen Folket)


Av en kommentator for Tjen Folket Media.


FNs hjelpeorganisasjon for palestinske flyktninger (UNRWA) melder at flere barn skal være drept i Gaza de siste fire månedene, enn totalt i konflikter i hele verden de siste fire årene. De viser til at mer enn 12.300 barn er drept i Gaza.

Philippe Lazzarini, sjef for UNRWA, kaller tallene på drepte barn «svimlende» og slår fast at denne krigen er en krig mot barn, og mot barnas barndom og fremtid. Han har henvist til FN-tall som viser at 12.193 barn ble drept i krig i verden mellom 2019 og 2022, mens helsemyndighetene på Gazastripen har rapportert at flere enn 12.300 barn blitt drept i det palestinske området siden 7. oktober 2023.

Per 17. mars melder Al-Jazeera at mer enn 13.000 barn nå er drept, og folkemordet intensiveres da 1,5 millioner mennesker i Gaza nå trues av hungersnød. Allerede dør barn av sult hver dag, samtidig som Israel blokkerer innførselen av mat og andre livsnødvendigheter. Nødhjelp står losset opp på lastebiler ved grensen til Gaza, men nektes innpass av sioniststaten.

UNRWA melder også at hjelpearbeidere drepes og skades i krigen. De har mistet mer enn 160 ansatte som følge av krigen mot Gaza. Israel har anklaget UNRWA for å ha Hamas-medlemmer blant sine ansatte som deltok i angrepet 7. oktober, noe som har ført til at en rekke land, deriblant USA, har trukket støtten til UNRWA. Dette viser at Israel målrettet ikke bare angriper det palestinske folket med bombing av boliger og sykehus, og også utsetter 1,5 millioner mennesker for utsulting, men at de også målrettet angriper alle former for nødhjelp, inkludert FN-bistand. Hele tiden under beskyttelse av sikkerhetsrådsmedlem USA, som systematisk legger ned sitt veto til forskjell for sine lakeier i Israel.

Referanser
Gaza: Number of children killed higher than from four years of world conflict | United Nations in Türkiye
Flere barn skal være drept i Gaza-krigen enn på fire år med verdenskonflikter
Over 12.000 barn skal være drept i Gaza – Siste nytt – NRK
Gaza: Number of children killed higher than from four years of world conflict | UN News
UNRWA Situation Report #91on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem
UNRWA Situation Report #91on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem

Over 13,000 children killed in Gaza, others severely malnourished: UNICEF | Israel War on Gaza News | Al Jazeera


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pc 19 marzo - Verona - repressione contro i lavoratori in lotta e contro attivisti sindacale Si cobas - infosolidale (proletari comunisti)


 

BELFIORE: NELLA NOTTE PERQUISIZIONI E SEQUESTRI AI DANNI DI 3 SINDACALISTI DEL SI COBAS.

 
Nella tarda serata di ieri, varie pattuglie del nucleo operativo radiomobile dei carabinieri hanno effettuato perquisizioni domiciliari a casa di tre sindacalisti del SI Cobas, arrivi in prima fila nella lotta alla Maxidi di Belfiore: Asmerom Zemenfes e Abbas Mohsan dell'esecutivo nazionale e Florina Ghiorghita del coordinamento nazionale.
A tutti e tre i compagni sono stati sequestrati i telefoni cellulari e le rispettive SIM, considerate "corpo del reato", relativo agli scioperi iniziati da giugno dello scorso anno per rivendicare l'effettiva e integrale applicazione del CCNL trasporto merci e logistica nel magazzino della GDO di Belfiore, e che nelle ultime settimane ha prodotto ben 17 giorni di sciopero e presidi fuori ai cancelli a seguito della volontà del nuovo fornitore (la cooperativa Manhandwork) di non riconoscere il SI Cobas, largamente maggioritario tra i lavoratori.
I capi di imputazione principali, manco a dirlo, sono i soliti: violenza privata, resistenza a pubblico ufficiale e blocco stradale così come "riveduto e corretto" dal nuovo decreto sicurezza del governo Meloni.
Evidentemente la Procura di Verona, che ha emesso il mandato di perquisizione, intende utilizzare i sequestri dei beni personali dei nostri compagni come strumento di intimidazione al fine di fare cessare gli scioperi fuori ai magazzini Maxidi e le proteste dei lavoratori che si sono sviluppate in queste settimane anche sui punti-vendita, arrivando al punto di esprimere valutazioni di merito sulla giustezza o meno degli scioperi: un giudizio tutto politico che dovrebbe esulare dal ruolo e dai compiti di una procura...
Addirittura, gli atti di indagine accusano gli scioperanti di aver acceso dei fuochi per riscaldarsi durante il presidio di notte al gelo, e arrivano persino a giustificare l,
'immonda aggressione di un vigilante dell'azienda che il mese scorso, come da noi ampiamente documentato, è arrivato a puntare la pistola in faccia ai lavoratori!!!
Per quanto ci riguarda, denunciamo con forza quest'ennesimo atto repressivo e intimidatorio nei confronti della nostra organizzazione, e ribadiamo ancora una volta che a decidere della legittimità degli scioperi non sono i Tribunali né tantomeno i padroni, bensì i lavoratori: quei lavoratori che nello scioperare mettono in gioco il loro salario e il loro posto di lavoro al fine di eliminare lo sfruttamento, i salari da fame e le rappresaglie antisindacali.
Se i padroni e le Procure credono che queste intimidazioni possano fermare le nostre battaglie per i diritti e la dignità degli operai, presto si renderanno conto ancora una volta di aver fatto male i conti.
Al fianco dei lavoratori in lotta della Maxidi di Belfiore!
Solidarietà ad Asmeron, Abbas e Florina!
Toccano uno- toccano tutti!
SI Cobas nazionale

Tutte le reazioni:
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Pippi Zannelunghe
Le solite 💩! Solidarietà ai compagnə ✊🏽
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Διώξεις εκπαιδευτικών - Συνέντευξη του Δημήτρη Χαρτζουλάκη στο ραδιοφωνικό σταθμό "Στο Κόκκινο 105,5" (Resistance in the neighbourhood)


 

Συνέντευξη του αναπληρωτή εκπαιδευτικού Δημήτρη Χαρτζουλάκη στο ραδιοφωνικό σταθμό "Στο Κόκκινο 105,5" εν όψει της διαδήλωσης στον Πειραιά για τις διώξεις , Πέμπτη 21/3




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pc 19 marzo - Insieme contro la repressione manifestazione ad Amburgo - 18 marzo (proletari comunisti)


traduzione ufficiosa

Rete del 17 marzo 2024 

Lo Stato ha ampliato i suoi poteri da anni ormai. Soprattutto, alla polizia e ad altre organi di sicurezza sono stati conferiti ampi diritti, mentre i diritti fondamentali sono stati sempre più violati. Nell'attuale caso Rondenbarg, la magistratura si sta vendicando per aver perso la faccia al vertice del G20 e allo stesso tempo vuole limitare ulteriormente il diritto di riunione. Anche dall'esterno, le manifestazioni di sinistra assomigliano più a marce della polizia. Se le manifestazioni sono permesse, perché molti temi devono scomparire dal paesaggio urbano, alle e ai palestinesi tra l’altro è stato proibito di portare la loro causa nelle strade per molto tempo ad Amburgo.

Antifa fuori dalla galera!

Nel frattempo, diversi antifascisti si trovano nelle carceri tedesche. Anche se ai rappresentanti del governo piace essere fotografati alle manifestazioni anti-AfD, l'antifascismo coerente in questo paese è ancora perseguito con lunghe pene detentive. In azioni più piccole, come la protesta contro Alexander Gauland (AfD) nel municipio di Amburgo, gli attivisti e le attiviste devono essere scoraggiati con massicce multe. Ma i vicini europei non sono in alcun modo da meno, tra cui diversi antifascisti di Budapest che sono sotto processo per aver cercato di impedire la manifestazione fascista Giorno d'onore, altri devono ancora essere estradati in Ungheria.

Non dimentichiamo le compagne e i compagni migranti!

Lo Stato tedesco sta colpendo le strutture di sinistra turche e curde con una severità ancora maggiore. Purtroppo, questo è quasi sconosciuto dal pubblico. Con un'accusa artificiosa di terrorismo (§ 129b), le persone vengono imprigionate più e più volte, anche se non sono personalmente accusate di un crimine. La presunta appartenenza al PKK (Partito dei Lavoratori del Kurdistan) o al DHKP-C (organizzazione rivoluzionaria turca) è sufficiente per diversi anni di carcere, rendendo la Germania il tirapiedi di Erdogan.

Nessun essere umano è illegale?

I rifugiati in questo paese sono ancora rinchiusi in campi e soggetti a un obbligo di residenza, quindi non possono muoversi liberamente. Si è creato un intero sistema di discriminazione, ci sono prigioni di deportazione ovunque. Si viene imprigionati lì se l’espulsione sarà resa più difficile o ostacolata. L'attuale governo federale ha imposto ulteriori vessazioni a queste persone private dei diritti civili con la "Legge sul rimpatrio veloce”. Stanno cercando di togliere il vento dalle vele della destra radicale, mettendo in atto le loro politiche.

Niente pasta, poi galera!

Ogni anno, circa 55.000 persone devono scontare una pena detentiva sostitutiva perché non possono permettersi la multa. Quindi puoi andare in prigione per aver viaggiato senza biglietto, ma non per aver parcheggiato in modo errato, ad esempio. Più del 50% delle persone è in carcere per reati contro la proprietà. Tra di loro quasi non ci sono ricchi truffatori fiscali, perché spesso vengono offerti loro accordi mentre i "pesci piccoli" vanno in prigione. Questa è un'espressione di giustizia di classe. In carcere, i detenuti sono sfruttati in condizioni misere per pochi euro l'ora. Le cattive condizioni nelle carceri distruggono le persone psicologicamente e dal punto di vista della salute.

Sia all'esterno che all'interno, si suppone che dovremmo essere addomesticati con questo sistema di punizione in modo che l'ordine della proprietà continui ad essere applicato, ma questo ordine significa sempre sfruttamento e oppressione per noi. Chiunque non voglia venire a patti con le condizioni e lavori per un mondo migliore è minacciato con il manganello della polizia e anche con il carcere in questa società. Non lasciamo soli coloro che vengono colpiti, restiamo sempre uniti e mostriamo solidarietà quando lo Stato perseguita di nuovo la sinistra e combattiamo in modo organizzato!

  1. Marzo è la "Giornata dei prigionieri politici"

Storicamente, il 18 marzo commemorava l'insurrezione della Comune di Parigi nel 1871, ma anche la sua sconfitta e la successiva repressione. Nel 1923, il Soccorso rosso internazionale dichiarò il 18 marzo "Giornata internazionale dell'aiuto ai prigionieri politici". Dopo il fascismo, nel 1996, su iniziativa dei gruppi di sinistra e di Soccorso rosso è stata istituita una giornata di mobilitazione per la liberazione dei prigionieri politici. Da allora, ogni anno si susseguono eventi e attività

Demo/Concerto ore 17:30 al Grüner Jäger/Arrivati Park

https://de.indymedia.org/node/346728

Rete del 17 marzo 2024 

Lo Stato ha ampliato i suoi poteri da anni ormai. Soprattutto, alla polizia e ad altre organi di sicurezza sono stati conferiti ampi diritti, mentre i diritti fondamentali sono stati sempre più violati. Nell'attuale caso Rondenbarg, la magistratura si sta vendicando per aver perso la faccia al vertice del G20 e allo stesso tempo vuole limitare ulteriormente il diritto di riunione. Anche dall'esterno, le manifestazioni di sinistra assomigliano più a marce della polizia. Se le manifestazioni sono permesse, perché molti temi devono scomparire dal paesaggio urbano, alle e ai palestinesi tra l’altro è stato proibito di portare la loro causa nelle strade per molto tempo ad Amburgo.

Antifa fuori dalla galera!

Nel frattempo, diversi antifascisti si trovano nelle carceri tedesche. Anche se ai rappresentanti del governo piace essere fotografati alle manifestazioni anti-AfD, l'antifascismo coerente in questo paese è ancora perseguito con lunghe pene detentive. In azioni più piccole, come la protesta contro Alexander Gauland (AfD) nel municipio di Amburgo, gli attivisti e le attiviste devono essere scoraggiati con massicce multe. Ma i vicini europei non sono in alcun modo da meno, tra cui diversi antifascisti di Budapest che sono sotto processo per aver cercato di impedire la manifestazione fascista Giorno d'onore, altri devono ancora essere estradati in Ungheria.

Non dimentichiamo le compagne e i compagni migranti!

Lo Stato tedesco sta colpendo le strutture di sinistra turche e curde con una severità ancora maggiore. Purtroppo, questo è quasi sconosciuto dal pubblico. Con un'accusa artificiosa di terrorismo (§ 129b), le persone vengono imprigionate più e più volte, anche se non sono personalmente accusate di un crimine. La presunta appartenenza al PKK (Partito dei Lavoratori del Kurdistan) o al DHKP-C (organizzazione rivoluzionaria turca) è sufficiente per diversi anni di carcere, rendendo la Germania il tirapiedi di Erdogan.



I rifugiati in questo paese sono ancora rinchiusi in campi e soggetti a un obbligo di residenza, quindi non possono muoversi liberamente. Si è creato un intero sistema di discriminazione, ci sono prigioni di deportazione ovunque. Si viene imprigionati lì se l’espulsione sarà resa più difficile o ostacolata. L'attuale governo federale ha imposto ulteriori vessazioni a queste persone private dei diritti civili con la "Legge sul rimpatrio veloce”. Stanno cercando di togliere il vento dalle vele della destra radicale, mettendo in atto le loro politiche.

Niente pasta, poi galera!

Ogni anno, circa 55.000 persone devono scontare una pena detentiva sostitutiva perché non possono permettersi la multa. Quindi puoi andare in prigione per aver viaggiato senza biglietto, ma non per aver parcheggiato in modo errato, ad esempio. Più del 50% delle persone è in carcere per reati contro la proprietà. Tra di loro quasi non ci sono ricchi truffatori fiscali, perché spesso vengono offerti loro accordi mentre i "pesci piccoli" vanno in prigione. Questa è un'espressione di giustizia di classe. In carcere, i detenuti sono sfruttati in condizioni misere per pochi euro l'ora. Le cattive condizioni nelle carceri distruggono le persone psicologicamente e dal punto di vista della salute.

Sia all'esterno che all'interno, si suppone che dovremmo essere addomesticati con questo sistema di punizione in modo che l'ordine della proprietà continui ad essere applicato, ma questo ordine significa sempre sfruttamento e oppressione per noi. Chiunque non voglia venire a patti con le condizioni e lavori per un mondo migliore è minacciato con il manganello della polizia e anche con il carcere in questa società. Non lasciamo soli coloro che vengono colpiti, restiamo sempre uniti e mostriamo solidarietà quando lo Stato perseguita di nuovo la sinistra e combattiamo in modo organizzato

18 Marzo è la "Giornata dei prigionieri politici

Storicamente, il 18 marzo commemorava l'insurrezione della Comune di Parigi nel 1871, ma anche la sua sconfitta e la successiva repressione. Nel 1923, il Soccorso rosso internazionale dichiarò il 18 marzo "Giornata internazionale dell'aiuto ai prigionieri politici". Dopo il fascismo, nel 1996, su iniziativa dei gruppi di sinistra e di Soccorso rosso è stata istituita una giornata di mobilitazione per la liberazione dei prigionieri politici. Da allora, ogni anno si susseguono eventi e attività

Demo/Concerto ore 17:30 al Grüner Jäger/Arrivati Park

https://de.indymedia.org/node/346728



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ΛΑΪΚΗ ΑΝΤΙΣΤΑΣΗ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΑ | ΟΛΟΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΔΗΛΩΣΗ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΑ ΣΤΙΣ ΔΙΩΞΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΠΕΜΠΤΗ 21/3 ΣΤΙΣ 18.30 ΣΤΗΝ ΠΛΑΤΕΙΑ ΔΗΜΟΤΙΚΟΥ ΘΕΑΤΡΟΥ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΑ (Resistance in the neighbourhood)



ΚΑΤΩ ΤΑ ΧΕΡΙΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΕΣ ΕΚΠΑΙΔΕΥΤΙΚΟΥΣ

ΝΑ ΣΤΑΜΑΤΗΣΕΙ Η ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΑ ΔΙΩΞΕΩΝ


Διευρύνεται η βιομηχανία διώξεων της κυβέρνησης απέναντι σε εκπαιδευτικούς και εργαζόμενους με δεκάδες μηνύσεις και πολίτικες διώξεις σε όλη την Ελλάδα και με ιδιαίτερο μένος ενάντια στους αγωνιστές εκπαιδευτικούς του Πειραιά, αναβαθμίζοντας το στημένο κατηγορητήριο.

Η απόλυση του εργαζόμενου στο ΕΚΠΑ, οι διώξεις στον πρόεδρο του εργατικού κέντρου Πειραιά, στον πρόεδρο της ΠΕΝΕΝ ακόμη και οι πρόσφατες δηλώσεις του Μητσοτάκη για διαγραφές των φοιτητών που κάνουν κατάληψη αποτελούν συνέχεια της βιομηχανίας των πολιτικών και συνδικαλιστικών διώξεων και είναι αναπόσπαστο κομμάτι της φασιστικοποιησης της δημόσιας και πολιτικής ζωής. Είναι ξεκάθαρο ότι το σύστημα έχει ένα και μόνο στόχο. Να θέσουν στην παρανομία την Αντίσταση, την Διεκδίκηση, τον Αγώνα. Να θέσουν στην παρανομία την ταξική συνδικαλιστική και πολιτική δράση, να τσακίσουν δημοκρατικά δικαιώματα και πολιτικές ελευθερίες, αλλά και κάθε συλλογική αγωνιστική έκφραση ενάντια στην αντιλαϊκή αντεργατική πολιτική του συστήματος.  

Θέλουν ένα σχολείο προσαρμοσμένο στον εργασιακό και κοινωνικό μεσαίωνα που επιχειρούν να επιβάλουν. Θέλουν να προετοιμάσουν την νεολαία για τα σύγχρονα σκλαβοπάζαρα του καπιταλισμού. Θέλουν τους εκπαιδευτικούς να δουλεύουν χωρίς δικαιώματα, με σκυμμένο το κεφάλι, στοιχισμένους και πειθήνιους εκτελεστές της ταξικής αντιδραστικής τους πολιτικής.  

Η κυβέρνηση εντείνει τις διώξεις σε μια περίοδο που κλιμακώνει την επίθεση στην εκπαίδευση με σωρεία νομοσχέδιων και αιχμή τα ιδιωτικά πανεπιστήμια, αντιμετωπίζοντας τον δίκαιο αγώνα  φοιτητών και μαθητών με την ένταση της κρατικής τρομοκρατίας και καταστολής. Με εισαγγελικές παραγγελίες, με συλλήψεις μαθητών, με στοιχισμένο τον κρατικό μηχανισμό των διευθυντών και των πρυτάνεων στην εκστρατεία των απειλών, με χτύπημα των διαδηλώσεων, με στρατιωτικού τύπου επεμβάσεις των δυνάμεων καταστολής στα πανεπιστήμια για να εκκενώνουνε τις δημοκρατικά αποφασισμένες καταλήψεις των φοιτητικών συλλόγων καταπατώντας το λαϊκό Άσυλο.

Η κυβέρνηση και το σύστημα στέλνουν μήνυμα προς τον «εχθρό» λαό πως η αντιλαϊκή πολιτική θα περάσει με «φωτιά και σίδερο». Πως η μόνη «κανονικότητα» είναι η κερδοφορία του ντόπιου και ξένου κεφαλαίου. Σε αυτήν την κανονικότητα θέλουν να υποτάξουν τον λαό βγάζοντας στην παρανομία τις φοιτητικές και μαθητικές καταλήψεις, τα μπλόκα των αγροτών, τις απεργίες των εργαζομένων, την υπεράσπιση της λαϊκής κατοικίας, τις συγκεντρώσεις, τις διαδηλώσεις, την συνδικαλιστική και πολιτική δράση. Για αυτόν τον λόγο το σύστημα εντείνει την πολιτική της φασιστικοποίησης, εξοπλίζει τους μηχανισμούς καταστολής, οχυρώνεται με σωρεία νόμων που καταργούν δημοκρατικά δικαιώματα.  

Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο διώκονται οι εκπαιδευτικοί, από ένα σύστημα που φοβάται και τρέχει να προλάβει ώστε η συσσωρευμένη οργή και αγανάκτηση του λαού, των εργαζομένων και της νεολαίας να μην μετατραπεί σε αγώνα, σε λαϊκό ξεσηκωμό για το δικαίωμα στις σπουδές, στη δουλειά, στις ελευθερίες, στην ζωή. Φοβούνται την δύναμη των λαϊκών, εργατικών και νεολαιίστικων αγώνων. Γνωρίζουν ότι το δίκιο του αγώνα είναι πιο ισχυρό από την κρατική βία, ότι η λαϊκή πάλη μπορεί να κάνει τον φόβο τους πραγματικό εφιάλτη. Δεν μας φοβίζουν, δεν μας τρομοκρατούν. Συνεχίζουμε στο δρόμο του ανυποχώρητου και ασυμβίβαστου αγώνα με ψηλά τις γροθιές.  


  • ΚΑΤΩ ΤΑ ΧΕΡΙΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΕΣ- ΝΑ ΑΠΟΣΥΡΘΟΥΝ ΟΛΕΣ ΟΙ ΔΙΩΞΕΙΣ
  • ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΔΩΡΕΑΝ ΕΚΠΑΙΔΕΥΣΗ ΓΙΑ ΟΛΟΥΣ
  •  ΣΤΟ ΔΡΟΜΟ ΘΑ ΣΠΑΣΕΙ Η ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ
  •  ΚΑΤΩ Η ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΦΑΣΙΣΤΙΚΟΠΟΙΗΣΗΣ
  •  ΚΑΤΩ ΤΑ ΧΕΡΙΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΑ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΛΑΙΚΕΣ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΕΣ

ΟΛΟΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΔΗΛΩΣΗ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΑ ΣΤΙΣ ΔΙΩΞΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΠΕΜΠΤΗ 21/3 ΣΤΙΣ 18.30 ΣΤΗΝ ΠΛΑΤΕΙΑ ΔΗΜΟΤΙΚΟΥ ΘΕΑΤΡΟΥ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΑ



    


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Διώξεις εκπαιδευτικών - Συνέντευξη του Παναγιώτη Χουντή στο ThePressProject (Resistance in the neighbourhood)



 Αναδημοσιεύουμε την συνέντευξη που έδωσε ο Παναγιώτης Χουντής στην εκπομπή "Φάρμα των Ζώων" στο ThePressProject για τις συνδικαλιστικές διώξεις στους εκπαιδευτικούς στον Πειραιά.

Την συνέντευξη μπορείτε να δείτε στο παρακάτω βίντεο:










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Danmark: Verneplikten utvides (Tjen Folket)


Av en kommentator for Tjen Folket Media.


Våre kamerater i Socialistisk Revolution skriver om endringer i krav for verneplikt i Danmark, og varsler om forberedelser til interimperialistisk angrepskrig.

De skriver om det danske forsvarets bestemmelse om å fjerne krav minstekravet for høyde (155cm) og krav om BMI. Forandringene i kravene var begrunnet med at opptil 50 prosent av de som møter til sesjon blir avvist. Forandringene kommer i tillegg til et initiativ for å fordoble antall vernepliktige ved å inkludere kvinner. Dansk imperialisme, gjennom borgerlige medier, vil framstille det som et feministisk initiativ, og presse det gjennom som et grep for likestilling. Både fjerning av krav for verneplikt og inkludering av kvinner i militæret er den danske imperialismens forsøk på å forberede seg til nye imperialistiske konflikter og angrepskriger som de skal delta i som del av NATO.

Det er også lett å se lignende tiltak i Norge, der borgerlige medier og et breit spekter av borgerlige partier prøver å innføre verneplikt for alle unge som går ut av videregående. Igjen, begrunnelsene for dette er at «vi må øke beredskapen» og at vi står i «krevende tider». Som i Danmark, er mange av de borgerlige partiene enige i forslaget, fra Rødt til Fremskrittspartiet. Dette, i tillegg til militærøvelsen «Cold Response», og nye avtaler om nye amerikanske baser i Norge viser hvor villige imperialistene er til å rekruttere flere å kaste bort i interimperialistiske angrepskriger, i tjeneste for borgerskapet og yankee-imperialismen.

Les også:

Referanser:
Værnepligten udvides yderligere – Den danske imperialisme forbereder sig på krig – Socialistisk Revolution
Stavanger Ap foreslår å ha alle unge inn i tjeneste – NRK


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Braga Netto orientou Cid a buscar verba do PL para financiar ida de ‘forças especiais’ às manifestações golpistas - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


Segundo o depoimento de Mauro Cid, o general da reserva Braga Netto orientou o tenente-coronel a buscar dinheiro no Partido Liberal (PL), presidido por Valdemar Costa Neto, para bancar a ida dos militares das “forças especiais” do Exército (os kids preto) para manifestações dos galinhas verdes em Brasília. 

O dinheiro foi inicialmente pedido a Cid por Rafael Martins de Oliveira, um dos “forças especiais” golpistas que ficou responsável por organizar a participação dos kids preto nas manifestações bolsonaristas. De acordo com mensagens recolhidas no celular de Cid, Oliveira solicitou a Cid R$ 100 mil e orientações de “locais para a realização das manifestações”, além de confirmações “se as Forças Armadas garantiriam a permanência das pessoas no local”. 

Cid, por sua vez, foi até Braga Netto para buscar a fonte do dinheiro, que o orientou a buscar no PL. Netto, à época candidato a vice-presidente na chapa de Bolsonaro, trabalhava exatamente na sede do PL. Como responsável de logística de algumas operações do partido, o general tinha uma sala e uma equipe próprias. Nessa posição, é provável que, se Netto deu essa orientação, alguma certeza tinha de que a agremiação forneceria o dinheiro. 

O papel dos militares ‘forças especiais’

Sabe-se atualmente que os “forças especiais” do Exército tiveram um papel importante na articulação golpista de extrema-direita, sobretudo no apoio logístico e operacional às manifestações dos galinhas verdes.

A força, tida como de “elite” no Exército reacionário, é especializada em operações irregulares, dentre elas ações de sabotagem e insurgência. São várias as suspeitas que apontam para a participação das “forças especiais” na segunda Bolsonarada do 8/1, sobretudo em momentos críticos como na abertura da escotilha e preparo do material para os galinhas verdes entrarem no prédio. Imagens mostram que, no dia, figuras de balaclava (vestimenta que faz parte do uniforme das “forças especiais”), tiveram papel na linha de frente e orientaram diretamente algumas ações. 

Outras provas da participação dos militares das “forças especiais” na articulação golpista são as próprias mensagens de Cid. Além do pedido de dinheiro por Martins, outras conversas revelam que os militares foram usados por auxiliares de Bolsonaro na organização de atos e na organização da culminação do golpe. Trocas de mensagens com o egresso das “forças especiais” Bernardo Romão Correia Neto também comprovaram que Neto foi o responsável pela articulação de uma reunião com diversos “forças especiais” em salões de festas de edifícios residenciais em Brasília e na redação da “Carta ao Comandante do Exército de Oficiais Superiores da Ativa do Exército Brasileiro”, assinada por centenas de oficiais e destinada a pressionar o então comandante Freire Gomes para a ruptura institucional.

Quem são e onde estão os restantes? 

Tanto a carta, quanto a reunião dos “forças especiais” levantam questões importantes sobre a investigação. Para a Polícia Federal, é fundamental descobrir quem que bancou a ida dos militares para Brasília. Isso é importante, mas pode não ser o mais crucial. 

Outra questão de suma importância, talvez até maior, é a própria identificação desses militares. Quem são os forças especiais que participaram da reunião em Brasília junto de integrantes do núcleo-duro golpista? Onde eles estão hoje em dia? E quantos foram, exatamente, e quem são, os altos oficiais que assinaram a carta pela ruptura institucional em novembro de 2022, documento que, quando emitido, o Exército buscou desmoralizar taxando-o de iniciativa de “gente da reserva”? Sabe-se que dois dos redatores foram coronéis, então na ativa: Giovani Pasini e Alexandre Bitencourt. Cid, Oliveira, Romão Correia Neto e Braga Netto podem ter ajudado, sendo os três primeiros também da ativa. Quais outros? E quanto aos que assinaram? Freire Gomes já afirmou antes, sem provas, que os militares foram identificados e punidos, mas outras evidências mostram que isso não é inteiramente verdade: o general Estevam Theophilo, por exemplo, integrante do núcleo bolsonarista, declarou que não chegou a punir os subordinados que assinaram a carta para além de um “chamado de atenção pela quebra de hierarquia”. 

São questões a se levar em consideração. Afinal, já é sabido que aqueles da Cúpula militar que negaram participar da ruptura institucional não o fizeram por um princípio imutável, e sim pela falta de apoio do Estados Unidos (USA) e pelo medo de um levante revolucionário das massas contra o golpe. Hoje, seguem a intervir na vida política nacional, como o “Poder Moderador” que entendem que são (como admitiu o próprio Freire Gomes, na carta assinada pelos três comandantes em 2022). 

Em cenários mais ardentes, em variáveis diferentes a níveis internacionais, e sob novas pressões de grande parte dos que apoiaram a ruptura e continuam na caserna, qual será a escolha do novo comandante? 


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MG: Moradores de Belo Horizonte protestam contra destruição do meio natural por evento automobilístico - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


No dia 3 de março ocorreu um protesto contra a destruição do meio natural cometida pelos organizadores do evento automobilístico Stock Car, como o corte de dezenas de árvores na esplanada do estádio Mineirão próximo à Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (MG). Os manifestantes denunciam que R$ 20 milhões já foram gastos pela prefeitura de Belo Horizonte para a realização desse evento esportivo que possui forte apelo comercial. O correspondente local de AND esteve presente e coletou denúncias de representantes de organizações sociais e personalidades que promoveram o protesto. 

Cleiton Aguiar, pesquisador e professor da UFMG: 

 “A realização da Stock Car no entorno do Mineirão vai prejudicar as pesquisas científicas na UFMG […] estudos sobre o sono, doenças raras, câncer, desenvolvimento de vacinas, outras doenças do cérebro como Alzheimer são amplamente afetadas com esse evento. São milhões de reais do dinheiro público investido nesse tipo de pesquisa que estão em jogo. Boa parte das pesquisas experimentais são feitas com roedores, ratos e camundongos, que são animais noturnos, dorme durante o dia. A maior parte das pesquisas em laboratório são com ratos, que possuem alta sensibilidade a sons. Os carros da Stock Car geram muitos ruídos. […]. o evento da Stock Car leva vários dias entre treinos e a corrida em si. Serão vários dias de privação de sono desses animais. Os teste científicos que estão em andamento serão amplamente prejudicados. Serão anos de pesquisa perdidos…”

Organização Social “Ah, É Lixo?!”

“Estão tentando construir um autódromo de uso temporário. O plano diretor de Belo Horizonte estabelece que autódromo é passível de licenciamento e tem uma deliberação normativa do Conselho Municipal de Meio Ambiente que enquadra autódromo como uma atividade de grande impacto ambiental, definindo que mais de 10 mil metros quadrados de área útil é um autódromo de grande porte.

Aqui, tirando a área do Mineirão, da 85 mil metros quadrados, ou seja, querem construir um autódromo sem passar pelo devido processo de licenciamento ambiental, num tamanho que é oito vezes e meio o limite para se considerar de grande porte. Não apresentado estudos de alternativas locacionais. Quando você vai fazer qualquer análise de viabilidade ambiental, a primeira coisa que se faz é um estudo de alternativas locacionais para verificar possibilidades para receberem aquele empreendimento, com impactos ambientais reduzidos, e nós temos opções, tendo muito menos impacto.

Eles escolheram passar em frente ao hospital universitário, uma área hospitalar, e colocaram o ponto de mais barulho do Stock Car, que chega a quase 110 decibéis, em frente ao hospital veterinário. O contrato permite que se feche as vias no entorno por 19 dias todos os anos (5 anos). Por que não fazer no aeroporto da Pampulha ? Lá tem uma reta oposta de quase 3 quilômetros que daria pra receber a melhor pista de Stock Car do Brasil”.

 Organização Social ‘Instituto Samaran’

“Aqui nós temos animais domésticos que andam por aqui, passarinhos que já estão acostumados , 1500 aves que fazem dessa área dormitório, 138 espécies, e uma delas está em extinção mundial. Por que será que ela veio parar aqui ? Porque ela conseguiu uma segurança, um conforto. […] Gostaríamos que eles apresentassem um plano de manejo com os animais. […] Os conselheiros (COMAM, Conselho Municipal do Meio Ambiente) não quiseram fazer uma visita técnica no local. Nossa pergunta é: qual o problema ? Qual impedimento que essa visita iria trazer ? Então, nós queremos a transparência e a apresentação dos documentos que nós solicitamos para os conselheiros do COMAN.

Organização Social ‘Projeto Pomar BH’

“A gente planta árvores frutíferas por toda a região metropolitana e a gente vai contra o que a prefeitura está fazendo com a supressão de árvores. Enquanto a gente tem mais de 5 mil árvores plantadas, a prefeitura está destruindo 73 árvores que nem se plantar 2.500 vão ter o mesmo benefício. Essas árvores aqui têm mais de 30, 40 anos. Se você corta uma árvore dessa e planta uma muda que representa um galho, o benefício não vai ser o mesmo. Vai levar um tempo muito grande pra elas crescerem, isso se elas sobreviverem, que a prefeitura tá fazendo plantio fora do período.” 

Organização Social ‘Preserva BH’

“Existem estudos sobre a não viabilidade técnica dessa realização da construção de uma posta automobilística no local justamente pela largura da pista, por não suportar o público que a Stock Car espera receber, pela própria topografia, não seria o local mais apropriado. Existem em Belo Horizonte outros lugares mais apropriados que nem foram cogitados como possibilidades. 


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Une nouvelle attaque contre l'Hopital Al-Shifa de Gaza ! - Nouvelle Époque (Nouvelle Epoque)


A l’aube du 18 mars, l’armée génocidaire d’Israël a à nouveau attaqué l’hôpital Al-Shifa, le plus grand complexe hospitalier de la bande de Gaza. Le ministère de la santé parle de «dizaines de milliers» de personnes dans l’hôpital, et ce, dans une situation humanitaire au-delà du catastrophique. Plus de 30 000 morts ont été recensés, et les experts militaires ou statisticiens parlent de dizaines de milliers d’autres morts hors des hôpitaux ou enterrés sous les décombres. Plus de 60% des bâtiments de la bande de Gaza sont détruits, dont l’immense majorité des universités, des hôpitaux, des bâtiments gouvernementaux, spécifiquement ciblés pour rendre la zone invivable et obliger la population à partir, ce qu’elle refuse de faire.

L’attaque de l’hôpital Al-Shifa est une nouvelle preuve de la volonté génocidaire de l’état Israélien. En effet, nous savons tous que la justification par de soit disant «bases opérationnelles du Hamas» est un mensonge. C’est une simple figure de style, tant les mensonges sont grossiers. Lorsque l’hôpital Al-Ahli de Gaza avait été bombardé par des avions israéliens, l’État sioniste avait prétendu que les 500 morts étaient le fait… d’une roquette du Jihad Islamique Palestinien (alors même que ces roquettes sont incapable de détruire une simple voiture lorsqu’elles tombent dans les colonies).

L’attaque systématique des hôpitaux peut être facilement comprise comme la volonté de détruire totalement la bande de Gaza en chassant la population par tous les moyens, y compris par le génocide de tous ceux qui osent rester. C’est un moyen d’empêcher la vie à Gaza.

En effet, l’état israélien cherche à détruire la bande de Gaza depuis des décennies, car il s’agit d’une concentration trop importante de Palestiniens, d’un bastion de la Résistance. C’est le seul espoir de l’État fasciste israélien : massacrer indistinctement les Palestiniens, empêcher leur existence, détruire toute forme de civilisation, en espérant briser militairement la Résistance. Mais cela ne fonctionne pas : la police gazaouie s’est redéployée dans le nord de Gaza début mars, des affrontements armées ont lieu régulièrement autour de Gaza, bien loin de Rafah où est concentrée la population. L’armée sioniste a été obligée de battre une nouvelle fois en retraite au début du mois de Ramadan, tant les opérations de la Résistance se sont intensifiées, alors même que la Cisjordanie est au bord de l’insurrection.

Face à la Révolution, la réaction ne peut suivre qu’une seule voie : faire couler des torrents de sang, en espérant retarder le plus possible l’heure de sa chute inéluctable.





Patients and internally displaced people are pictured at Al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City on November 10, 2023, amid ongoing battles between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. Heavy fighting was raging near Al-Shifa hospital, with Israel saying it had killed dozens of militants and destroyed tunnels that are key to Hamas’s capacity to fight. Israel launched an offensive in Gaza after Hamas fighters poured across the heavily militarised border on October 7, killing 1,400 people, mostly civilians, and taking around 240 hostages. (Photo by Khader Al Zanoun / AFP)

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PB: Ocupação no interior da Paraíba realiza brigada de obras no Dia Internacional da Mulher Proletária - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


Apoiados por movimentos populares, os moradores da Ocupação Luiz Gomes em Campina Grande realizaram, no dia 16 de março, uma brigada para a finalização da obra para implantar canos de água e, assim, possibilitar acesso de qualidade a água para todos. 

Na noite do mesmo dia também ocorreu uma vitoriosa celebração do Dia Internacional da Mulher Proletária com falas, sorteios e uma grande homenagem à companheira Perla Albuquerque Lima, moradora da ocupação falecida há pouco mais de um mês, nomeando a Escola Popular com o seu nome.

Projeto

No ano passado, os moradores da Ocupação Luiz Gomes, com apoio do CDP-CG (Comite de Defesa Popular de Campina Grande), do Observatório das Metrópoles e do Coletivo Verde Campina , conseguiram aprovar um projeto para implantação da rede de esgoto e água através da ong Habitat para Humanidade Brasil.

A ong forneceu uma verba, baseada no projeto, para a compra de materiais e contratação de alguns serviços essenciais para o andamento da obra, mas, uma vez que o direcionamento principal da verba era compra de materiais, foi necessário que os moradores e apoiadores da Ocupação unissem forças, trabalhando juntos para que todos melhorassem suas condições de moradia. Assim, a obra que teve seu início em setembro/2023, tem previsão de término para o mês de março/2024.

Celebrações e Homenagens 

Unindo coletivos, apoiadores e moradores, a brigada foi realizada no dia 09 de março com o intuito de acelerar a obra em vigor. Além do trabalho na obra em si, também foi preparada uma feijoada coletiva na cozinha da escola popular, atividades com as crianças e sorteios para os presentes.

Também ocorreu um momento de celebração e homenagens para ressaltar a importância do Dia Internacional da Mulher Proletária, junto às mulheres da Ocupação presentes, quando foi lido um panfleto publicado pelo Movimento Feminino Popular. 

Por fim, mas não menos importante, a homenagem à companheira Perla. Perla foi uma mulher da luta, apesar dos seus problemas sérios de saúde (lutava contra o lúpus), esteve presente nessa luta por moradia desde o início, lá em 2020, quando levantou seu pequeno barraco de lona. Perla sempre esteve presente nas atividades da escola, participando de cursos de formação, zelando pela organização e preservação da escola e também demonstrando interesse por dar aulas de reforço para as crianças.

No último mês de janeiro, a companheira Perla faleceu após ter contraído Covid, quadro que complicou o seu problema de saúde já afetado pelo lúpus. Mãe de 4 filhos, Perla deixou seu pequeno barraco, que com o passar desses anos, com muito esforço, se transformou em uma casa de alvenaria, mas, mais do que isso, deixou o exemplo para tantas outras mulheres que estão dentro da luta por moradia. Por isso, para lembrar essa grande companheira, a escola foi nomeada de “Escola Popular Perla Albuquerque Lima”.

E o prefeito?

Enquanto os moradores constroem sua infraestrutura de moradia e luta cada vez mais por dignidade, o prefeito, em ano de eleição, prometeu mandar instalar os postes de energia elétrica na Ocupação, que atualmente ainda possui uma iluminação muito precária. A promessa foi feita no ano passado, no primeiro dia das obras de esgotamento, dando ele um prazo de 15 dias, mas, como era de se esperar, o povo continua sem os prometidos postes.

O prefeito duvida da inteligência e da capacidade do povo organizado: enquanto promete mundos e fundos na esperança de conseguir votos, mantém na justiça um processo de reintegração de posse do terreno onde foi estabelecida a Ocupação Luiz Gomes.


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Wahlboykott in Mexiko: Angriffe auf Institutionen des alten Staates (Dem Volke Dienen)


In Mexiko entfaltet sich gerade eine breite und lebendige Kampagne zum Boykott der anstehenden, am 02. Juni stattfindenden Präsidentschaftswahlen des alten mexikanischen Staates.Die Genossen der demokratischen und revolutionären Website Mural Periodico schreiben in einem Bericht über die Aktivitäten zum Wahlboykott über die Besonderheit des mexikanischen Wahlkampfes.

So kommt es im Wahlkampf als ein zentraler Austragungsort der Widersprüche und Machtverhältnisse zwischen der verschiedenen Fraktionen der bürokratischen Bourgeoisie, Kompradorenbourgeoisie und Großgrundbesitzern auch zu Gewalt zwischen diesen Fraktionen. So berichten die Genossen das seit dem Start der Vor-Kampagne am 6. November letzten Jahres es insgesamt zu 23 Ermordungen von Politikern des Bürokratkapitalistischen-Großgrundbesitzer Staates kam. Ein weiterer Beweis das es den Fraktionen der Herrschenden Klassen und ihrem politischen Personal nur um die persönliche Macht für ihre eigenen Interessen geht und die Wahlen nicht im geringsten im Interesse des Volkes abgehalten werden um dem Land Fortschritt zu bringen.

Derweil fanden im Rahmen der Wahlboykottkampagne einige kraftvolle und kämpferische Aktionen gegen die Wahlpropaganda des alten mexikanischen Staates und den Parteien der Großbourgeoisie und Großgrundbesitzer statt.

In Chiapas im Süden Mexikos kam es am 21. Februar zu einem Angriff auf ein Gebäude der Wahlbehörde. Bei dem Angriff wurde das Gebäude mit Steinen und Molotow-Cocktails beworfen was zu einem Feuer innerhalb des Gebäude führte welches teilweise Wahlunterlage verbrannte und Möbel in Flammen setzte. Dies führte zu einem Großeinsatz der Staatspolizei und Nationalgarde sowie der Feuerwehr.

wahlboykottmexiko2

In mexikanischen Bundesstaat Oaxaca fanden am 04. März während einer großen Mobilisierung mit über tausend Teilnehmern verschiedene Propagandaaktionen gegen die Wahlen statt. So entfernten Teilnehmer der Demonstration Wahlwerbung der verschiedenen Parteien und brachten an Stelle derer Graffiti und Losungen an die Wände in denen zum Boykott der Wahlen aufgerufen. Die entfernte Wahlpropaganda wurde anschließend unter den Parolen „Wahlen sind nicht die Lösung, die Lösung ist die Revolution!“ und „Geht nicht wählen, bereitet euch auf den Kampf vor“ verbrannt.

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In der Hauptstadt des Landes, Mexiko-Stadt, wurde im Rahmen des Kampfes um den zehnten Jahrestag des Verschwinden-Lassens von 43 Studenten durch Polizisten Aktionen durchgeführt, bei der die Vereinigung der ländlichen Lehrer und Lehramtsstudenten erst einen Pick-Up des staatlichen Elektriztätskonzerns CFE enteigneten und dann mit diesem Pick-Up, während schweren Kämpfen mit der Militär- und Stadtpolizei, ein Tor des Präsidentenpalastes durchbrachen.

wahlboykottmexiko1

Diese kraftvollen und brachialen Aktionen sind nicht nur ein Ausdruck der tiefen Krise in dem der bürokratische Kapitalismus und der alte mexikanische Staat sich befindet, sondern spiegelt auch die Seele des Wahlboykotts wieder. Der Boykott der Wahlen verweigert dem alten System die Legitimation und antwortet auf die Frage wie Veränderung stattdessen gehen kann darauf das die Volksmassen unter Führung der Revolutionäre mit revolutionärer Gewalt gegen das alte System kämpfen müssen um die Macht zu erobern. Dies gilt nicht nur für die Verhältnisse in Mexiko, sondern ist eine strategische Frage welche für jedes Land auf der Welt gilt, ganz gleich ob es eine unterdrückte Nation oder eine imperialistische Nation ist.


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UFPE assina acordo de cibersegurança com Exército - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


No começo deste mês de março, a reitoria da UFPE, representada pelo reitor Alfredo Gomes, assinou um acordo com o Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME), que visa o avanço de tecnologias como Inteligência Artificial e segurança cibernética. O projeto ainda fundou um curso para esse objetivo, que começará no início de 2025. Apesar de promovido com o discurso de “desenvolvimento” do IME e da universidade, o projeto serve para o aprofundamento da atuação do Exército reacionário na universidade.

O reitor Alfredo Gomes ressalta a “importância de construir conjuntamente parcerias para fortalecer áreas tão estratégicas e importantes para o Brasil”, enquanto o Reitor do Instituto Militar de Engenharia frisa o caráter dessa parceria: “faz parte de uma ação estratégica do DCT (Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia do Exército), visando a participação mais efetiva do IME em várias regiões do país”.

Momento específico

O novo passo para a maior presença militar na universidade não ocorre de forma isolada. A força armada reacionária recebeu outros incentivos recentes no estado, como a construção da Escola de Sargentos de Pernambuco, apoiada pelo governo federal.

A maior militarização ocorre concomitantemente ao avanço da luta camponesa no estado. No município de Jaqueira, por exemplo, posseiros tem resistido contundentemente às ofensivas do latifúndio. Em escada, importantes protestos camponeses bloquearam vias depois da execução de um camponês por um PM.

Nas universidades, a presença militar pode ser encarada como uma ameaça ao desenvolvimento da luta estudantil, sobretudo se levado em consideração as constantes demonstrações de apoio do movimento estudantil combativo aos povos em luta no campo, desde camponeses, até indígenas e quilombolas.


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Barcelona: 9 detenidos por acciones solidarias con Palestina (Servir al pueblo)


Manifestación del 7 de febrero. Fuente: La DIrecta.

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La Courneuve (IDF) : un assassinat policier de plus - Nouvelle Époque (Nouvelle Epoque)


‌9 mois après l’assassinat de Nahel qui avait enflammé la France en juin 2023, un nouveau jeune est mort dans des circonstances floues ce mercredi 13 mars à la Courneuve (Seine Saint-Denis), le jeune Wanys, 18 ans.

Alors que les policiers l’accusent de “refus d’optemperer”, une vidéo de surveillance montre clairement la voiture de la BAC (Brigade “anti-criminalité”) venir percuter de face le jeune Wanys, qui circulait visiblement de manière totalement règlementaire, casqué, au milieu la chaussé, en respectant la limite de vitesse, sans doubler personne (ce qui rend étonnantes les accusations de “refus d’obtemperer”)

Aussitôt, les vautours se déchaînent : exhibition de son casier judiciaire (rappelons que le casier judiciaire est censé être secret, connu uniquement de la justice, et de plus qu’il est censé être effacé à la majorité de l’individu), attaque sur sa famille, justification honteuse de ” l’accident ” lui ayant couté la vie.

Les crimes policiers ne sont pas le fruit du hasard : c’est la jeunesse prolétaire qui est attaquée, celle qui a le pouvoir et la capacité de renverser le vieil ordre social corrompu et pourrissant. C’est la jeunesse des quartiers, révoltée en Juin, en 2018 après le viol de Théo, en 2005 après l’assassinat de Zyed et Bouna, dans les années 1980 à Vénissieux, qui est attaquée, car elle est la base et le moteur de la Révolution prolétarienne en France.

L’Etat et sa force armée l’ont bien compris : il faut écraser cette jeunesse, que ce soit à l’école, par les parents, humiliés depuis des années, par les allocations et les salaires insuffisant, qui permettent de tenter de faire croire que ceux qui produisent tout sont en fait des “parasites”, et dans le sang s’il le faut. Il faut détruire par la répression armée et judiciaire les envies de changements : c’est à dire, de révolution.

Mais la jeunesse prolétaire ne se laissera plus faire. Le souvenir de Nahel est encore chaud, de nombreux révoltés encore emprisonnés, et pourtant les jeunes n’ont pas hésité à se révolter, des affrontements ont éclaté à la Courneuve dans la nuit de dimanche à lundi, le commissariat étant pris d’assaut et ciblé par des jets de cocktails molotov, les forces de l’ordre mettant plusieurs heures avant de reprendre le contrôle de la situation. Six interpellations sont à déplorer dans ces affrontements, qui conduiront, à n’en pas douter, à de nouvelles peines de prison.

Il y a plus de 50 ans, le journal de la Gauche Prolétarienne, titrait : “Force ne doit plus être à la loi”. Jamais cela n’aura été aussi juste, et cela le restera tant que n’aura pas été détruit le système capitaliste, force ne sera plus jamais à la loi dans la société capitaliste. En France, en Palestine, ou encore au Brésil, la jeunesse se révolte, fait trembler le vieux monde, et prouve à l’immense masse du peuple, au prolétariat tout entier, à quel point le système qui nous domine, l’impérialisme, est faible : un “tigre de papier”, comme le disait le président Mao.






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Lyon : Plusieurs évènements et actions à l’occasion du 8 mars, journée internationale de lutte pour les droits des femmes - Nouvelle Époque (Nouvelle Epoque)


A l’occasion du 8 mars, le Comité Féminin Populaire (CFP) s’est largement mobilisé à Lyon pour porter haut les mots d’ordre révolutionnaires pour la lutte pour l’émancipation des femmes.

Le premier évènement était la tenue d’un meeting, auquel Nouvelle Epoque a pu assisté. Au programme de celui-ci, une présentation par une porte-parole du CFP du travail de l’organisation, travail propre ainsi que le travail au sein du CPES (Comité Populaire d’Entraide et de Solidarité) du quartier des Etats-Unis. Dans un deuxième temps, c’est une intervention par des femmes palestiniennes de la diaspora sur la place des femmes dans la Résistance qui était prévu.

Affiche du meeting du Comité Féminin Populaire (CFP). Source : Twitter de Nouvelle Epoque

Celui-ci s’est ainsi tenu le soir du 7 mars dans la faculté de Lyon 2. Malgré la tentative par la présidence de la fac de faire annuler le meeting, celui-ci a pu avoir lieu, réunissant une trentaine de personnes.

La porte-parole du CFP a ainsi commencé par présenter le travail des femmes du CFP dans le monde étudiant en particulier, dans lequel l’organisation œuvre pour briser les murs de l’université et entamer la lutte de classe idéologique au cœur du bastion de la bourgeoisie. La deuxième partie du travail du CFP se situe au cœur des masses prolétaires, dans les quartiers populaires, à Lyon notamment celui des États-Unis, dans lequel les activistes luttent aux seins des femmes des masses, menant un travail acharné de mobilisation, de politisation et d’organisation des femmes dans le cadre du CPES.

A la suite de la présentation de l’activiste, les femmes palestiniennes ont pu s’exprimer sur le rôle des femmes dans la Résistance. Elles ont fermement rappelé et martelé que l’ennemi n’était en rien l’homme palestinien mais bien l’impérialisme, allant à contre-rebours des conceptions petites-bourgeoises plaçant en opposition par essence femmes et hommes. En effet, c’est l’impérialisme qui maintient les vieilles structures patriarcales, qui permet la survie de la misère noire dans laquelle vivent les femmes du peuple.
Elles ont ainsi tenu à rappeler que les femmes doivent porter le poids de deux montagnes : l’impérialisme et le patriarcat, et qu’en cela elles ont comme les hommes tout à gagner dans la lutte révolutionnaire pour le socialisme, la seule à même de les émanciper.




Le 8 mars, nous avons retrouvé en plein cœur de la manifestation un cortège combatif et anti-impérialiste, organisé par la Fosse aux Lyons et le Comité Féminin Populaire. Ce cortège se plaçait en soutien à la Glorieuse Résistance Nationale Palestinienne et en particulier aux femmes de Palestine et surtout de Gaza, qui tiennent sur leurs épaules leur peuple et leurs familles malgré les bombardements, le blocus et la famine. Les drapeaux palestiniens, rouges et ceux de la Fosse aux Lyons se sont cotoyés, derrière une banderole «Soutien à nos sœurs de Gaza qui luttent contre l’impérialisme et le patriarcat ! Palestine vaincra» et de nombreux slogans et chants en soutien à la lutte armée, aux femmes de Palestine et contre Israël, le sionisme et l’impérialisme ont résonné.
Plusieurs prises de parole par les activistes du cortège anti-impérialiste ont permis de porter largement ces mots d’ordre révolutionnaires, anti-impérialistes, et pour la lutte pour l’émancipation des femmes. Au delà de l’impérialisme yankee et de la barbarie sioniste, l’impérialisme français a aussi été attaqué pour son rôle dans le traitement inhumain des femmes mahoraises, afin d’appuyer que le patriarcat ne s’arrête pas aux frontières des puissances impérialistes, mais que celles-ci sont les gardiens de cette oppression des femmes.

Nous avons pu constater que ce cortège a été particulièrement bien accueilli sur son passage, preuve s’il en est besoin que malgré la chape de plomb de l’impérialisme et de ses idéologies post-modernes, les femmes du peuple osent lutter, et, surtout, osent vaincre.


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France/Saint-Etienne: On March 23rd, let’s commemorate the Paris Commune! – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


We publish this unofficial translation of a call from France.

Let’s meet on March 23rd, at 2 p.m., at Place du Peuple in Saint-Etienne (42) for an event to commemorate the Paris Commune!

The reactionary wave that has engulfed the country since the 1990s continues to grow, leaving the “people of the left” speechless. The absolute domination of a clique of lobbyists over the media leads us to believe that the entire country has sunk into reactionary, anti-Enlightenment and anti-emancipation ideas. The manipulation of History is an old technique of the ruling to try to transform the present in their image. Current and past policies inevitably pave the way for fascism and war. We can only be worried about the warlike tones of the “first of the citizens” and his henchmen, while tensions between nuclear powers are growing.

The economic crisis, impoverishment, the march towards war, reactionary and racist policies deserve a clear response from all that this country has of democrats, progressives, humanists, trade unionists, associations, activists, all those who think that the emancipation of the human race is not an old thing of the 20th century, but the future of the 21st.

The history of the workers’ and people’s movement is strewn with armed feats. Our entire social system, our democratic freedoms, are the result of the struggles of the past. The future of the country is only the fruit of today’s struggles and tomorrow. The only guarantor of political and social rights is the people.

We, citizens, left-wing activists, trade unionists, progressives, humanists, believe that we need historical benchmarks, milestones to be part of a much longer process than the ephemeral tweets of current politicians. We could cite the Great French Revolution, the struggles for the Republic and June 1848, the People’s Front and the Resistance, but of all these dates one particularly serves as an inerasable, temporal mark, because its heart is marked with that of the eternity, we want to talk about the Epic of the Commune!

It was the first republic of workers in the country and in the world, it abolished the army, separated the State and the Church, gave education for all, new rights to the working class, and it saved the honor of the country sold to the Prussians by the Versailles. The political emancipation of women was the work of the Commune. Real democracy was put in place, with revocability of elected officials at all levels and direct consultation of the people. The Commune was profoundly internationalist, the French citizen was the one who found himself in the universal ideals carried by the Commune.

The current government is of the same caliber as those from Versailles: republican and democratic in form, ultra-reactionary in substance. Continuing the long work of destroying the public good (public enterprises, social system, education, pensions, health, etc.), he wants to call into question the achievements of the Resistance more than ever.

To commemorate the Commune is to commemorate the unreclaimable, the event which made all the powerful of Europe tremble, which resonated throughout the world as a new era, that of the Universal Republic of Workers, that of the emancipation of human kind, that of bread and peace.

The Commune is not a dead idea, it is a future to be reconquered, an expanding ideal which we must all seize, today, as the antithesis of this Republic which defiles its fundamental principles.

Long live the Commune !
Meet at Place du Peuple on Saturday March 23rd at 2 p.m.

Friends of the Commune 1871 (Saint-Etienne)
mail: lesamisdelacommune42@proton.me

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THE GAZA STRIP FAMINE IS IMMINENT AS 1.1 MILLION PEOPLE, HALF OF GAZA, EXPERIENCE CATASTROPHIC FOOD INSECURITY Overview The IPC acute food insecurity analysis conducted in December 2023 warned of a risk that Famine may occur by the end of May 2024 if an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access for the provision of essential supplies and services to the population did not take place. Since then, the conditions necessary to prevent famine have not been met and the latest evidence confirms that Famine is imminent in the northern governorates and projected to occur anytime between mid-March and May 2024. CURRENT: 15 FEBRUARY - 15 MARCH 2024 2.13M 95% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTIONPhase 5 677,000 People in Catastrophe Phase 4 876,000 People in Emergency Phase 3 578,000 People in Crisis Phase 2 96,000 People Stressed Phase 1 0 People in food security PROJECTED: 16 MARCH - 15 JULY 2024 2.23M 100% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTIONPhase 5 1,107,000 People in Catastrophe Phase 4 854,000 People in Emergency Phase 3 265,000 People in Crisis Phase 2 0 People Stressed Phase 1 0 People in food security IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS 15 FEBRUARY - 15 JULY 2024 Published on 18 March 2024IPC Global Initiative - Special Brief IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in Palestine. This analysis factors in all data and information available up to 10 March 2024 and does not take into account the latest developments on the ground. Key Drivers Restricted humanitarian access Extremely limited humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip continues to impede the safe and equitable delivery of life-saving multi-sector humanitarian assistance critical for Famine prevention and response. This includes severe limitations to the supply of goods as well as basic services.Hostilities Hostilities continue to involve the besiegement of the entire population and widespread, intense and sustained ground and air operations and clashes. This has caused over 31,000 deaths and injured 73,000 people, displaced about 1.9 million people, damaged or destroyed over half of the buildings, and devastated assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival, including across the food, health and water systems.Current Acute Food Insecurity | 15 February - 15 March Projected Acute Food Insecurity | 16 March - 15 July
According to the most likely scenario, both North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine) with reasonable evidence, with 70% (around 210,000 people) of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Continued conflict and the near-complete lack of access to the northern governorates for humanitarian organizations and commercial trucks will likely compound heightened vulnerabilities and extremely limited food availability, access, and utilization, as well as access to healthcare, water, and sanitation. The famine threshold for household acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and, given the latest data showing a steeply increasing trend in cases of acute malnutrition, it is highly likely that the famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. In North Gaza, acute malnutrition (by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference - MUAC) moved from a pre-escalation estimated of 1 percent to 6.8 – 9.1 percent in January and 12.4 to 16.5 percent in February (weighted for children 6-59). Acute malnutrition (by MUAC) among children 6-23 months old increased in the same period from 16.2 percent to 29.2 percent. The upward trend in non-trauma mortality is also expected to accelerate, resulting in all famine thresholds likely to be passed imminently. The southern governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and the Governorate of Rafah, are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). However, in a worst-case scenario, these governorates face a risk of Famine through July 2024. The entire population in the Gaza Strip (2.23 million) is facing high levels of acute food insecurity. From mid-March to mid-July, in the most likely scenario and under the assumption of an escalation of the conflict including a ground offensive in Rafah, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1.11 million people) is expected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5), the most severe level in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. This represents an increase of 530,000 people (92 percent) compared to the previous analysis. Between the current and the projection period, around 400,000 more people are expected to slide into IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The rest of the population faces Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (854,000 people, 38 percent of the population) or Crisis (IPC Phase 3) (265,000 people, 12 percent of the population). The escalation of the hostilities has caused widespread damage to assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival. About 50 percent of buildings - and more than 70 percent in the northern governorates - have been damaged or destroyed. This has included dwellings, shops and infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, as well as water, sanitation and other facilities. Assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limiting the functionality of the food system. From a pre-escalation average of 500 trucks a day of which 150 carrying food, in the period between 7 October 2023 to 24 February 2024, only 90 trucks per day, of which only 60 carrying food, entered the Gaza Strip. Consequently, virtually all households are skipping meals every day and adults are reducing their meals so that children can eat. In the northern governorates, in nearly two thirds of the households, people went entire days and nights without eating at least 10 times in the last 30 days. In the southern governorates, this applies to one third of the households.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF3 CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (15 February - 15 March 2024 ) Population table for the current situation: 15 February - 15 March 2024 Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.GovernorateTotal population analysedPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 3+Area Phase#people % #people % #people % #people % #people % #people % Deir al-Balah & Khan Younis governorates600,000 0 030,000 5120,000 20 270,000 45 180,000 30 570,000 95 4 North Gaza & Gaza governorates300,000 0 0 0 0 60,000 20 75,000 25 165,000 55 300,000 100 4 Rafah governorate1,326,544 0 066,327 5397,963 30 530,618 40 331,636 25 1,260,217 95 4 Grand Total 2,226,544 0 096,327 5 577,963 26 875,618 39 676,636 30 2,130,217 95
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF4 CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (15 February - 15 March 2024) Vulnerabilities and Acute Events Prior to the current hostilities, vulnerability was high in the Gaza Strip due to prolonged blockade and periodic escalations in hostilities that severely damaged the food system in the area. At 5,900 residents per square kilometre, one of the most densely populated areas in the world even before the concentration of most of the population in only one of five governorates, the Gaza Strip population is extremely reliant on the cross-border movement of goods and utilities like electricity and water. In 2022, the Gaza Strip faced an unemployment rate of nearly 45 percent 1 and, by September 2023, the poverty rate was at 60 percent 2, among a population that included nearly 70 percent of refugees. 3 Due to severely constrained livelihood opportunities, in 2022, over half of the population was relying on humanitarian assistance as their main income source and about one-third on casual labour, 4 with 70 percent of the population food insecure. 5 Conflict . As of 14 March 2024, the ongoing hostilities have reportedly caused nearly 105,000 casualties within the Gaza Strip – nearly 5% of the total population. 6 This includes over 73,000 people injured, about half of them women and children, and over 31,000 deaths. The escalation of hostilities within the Gaza Strip began with heavy bombardment on 7 October 2023. 7 On 27 October, major ground operations and clashes reportedly began within the Gaza Strip. 8 These started in the northern governorates and continued through 23 November, with a humanitarian pause from 24 November through 30 November. 9 Hostilities subsequently resumed at high intensity, with major ground operations and bombardment by air, land, and sea. This included the continued expansion of a ground operation in Khan Younis Governorate, centred on Khan Younis city. 10 Another large ground operation began in Deir al-Balah Governorate on 24 December 2023, 11 expanding across multiple though not all refugee camps and urban areas in the governorate. These operations were accompanied by continued clashes among armed actors. Clashes in the northern governorates, especially some neighbourhoods of Gaza city like Zeitoun, re-escalated in late February 2024. 12 Bombardment by air, land, and sea of all areas of the Gaza Strip has continued throughout this period, intensifying particularly before and during major ground operations. Humanitarian access. Conflict continues to place severe limitations on the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving food, nutrition, health, water, hygiene, sanitation and other life-saving assistance to the besieged population. Commercial traffic is similarly impeded. Humanitarian access, and the ability of the most vulnerable populations to access and participate in humanitarian activities safely is highly limited and uneven across the Gaza Strip. Once humanitarian assistance and commercial goods enter the Gaza Strip, onward access to the northern governorates is extremely limited and unavailable for extended periods, while access is relatively higher for the southern governorates, particularly Rafah Governorate. While there has been improvement in access to the Gaza Strip relative to early October 2023, including the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing in Mid-December 2023, access to the Gaza Strip continues to fluctuate and remains insufficient for meeting the basic needs of the overall population. Severe limitations and attacks on humanitarian staff and assets forced major providers of humanitarian food and other assistance to the northern governorates to suspend convoys to these areas, including the World Food Programme, on 20 February. 13 Since the previous IPC analysis on the Gaza Strip in December 2023, access denial increased significantly, especially in the northern governorates. In January 2024, only nine humanitarian missions to the northern governorates were facilitated, dropping to six missions in February. 14 Figure 1. Casualties in the Gaza Strip reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health as of 14 March 2024. Source: Health Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF5 According to OCHA, constraints on humanitarian action throughout the Gaza Strip include direct strikes with explosive weapons on humanitarian convoys, detention of humanitarian staff, road closures, checkpoints, and related blockages or delays on main transportation corridors. Swarming of humanitarian convoys subsequently increased, including at several hotspots throughout the Gaza Strip, such as immediately after crossing Wadi Gaza into the northern governorates. Physical access constraints further limit the movement of humanitarian and commercial traffic, including road damage from bombardment and traffic of heavy military vehicles as well as the accumulation of an estimated 12,000 metric tons of debris that may take up to four years to fully clear. 15 Displacement and Movement Restrictions. Displacement continues to be driven by conflict. An evacuation order was issued to the entire population residing north of Wadi Gaza (1.1 million people) on 13 October, 16 followed by orders and accompanying maps indicating to move as far south as Khan Younis Governorate. 17 After the humanitarian pause on 24- 30 November 2023, new evacuation orders covering at least 30 percent of the entire Gaza Strip were issued. 18 The unilaterally declared Al-Mawasi “Humanitarian Zone” was first announced on 18 October 2023, however, humanitarian agencies did not agree to the establishment of such zones. 19 The proposed area has limited pre-existing services, with OCHA reporting there is “almost no sheltering capacity” . 20 In addition to the closure of some of the main transportation corridors within the Gaza Strip, other movement restrictions have also been announced, including a ban on movement from southern to northern governorates. 21 Additional restrictions imposed on populations affect livelihoods and food access, such as a de facto prohibition on fishing and movement within one kilometre of the border fence, which covers a significant proportion of farmland. 22 The movement of livestock together with displaced populations has not generally been reported and livestock abandonment is likely high.Map 1. Missions planned, facilitated and denied, October 2023 to Mid-February 2024. Source: OCHA Map 2. Distribution of IDPs staying in Collective Centres. Source: Shelter Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF6 As new evacuation orders are issued alongside with continuation of bombardments and ground operations, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are constantly moving in search of safety. Most of them have moved south, largely to Rafah Governorate. 23 The population in Rafah has increased about five-fold as a result, rapidly rising from 276,000 pre-escalation to over 1.3 million as of February 2024. A large proportion of the displaced population is from Gaza and North Gaza Governorates, which have seen their population decrease by 84 percent and 75 percent respectively. 24 Rafah Governorate, which spans over 65 km 2, now hosts around 1.3 million people. 25 In Rafah, there are 35 UNRWA shelters hosting 882,800 people and another 30 informal shelters hosting 506,300 people, 26 corresponding to over 30 percent of the population staying in shelters. The formal shelters managed by UNRWA are overcrowded with severely limited access to safe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and other services. People in informal shelters face even more difficulties accessing health, food and non-food services. The lack of Non-food Items (NFIs) provision in informal settlements has led people to set up makeshift shelters and tents, which are subject to flooding on rainy days, further exacerbating the suffering of displaced people. 27 Damages . Destruction and damage of buildings, particularly from bombardment by air, land, and sea, is evident in all governorates of the Gaza Strip. According to the recent satellite assessments, by late February 2024, at least 54 percent of all buildings in the Gaza Strip were likely damaged or destroyed. The largest scale destruction is in Gaza Governorate where more than 73 percent of buildings are estimated to be destroyed, followed by North Gaza (70 percent), Deir al-Balah (44 percent), Khan Younis (52 percent) and Rafah (28 percent). 28 This has included dwellings, shops and various types of infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, and other public buildings, as well as WASH infrastructure and storage facilities, among others. Food Availability Production . The escalation of hostilities and mass displacements have caused food shortages and unavailability throughout the Gaza Strip as the food system and agriculture value chains have collapsed or are marginally surviving through the informal market. A significant portion of agriculture land, encompassing orchards, greenhouses, and farmlands has suffered extensive destruction. According to the UNOSAT, the percent of damaged agriculture land has increased from 25 percent to 60 percent, between November 2023 and January 2024.29 Extensive damage has been inflicted on the local food system, including agricultural infrastructure. More than 300 home barns, 100 agricultural warehouses, 46 farm storages, 119 animal shelters, 200 farms, as well over 600 wells used for irrigation have been destroyed, amongst other agriculture facilities.30 According to the FAO damage assessment of February 2024, damage to wells was found to be most concentrated in the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates; and in some areas, all the wells were damaged. Additionally, over 26 percent (336) of all greenhouses have been damaged across all governorates. The governorates with the highest Map 3. Gaza Damage Mapping 26.02.2024. Source: Decentralized Damage Mapping Group Map 4. Damage to Agriculture Areas Imagery Analysis Maps - November 2023 (left), December 2023 (middle) and January 2024 (right). Source: UNOSAT, 2023-2024
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF7 damage are Gaza (55 percent), North Gaza (48 percent), Khan Younis (35 percent), Deir al-Balah (20 percent) and Rafah (16 percent). The Governorate of Khan Younis had the largest area of damaged greenhouses (149 hectares), followed by Rafah (89 hectares). More than 40 percent (6,694 ha) of all croplands has been damaged since 7 October, with the highest reported damages in Gaza (55 percent, 1,941 ha), Deir al-Balah (51 percent, 1,408 ha), North Gaza (45 percent, 1,402 ha), Khan Younis (33 percent, 1,492 ha) and Rafah (25 percent, 451 ha) Governorates. In terms of cropland type, 41 percent of irrigated land, 43 percent of orchards and 42 percent of rainfed land have been damaged.31 The hostilities have not only led to the destruction of agricultural assets and infrastructure, they also resulted in the displacement of populations away from agricultural land and constrained access for agricultural activities. Other assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limited the functionality of the food system. Although some local production, primarily of vegetables, is still ongoing, it is very limited. Lack of access to land and destruction of crops are compounded by a lack of access to essential agriculture inputs (fuel, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides). Most livestock were abandoned during the large-scale displacement in October 2023. Remaining livestock are being slaughtered or sold due to the lack of fodder and water or due to the need for cash or other resources. Similarly, poultry lack animal feed, and the availability of poultry meat and eggs is reduced throughout the Gaza Strip. The comparison among the preliminary reports from the FAO Loss and Damage assessment and the baseline figure from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), shows about 70 percent of livestock and other animals have been lost since 7 October 2024. Fishing production is largely halted due to the damage of boats, lack of fuel and security/safe access. Some fishing is still happening, but it is only available to those who still possess equipment and have access to fuel. Food security assessments indicate32 that, due to the lack of food availability, some households are resorting to eating wild foods. These range from mallow ( khebbayze in Arabic) to unconventional food sources such as animal fodder and other unsafe foods. Figure 2. Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 15 February 2024. Source: FAO
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF8 Imports . Between January and September 2023, a daily average of 150 food trucks entered the Gaza Strip. Between 8 October 2023 and 9 March 2024, this number decreased to an average of 65 trucks per day33 and the availability of food commodities has dramatically declined. Since the escalation of the hostilities, the number of trucks allowed into the Gaza Strip has been severely restricted, reducing the inflow of humanitarian assistance and preventing the entry of commercial goods completely until 8 December 2023. Since then, there was an initial increase in the flow of food and non-food commodities, facilitated through the opening of a second border crossing (Kerem Shalom). However, in February, the flow of commodities decreased again and has been intermittent from late January through February. The month of February in particular saw major variations highlighted in figure 3. The entry of humanitarian and commercial trucks into Gaza is significantly limited to the southern governorates, mainly Rafah. Conversely, there are very few items reaching the northern governorates and other areas in the rest of the south of Gaza Strip.34 OCHA estimates that less than 5 percent of all the food trucks have reached North Gaza and Gaza Governorates in the past four weeks, while 45 percent remained in Rafah and about 50 percent reached Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis. An in-depth analysis of the border crossing manifest allowed to generate approximate kilocalories values per truck and per unit of analysis then distributed per area, using information provided by OCHA and the Food Security Sector. This reveals that in most days, the quantity of food translated in kilocalories entering in Gaza has been extremely below the requirements in North Gaza Governorates, and mostly half the requirements in Rafah. The only areas appearing to have benefited from an almost sufficient amount of kilocalories (although irregular) are in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates (with higher quantities in the later). This may suggest that most Figure 3. Reanalysis of food-only trucks entering Gaza through Kerem Shalom and Rafah border crossing. Source: UNRWA Figure 4. Reanalysis of the Kcal availability per unit of analysis. Source: UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF9 requirements in Rafah. Based on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 21 October 2023 to 3 March 2024, the proportion of average kilocalories per day (using a 7-day rolling average) has been consistently below the daily kilocalorie requirements (calculated using demographic data considering variations by age and gender), with the exception of a short period of time around mid-January. A survey conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP)35 highlights that interviewed shop owners are faced with a significant shortage of basic food items, with 81 percent indicating depletion. Furthermore, 19 percent highlighted that the available food items are in short supply, and not expected to last more than a week. The formal market has been heavily impacted with a non-functioning supply chain, and severely damaged shops. Consequently, the informal market has surged. Informal markets, provide 1 or 2 types of foods (canned foods mainly), and are supplied by the beneficiaries of assistance (selling or bartering). The WFP market monitoring indicates that most respondents have stocks inferior to 1 week or inexistent for the vast majority of the food commodities, with the exception of vegetables. All respondents have exhausted dairy products.36 Despite the presence of at least a hundred bakeries in northern Gaza, few are able to operate due to significant challenges. The main obstacle is the persistent shortage of flour, other bakery inputs, and fuel. In early January, WFP began supporting 12 bakeries in Rafah and Deir al-Balah.37 Access Market functionality. Informal markets now dominate both food and non-food item transactions across the Gaza Strip as formal markets have collapsed following the depletion of stocks and damage to primary places of business. Selling and buying is mostly taking place in the street along with potential barter activities. People, and more particularly vulnerable groups, are increasingly facing protection risks to access markets with the lack of social order and high levels of food insecurity. There is a risk associated to transporting and carrying food in the street, especially in Northern Gaza and Gaza Governorates where people have resorted to going out in groups to buy food and/or carrying knives to protect themselves. The scarcity of items is driving food prices up and reducing household purchasing power. The overall Consumer Price index (CPI) was approximately 49 percent higher in December 2023 compared to the onset of the conflict; the CPI for food and soft drinks was 76 percent higher.38 Food aid. The flow of humanitarian assistance into and across the Gaza Strip continues to be severely disrupted. Between 1 January and 12 February 2024, 51 percent of aid missions planned for the north of Wadi Gaza and 25 percent of those planned for the areas requiring coordination south of Wadi Gaza were denied access..39 In February, the UN and its humanitarian partners planned only 24 missions to areas north of Gaza, of which six (25 percent) were facilitated. This stands in stark contrast to January, when 61 missions were planned to the north, with nine (15 percent) facilitated.40Figure 5. Stocks availability at shops as of 21 January (% of respondents). Source: WFP
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF10 Based on data from UNRWA,41 the maximum number of trucks entering daily from both the Kerem Shalom and the Rafah crossings was 300 (compared to an average of 500 daily pre-escalation), approximately 70 percent of these trucks carried food or a mixture of food and non-food items. On 20 February 2024, WFP decided to suspend its food aid deliveries to northern Gaza as a result of chaos and violence.42 On 5 March, a 14-truck food convoy, the first by WFP to the north since it paused deliveries on 20 February, was denied access after a three-hour wait at the Wadi Gaza checkpoint and then looted on its way back.43 On 7 March, 11 food trucks from private sector were allowed to enter. In total, from 5 February to 5 March, 10-15 food trucks were allowed into the Gaza Governorate to feed about 300,000 people (less than 1 Kg per person for a full month). Given the spread of the conflict, restrictions on movement and the displacement of the population, the humanitarian space is constantly decreasing, and humanitarian food assistance is being distributed unequally among areas. Airdrop operations of food aid along the Gaza Strip coastline began on 26 February 2024. Airdrops mainly consist of ready-made meals that do not require cooking methods and are of high nutritional value. However, they are erratic, small-scale, cover a limited geographic area, and are primarily accessible to populations located near the coast, including those physically able to recover food pallets and packages from the sea in a context of heightened civil unrest. Airdrops without ground coordination are also dangerous and falling assistance may strike civilians, as occurred on 8 March when Figure 6. Food CPI in Gaza Strip (December 2022 - December 2023). Source: WFP/ PCBS Figure 7. Inflation rate (September 2023 vs. December 2023). Source: WFP/ PCBS
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF11 OCHA reported that five civilians died.44 In light of this, airdrops account for a negligible share of the humanitarian food security assistance in the Gaza Strip compared to what is trucked in overland. Cash Assistance. The functionality of cash assistance in the Gaza Strip is limited. As of 15 February 2024, cash actors had delivered emergency multi-purpose cash assistance to over 125,000 households (over 828,000 people) since the onset of the conflict.45 According to the most recent Cash Post Distribution Monitoring,46 about 71 percent of the respondents reported that the cash assistance received helped them to either access urgent/basic items and services needed. Most expenditures were on food (89 percent), followed by medicines, debt repayment, water and hygiene products, and transportation. In Rafah, cash liquidity is a significant challenge47 because of the high number of displaced individuals and the logistical difficulties banks face in transferring cash. Poor electricity supply and connectivity are also affecting the ability of financial service providers to make cash accessible. Figure 8. Planned aid missions by month. Source: OCHA Figure 9a. Use of cash, since 7 October 2023 and January 2024. Source: Cash Working Group
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF12 Figure 9b. Challenges in use of cash, since 7 October 2023 and January 2024. Source: Cash Working Group Figure 10. Quantity of Diesel and Domestic Gas imported per day. Source: UNRWAUtilization Before the escalation of hostilities, electricity was unreliable and only available for a few hours each day. The lack of electricity negatively affected all aspects of life, including food safety, and made it almost impossible to operate food processing units effectively.48 The main water and electricity networks, fuel and food supplies are now almost completely suspended.49 Frequent communication blackouts make it extremely challenging to coordinate the distribution of aid, and let people know how to access it, and when. The complete electricity blackout that began on 11 October 2023 continues, with only limited electricity generated inside the Gaza Strip from generators and solar panels. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip continue to prevent the delivery of fuel to the Gaza power plant, which remains non-functioning, and block cross-border electricity distribution.50 This severely impacts all aspects of daily life, including the processing and storage of food, pumping and distribution of drinking water, treatment of wastewater, and the functionality of telecommunications and financial systems.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF13 The lack of electricity and damage to telecommunication systems has also limited the ability of populations to communicate and access information like evacuation orders or humanitarian assistance delivery. There have been rolling telecommunication blackouts since 7 October, with several lasting around one week.51 Fuel was not permitted to enter the Gaza Strip from 7 October until 15 November 2023. UNRWA reported that for only the bare minimum of critical services in which it is involved, 160,000 litres per day of diesel fuel are needed. This minimum requirement, which is still insufficient for a full restoration of humanitarian operations and other basic services, has been met only about 10 percent of days from 7 October through 9 March. No fuel was permitted to enter the Gaza Strip from 20 December 2023 through 7 January 2024, a period of new or expanding major ground operations, including in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates. From 24 January through 6 March, fuel was permitted to enter the Gaza Strip only on alternative days.52 Even once inside the Gaza Strip, the onward movement of diesel fuel faces the same extreme challenges as other humanitarian and commercial goods, with little fuel reaching the northern governorates. Regarding fuel to North Wadi Gaza, two (10 percent) of 21 planned missions were facilitated. Both deliveries were facilitated to a single hospital, leaving other hospitals and WASH facilities without fuel. For fuel to areas South of Wadi Gaza, 15 (71 percent) of 21 planned missions to areas requiring coordination were facilitated. A total of 300,600 litres were delivered. However, convoys to Nasser hospital were denied access five times in a row. Fuel shortages in hospitals force them to cease most operations and may lead to preventable deaths.53 About 250 tons of cooking gas entered the Gaza Strip per day on average from January to August 2023.54 Daily entry into the Gaza Strip from 24 November 2023 through 10 March 2024 has consistently been roughly 30-40 percent of that pre- escalation amount.55 This has further challenged the ability of the Gaza Strip population to cook food that they are able to access, presenting challenges to physical and biological utilization. As of January-February 2024, nearly 80 percent of the population in all governorates reported using firewood as their primary cooking fuel, covering any form of wood available. Around 10-15 percent of the population across governorates reported burning waste as their main cooking fuel, while almost no respondents reported using cooking gas. Between 7 and 10 percent of respondents reported that there was no cooking fuel available.56 This is a particular concern as these populations face major challenges with consuming food that they may still have access to, in particular flour. Stability Continued conflict and worsening acute food insecurity and nutritional status also contribute to civil unrest, which further lowers the stability of all food security dimensions. Civil unrest is a major challenge to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to humanitarian staff, and hampers their ability to reach the people in need as well as for the most vulnerable to access and make full use of assistance. Recent deaths related to the airdrops and swarming of the trucks entering the Gaza Strip are key evidence of the level of desperation and acute hunger among the people of Gaza. These also show that even a minimal degree of order to facilitate access to food and other essential supplies, such as medicines, cannot be guaranteed, given the absence of civil authorities or organized police. Social cohesion in Gaza is strained, exposing the most vulnerable, such as children - particularly those who are unaccompanied, women, the elderly, the chronically ill and people living with disabilities to extreme levels of food and water deprivation. Food Security Outcomes The most recent WFP survey relied on data collected through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) between 6 December 2023 and 19 February 2024. The number of observations were: For North Gaza and Gaza Governorates: 104 observations; for Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates: 369 observations; for Rafah Governorate: 892 observations. Households were randomly selected from a master list of 320,000 WFP pre-conflict beneficiary households representing 80 percent of the total pre-conflict population in the Gaza Strip. Overall, 10,320 households were selected and called. Of them, 1,365 respondents completed the questionnaires (success rate of 13.3 percent - in line with the 10 percent to 20 percent typical of CATI analyses in the region), while 19 (0.2 percent) answered the call but hung-up and did not complete it. The rest did not answer.57
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF14 Food Consumption Score (FCS). According to the survey, most households across the Gaza Strip have inadequate food consumption with almost 88 percent of households in the North reporting Poor Food consumption (indicative of IPC Phase 4 and 5, Emergency and Catastrophe) and 9 percent reporting Borderline food consumption (indicative of IPC Phase 3, Crisis). An additional disaggregation of the FCS ‘poor’ category (<14) shows that in the North Gaza Governorates, 36 percent of the respondents are not even able to eat cereals daily. In Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah around 53 percent of households reported poor consumption and 31 percent reported borderline consumption, among them 11 percent had a value below 14. In Rafah, around 48 percent of households reported poor food consumption and 31 percent reported borderline consumption of which 5 percent had a value below 14.58 Across all governorates, the food consumption gaps are clear as most households are unable to consume cereals daily. In the north, the mean number of days of cereal consumption is 4.4 per week, in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates and Rafah Governorate the mean number of days is 5.14 and 5.15, respectively. Consumption of protein rich food is extremely low in Northern Gaza at 0.33 days a week and a little over one day a week in the rest of the Gaza Strip. Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI). Results from reduced coping strategies index indicates that nearly 100 percent of respondents in the Gaza Strip are engaging in extreme coping strategies. The indicator assesses the frequency with which households resorted to coping strategies that altered their consumption patterns such as reducing meals, restricting consumption by adults for children to eat, and borrowing food, in the previous week to cover gaps in their consumption. Household Hunger Scale (HHS). An increase in the proportion of households facing extreme food consumptions gaps is observed across all analysed governorates when compared with November 2023 data. About 84 percent of households in Northern Gaza (Gaza and North Gaza) experienced ‘very severe hunger’ , indicative of IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), while 8 percent of households reported ‘severe hunger’ , indicative of IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Compared with the previous survey round, the deterioration has been significant. In November the proportion of households with ‘very severe hunger’ was estimated at 40 percent showing a doubling of households facing extreme food consumption gaps indicative of IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, 57 percent of households reported experiencing ‘very severe hunger’ , while 24 percent reported to experience ‘severe hunger’ , compared with November 2023 when only 22 percent of households faced ‘very severe hunger’ . In Rafah, the proportion households reportedly experiencing ‘very severe hunger’ was 56 percent and 21 percent reporting ‘severe hunger’ .59 Livelihood coping. Some indirect evidence on livelihood coping mechanisms was collected focusing on emergency strategies contextualised for the very specific conditions of Gaza. The data indicates the highest use of extreme coping strategies in the North with 18 percent of households reporting that they bartered/exchanged clothing for food, while 12 percent reported begging for food. As estimated 3 percent reported scavenging due to lack of food, and 18 percent reported gathering wild foods. Around 23 percent reported looting food from debris, and 74 percent indicated that they sought food outside their shelter, facing potential security risks. In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, the reported proportions were similar: 24 percent of households reported that they bartered/exchanged clothing for food, and in Rafah the proportion was 27 percent. Around 7 percent in Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah and Rafah Governorates reported begging for food. An estimated 1.8 percent reported scavenging due to lack of food and 15 percent gathering wild foods. Around 5 percent in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, and 6 percent in Rafah Governorate reported looting food from debris. Finally, 65 percent of the households in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and 59 percent in Rafah Governorate reported that they sought food outside their shelter facing potential security risks. The survey detected a high level of non-applicable strategies, which might indicate the pure exhaustion of these coping mechanisms. Household Economy Approach (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA): Preliminary HEA Outcome Analysis was made available by FEWS NET for this IPC analysis. For the northern governorates (North Gaza and Gaza urban area), for the period of February – August 2024, all the wealth groups categories living in these governorates are expected to face high level of Survival Deficits (SD), indicative of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The SD is calculated compared to a survival threshold defined as the amount of food and cash income needed by the households to meet the 2,100 Kcal per day per person. This also include the cost of preparing and consuming food plus any cash expenditure on water for human consumption.60 The only exception in these results appear for the Better Off (BO) wealth group living in the Semi Agriculture Gaza (SAG) livelihood zone with livelihoods more related to crops sales, livestock sales or self-employment, that will experience SD Indicative of an IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), at the limit of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). For Southern Gaza, the level of deficit for the projected period of April – August 2024 for the households living in urban areas (URB livelihood zone), will be indicative of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). For the households living in this governorate with livelihoods more related to agricultural labour, crop and livestock sales or self-employment, (SAG livelihood zone) – that represent a small portion of the population living in this governorate -, the Very Poor and the Poor wealth groups will face SD indicative of an IPC
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF15 Figure 11. Summary of food security outcome indicators. Source: WFP/ FEWS NETPhase 4 (Emergency). The Middle and the Better Off categories won’t face any SD or Livelihood Protection Deficit. This last deficit is calculated compared to a Livelihood Protection basket that include all the sources of food and income needed for the households to maintain their local livelihoods. Gender lens. Food insecurity has a multidimensional impact on women, as it not only relates to unequal access to, distribution of, consumption of, and control over food, but it also has long-term health and safety risks. UN Women data shows that the escalation in food insecurity has also increased the vulnerability of women to food insecurity. More than 4 out of 5 women (84 percent) interviewed by UN Women report that their family eats half or less of the food they used to before the conflict began, with mothers and adult women being those tasked with sourcing food, yet eating last, less, and least than everyone else. Moreover, 4 in 5 women (84 percent) in Gaza indicate that at least one of their family members had to skip meals during the past week. In 95 percent of those cases, mothers are the ones going without food, skipping at least one meal to feed their children. Nearly 9 in 10 women (87 percent) report finding it harder to access food than men. Some women are now resorting to extreme coping mechanisms, such as scavenging for food under rubble or in dumpsters.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF16Area Governorate % of total Gaza populationURB LZ SAG LZ % of governorate HHs with kcal gaps indicative of IPC 5 % of area (northern/southern) with kcal gaps indicative of IPC 5Estimated % of population in the LZ (URB) Very Poor (24% of the LZ population) Survival Deficit (SD), Indicative IPC Phase Poor (33%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Middle (41%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Better Off (4%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Estimated % of population in the LZ (SAG) Very Poor (32%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Poor (37%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Middle (25%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Better Off (7%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase SCENARIO 1 (FEBRUARY - AUGUST 2024) SCENARIO 1 (FEBRUARY - AUGUST 2024)Northern Gaza North Gaza5% 100%85%, Phase 585%, Phase 587%, Phase 555%, Phase 50% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0%Gaza5% 94%85%, Phase 585%, Phase 587%, Phase 555%, Phase 56%86%, Phase 587%, Phase 584%, Phase 549%, Phase 4100%Southern Gaza Deir al Balah (or middle Gaza)10% 99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1% N/A N/A N/A N/ATo be inferred To be inferred based on Khan Younis and Deir al Balah assumptions and convergence of other data higlighting where and to what extent conditions resemble Rafah vs. Northern GazaKhan Younis21% 99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1% N/A N/A N/A N/ATo be inferredRafah59% 97%33% survival deficit, Phase 432% survival deficit, Phase 445% survival deficit, Phase 427% survival deficit, Phase 43%13% survival deficit, 100% liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 30% survival deficit, 89% liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 30% survival/ liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 10% survival/ liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 10,0% SCENARIO 2 (APRIL - AUGUST 2024) SCENARIO 2 (APRIL - AUGUST 2024)simulation - Rafah invasion 59% 97%67% 64% 63% 54% 3%42% 31% 0% 0% Phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 5Phase 4 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 1
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF17 NUTRITION SITUATION Inadequate dietary intake According to the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster in December 2023-January 2024,61 in North Gaza, 98 percent of the children (47 observations) included in the analysis had consumed two or fewer food groups in the 24 hours preceding the survey. Among the main food groups reported, breastmilk was mentioned for 39 children (83 percent), and eggs for 17 (36 percent). The consumption of all the other food groups, such as legumes, vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables, other vegetables, grains, meat and dairy products, had almost completely disappeared from their daily diet, indicating an extremely worrying situation in terms of diet quality. 95 percent of the pregnant and breastfeeding women had consumed two or fewer food groups the previous day. The main food groups mentioned were non-vitamin A rich vegetables, grains and eggs. This situation highlights critically insufficient micronutrient intake before and during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which can affect both women and the development of their infants. In Khan Younis, 90 percent of young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women consumed two food groups or fewer in the last 24 hours. For young children, the food groups most frequently mentioned were breastmilk and eggs, while grains, pulses and eggs were the food groups most frequently mentioned for pregnant and breastfeeding women. In Deir al-Balah, 86 percent of young children had eaten two or fewer food groups during the day before the survey, while only 3 percent had consumed five food groups. The food groups most consumed were breastmilk, followed by eggs and grains. Among pregnant and breastfeeding women, 67 percent consumed only one food group the day preceding the survey, while 26 percent consumed two food groups. Pulses, grains and other vegetables were the food groups most frequently mentioned by respondents. In Rafah, 88 percent (UNICEF) – 89 percent (CATI) of young children had consumed two or fewer food groups within the past 24 hours, breastmilk, eggs and grains were the main food groups consumed by young children. Only 3 percent had eaten more than two food groups in the last 24 hours. Infant and young child feeding practices Neonates face deteriorating nutritional status if mothers are unable to breastfeed due to stress, poor mental health and/ or inadequate breastfeeding privacy, and lack of counselling and support by healthcare providers.62 Further, the high pre- conflict prevalence of formula use among Gazans (58 percent among under six-month-old infants) raises concerns with regards to potential supply disruptions. Under poor WASH conditions, keeping formula water, teats, and bottles sterile is very challenging. These disruptions can result in increased incidence of diarrhoea and other infectious diseases, both of which further exacerbate malnutrition. The prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding is projected to average between 25 percent to 35 percent under a ceasefire scenario (lower than the pre-conflict baseline of 42 percent, reflecting ongoing disruptions including overcrowding and worsened mental health), falling to 20 percent to 30 percent under a status quo scenario and 5 percent to 15 percent under the escalation scenario. These disruptions have enduring consequences on infant and child health. Based on interviews that WFP conducted with eight key informants (four interviews were held on 11 January, and the remaining interviews were conducted on 22-23 January), widespread weight loss, diseases, and malnutrition prevail due to insufficient food supplies, intensifying the health crisis in the Gaza Strip.63 Health There are now only four hospitals and two clinics remaining in Gaza Governorate and two hospitals and two clinics in North Gaza. All of them operate at a very low level and information on the health status of children under five is close to absent. The survey conducted did not reach a minimum sample allowing exploitation of the information. In Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, according to the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis, more than 97 percent of children under five reported having had one or more diseases in the past two weeks. 56 percent of the children under five had experienced Acute Respiratory Infections within the past two weeks, 70.5 percent had experienced diarrhoea, and 82.3 percent had had a fever. This shows the extremely critical health conditions children face, exposing them to high-risk nutritional deterioration. Trends from WHO corroborate these findings, showing a 55 percent increase in diarrhoea cases in children under five between November-December 2023. While the three hospitals in the Governorate of Deir al-Balah were still operational in late November, nine of the 16 Primary Health Care Centres (PHCCs) were no longer functioning, seriously impeding access to health services. On average, 0.49 litres of drinking water
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF18 was available per person per day in the households surveyed, which is far from the minimum humanitarian standard (2L/ person/day).35 The scale of needs is staggering with 100 percent of the 49 households in need of food and hygiene items, 78 percent in need of water, 69 percent shelter, and 65 percent health assistance. In Rafah, the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis also shows extreme health conditions with almost 93 percent of children under five having one or more disease within the past two weeks, 79 percent had had a fever and 56 percent had experienced vomiting. The level of diarrhoea is extremely critical with 70 percent of children under five having had one episode in the past two weeks, and almost 60 percent having ARI (Acute Respiratory Infection).64 Since mid-October, 388,200 cases of acute respiratory infections have been recorded, along with 246,000 cases of diarrhea and 3,300 cases of bloody diarrhea, 84,000 cases of skin rashes, 12,000 cases of Acute Jaundice (including confirmed Hepatitis A).65 As per OCHA, 1.9 million IDPs face at high risk of communicable disease due overcrowding of IDP sites and lack of access to proper water sanitation and hygiene facilities.66 In Gaza, cases of Hepatitis A have been confirmed in January 2024 and WHO warned that inhumane living conditions will enable Hepatitis A to continue to spread.67 Health system functionality. In February 2024, attacks against healthcare facilities, infrastructure and services continued resulting in 58 percent of the hospitals are not functioning in the Gaza Strip, especially in the northern governorates (75 percent of the hospitals not functioning). According to the Health Cluster, as of 5 March 2024, only 2 hospitals and no Primary Health Care Centres were fully functioning; 14 hospitals and 20 Primary Health Care Centres were partially functioning; while 23 hospitals and 62 Primary Health Centres were not functioning. Only 141 medical points in shelters were available, while 264 informal, public and UNRWA shelters did not have a medical centre available.68 In the northern governorates, hospitals have been offering limited maternity, trauma, surgery and emergency care services. They also face challenges such as a shortage of medical staff, including specialized surgeons, neurosurgeons, and intensive care staff, as well as a lack of medical supplies, and have an urgent need for fuel, food, and drinking water.69 In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, according to OCHA, since January 2024, three hospitals – Al Aqsa, Nasser, and Gaza European – were at risk of closure due to the issuance of evacuation orders in adjacent areas and the ongoing conduct of hostilities nearby. In Rafah, 5 hospitals are still functioning. The influx of IDPs migrating to Rafah has overwhelmed the bed availability in hospitals, leading to insufficient capacity to meet the healthcare needs of the population. There is also high need for primary health services in informal shelters hosting IDPs. The continued besiegement around some hospitals is significantly affecting their case management capacity. Referring patients outside of Gaza remains a challenge, as the waiting list continues to grow.70 In addition, people are unable to effectively access healthcare due to the lack of laboratory equipment and reagents needed for accurate diagnosis and testing.71 The risk to public health is intensified due to an acute scarcity of hygiene materials and adequate sanitation infrastructure. Persistent anecdotal reports of Hepatitis A cases in Gaza, as recorded by UNRWA and the Health Cluster, highlight ongoing concerns. Limited access to proper WASH facilities is hindering prevention of diseases. The high number of surgeries and procedures has led to increased demand for anaesthetic and analgesic medications which are in short supply. Blood and blood products in hospitals are needed for emergencies and medical procedures to ensure that patients receive timely transfusions.72 Figure 1. Gaza disease surveillance Source: WHO, Health Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF19 UNRWA stocks of medicines continue to decrease, with around 15 days’ supply remaining overall and one week’s supply of insulin; some items may run out sooner based on needs at shelters. Therefore, there is an urgent need to restock medical supplies given the depletion of stocks in the local market. Stocks of fuel and medicines continue to be at risk of depletion halting UNRWA operations at the health centres. Essential medicines and other critical medical supplies remain difficult to bring into the Gaza Strip due to strict control of allegedly dual-use items at border crossings and wider challenges with importing controlled drugs. As basic and specialty healthcare services in Gaza continue to deteriorate, an increase in excess deaths due to traumatic injuries that would otherwise be survivable with timely and appropriate care is expected. In December 2023, UNICEF delivered 962,550 doses of essential vaccines, including for measles, pneumonia, and polio. Opening of stabilization centres for acute malnutrition cases with medical complications are also planned notably in Tal as Sultan (Rafah) and another in one of the field hospitals.73 Heightened insecurity and limited access to health facilities continue to present major challenges for partners to respond and partner operations continue to be negatively affected by the displacement of staff, social stresses and telecommunication challenges.74 Water, sanitation, and hygiene Prior to the escalation of hostilities, the majority of the water supply in the Gaza Strip came from groundwater sources and the rest (around 20 percent) from desalination plants and cross border pipelines. The over pumping of groundwater in Palestine led to severe water pollution and salinization, especially in the Gaza Strip. More than 97 percent of the water pumped from the coastal aquifer in the Gaza Strip did not meet the water quality standards set by WHO (PCBS and PWA, 2021).75 Figure 13. Health system functionality. Source: WHO, Health Cluster Damage to WASH facilitiesSewage facilityWater facilityTotal% of Sewage facilities % of Water facilities% of Sewage and Water facilities Destroyed 9 68 77 7% 14% 13% Severe damage 23 64 87 19% 14% 15% Moderate damage 36 131 167 30% 28% 28% Possible damage 16 51 67 13% 11% 11% No visible damage 38 156 194 31% 33% 33% Total 122 470 592Figure 14. WASH facilities damaged, February 2024. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF20 Nitrate levels already exceeded 150 mg/litre in most areas of the Gaza Strip, which made the water undrinkable, given the World Health Organization (WHO) acceptable limit of 50 mg/litre. In 2019, the daily allocation of water per capita for domestic purposes was 77 litres/ capita in the Gaza Strip.77 Taking the high percentage of water pollution in the Gaza Strip and calculating the quantity of water suitable for human use, the per capita share of fresh water was 22.4 litres per day.78 Damage to WASH facilities. Based on satellite damage assessments on WASH infrastructure dated 21 February,79 13 percent of all sewage and water facilities have been destroyed (7 percent and 14 percent respectively), while in total over 56 percent have been either destroyed or damaged (13 percent and 34 percent respectively). Another 11 percent are assessed to have possible damage. Overall, this assessment identifies 77 facilities destroyed and 254 facilities damaged, with another 67 facilities with possible damage. Northern Gaza and Gaza Governorates have the highest concentration of reported damaged or destroyed infrastructure. The functionality of, or access to, the 194 facilities (38 and 156 respectively) that were found with no visible damage is conditional to access to fuel and spare parts, which are in very limited supply, as well as availability of technicians and access to areas with these assets. The combined damaged and conditional access to the remaining WASH infrastructure is expected to have a profound impact on the availability of water, water quality and presence of unsafe water or contaminants for populations in these areas. Water availability and drinking water. Water availability continues to be a major concern across the Gaza Strip. In February 2024, the water produced from all the water sources in Gaza accounted for only 5.7 percent of the pre-escalation production levels.80 According to OCHA, only 17 percent of the 284 groundwater wells are operating with limited hours and 39 wells have been reported as destroyed and 93 as moderately to severely damaged.81 Still according to OCHA, only one of the three cross border water pipelines is operating, functioning at 47 percent of its capacity. Plans to repair the non-functioning pipelines face challenges in terms of access, communication, or repair coordination considering the current context. The United Arab Emirate’s small desalination plant located on the Egyptian side of Rafah, operates at full capacity, providing 2,400 cubic metres per day, following the construction of a 3-kilometre transmission line. In addition, only two out of the three main water desalination plants are partially functional, mainly in the southern governorates.82 Water quality appears low due to lack of processing facilities or other way of contamination. According to another study (sample size of 1,200 people)83 conducted in the Gaza Strip in February 2024, access to water for drinking, bathing and cleaning, is estimated at 1.5 litre per person per day compared to the 15 litres minimum amount of water required for survival as per as the international SPHERE standards. Similar results from the WASH cluster rapid assessment conducted in 41 sites indicate a median value of 2 litres per person per day.84 Water production and distribution is a fuel intensive process and the overall WASH fuel allocation is currently 30,000 litres per day. From 24 January through 4 March, the WASH sector in the Gaza Strip accounted for 30 percent to 60 percent Map 5. WASH facilities damaged, February 2024. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF21 of all fuel entering the Gaza Strip, with limitations on diesel fuel entry a major impediment to meeting minimum water requirements throughout the Gaza Strip, especially in the northern governorates.85 In the northern governorates, water supply remains limited and no access to clean water has been reported.86 According to OCHA, as of 12 January 2024, the combination of water trucking, water from the functional desalination plant, and the restoration of one of the three main water supply lines on 30 December 2023, has yielded only seven percent of water production in Gaza, compared with the pre-October 2023 supply.87 In Rafah Governorate, according to the WASH cluster rapid assessment, the majority of the sites rely mainly on water trucking and piped water in scattered sites, and collective centres rely more heavily on wells.88 More than half of the sites provide water that is unsafe for drinking (67 percent in collective centres) and only 12 percent can provide water treatment at source. According to the Euromed study, in Rafah Governorate out of the 15 litres minimum amount of water a day required as per sphere standard, only 8 litres are available on average across sites (3 litres in collective centres), with a median of 2 litres per person per day, indicating high level of disparities among sites. Hygiene. According to the WASH cluster, in Rafah, 61 percent of the sites in collective centres and 71 percent in scattered sites have no shower89 and the average number of showers per person is about 3,500 in collective centres and 1,050 in scattered sites. Access and protection of most vulnerable population is also of high concern, with only 12 percent of the showers being accessible for people living with disabilities and only 24 percent of the sites having separated showers for women (14 percent in collective centres). Figure 15. Quantity and type of water sources per site. Source: WASH cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF22 An NRC assessment90 conducted in nine shelters in Rafah also stated that every assessed location had reported cases of “hepatitis A, gastroenteritis, diarrhoea, smallpox, lice, [and] influenza.” Solid Waste Management. In terms of waste management, most of the wastewater treatment systems have been suspended and non-functioning since November 2023, due to damage, lack of fuel/power supply, and lack of maintenance.91 Regarding solid-waste management, which was already a crucial issue before the escalation, the last UNRWA update on 16 January states that solid waste management continues in Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates and partially in Deir al-Balah Governorate, where approximately 45 truck loadings were transferred to temporary sites.92 However, according to the WASH cluster,93 93 percent of the sites (89 percent in collective centres and 100 percent in scattered sites) have some type of visible waste, mainly solid waste or trash and 68 percent of all the sites present informal or uncontrolled dumping areas. The accumulation of tens of thousands of tons of solid waste on the streets, around hospitals, IDP shelters, and various random dump sites, represent high public health risks. The Gaza Municipality also estimates that approximately 50,000 tons of solid waste remain unmanaged.94Figure 16. Quantity and type of water sources per site. Source: WASH cluster Figure 17. Waste management. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF23 Sanitation. Sanitation situation continues to deteriorate and remains a major issue in all governorates. Despite significant efforts by UNICEF and its partners to construct family latrines, sanitation coverage remains very low and efforts to increase coverage are hindered by a lack of cement and other construction materials, including due to constraints on the entry of items considered to be dual use into the Gaza Strip.95 With wastewater treatment plants non-functioning and many sewage facilities destroyed, especially in Gaza city, flooding has been a major health hazard through the rainy period as floodwater mixes with untreated sewage in urban areas with dense displaced populations.96 This is further compounded by the enduring fuel shortage, which impedes the operation of remaining sewage stations and wastewater treatment plants. According to the WASH Cluster, there is also an increasing concern about the potential for additional flooding of already contaminated rainwater harvesting lagoons, particularly if rainfall intensifies. This situation poses a critical threat to both the environment and public health.97 In early 2023, UNICEF reported that “insufficient safely managed water supply to households, poor sanitation, limited public WASH services, and risk of flooding expose 1.36 million Palestinians to water-related diseases risks” .98 The situation is exacerbated by continuous restricted access to essential sanitation supplies and services in Gaza.99 The inability to transport sufficient fuel into the Gaza Strip, and especially to the northern governorates, also significantly compounds the challenges faced by the WASH response.100 A rapid assessment of displacement sites, including scattered sites and collective centres, in Rafah Governorate was conducted by the WASH cluster in February 2024.101 63 percent of assessed sites reportedly had access to a sewer connection (78 percent in collective centres and 36 percent in scattered sites). Few sites reported using buckets/plastic bags, flush to open drain, septic tank, or flush to elsewhere as a sanitation facility. The median number of persons per toilet across all sites was 341, though 994 in collective centres and 57 in scattered sites. 80 percent of the 41 sites had non-functional latrines (74 percent in collective centers and 93 percent in scattered sites). Only 15 percent of sites had handwashing facilities near latrines. 24 percent of assessed sites offered safe and private latrine access and 51 percent had separate facilities for men and women. Sanitation facilities in collective centres and informal sites are overcrowded also due to the high number of displaced populations. According to UNRWA, on average, there are 1,109 IDPs per toilet in shelters in Rafah Governorate, 619 IDPs per toilet in shelters in Deir al-Balah Governorate, and 1,349 IDPs per toilet in Khan Younis Governorate.102 UNRWA also reports that there are at least 486 people per toilet in UNRWA shelters in Rafah Governorate.103 Figure 18. Sanitation quantities. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF24 Figure 19. Sanitation facilities. Source: WASH Cluster Summary of Acute Malnutrition Drivers According to the Nutrition Vulnerability Study,104 conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster, over 90 percent of children aged 6-23 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women are eating two or fewer food groups each day, often those of the lowest nutritional value. At least 90 percent of children under five have had at least one infectious disease, with 70 percent having had diarrhoea in the previous two weeks. Against a minimum standard of 15 litres per person, 81 percent of households lack safe and clean water, with average daily household access to water reportedly less than one litre per person per day. This extreme lack of safe water access is especially concerning for the greater number of infants now reliant on infant formula than before the most recent escalation. Low clean water availability and access further exposes young children to infection and subsequently malnutrition. Figure 20: Acute malnutrition drivers. Source: Global Nutrition Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF25 Nutrition Outcomes There is very limited data on acute malnutrition available in Gaza since the start of the conflict on 7 October 2023. The only data that is available on acute malnutrition as of 9 Mar 2024 come from Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) screenings conducted in the three IPC AFI units of analysis, i.e. northern, middle and southern governorates. While some screenings included children 6-59 months, others almost exclusively measured only children between 6 and 23 months of age. Additionally, although some screenings contained individual MUAC and age data, others only had MUAC data at aggregate level. Of the screening data made available for the analysis, one set only included 45 children and therefore was not considered in the analysis. The remaining screening datasets were analysed as follows: Figure 21. Metadata, MUAC screening results. Source: Various - reanalysis conducted by the Global Smart Team For every screening that contained only aggregate MUAC data on children 6-59 months, first, unweighted prevalence estimates were calculated for the following age groups: (i) 6-59 months, (ii) 6-23 months, and (iii) 24-59 months. Secondly, weighted prevalence of MUAC among children between 6-59 months were calculated from the unweighted prevalence estimates of children 6-23 months and 24-59 months by applying weights of 0.33 and 0.66,105 respectively. Finally, the weighted prevalence estimates of 6-59 months were compared with the IPC Acute Malnutrition (IPC AMN) reference table and the IPC AMN Phases were determined. For each screening that only contained aggregate MUAC data on children 6-23 months, the MUAC prevalence of children between 23-59 months and weighted prevalence of MUAC among children 6-59 months were estimated using the following procedure. First, using data from screenings that contained MUAC data on children 6-59 months, the ratio between the MUAC prevalence of 6-23 months and 24-59 months was determined (this ranged from 3.07 to 9.68). Secondly, using sensitivity analysis, expected ranges of MUAC prevalence among children between 24-59 months were calculated using the lowest (3.07) and the highest (9.68) empirically observed ratios. Thirdly, a weighted analysis was performed, and a range of weighted prevalence estimates of children 6-59 months were obtained. Finally, the weighted prevalence estimates of 6-59 months were compared with the IPC Acute Malnutrition (IPC AMN) reference table and the possible IPC AMN Phases were determined.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF26 In conclusion: • In North Gaza Governorate , MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 2 - 3 (Alert - Critical) in January, having rapidly deteriorated to an indicative IPC AMN Phase of 4 - 5 (Critical - Extremely Critical) in February 2024. • In Khan Younis Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 3 - 4 (Serious - Critical) in February 2024. • In Deir al-Balah Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 1 - 2 (Acceptable - Alert) in February – early March 2024. • In Rafah Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 1 - 2 (Acceptable - Alert) in late January – early March. Figure 22. MUAC screening results. Source: Various - reanalysis conducted by the Global Smart Team
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF27 Mortality The analysis could not benefit from representative evidence of non-trauma mortality as intended by IPC Protocols (Crude Death Rate and Under Five Death Rate). The data available consisted in death counts issued by the Gaza Ministry of Health and reported by the Health Cluster, and interview data collected during CATI surveys conducted by WFP . Furthermore, a study on mortality and public health106 was conducted to inform humanitarian and other decision-makers working on the Gaza crisis by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Center for Humanitarian Health at Johns Hopkins University (LSHTM). The mortality data collected by the Ministry of Health are not disaggregated by area and appears to only be those attributable to conflict related violence. The WFP CATI survey data results can be disaggregated by area but not by cause of death. Therefore, no direct measurements of CDR or U5DR after trauma exclusion are currently available. Nonetheless, it worths noticing that the modelled projections published by LSHTM, while considered useful for indicating the expected direction of travel and scale of the expected excess mortality, the IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) found some of the assumptions factored in the study published in early February might have evolved in different directions, especially regarding food intake estimates and acute malnutrition. The absence of usable mortality data in both governorates leaves a high degree of uncertainty on the translation of these acute malnutrition rate into children and adult mortality in the current period in North Gaza. It is likely that these extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet translated into 2/10,000/day Crude Death Rate. The likelihood of having surpassed U5DR thresholds (4/10,000/day for children) is higher but impossible to ascertain.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF28 PROJECTED SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (16 March - 15 July 2024 ) Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.GovernorateTotal population analysedPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 3+Area Phase#people % #people % #people % #people % #people % #people % Deir al-Balah & Khan Younis governorates600,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 300,000 50 300,000 50 600,000 100 4 North Gaza & Gaza governorates300,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 90,000 30 210,000 70 300,000 100 5 Rafah governorate1,326,544 0 0 0 0265,309 20 464,290 35 596,945 45 1,326,544 100 4 Grand Total 2,226,544 0 0 0 0 265,309 12 854,290 38 1,106,945 50 2,226,544 100 Population table for the projected situation: 16 March - 15 July 2024
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF29 PROJECTED SITUATION OVERVIEW (16 March - 15 July 2024 ) In the most likely scenario, the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine), with reasonable evidence. Famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months. The Governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and the Governorate of Rafah, are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). During the projection period (16 March - 15 July), in the most likely scenario and under the assumption of an escalation of the conflict including a ground offensive in Rafah, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1,107,000 people) is expected to face IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), the most severe level in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. The rest of the population is likely to be either in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (854,000 people, 38 percent of the population) or in Crisis (265,000 people, 12 percent of the population). During this period, the whole population of the Gaza Strip (2,230,000 people) will face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). North Gaza and Gaza Governorates In the most likely scenario, the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine), with reasonable evidence. Famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months. In terms of magnitude, 70 percent of the population is likely to be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and 30 percent in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Continued conflict and the near-complete lack of access to the northern governorates for humanitarian organizations and commercial trucks will likely compound heightened vulnerabilities and extremely limited food availability, access, and utilization, as well as access to healthcare, water, and sanitation services. People’s ability to exit the northern governorates and move to locations with relatively greater food availability and access is likely to be very limited. Within the north, displacements are likely to remain frequent and localized; yet conditions in the shelters will continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs. As food stocks or sources (wild foods, livestock, or other types of food – from domestic stocks, shelters or agricultural assets) will continue to reduce, food availability is expected to be limited. With the very few humanitarian and commercial trucks entering these governorates, it is unlikely that households will be able to restock or stabilize their food consumption patterns. Due to scarce food availability, the vast majority of markets are either not functioning or availing very few Assumptions for the most likely scenario in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates Conflict: In the most likely scenario, the pop - ulation will likely remain fully exposed and highly susceptible to conflict. Conflict and related casualties will likely continue at simi - lar levels to January-February 2024, including the wider besiegement, neighbourhood-lev - el clearing operations, occasional armed actor clashes, and a comparable rate of bombardment (air, land, sea). Basic services infrastructure will likely remain extremely de - graded, and the proportion of all buildings damaged or destroyed will likely continue to steadily approach 100%. Humanitarian access to provide food, water, medicines, and provision of health and WASH services: The northern governorates are likely to be mostly inaccessible and intermittently hard-to-reach, given continued ground operations, bombardment (air, land, sea), civil unrest, bureaucratic impediments, and physical obstruction. The humanitarian space in the northern governorates will continue to be extremely restricted, thereby hampering the provision of the necessary supplies and services to the most vulnerable population. It will also hamper the capacity of humanitarian actors to monitor closely the situation on the ground and to intervene promptly to provide relief. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely continue to worsen, including due to intense and widespread conflict, largely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will increasingly inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance within the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely remain frequent and localized and conditions in shelters will continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs. food commodities at excessively high prices. As a result, communities’ coping capacity and social cohesion will be further strained. Social tensions are also likely to increase putting the most vulnerable at higher risk of exposure to violence and lower access to food. Physical access to markets is also of concern, due to restrictions of civilian mobility and conflict intensity. Utilization of food resources will also be heavily impacted as seasonal higher temperatures reduce food storage options in a context of no or extremely limited access to electricity, fuel and/or gas to preserve, process or cook food. The lack of access to sufficient and safe water, sanitation facilities and health services is likely to increase the risk of cholera and the spread of infectious diseases impacting people’s nutrition and health status and increasing mortality from non- trauma related causes. The restoration of public services will be a major challenge given that the majority of WASH facilities and infrastructure are damaged or destroyed.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF30 FRC analysis of acute malnutrition trends A detailed analysis of the drivers (risk factors) for acute malnutrition and the available data on nutritional status was provided by the Global Nutrition Cluster report on Nutrition Vulnerability in February 2024.7 Based on this report and their own analysis the IPC Analysis Team concluded that the key driver of acute malnutrition in the North Gaza governorate was the highly inadequate dietary diversity in Children 6–23m, with 79% consuming ≤2 food groups, 8 and also in Pregnant and Breastfeeding Women, with 95% consuming ≤2 food groups. The main food groups mentioned were non-vitamin A rich vegetables (24 affirmations), grains (20) and eggs (17). This situation highlights critically insufficient diet diversity and micronutrient intake before and during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which can affect both the women and the development of their infants. Infant and Young Chil - dren Feeding practices are highly constrained by the lack of resources and health seeking behavior is also highly constrained. Interviews conducted by the FRC with key informants and a review of available reports confirmed that the situation in the northern governates during the current analysis period was similar to that reported by the Analysis Team. The health and WASH situations are also considered separately belo w. Figure 23: Trends in GAM by MUAC Prevalence in North Gaza (children aged 6-59 mo.) Within the IPC unit of analysis, MUAC screening data9 was available from the North Governorate but not from Gaza City. The available data was collected as part of a vaccination programme and measurements were only taken from children aged 6-23 months. The FRC explored different methods for using this data to estimate the prevalence of GAM by MUAC in children aged 6-59 months. This was a necessary step to allow the classification of malnutrition according to IPC Phases. To provide a starting point for the trend analysis the prevalence of GAM by MUAC in North Gaza in 2023, before October 7th, was estimated at 1%. This is consistent with previous studies.11 Age-adjustment of the MUAC screening data resulted in a GAM by MUAC prevalence in January 2024 of 6.8% to 9.1%. By February this had risen to give a range of 12.4% to 16.5%, indicating a very steep increase in the incidence of acute malnutrition in children 6-59 mo. To estimate what the prevalence would be at the time of the current analysis in March 2024, two nowcasting scenarios were examined. Given the extremely poor situation regarding the drivers of malnutrition, the best-case scenario was that there had been a continued linear increase in prevalence, while the more likely scenario was that the rate of increase would have followed the observed trend and have increased further in the time since the February screening. These two scenarios were then applied to the high and low estimates for age-adjusted GAM by MUAC prevalence, resulting in the four dotted lines shown in Figure 2. This analysis indicates that in all scenarios the GAM by MUAC prevalence had passed the IPC Phase 4/5 threshold (Critical/Extremely Critical) in the current analysis period. Given the current trajectory in MUAC prevalence data it is clear that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition prevalence, measured using weight-for-height Z-scores, may have already been crossed or will be crossed imminently. These data were collected exclusively in North Gaza governorate.Healthcare availability and access will likely continue to decline, including due to lack of humanitarian access and inadequate delivery of critical supplies, as well as a decline in the functionality of the few remaining health centres. The risk of infectious diseases will likely continue to increase due to the extreme deterioration of the overall health environment. In line with the Famine Review Committee findings, people’s livelihoods and food consumption are likely to continue deteriorating, resulting in more than two thirds of the population (70 percent) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Acute Malnutrition will increase at a high pace as already observed in the past few weeks (current period) and mortality levels will likely breach the Famine thresholds (extremely critical) - by the end of May 2024.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF31 Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates These Governorates are projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), though with half of the population (300,000 people) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), up from 30 percent in the current period; and the other half (300,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). While this unit of analysis includes both Governorates, the conditions for the population in Khan Younis Governorate are expected to be worse than those in Deir al-Balah. The onset of a major ground operation in Rafah Governorate will likely be a major driver of deterioration in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, including through an influx of displaced populations – many already displaced multiple times – into parts of these Governorates and the impact of the ground operation on humanitarian access. Ground operations are likely to continue throughout Khan Younis Governorate and in eastern Deir al-Balah Governorate. Displacement will likely escalate with large populations moving into the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis Governorate and into Deir al- Balah Governorate, especially in and around Deir al-Balah city and camp. Further displacement will likely stress already highly limited resources and basic services, exacerbating existing conditions. Shelter conditions are likely to deteriorate with continued deprivation of basic needs. Food availability and access are expected to further decline as the major ground operation in Rafah Governorate reduces humanitarian and commercial traffic into and throughout the Gaza Strip. This will be exacerbated by continued civil unrest outside the Kerem Shalom crossing, which will likely further reduce humanitarian and commercial truck entry. Fewer humanitarian convoys to these governorates are expected, including those unsuccessfully attempting to reach the northern governorates and offloading assistance in Deir al-Balah instead. The already limited agricultural production, mostly of vegetables, observed in the current period will likely continue to decline as ground operations are pursued within and near production areas of both governorates, especially in all areas of Khan Younis Governorate; and the harvest period for several vegetables comes to an end. Market functionality is likely to continue falling as agricultural production and humanitarian and commercial truck arrivals decline. Civilian mobility is likely to be severely constrained, further reducing access to food, including through coping strategies like gathering wild foods or scavenging. The end of the typical rainy period may also limit wild food availability. Compared to other governorates, Deir al-Balah Governorate had higher food availability in the current period, including due to higher deliveries of humanitarian food assistance (proportional to estimated Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Deir al Balah and Khan Younis Governorates Conflict: Conflict and related casualties will likely continue at similar levels to February 2024, including ground operations in mul - tiple but not all urban areas of Deir al-Balah and throughout Khan Younis governorate, frequent armed actor clashes especially in Khan Younis governorate, and a compa - rable rate of bombardment (air, land, sea). The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip will likely continue. Humanitarian access: Humanitarian access to Khan Younis and Deir al Balah governorate - including for the delivery of life-saving multi-sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations - is likely to be intermittently reduced, especially relative to the higher proportional delivery of assistance made to Deir al- Balah Governorate compared to other governorates in early 2024. This decrease in access is likely due to the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis governorate, bombardment (air, land, sea) in these governorates and within Deir al-Balah Governorate, and worsening civil unrest. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely escalate, driven by intense and widespread conflict as well as largely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will likely increasingly inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance throughout the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely escalate, with large populations moving into the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis governorate and into Deir al Balah governorate, especially the area of Deir al Balah city/camp. Shelter conditions will likely continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and increased sheltering in open spaces. population) in parts of January and February 2024. These deliveries appear to have partially resulted from the offloading of humanitarian food assistance that could not be delivered to the northern governorates. Any accumulated stocks in markets and households will provide at least a short-term buffer to some of the people in the early part of the projection period. Khan Younis Governorate received lower levels of humanitarian food assistance during that period, resulting in households likely to face larger food consumption gaps from the beginning of the projection period. With no major improvements in the availability of electricity, fuel, cooking gas, and safe water, food utilization will likely be a major limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates. This includes challenges to the safe storage and preparation
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF32 Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Rafah Governorate Conflict: Conflict will likely escalate, in - cluding the continuation of the wider besiegement, the onset of a new, major ground operation throughout Rafah gov - ernorate and concentrated on Rafah city, with armed actor clashes, and an increase in bombardment (air, land, sea). Humanitarian access: Humanitarian access to Rafah Governorate, including for the delivery of life-saving multi- sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, will likely be intermittently reduced, though without total access loss to the Rafah Governorate portion of the Al-Mawasi area, where an extreme concentration of displaced people is likely. Loss of access will be particularly high to populations remaining within Rafah city during the major ground operation likely to occur there. This disruption will likely result from the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), and civil unrest. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely continue, including due to intense and widespread conflict and severely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will continue to inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance within the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely increase substantially, with most of the current population of Rafah city forced into the Al-Mawasi area of Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates and into Deir al-Balah Governorate, especially the area of Deir al- Balah city/camp. Conditions in shelters will likely continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and increased sheltering in open spaces.of food, lack of safe access to water, and an increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. Full resumption of cross border water pipeline activity is unlikely, and the functionality of remaining wells and water distribution systems will likely decline. Wastewater treatment plants are likely to remain non-functioning. Solid waste management will continue to be limited. Healthcare availability and access will likely continue to decline, including due to lack of humanitarian access and inadequate delivery of critical supplies as well as a decline in the functionality of remaining health centres. Infectious disease risk will continue to increase due to the extreme deterioration of the overall health environment. Low and declining food availability, access, and utilization will likely lead to extreme gaps in food consumption and a collapse of coping capacities for the estimated 300,000 people (50 percent of the population) experiencing IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe); while large food consumptions gaps are expected for the 300,00 people (50 percent of the population) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). With the drivers of acute malnutrition expected to worsen (infectious diseases expected to increase, dietary diversity still severely restricted), the nutritional status of the people of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis will likely continue to deteriorate towards critical levels of acute malnutrition (IPC AMN Phase 4) during this period. Rafah Governorate The onset of a major ground operation in Rafah Governorate will likely drive a significant increase in acute food insecurity alongside other severe humanitarian consequences. The situation is projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), though with nearly half (45 percent) of the population (around 600,000 people) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), up from 25 percent in the current period. The whole population of Rafah will likely be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, including over one third (about 464,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 12 percent (about 265,000 people) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Relative improvement in access into and within Rafah have been observed compared to the previous analysis, with the opening of a second border crossing in Kerem Shalom allowing more humanitarian and commercial supply for aid and markets, However, for the projection period, considering the most likely scenario of a major ground operation in Rafah, the humanitarian access and space are likely to reduce due to the escalating hostilities and populations will face continued and repeated displacement in search of “safer” areas. As many IDPs already face poor food security, nutrition, health and WASH outcomes, further displacement will likely cause further deterioration. Existing mitigation measures from humanitarian services or programmes are likely to be disrupted by conflict or sizeable displacements and may cause further family separation or marginalization of the most vulnerable. Local production will be minimal and difficult to access and agricultural activities (crop production, livestock herding or fishing) will either not be pursued or remain very limited due to lack of agricultural inputs, access to assets or land and geographical concentration of displaced populations. Further disruptions to market supplies and prices are likely to continue and decrease access to food through markets. Markets or traders may be displaced along with the population, impacting their ability to restock or remain functional, especially as populations move further away from border crossings and fewer trucks enter the Gaza
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF33 Strip. Market-based interventions will continue to be challenged by high levels of displacement, including of the staff of financial service providers, and a wider loss of enabling condition, including an adequate electricity supply and functional telecommunications services, physical cash availability and access, and functioning markets able to absorb any rapid increases in demand. Physical access to humanitarian assistance and markets will be hindered. There will likely be a disruption in social support systems (e.g. community kitchens) and increased tensions within the community. Rising temperatures and declining access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene will likely lead to challenges in safe food storage and preparation, and a rise in waterborne diseases or food borne illnesses. Scarcity of firewood will force people to resort to using unsafe materials, increasing health risks. Explosive remnants will raise concerns about personal, food and water safety. Health outcomes and morbidity are expected to deteriorate in this period and even more so with increased overcrowding, further displacement and/or lower access to health services. A major decrease in food availability, access, and utilization will likely cause extreme gaps in food consumption and the exhaustion of people’s coping strategies. Acute malnutrition is likely to increase towards IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) as food insecurity, the health environment, and infant and young childcare and feeding practices deteriorate due to conflict escalation, displacement, and reduced delivery of, and access to multi-sector humanitarian assistance.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF34 COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS In comparison to the previous analysis (projection period December 2023 – 7 February 2024), the total share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) across the Gaza Strip continues to increase, from 26 percent to 30 percent in the current period (mid-February to mid-March 2024) and 50% in the projection period (mid-March to mid-July). In the northern governorates, the share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) increased from 30 percent to 55 percent in the current period and 70% in the projected period, representing an increase of about 100,000 people and 530,000 people, respectively. Figure 24. Population phase classifications in the Gaza StripFigure 25. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in the Gaza Strip Figure 27. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Northern Governorates Figure 29. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Southern GovernoratesFigure 26. Population phase classifications in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates Figure 28. Population phase classifications in Southern Governorates
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF35 From the first WFP survey of November-December 2023 to its second survey of December 2023-February 2024, the proportion of households reporting a Poor FCS increased 14 percentage points to 66 percent in the northern governorates, nine points to 27 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and remained steady at 22 percent in Rafah Governorate. Over the same two surveys, the proportion of households reporting Severe and Very Severe HHS results increased by 44 percentage points to 84 percent in the northern governorates, 35 percentage points to 57 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and 37 percentage points to 56 percent in Rafah Governorate. 107 Figure 30. FCS in the Gaza Strip Figure 31. HHS trends in the Gaza Strip
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF36 RISK OF FAMINE ANALYSIS As per the IPC tools and technical guidance, an IPC statement on the risk of Famine differs from a Famine classification. While a projected Famine classification is based on the most likely scenario, the risk of Famine refers to the worst case scenario that has a reasonable and realistic chance of happening. The risk of Famine is only a statement and not a classification and was designed to complement the standard IPC projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of a potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated. The elements considered when developing the worst case scenario are described below. Factor/element Risk of Famine Scenario - Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis GovernoratesRisk of Famine Scenario – Rafah Governorate Primary Drivers ConflictConflict would escalate to levels seen in December 2023-January 2024 when a major ground operation was conducted in Bureij and Maghazi camps of Deir al-Balah Governorate. This would include expanding and intensified ground operations across all central camps alongside neighbourhood-level clearing operations throughout Khan Younis Governorate, frequent armed actor clashes, and increased bombardment (air, land, sea).. Expanded ground operations within Deir al-Balah Governorate would not necessarily be concurrent with a major ground operation on Rafah. The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip would intensify.Conflict would rapidly escalate, including the onset of a new, wide-ranging, and large- scale ground operation throughout Rafah Governorate and concentrated on Rafah city, intense and frequent armed actor clashes, and a large increase in bombardment (air, land, sea). The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip would intensify. Humanitarian AccessHumanitarian access, including for the delivery of life-saving multi-sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, to Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorate would severely reduce, including due to the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, the later resumption of major ground operations in Deir al-Balah Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), the closure of the Rafah border crossing and reduction in crossings at Kerem Shalom, and public order collapse.Humanitarian access to Rafah Governorate, including for the delivery of life-saving multi- sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, would severely reduce. Access to populations remaining within Rafah city during the major ground operation would be completely lost, while access to the extreme concentration of displaced people in the Rafah portion of the Al-Mawasi area would be intermittent. This disruption would result from the onset of major, rapid ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), the closure of the Rafah border crossing and reduction in crossings at Kerem Shalom, and public order collapse.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF37 Factor/element Risk of Famine Scenario - Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis GovernoratesRisk of Famine Scenario – Rafah Governorate Secondary Drivers Civil unrestAlready strained, public order would collapse, involving widespread and intense civil unrest, including looting, riots, vigilantism, escalating violence among various social groups, and a wider breakdown of social cohesion. This collapse would heavily constrain humanitarian operations through reducing access and inhibiting the ability to conduct critical activities like distributions, especially to the most vulnerable population groups. The United Nations presence within the Gaza Strip, including offices and storage facilities, would be particularly impacted, including by violence and looting. The loss of social cohesion would involve the loss of most remaining socially- based coping, such as receiving food or cash through social networks outside of immediate family.Already strained, public order would collapse, involving widespread and intense civil unrest, including looting, riots, vigilantism, escalating violence among various social groups, and a wider breakdown of social cohesion. This collapse would heavily constrain humanitarian operations through reducing access and inhibiting the ability to conduct critical activities like distributions, especially to the most vulnerable population groups. The United Nations presence within the Gaza Strip, including offices and storage facilities, would be particularly impacted, including by violence and looting. The loss of social cohesion would involve the loss of most remaining socially- based coping, such as receiving food or cash through social networks outside of immediate family. DisplacementRapid mass displacement would occur, mostly to the Al-Mawasi area across Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates, with an extreme concentration of IDPs there. Outflow to Deir al-Balah Governorate would be limited. No mass exit of civilians from the Gaza Strip is considered. Rapid mass displacement would occur, mostly to the Al-Mawasi area across Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates, with an extreme concentration of IDPs there. A small civilian population in Rafah city would be isolated and inaccessible. Outflow to Deir al-Balah Governorate would be limited. No mass exit of civilians from the Gaza Strip is considered. Shelter conditionsShelter conditions would deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and a large increase in sheltering in open spaces. Shelter conditions would collapse, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and widespread sheltering in open spaces.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF38 Impact on Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition elements Food availability (from assistance, private sector and production)Food Availability would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates, including due to intensified besiegement, severe humanitarian access constraints, conflict escalation, severely reduced market functionality, and extreme population concentration. Food Availability would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate, including due to intensified besiegement, severe humanitarian access constraints, conflict escalation, severely reduced market functionality, and extreme population concentration in the Al-Mawasi area. Food access (physical, social, prices)Food Access would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates due to declining food availability, freedom of movement, and reduced humanitarian and commercial traffic. Food Access would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate due to large declines in food availability, freedom of movement, and humanitarian and commercial traffic, including for populations remaining within Rafah city during conflict escalation and those in extremely crowded conditions within the Al-Mawasi area. UtilizationUtilization would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates. This includes challenges to the safe storage and preparation of food, lack of access to water, and a rapidly increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. Utilization would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate. This includes severe challenges to the safe storage and preparation of food, extreme lack of access to water, and a rapidly increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. HealthThe provision of healthcare would largely end, driven by extremely inadequate delivery of critical supplies and a final collapse in the functionality of the remaining health centres. The provision of healthcare would largely end, driven by extremely inadequate delivery of critical supplies and a final collapse in the functionality of the remaining health centres. WASHAccess to water – safe or unsafe – would be extremely limited, with no cross-border water distribution, a limited number of functional wells, and limited water trucking. Wastewater treatment facilities would remain non-functioning. Access to water – safe or unsafe – would be extremely limited, with no cross-border water distribution, a limited number of functional wells, and limited water trucking. Wastewater treatment facilities would remain non- functioning.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF39 Conclusions on the Risk of Famine Following the Famine Review Committee Recommendations, the risk of Famine conclusions for the two unit of analysis has been merged. Given the continued catastrophic food security situation across the entire Gaza Strip, a risk of Famine analysis was done for Deir al Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah Governorates. This analysis considered whether Famine will occur under a reasonable worst-case scenario during the projection period through 15 July 2024. An analysis for the northern governorates was not performed as the FRC is projecting Famine in those areas under the most likely scenario. The FRC considered the assumptions for the worst-case scenario made by the Analysis Team regarding the evolution of the conflict and the expected impacts on food security and acute malnutrition to be plausible for all three governorates. The intensity of the conflict and the extent of humanitarian space will determine the magnitude and directions of population movement within the Gaza Strip. It is currently impossible to ascertain the destination(s) of these human-made displacements, however any further concentration of population in any already highly populated area, for instance as a consequence of an escalation in the Rafah Governorate driving hundreds of thousands towards Al-Mawasi and the surrounding areas, will significantly increase the risk of Famine. The FRC considered the risk of Famine statement made by the Analysis Team about Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates to be plausible. Given the high degree of uncertainty and fluidity of the situation with displacements likely forcing people to move to and from multiple localities, the FRC felt it was appropriate to group together all three of the southern governates for a risk of Famine analysis rather than to separate the governates as different units of analysis. Forced displacement will increase the risk of Famine because of overcrowding, poor supply of food, water, and medicines, and limited provision of health and wash services, which will expose the displaced population to epidemic outbreaks. The FRC reached technical consensus that, under a reasonable worst-case scenario, there is a risk of Famine across the entire middle and southern areas of the Gaza Strip during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July 2024. The cessation of hostilities together with the restoration of humanitarian space to deliver multi-sectoral assistance and restore services are essential steps in mitigating the risk of Famine.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF40 CONCLUSIONS OF THE FAMINE REVIEW COMMITTEE (FRC) This report is the second time that the Famine Review Committee has reviewed analysis conducted by a multi-agency, multi-sectoral Analysis Team to determine the current and projected food security situation in the Gaza Strip. The first analysis, conducted in December 2023, determined that there was a risk of Famine within the projection period of December 2023 to May 2024, and that the risk would increase for each day that the intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened. The findings of the FRC’s latest review confirm that Famine is now projected and imminent in the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates and is expected to become manifest between mid-March 2024 and May 2024. The Famine threshold for acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and the steeply increasing trend in malnutrition data indicates that it is highly likely that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. The FRC expects the upward trend in non-trauma mortality to accelerate and for all Famine thresholds to be passed imminently. It is vital to note that the projected Famine can be prevented or alleviated. All evidence points towards a major acceleration of deaths and malnutrition. Waiting for a retrospective Famine classification before acting is indefensible. The FRC concludes that Famine is imminent unless there is an immediate cessation of hostilities and full access is granted to provide food, water, medicines, and protection of civilians as well as to restore and provide health, water, and sanitation services, and energy (electricity, diesel, and other fuel) to the population in the northern governorates. In the current period (leading up to mid-March), the FRC finds the conclusions of the IPC Analysis Team for the northern governorates to be plausible (IPC Phase 4 Emergency). However, the FRC highlighted that: (i) Famine thresholds for acute food insecurity have already been surpassed; (ii) Famine thresholds for acute malnutrition (Extremely Critical) have likely already been surpassed; (iii) It is likely that these extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet translated into a Crude Death Rate above 2/10,000/day. The likelihood of having surpassed Under-Five Death Rate thresholds (4/10,000/day for children) is higher but impossible to ascertain. For the Governorates of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah , the FRC considers the findings of the Analysis Team for the current period (IPC Phase 4 – Emergency) to be plausible. The projection period identified by the Analysis Team is mid-March 2024 to mid-July 2024. The FRC considers the most likely scenarios and conclusions of the Analysis Team for the projected period (IPC Phase 4 – Emergency) to be plausible. However, given the high uncertainty over how the situation will evolve and a high degree of fluidity given the intensity of the conflict, forced displacements, and constricted humanitarian access in the next 4 months, the FRC recommends grouping all southern governates together for a risk of Famine analysis . Thus, for the combined southern and middle governates, the FRC concludes that there is a risk of Famine during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July in a worst-case scenario with a reasonable chance of occurring. The primary drivers of the food security, nutrition, and mortality situation in Gaza Strip are the conflict intensity and highly constrained/restricted access, defined as the ability of humanitarian and private actors to deliver the necessary supplies and services to the most vulnerable population. Only an immediate and sustainable cessation of hostility, accompanied by a sustained supply of food, water, medicines, protection services, and provision of health and sanitation services to the population can reduce acute malnutrition and excess mortality. Provision of electricity/fuel supplies for water trucking, pumps, health services, restoration of agricultural production, and other essential needs are also critical, along with support for unrestricted civilian communications within and outside of the Gaza Strip. The actions needed to prevent Famine require an immediate political decision for a ceasefire together with a significant and immediate increase in humanitarian and commercial access to the entire population of Gaza. If this does not happen fully and immediately, even if Famine is avoided in the near term, the impact on mortality and the lives of Palestinians now, and in future generations, will increase markedly with every day.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF41 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION Famine can be halted. The rapidly escalating hunger crisis in the Gaza Strip must immediately be curbed. This requires putting an end to the hostilities, mobilizing necessary resources and ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza. Response Priorities Overall recommendations • Restore humanitarian access to the entire Gaza Strip. • Stop the fast-paced deterioration of the food security, health and nutrition situation leading to excess mortality through: (i) the restoration of health, nutrition, and WASH services and the protection of civilians; and (ii) the provision of safe, nutritious, and sufficient food to all the population in need. • The sustained supply of sufficient aid commodities, including but not limited to food, medicines, specialist nutrition products, fuel, and other necessities should be allowed to enter and move throughout the entire Gaza Strip by road. Traffic of commercial goods should also be fully resumed to meet the volume of commodities required. Programmatic recommendations • Deliver acute malnutrition treatment services, specifically CMAM and IYCF-E services throughout the Gaza Strip, with a particular emphasis on opening stabilization centres in the north. • Supply ready-to-use formula for non-breastfed infants and ensure sufficient access to safe drinking water if preparation is required. • Provide complimentary foods and micronutrient supplements for young children, as well as pregnant and lactating women, the chronically ill, and the elderly. • Restore the functioning of market infrastructures and bakeries combined with cash-based interventions where feasible. • Rehabilitate food production systems as soon as possible, including horticulture, livestock, and fishing. Situation Monitoring and Update Considering the volatility of the context and the changing environment, the following risk factor elements should be monitored continuously: • Intensity and extension of hostilities • Humanitarian access to supply food, water medicines, non-food items • Functionality and access to the health system and WASH supplies and services • Entry of commodities though the Gaza Strip whether through commercial trucks or food assistance by truck or airdrops • Population displacements and conditions in collective centres and scattered sites • Morbidity and disease outbreaks • Acute malnutrition and mortality, with a distinction of the trauma and non-trauma causes
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF42 PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY Similar to the previous analysis conducted in December 2023, the IPC Global Partnership completed an IPC analysis for the Gaza Strip to inform critical humanitarian information needs. Country led IPC analyses are the cornerstone of the IPC process and will continue to be so. In the case of the Gaza Strip, with the onset of the conflict and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe, there was a critical need for an IPC analysis. Without an active country Technical Working Group, the IPC Global Partnership made use of its non-TWG led analysis process to inform decision-making around the crisis in the Gaza Strip. The analysis was conducted remotely from 26 February to 1 March by over 40 experts from 18 agencies, applying standard IPC protocols, and made use of publicly available data from a wide range of courses on the conditions in the Gaza Strip (see below). Based on IPC protocols, the level of evidence of this analysis was assessed as “Medium” (level 2) for each of the three units of analysis. At the analysis completion, the Famine Review Committee was activated to review the Analysis Team’s findings. Their conclusions were adopted by the Analysis Team. Sources The main sources of data used to conduct this analysis include: • FAO, A rapid geospatial damage assessment of the 2023 conflict in the Gaza Strip on agricultural land and infrastructure , February 2024. • Food Security Sector, Sitrep #7 - 13 , 1 December 2023 to March 2024, FSS Gaza Updates. • Gaza Cash Working Group, Emergency MPCA – Gaza 2023, Joint PDM results overview , 15 February 2024. • Global Nutrition Cluster, Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis / Gaza , February 2024. • Health Cluster, Dashboard . • iDMC, Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip , February 2014. • London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024 • OCHA, Damage to Gaza’s agricultural sector , 30 September 2014. • OCHA, Flash Updates #70 - 136 , 15 December 2023 – 11 March 2024. • OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshots - Gaza Strip , March 2024. • OCHA, Population Estimates , February 2024. • Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey , 2022 - Annual Report , 2022. • Shelter Cluster Palestine, Shelter in Crisis: Joint Advocacy Statement , 24 November 2023. • UNICEF, Post-distribution Monitoring Repor t, 29-31 January 2024. • UNITAR and UNOSAT, I mpact of the 2014 Conflict in the Gaza Strip , September 2014. • UNOSAT, Agricultural damage assessments , 17 November 2023, 13 December 2023, 31 January 2024. • UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch tracking , March 2024. • Van den Hoek, J. and Scher, C., Gaza Strip Damage Maps, 2023-2024, Decentralized Damage Mapping Group. • WASH Cluster, Rapid WASH Assessment Preliminary Findings, 21 February 2024. • WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #4-7 , December 2023 – March 2024. • WFP , mVAM Survey , 19 February 2024. • World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy , December 2023.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF43 What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity? The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on interna - tional standards. The IPC consists of four mu - tually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consen - sus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and compa - rability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and pro - gramming. For the IPC, acute food insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity. Contact for further Information IPC Global Support Unit www.ipcinfo.org IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in the Gaza Strip. Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Contre la Faim, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC, FAO, FEWS NET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP , UNICEF, WFP , WHO and the World Bank. Phase 1 None/Minimal Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.Phase 2 Stressed Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress- coping strategies.Phase 3 Crisis Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.Phase 4 Emergency Households either: • have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidationPhase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine Households experience an extreme lack of food and/or cannot meet other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For Famine Classi cation, area needs to have extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.Acute Food Insecurity Phase name and descriptionLimitations of the Analysis Given the major access constraints, data on food security outcomes was collected using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). Quality concerns regarding the use of this methodology including the representativeness, and potential biases associated with mobile network coverage and ownership were discussed at length during the previous round of IPC analysis (for data collected in November 2023). The Analysis Team concluded that the data meets the requirements set by the IPC and were the same for this analysis, especially considering the number of observations. Through the efforts of partners, gaps in nutrition information were filled through screening information. The high degree of volatility around the conflict limits the ability to consider longer analysis periods. Scenarios on the evolution of the conflict were developed in conjunction with conflict experts to the best of their knowledge and expertise.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF44 ENDNOTES 1 PCBS Labour Force Survey, 2022 - Annual Report , 2022, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2658.pdf 2 World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy , December 2023, https://thedocs. worldbank.org/en/doc/7600aee6c75eff4cf9b71ea1fe4016db-0280012023/original/NoteWBG-dec11-CLEAN.pdf 3 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Occupied Palestinian Territories , January 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ humanitarian-needs-overview-2023 4 OCHA and REACH, Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 2022 conducted in the occupied Palestinian territory , July 2022, https://www.ochaopt.org/msna/2022/MSNA-Cross-cutting-Report-2022.pdf 5 WFP , Palestine Country Brief , September 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/wfp- palestine-country-brief-september-2022 6 Health Cluster Dashboard, Occupied Palestinian Territory , March 2024, Microsoft Power BI 7 OCHA, Escalation in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #1 as of 18:00, 7 October 2023, https://www.unocha. org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/escalation-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-1-1800-7- october-2023 8 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #21, 27 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-21 9 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #56, 1 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-56 10 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #116, 12 Feb 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-116 11 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update , 26 December 2023, https://www.understandingwar.org/ backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2023 12 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update , 28 February 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ iran-update-february-28-2024 13 WFP , UN Food Agency pauses deliveries to the North of Gaza , 20 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/un-food- agency-pauses-deliveries-north-gaza 14 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024 6 March 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024 15 ACAPS, Palestine - Humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip: five months into the recent hostilities , 8 March 2024, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240308_ACAPS_Palesstine_Gaza_humanitarian_ access_note.pdf 16 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #8, 14 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-8 17 IDF Spokesman, IDF evacuation route announcement (Tweet), 13 October 2023, X, https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/ status/1712846493747495223 18 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #56, 1 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-56 19 IASC, Statement by Principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Humanitarian chiefs will not take part in unilateral proposals to create “safe zones” in Gaza , 16 November 2023, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/about-inter- agency-standing-committee/statement-principals-inter-agency-standing-committee-humanitarian-chiefs-will-not- take-part 20 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #20, 26 October 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-20-enarhe 21 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #49, 24 November 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-49
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF45 22 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #6, 12 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-6 23 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #117, 13 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-117 24 OCHA, Shelters and IDPs dashboard , February 2024. 25 UNHCR, Gaza Crisis 2023 Shelter Situation Update , 7 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-crisis-2023-shelter-situation-update-7th-january-2024 26 OCHA, Shelters and IDPs dashboard , February 2024 27 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #117, 13 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-117 28 Van den Hoek, J. and Scher, C., Gaza Strip Damage Maps , Decentralized Damage Mapping Group, 2023-2024, https:// www.conflict-damage.org/ 29 UNOSAT, Agricultural damage assessments , 17 November 2023, 13 December 2023, 31 January 2024, https://unosat. org/products/ 30 FAO, A rapid geospatial damage assessment of the 2023 conflict in the Gaza Strip on agricultural land and infrastructure , February 2024, https://www.nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition- vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf 31 FAO, Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 15 February 2024 , 28 February 2024, http://www.fao.org/3/cc9792en/cc9792en.pdf 32 WFP , mVAM Survey , 19 February 2024 33 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch tracking , March 2024. 34 WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #6 , 2 February 2024, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP- 0000156177/download/?_ga=2.88114139.1989739434.1710023558-981095887.1696492379 From 19 December 2023 to 21 January 2024, WFP sought to contact 72 shops but received a response from only 11 shops, of which 7 were operational. This limited response was attributed to frequent telecommunication disruptions in the Gaza Strip during the mentioned period. The primary focus was on Rafah, where 6 shops participated in the WFP survey on January 21, and one in Khan Younis. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Food Security Sector (Palestine), Sector Update #13 , 19 January 2024, https://fscluster.org/state-of-palestine/ document/fss-gaza-updates 38 Gaza Cash Working Group, Meeting Minutes , 6 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 39 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact , 19 February 2024 at 15:00, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-19-february-2024-1500 40 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024, 6 March 2024, https://www. ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024?_gl=1*tdp1i0*_ ga*MTEwNjk4NDg0LjE3MDk3NDIwNzg.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwOTgwMDIxOC4yLjEuMTcwOTgwMTI3OS41NS4wLjA 41 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 42 WFP , UN Food Agency pauses deliveries to the North of Gaza , 20 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/un-food- agency-pauses-deliveries-north-gaza 43 WFP , WFP food deliveries to northern Gaza face further setbacks, 5 March 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-food- deliveries-northern-gaza-face-further-setbacks 44 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #136 , 11 March 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-136
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF46 45 Gaza Cash Working Group, Emergency MPCA – Gaza 2023, Joint PDM results overview , 15 February 2024, https://drive. google.com/drive/folders/17wI2GlSITludiA126Bry6L37E4aO0Plx 46 Ibid. 47 Gaza Cash Working Group, Meeting Minutes , 13 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 48 FAO, European Union and CIRAD, Food Systems Profile - Palestine, 2023, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc7323en 49 ECHO, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Palestine, 19 December 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/humanitarian-implementation-plan-hip-palestine-echopsebud202491000-version-1 50 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #71 , 16 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-71 51 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #71 , 16 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-71 ; OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #99, 22 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-99 52 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 53 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-January 2024 , 5 February 2024, https://www.unocha.org/ publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-january-2024 54 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #54 , November 2023, https://www.unocha.org/publications/ report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-54 55 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 56 WFP , mVAM Survey, 19 February 2024. 57 In the November - December mVAM survey of WFP , the sampling design was not designed to be representative at governorate-level for Rafah, nor for any other single governorate. Only 63 completed questionnaires were recorded in that survey round for Rafah governorate. Comparisons between the November-December 2023 survey round and the December 2023-February 2024 survey round for Rafah governorate are only indicative given the non- representative sample from the first round. Additionally, the continued displacement recorded in the governorate of Rafah after 5 December 2023 calls for additional caution when comparing Rafah governorate results across the two survey rounds. 58 WFP , mVAM Survey , 6 December 2023 and 19 February 2024. 59 Ibid. 60 Food Economy Group, The practitioner’s guide to the Household Economy Analysis , p 141. https://foodeconomy.com/ wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-Practitioners-Guide-to-HEA.pdf 61 This paragraph is uniquely informed by the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster. Most of the text is a direct quote. The report is based on: (1) UNICEF, Post-distribution Monitoring Report , 29-31 January 2024. In North Gaza, the UNICEF PDM survey gathered responses on the diet diversity for 47 children aged 6-23 month in North Gaza; in Khan Younis: PBW=31, children aged 6-23 month = 31; Deir Al Balah: PBW = 34, children aged 6-23 month = 103, Rafah: PBW = 299, children aged 6-23 month = 270. (2) WFP , mVAM CATI Survey. 62 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario- Based Health Impact Projections (gaza-projections.org) 63 WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #6 , 2 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/publications/202324-wfp- palestine-monthly-market-dashboard 64 Ibid. 65 WHO, oPT emergency Situation Update Issue 22 , 30 January 2024, https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/Sitrep_-_ issue_22.pdf?ua=1
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF47 66 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #88 , 9 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-88 67 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #97 , 19 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-97 68 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 69 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #89 , 10 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-89-enar#:~:text=A%20total%20of%2019%20 homes,demolished%20and%2078%20people%20displaced 70 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incidents 71 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #115 , 9 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-115 72 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incident) 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 FAO, Food systems profile on Palestine, 2023 https://www.fao.org/3/cc7323en/cc7323en.pdf ; PCBS and PWA, Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day, 22 March 2021, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post. aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4468 76 Fanack Water, Why is there a water crisis in Gaza? , 201521, https://water.fanack.com/why-gaza-is-running-out-of-fresh- water/ 77 PCBS and PWA, Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day, 22 March 2021, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post. aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4468 78 FAO, Food systems profile on Palestine, 2023 , https://www.fao.org/3/cc7323en/cc7323en.pdf 79 WASH Cluster, Gaza Strip: WASH facilities damage assessment , February 2024. 80 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 14 February 2024 , Meeting minutes -URL 84 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting minutes - URL 85 Ibid. 86 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #124 , 22 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-124 87 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #91 , 12 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-91 88 WASH Cluster, Rapid WASH Assessment Preliminary Findings, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 89 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 90 NRC, Gaza: Israel’s military operation in Rafah would be fatal for displaced civilians and humanitarian aid, 8 February 2024, https://www.nrc.no/news/2024/february/gaza-israels-military-operation-in-rafah-would-be-fatal-for-displaced- civilians-and-humanitarian-aid/
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF48 91 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incident 92 UNRWA, UNRWA Situation Report # 80 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, 21 February 2024, https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation- report-80-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-Jerusalem?__cf_chl_tk=Fbky2q_ a29r0Fy3TD8TlVYbtpJ1PGIxBrGSYCIw7nMw-1710157363-0.0.1.1-1727 93 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 94 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #105 , 30 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-105-enarhe 95 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 96 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #124 , 22 February 2024, https://www.unocha.org/ publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-124 97 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 24 January 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 98 UNICEF, State of Palestine Humanitarian Situation Report No. 3 : 1 January to 31 December 2022, March 2023, https:// reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unicef-state-palestine-humanitarian-situation-report-no-3-1- january-31-december-2022 99 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 100 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 24 January 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 101 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 21 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 102 WASH Cluster. Sanitation data in collective centers shared with the IPC Analysis Team , 28 February 2024. 103 UNRWA, Situation Report #64 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem , 15 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unrwa-situation-report-64-situation-gaza-strip-and- west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-all-information-11-13-january-2024-valid-13-january-2024-2230-enar 104 Global Nutrition Cluster, Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis / Gaza , February 2024, https://www. nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition-vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf 105 In an age-balanced sample, approximately two thirds (~66%) of the sample is over 2 years old. 106 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario- Based Health Impact Projections (gaza-projections.org) 107 In the November - December mVAM survey of WFP , the sampling design was not designed to be representative at governorate-level for Rafah, nor for any other single governorate. Only 63 completed questionnaires were recorded in that survey round for Rafah governorate. Comparisons between the November-December 2023 survey round and the December 2023-February 2024 survey round for Rafah governorate are only indicative given the non- representative sample from the first round. Additionally, the continued displacement recorded in the governorate of Rafah after 5 December 2023 calls for additional caution when comparing Rafah governorate results across the two survey rounds.

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PARTIZAN: OUR STANCE TOWARDS THE ELECTION IN DERSIM – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


We publish this unofficial translation of a statement of Partizan.

Our people,

As a result of our general policy regarding the electoral process, our evaluations of the developments and the negotiations, we have concluded: we declare to our people that we will protest the election on the grounds that sufficient conditions are not met in Dersim, where we have the condition to participate in the election in favor of the DEM Party [The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party], and that approaches that are incompatible with the interests and expectations of the people are dominant here. We do not support any candidate. We see that the reaction that our people have been showing openly for a while, sometimes expressed through action, is appropriate, and that an organization based on this reaction is a basic necessity. We consider it our duty to do justice to this reaction in our work.

THERE IS NO GROUND FOR COMMON AGREEMENT!

Communists try to use all means and opportunities to develop the revolutionary struggle. Our principles and perspective require this. Serving the revolution is possible by determining policies in line with the interests and objective tendencies of the masses. Everything that is not evaluated “for the revolution” and that does not comply with the expectations and objective interests of the people deals blows to the indispensable relationship of trust. This is much more important, especially since elections involve competing by the rules set by the bourgeois-feudal state. As a matter of fact, the latest attack on the trustees is a definitive proof of this reality. The unsuccessful policy followed against the trustees as a blow to the will of the people has created a serious trust issue. While patriotic Kurdish politics continues to be destroyed by all kinds of attacks and the rules of the State, it is a necessity to think in line with this reality. Especially if there is ideological weakness and the belief in the revolution is shaken, the electoral vote will open the door to reformism wide open.

We acted with this understanding during the election process in Dersim. First of all, we want this to be known. We were open to negotiations until the last moment, expecting joint work, and we even had to make a request in this direction. The findings and opinions we will present here are shared as a result of the somehow forced meetings we had with our friends.

Dersim was the scene of unsurprising but still interesting developments and discussions. We acted by paying attention to the approaches of our friends to clarify our policy in Dersim due to their originality and long-established relationships. In the end, what we reached was that our friends thought and acted very far away from us, and that they kept their group interests above of the public’s tendencies and expectations; therefore, the conditions for acting together with them are not met. Undoubtedly, the loss and decline of the political cause, which is particularly represented in the DEM Party, is not or will not be a positive situation when we look at it from the perspective of the public’s interests. However, in order for this cause not to regress or even develop, there must be policies, studies and staff suitable for the cause. Developments in this process have shown that we are far from these. We must say that we will not specifically pursue any work against this case, and that our priority is to organize against those who are hostile to the people. We declare that we are not involved in the election process because appropriate steps were not taken for the case and because it was viewed and acted from the perspective of narrow group interests.

Our evaluation of the developments and discussions in this process will explain the reason for the stance we have taken.

LET FRIENDS SEE IN ALLIANCE

Dersim gains special importance for every political actor, especially when it comes to local elections. For the DEM Party, it is “an important city of Kurdistan that cannot be lost”, in the terms of EMEP [Labor Party] and SMF [Socialist Assemblies Federation] etc. it is “the bastion of socialism.” For former CHP [Republican People’s Party] deputy Hüseyin Aygün and his partners, who will enter the elections as an independent candidate, “Dersim belongs to the people of Dersim, it should be saved from revolutionaries and socialists.” Since H. Aygün and his associates do not have much to consider in terms of the interests of the masses, the possibility of forming an alliance or acting together with this group has not been on our agenda from the very beginning. DEM Party, SMF and EMEP are the friends we address in discussions in this context. Their approaches and general attitudes were monitored and evaluated by us. Of course, we have certain ideas and attitudes about every institution from the very beginning. Accordingly, there are no sufficient conditions for an alliance or joint action in the right direction with both SMF and EMEP in general and especially in Dersim.

SMF and EMEP, which determine all their activities according to elections and are actually stuck in an area limited to elections, enter into a fierce fight in every local election. This fight continues from past to present, sometimes between each other and sometimes both together against DEM and its predecessors. When it comes to parliamentary elections, those who get 1-2 seats and easily form an alliance with DEM and its predecessors do not hesitate to shake their swords at each other to get Dersim Municipality. Since they act according to narrow group interests in a line that is far from principles and revolutionary values, their inconsistencies and practices have been developing against the expectations of the people for a long time, and the interests of the people are often not understood or taken into consideration. If you remember, in the parliamentary elections held in 2023, all of the parties and organizations in question established the “Labor and Freedom Alliance”. However, this alliance collapsed just before the elections. However, it was stated by all actors that this alliance would not only be an electoral alliance, but also a struggle alliance.

This issue is important because it shows that the basis of the alliances in question is far from revolutionary, democratic principles and understanding, and these alliances are insincere. The coming together of these understandings does not concern the development of the struggle and obtaining permanent results. It is disconnected from the real agenda and problems of the people. Therefore, it is far from developing a solution. It searches for solutions to problems within the system without touching the system. It should be known that the source of the problem is the system itself. A radical solution to the problems is impossible without drying up this resource. That is why, to date, these institutions have not been able to develop a consistent democratic policy in municipal elections and even in “municipalism”.

The same result exists today. These understandings, which generally hold the people responsible for every failed practice, have always lagged behind the people, and of course still do today. Our people analyze events and facts more clearly and draw conclusions. The alliance components are tied to each other with a thread. There is an alliance shaped by coercion and “necessity to win”. “Friends should see it while shopping”, our people see the content of this alliance and clearly show their reaction. Of course, it is debatable to what extent it will affect the election results. In conclusion, this reaction is appropriate and justified.

Alliance talks are always drowning in candidacy debates and turning into a fight over just this issue. Of course, every political movement can nominate candidates and present them to the alliance. If they are going to enter the elections with an alliance, this issue, namely the candidate issue, cannot be left out of discussion. However, candidates should be the last topic to be discussed in discussions; firstly, it should be understood about the reasons for coming together and what will be done for what purpose. However, this is not what we see in the alliance established in Dersim, it was acted through a bargaining method in which narrow group interests were decisive. It is clear that the revolutionary struggle will not develop and the masses will not be able to organize with these understandings. On the contrary, this situation leads to degeneration in ideology. It deepens the separation from the public.

In order to understand what we have stated above, let’s take a look at the events that took place between the institutions as far as we know about the situation that has developed so far during the local elections process.

During these elections, both SMF and DEM Party, and EMEP and DEM Party held separate meetings and could not get results from these meetings to form an alliance. From now on, DEM Party shared with the public that it would enter the elections in Dersim with its own candidates. After this statement of the DEM Party, SMF and EMEP made a statement that they had formed an alliance and called on other movements to join this alliance. After the EMEP and SMF alliance was reflected in the public, a statement was made by the DEM Party headquarters and said, “Dersim cannot exist without DEM, and DEM cannot exist without Dersim.” After this statement, mutual discussions started. In the article written by Doğan Durgun in Yeni Yaşam newspaper regarding the alliance established by EMEP and SMF, it was called “Tunçeli alliance” and accusations were made against this alliance by Sırrı Sakık. DEM Party discussed this alliance, which was established despite itself, as a reflection of the “State mentality”. These discussions continued for a few days, and then, with the statements of the party headquarters, it was said that “an alliance was reached in Dersim”. After all the discussions, the parties formed an alliance without developing any self-criticism, which was met with reaction from the people of Dersim.

SMF’s “socialist municipalism” adventure, which started in Ovacık, first abandoned Ovacık to the CHP, then came to Dersim Central Municipality, turned the city into rubble in every sense, and shook the people’s trust in the revolutionaries. Then, during this election process, it went to Kadıköy as if it was running away from the people of Dersim. Manipulation of the masses was created with populist discourses such as “socialist municipalism”, “communist president” and “cooperative socialism”. From free transportation to free water, from student scholarships to the development of village agriculture, by creating a misconception with things that were never actually done, it has shaken the public’s trust in the revolutionaries who have been struggling in these lands for half a century. The masses continue to be deceived from “Kaypakkayaism” to the struggle under the social chauvinist TKP flag. The fact that EMEP and DEM Party, which criticized this entire process before, formed an alliance as if nothing had happened, means that they are united in all these negativities.

Approving the liquidationist group who use the name “Partizan” to be included in the alliance is another indicator of lack of principle. Our friends continue to ignore the fact that this group cannot represent Partizan. Aside from the fact that the line, understanding and way of existence they defend are incompatible with Partizan’s most well-known principles and historical background, it is obvious that they have no following in Dersim. The main reason for this is the attitude of the people of Dersim regarding who and with what principles Partizan is represented. This attitude has been ignored. The problem is clearly a political one. What is the answer to the question “What is the attitude of Partizan in Dersim?” How to explain the contradiction between what the people of Dersim see and know and what the alliance offers? The answer to this question confirms our explanations on the subject and the criticisms we offer. Based on this concrete reality, we once again invite our friends to take the statement we made regarding the name “Partizan” and the attitude we expect.

The name “Partizan” represents a certain line and historical accumulation. The group included in the alliance has broken away from it. We reiterate that addressing this group under the name “Partizan” is unprincipled and incompatible with friendship. We will continue to criticize and reject this wrong attitude in every environment and platform we are in.

We call,

It is clear that this alliance of forces that have lost the trust of the people, formed without self-criticism to the people of Dersim and without being held accountable for these negativities, has no future. We did not have an understanding of being a part of alliances based solely on the possibility of winning elections. We share with the public that we have drawn a clear line between ourselves and this alliance, which neglects to take a sincere and honest stance even though a strong and necessary self-criticism is required and it is faced with an intense reaction from the people of Dersim in particular. We call on all our people to take a stand against these wrongs, apart from their election choices, and to be a part of our insistence on a revolutionary attitude and line.

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THE GAZA STRIP FAMINE IS IMMINENT AS 1.1 MILLION PEOPLE, HALF OF GAZA, EXPERIENCE CATASTROPHIC FOOD INSECURITY Overview The IPC acute food insecurity analysis conducted in December 2023 warned of a risk that Famine may occur by the end of May 2024 if an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access for the provision of essential supplies and services to the population did not take place. Since then, the conditions necessary to prevent famine have not been met and the latest evidence confirms that Famine is imminent in the northern governorates and projected to occur anytime between mid-March and May 2024. CURRENT: 15 FEBRUARY - 15 MARCH 2024 2.13M 95% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTIONPhase 5 677,000 People in Catastrophe Phase 4 876,000 People in Emergency Phase 3 578,000 People in Crisis Phase 2 96,000 People Stressed Phase 1 0 People in food security PROJECTED: 16 MARCH - 15 JULY 2024 2.23M 100% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTIONPhase 5 1,107,000 People in Catastrophe Phase 4 854,000 People in Emergency Phase 3 265,000 People in Crisis Phase 2 0 People Stressed Phase 1 0 People in food security IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS 15 FEBRUARY - 15 JULY 2024 Published on 18 March 2024IPC Global Initiative - Special Brief IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in Palestine. This analysis factors in all data and information available up to 10 March 2024 and does not take into account the latest developments on the ground. Key Drivers Restricted humanitarian access Extremely limited humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip continues to impede the safe and equitable delivery of life-saving multi-sector humanitarian assistance critical for Famine prevention and response. This includes severe limitations to the supply of goods as well as basic services.Hostilities Hostilities continue to involve the besiegement of the entire population and widespread, intense and sustained ground and air operations and clashes. This has caused over 31,000 deaths and injured 73,000 people, displaced about 1.9 million people, damaged or destroyed over half of the buildings, and devastated assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival, including across the food, health and water systems.Current Acute Food Insecurity | 15 February - 15 March Projected Acute Food Insecurity | 16 March - 15 July
According to the most likely scenario, both North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine) with reasonable evidence, with 70% (around 210,000 people) of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Continued conflict and the near-complete lack of access to the northern governorates for humanitarian organizations and commercial trucks will likely compound heightened vulnerabilities and extremely limited food availability, access, and utilization, as well as access to healthcare, water, and sanitation. The famine threshold for household acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and, given the latest data showing a steeply increasing trend in cases of acute malnutrition, it is highly likely that the famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. In North Gaza, acute malnutrition (by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference - MUAC) moved from a pre-escalation estimated of 1 percent to 6.8 – 9.1 percent in January and 12.4 to 16.5 percent in February (weighted for children 6-59). Acute malnutrition (by MUAC) among children 6-23 months old increased in the same period from 16.2 percent to 29.2 percent. The upward trend in non-trauma mortality is also expected to accelerate, resulting in all famine thresholds likely to be passed imminently. The southern governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and the Governorate of Rafah, are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). However, in a worst-case scenario, these governorates face a risk of Famine through July 2024. The entire population in the Gaza Strip (2.23 million) is facing high levels of acute food insecurity. From mid-March to mid-July, in the most likely scenario and under the assumption of an escalation of the conflict including a ground offensive in Rafah, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1.11 million people) is expected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5), the most severe level in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. This represents an increase of 530,000 people (92 percent) compared to the previous analysis. Between the current and the projection period, around 400,000 more people are expected to slide into IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The rest of the population faces Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (854,000 people, 38 percent of the population) or Crisis (IPC Phase 3) (265,000 people, 12 percent of the population). The escalation of the hostilities has caused widespread damage to assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival. About 50 percent of buildings - and more than 70 percent in the northern governorates - have been damaged or destroyed. This has included dwellings, shops and infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, as well as water, sanitation and other facilities. Assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limiting the functionality of the food system. From a pre-escalation average of 500 trucks a day of which 150 carrying food, in the period between 7 October 2023 to 24 February 2024, only 90 trucks per day, of which only 60 carrying food, entered the Gaza Strip. Consequently, virtually all households are skipping meals every day and adults are reducing their meals so that children can eat. In the northern governorates, in nearly two thirds of the households, people went entire days and nights without eating at least 10 times in the last 30 days. In the southern governorates, this applies to one third of the households.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF3 CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (15 February - 15 March 2024 ) Population table for the current situation: 15 February - 15 March 2024 Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.GovernorateTotal population analysedPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 3+Area Phase#people % #people % #people % #people % #people % #people % Deir al-Balah & Khan Younis governorates600,000 0 030,000 5120,000 20 270,000 45 180,000 30 570,000 95 4 North Gaza & Gaza governorates300,000 0 0 0 0 60,000 20 75,000 25 165,000 55 300,000 100 4 Rafah governorate1,326,544 0 066,327 5397,963 30 530,618 40 331,636 25 1,260,217 95 4 Grand Total 2,226,544 0 096,327 5 577,963 26 875,618 39 676,636 30 2,130,217 95
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF4 CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (15 February - 15 March 2024) Vulnerabilities and Acute Events Prior to the current hostilities, vulnerability was high in the Gaza Strip due to prolonged blockade and periodic escalations in hostilities that severely damaged the food system in the area. At 5,900 residents per square kilometre, one of the most densely populated areas in the world even before the concentration of most of the population in only one of five governorates, the Gaza Strip population is extremely reliant on the cross-border movement of goods and utilities like electricity and water. In 2022, the Gaza Strip faced an unemployment rate of nearly 45 percent 1 and, by September 2023, the poverty rate was at 60 percent 2, among a population that included nearly 70 percent of refugees. 3 Due to severely constrained livelihood opportunities, in 2022, over half of the population was relying on humanitarian assistance as their main income source and about one-third on casual labour, 4 with 70 percent of the population food insecure. 5 Conflict . As of 14 March 2024, the ongoing hostilities have reportedly caused nearly 105,000 casualties within the Gaza Strip – nearly 5% of the total population. 6 This includes over 73,000 people injured, about half of them women and children, and over 31,000 deaths. The escalation of hostilities within the Gaza Strip began with heavy bombardment on 7 October 2023. 7 On 27 October, major ground operations and clashes reportedly began within the Gaza Strip. 8 These started in the northern governorates and continued through 23 November, with a humanitarian pause from 24 November through 30 November. 9 Hostilities subsequently resumed at high intensity, with major ground operations and bombardment by air, land, and sea. This included the continued expansion of a ground operation in Khan Younis Governorate, centred on Khan Younis city. 10 Another large ground operation began in Deir al-Balah Governorate on 24 December 2023, 11 expanding across multiple though not all refugee camps and urban areas in the governorate. These operations were accompanied by continued clashes among armed actors. Clashes in the northern governorates, especially some neighbourhoods of Gaza city like Zeitoun, re-escalated in late February 2024. 12 Bombardment by air, land, and sea of all areas of the Gaza Strip has continued throughout this period, intensifying particularly before and during major ground operations. Humanitarian access. Conflict continues to place severe limitations on the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving food, nutrition, health, water, hygiene, sanitation and other life-saving assistance to the besieged population. Commercial traffic is similarly impeded. Humanitarian access, and the ability of the most vulnerable populations to access and participate in humanitarian activities safely is highly limited and uneven across the Gaza Strip. Once humanitarian assistance and commercial goods enter the Gaza Strip, onward access to the northern governorates is extremely limited and unavailable for extended periods, while access is relatively higher for the southern governorates, particularly Rafah Governorate. While there has been improvement in access to the Gaza Strip relative to early October 2023, including the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing in Mid-December 2023, access to the Gaza Strip continues to fluctuate and remains insufficient for meeting the basic needs of the overall population. Severe limitations and attacks on humanitarian staff and assets forced major providers of humanitarian food and other assistance to the northern governorates to suspend convoys to these areas, including the World Food Programme, on 20 February. 13 Since the previous IPC analysis on the Gaza Strip in December 2023, access denial increased significantly, especially in the northern governorates. In January 2024, only nine humanitarian missions to the northern governorates were facilitated, dropping to six missions in February. 14 Figure 1. Casualties in the Gaza Strip reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health as of 14 March 2024. Source: Health Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF5 According to OCHA, constraints on humanitarian action throughout the Gaza Strip include direct strikes with explosive weapons on humanitarian convoys, detention of humanitarian staff, road closures, checkpoints, and related blockages or delays on main transportation corridors. Swarming of humanitarian convoys subsequently increased, including at several hotspots throughout the Gaza Strip, such as immediately after crossing Wadi Gaza into the northern governorates. Physical access constraints further limit the movement of humanitarian and commercial traffic, including road damage from bombardment and traffic of heavy military vehicles as well as the accumulation of an estimated 12,000 metric tons of debris that may take up to four years to fully clear. 15 Displacement and Movement Restrictions. Displacement continues to be driven by conflict. An evacuation order was issued to the entire population residing north of Wadi Gaza (1.1 million people) on 13 October, 16 followed by orders and accompanying maps indicating to move as far south as Khan Younis Governorate. 17 After the humanitarian pause on 24- 30 November 2023, new evacuation orders covering at least 30 percent of the entire Gaza Strip were issued. 18 The unilaterally declared Al-Mawasi “Humanitarian Zone” was first announced on 18 October 2023, however, humanitarian agencies did not agree to the establishment of such zones. 19 The proposed area has limited pre-existing services, with OCHA reporting there is “almost no sheltering capacity” . 20 In addition to the closure of some of the main transportation corridors within the Gaza Strip, other movement restrictions have also been announced, including a ban on movement from southern to northern governorates. 21 Additional restrictions imposed on populations affect livelihoods and food access, such as a de facto prohibition on fishing and movement within one kilometre of the border fence, which covers a significant proportion of farmland. 22 The movement of livestock together with displaced populations has not generally been reported and livestock abandonment is likely high.Map 1. Missions planned, facilitated and denied, October 2023 to Mid-February 2024. Source: OCHA Map 2. Distribution of IDPs staying in Collective Centres. Source: Shelter Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF6 As new evacuation orders are issued alongside with continuation of bombardments and ground operations, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are constantly moving in search of safety. Most of them have moved south, largely to Rafah Governorate. 23 The population in Rafah has increased about five-fold as a result, rapidly rising from 276,000 pre-escalation to over 1.3 million as of February 2024. A large proportion of the displaced population is from Gaza and North Gaza Governorates, which have seen their population decrease by 84 percent and 75 percent respectively. 24 Rafah Governorate, which spans over 65 km 2, now hosts around 1.3 million people. 25 In Rafah, there are 35 UNRWA shelters hosting 882,800 people and another 30 informal shelters hosting 506,300 people, 26 corresponding to over 30 percent of the population staying in shelters. The formal shelters managed by UNRWA are overcrowded with severely limited access to safe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and other services. People in informal shelters face even more difficulties accessing health, food and non-food services. The lack of Non-food Items (NFIs) provision in informal settlements has led people to set up makeshift shelters and tents, which are subject to flooding on rainy days, further exacerbating the suffering of displaced people. 27 Damages . Destruction and damage of buildings, particularly from bombardment by air, land, and sea, is evident in all governorates of the Gaza Strip. According to the recent satellite assessments, by late February 2024, at least 54 percent of all buildings in the Gaza Strip were likely damaged or destroyed. The largest scale destruction is in Gaza Governorate where more than 73 percent of buildings are estimated to be destroyed, followed by North Gaza (70 percent), Deir al-Balah (44 percent), Khan Younis (52 percent) and Rafah (28 percent). 28 This has included dwellings, shops and various types of infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, and other public buildings, as well as WASH infrastructure and storage facilities, among others. Food Availability Production . The escalation of hostilities and mass displacements have caused food shortages and unavailability throughout the Gaza Strip as the food system and agriculture value chains have collapsed or are marginally surviving through the informal market. A significant portion of agriculture land, encompassing orchards, greenhouses, and farmlands has suffered extensive destruction. According to the UNOSAT, the percent of damaged agriculture land has increased from 25 percent to 60 percent, between November 2023 and January 2024.29 Extensive damage has been inflicted on the local food system, including agricultural infrastructure. More than 300 home barns, 100 agricultural warehouses, 46 farm storages, 119 animal shelters, 200 farms, as well over 600 wells used for irrigation have been destroyed, amongst other agriculture facilities.30 According to the FAO damage assessment of February 2024, damage to wells was found to be most concentrated in the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates; and in some areas, all the wells were damaged. Additionally, over 26 percent (336) of all greenhouses have been damaged across all governorates. The governorates with the highest Map 3. Gaza Damage Mapping 26.02.2024. Source: Decentralized Damage Mapping Group Map 4. Damage to Agriculture Areas Imagery Analysis Maps - November 2023 (left), December 2023 (middle) and January 2024 (right). Source: UNOSAT, 2023-2024
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF7 damage are Gaza (55 percent), North Gaza (48 percent), Khan Younis (35 percent), Deir al-Balah (20 percent) and Rafah (16 percent). The Governorate of Khan Younis had the largest area of damaged greenhouses (149 hectares), followed by Rafah (89 hectares). More than 40 percent (6,694 ha) of all croplands has been damaged since 7 October, with the highest reported damages in Gaza (55 percent, 1,941 ha), Deir al-Balah (51 percent, 1,408 ha), North Gaza (45 percent, 1,402 ha), Khan Younis (33 percent, 1,492 ha) and Rafah (25 percent, 451 ha) Governorates. In terms of cropland type, 41 percent of irrigated land, 43 percent of orchards and 42 percent of rainfed land have been damaged.31 The hostilities have not only led to the destruction of agricultural assets and infrastructure, they also resulted in the displacement of populations away from agricultural land and constrained access for agricultural activities. Other assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limited the functionality of the food system. Although some local production, primarily of vegetables, is still ongoing, it is very limited. Lack of access to land and destruction of crops are compounded by a lack of access to essential agriculture inputs (fuel, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides). Most livestock were abandoned during the large-scale displacement in October 2023. Remaining livestock are being slaughtered or sold due to the lack of fodder and water or due to the need for cash or other resources. Similarly, poultry lack animal feed, and the availability of poultry meat and eggs is reduced throughout the Gaza Strip. The comparison among the preliminary reports from the FAO Loss and Damage assessment and the baseline figure from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), shows about 70 percent of livestock and other animals have been lost since 7 October 2024. Fishing production is largely halted due to the damage of boats, lack of fuel and security/safe access. Some fishing is still happening, but it is only available to those who still possess equipment and have access to fuel. Food security assessments indicate32 that, due to the lack of food availability, some households are resorting to eating wild foods. These range from mallow ( khebbayze in Arabic) to unconventional food sources such as animal fodder and other unsafe foods. Figure 2. Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 15 February 2024. Source: FAO
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF8 Imports . Between January and September 2023, a daily average of 150 food trucks entered the Gaza Strip. Between 8 October 2023 and 9 March 2024, this number decreased to an average of 65 trucks per day33 and the availability of food commodities has dramatically declined. Since the escalation of the hostilities, the number of trucks allowed into the Gaza Strip has been severely restricted, reducing the inflow of humanitarian assistance and preventing the entry of commercial goods completely until 8 December 2023. Since then, there was an initial increase in the flow of food and non-food commodities, facilitated through the opening of a second border crossing (Kerem Shalom). However, in February, the flow of commodities decreased again and has been intermittent from late January through February. The month of February in particular saw major variations highlighted in figure 3. The entry of humanitarian and commercial trucks into Gaza is significantly limited to the southern governorates, mainly Rafah. Conversely, there are very few items reaching the northern governorates and other areas in the rest of the south of Gaza Strip.34 OCHA estimates that less than 5 percent of all the food trucks have reached North Gaza and Gaza Governorates in the past four weeks, while 45 percent remained in Rafah and about 50 percent reached Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis. An in-depth analysis of the border crossing manifest allowed to generate approximate kilocalories values per truck and per unit of analysis then distributed per area, using information provided by OCHA and the Food Security Sector. This reveals that in most days, the quantity of food translated in kilocalories entering in Gaza has been extremely below the requirements in North Gaza Governorates, and mostly half the requirements in Rafah. The only areas appearing to have benefited from an almost sufficient amount of kilocalories (although irregular) are in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates (with higher quantities in the later). This may suggest that most Figure 3. Reanalysis of food-only trucks entering Gaza through Kerem Shalom and Rafah border crossing. Source: UNRWA Figure 4. Reanalysis of the Kcal availability per unit of analysis. Source: UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF9 requirements in Rafah. Based on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 21 October 2023 to 3 March 2024, the proportion of average kilocalories per day (using a 7-day rolling average) has been consistently below the daily kilocalorie requirements (calculated using demographic data considering variations by age and gender), with the exception of a short period of time around mid-January. A survey conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP)35 highlights that interviewed shop owners are faced with a significant shortage of basic food items, with 81 percent indicating depletion. Furthermore, 19 percent highlighted that the available food items are in short supply, and not expected to last more than a week. The formal market has been heavily impacted with a non-functioning supply chain, and severely damaged shops. Consequently, the informal market has surged. Informal markets, provide 1 or 2 types of foods (canned foods mainly), and are supplied by the beneficiaries of assistance (selling or bartering). The WFP market monitoring indicates that most respondents have stocks inferior to 1 week or inexistent for the vast majority of the food commodities, with the exception of vegetables. All respondents have exhausted dairy products.36 Despite the presence of at least a hundred bakeries in northern Gaza, few are able to operate due to significant challenges. The main obstacle is the persistent shortage of flour, other bakery inputs, and fuel. In early January, WFP began supporting 12 bakeries in Rafah and Deir al-Balah.37 Access Market functionality. Informal markets now dominate both food and non-food item transactions across the Gaza Strip as formal markets have collapsed following the depletion of stocks and damage to primary places of business. Selling and buying is mostly taking place in the street along with potential barter activities. People, and more particularly vulnerable groups, are increasingly facing protection risks to access markets with the lack of social order and high levels of food insecurity. There is a risk associated to transporting and carrying food in the street, especially in Northern Gaza and Gaza Governorates where people have resorted to going out in groups to buy food and/or carrying knives to protect themselves. The scarcity of items is driving food prices up and reducing household purchasing power. The overall Consumer Price index (CPI) was approximately 49 percent higher in December 2023 compared to the onset of the conflict; the CPI for food and soft drinks was 76 percent higher.38 Food aid. The flow of humanitarian assistance into and across the Gaza Strip continues to be severely disrupted. Between 1 January and 12 February 2024, 51 percent of aid missions planned for the north of Wadi Gaza and 25 percent of those planned for the areas requiring coordination south of Wadi Gaza were denied access..39 In February, the UN and its humanitarian partners planned only 24 missions to areas north of Gaza, of which six (25 percent) were facilitated. This stands in stark contrast to January, when 61 missions were planned to the north, with nine (15 percent) facilitated.40Figure 5. Stocks availability at shops as of 21 January (% of respondents). Source: WFP
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF10 Based on data from UNRWA,41 the maximum number of trucks entering daily from both the Kerem Shalom and the Rafah crossings was 300 (compared to an average of 500 daily pre-escalation), approximately 70 percent of these trucks carried food or a mixture of food and non-food items. On 20 February 2024, WFP decided to suspend its food aid deliveries to northern Gaza as a result of chaos and violence.42 On 5 March, a 14-truck food convoy, the first by WFP to the north since it paused deliveries on 20 February, was denied access after a three-hour wait at the Wadi Gaza checkpoint and then looted on its way back.43 On 7 March, 11 food trucks from private sector were allowed to enter. In total, from 5 February to 5 March, 10-15 food trucks were allowed into the Gaza Governorate to feed about 300,000 people (less than 1 Kg per person for a full month). Given the spread of the conflict, restrictions on movement and the displacement of the population, the humanitarian space is constantly decreasing, and humanitarian food assistance is being distributed unequally among areas. Airdrop operations of food aid along the Gaza Strip coastline began on 26 February 2024. Airdrops mainly consist of ready-made meals that do not require cooking methods and are of high nutritional value. However, they are erratic, small-scale, cover a limited geographic area, and are primarily accessible to populations located near the coast, including those physically able to recover food pallets and packages from the sea in a context of heightened civil unrest. Airdrops without ground coordination are also dangerous and falling assistance may strike civilians, as occurred on 8 March when Figure 6. Food CPI in Gaza Strip (December 2022 - December 2023). Source: WFP/ PCBS Figure 7. Inflation rate (September 2023 vs. December 2023). Source: WFP/ PCBS
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF11 OCHA reported that five civilians died.44 In light of this, airdrops account for a negligible share of the humanitarian food security assistance in the Gaza Strip compared to what is trucked in overland. Cash Assistance. The functionality of cash assistance in the Gaza Strip is limited. As of 15 February 2024, cash actors had delivered emergency multi-purpose cash assistance to over 125,000 households (over 828,000 people) since the onset of the conflict.45 According to the most recent Cash Post Distribution Monitoring,46 about 71 percent of the respondents reported that the cash assistance received helped them to either access urgent/basic items and services needed. Most expenditures were on food (89 percent), followed by medicines, debt repayment, water and hygiene products, and transportation. In Rafah, cash liquidity is a significant challenge47 because of the high number of displaced individuals and the logistical difficulties banks face in transferring cash. Poor electricity supply and connectivity are also affecting the ability of financial service providers to make cash accessible. Figure 8. Planned aid missions by month. Source: OCHA Figure 9a. Use of cash, since 7 October 2023 and January 2024. Source: Cash Working Group
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF12 Figure 9b. Challenges in use of cash, since 7 October 2023 and January 2024. Source: Cash Working Group Figure 10. Quantity of Diesel and Domestic Gas imported per day. Source: UNRWAUtilization Before the escalation of hostilities, electricity was unreliable and only available for a few hours each day. The lack of electricity negatively affected all aspects of life, including food safety, and made it almost impossible to operate food processing units effectively.48 The main water and electricity networks, fuel and food supplies are now almost completely suspended.49 Frequent communication blackouts make it extremely challenging to coordinate the distribution of aid, and let people know how to access it, and when. The complete electricity blackout that began on 11 October 2023 continues, with only limited electricity generated inside the Gaza Strip from generators and solar panels. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip continue to prevent the delivery of fuel to the Gaza power plant, which remains non-functioning, and block cross-border electricity distribution.50 This severely impacts all aspects of daily life, including the processing and storage of food, pumping and distribution of drinking water, treatment of wastewater, and the functionality of telecommunications and financial systems.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF13 The lack of electricity and damage to telecommunication systems has also limited the ability of populations to communicate and access information like evacuation orders or humanitarian assistance delivery. There have been rolling telecommunication blackouts since 7 October, with several lasting around one week.51 Fuel was not permitted to enter the Gaza Strip from 7 October until 15 November 2023. UNRWA reported that for only the bare minimum of critical services in which it is involved, 160,000 litres per day of diesel fuel are needed. This minimum requirement, which is still insufficient for a full restoration of humanitarian operations and other basic services, has been met only about 10 percent of days from 7 October through 9 March. No fuel was permitted to enter the Gaza Strip from 20 December 2023 through 7 January 2024, a period of new or expanding major ground operations, including in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates. From 24 January through 6 March, fuel was permitted to enter the Gaza Strip only on alternative days.52 Even once inside the Gaza Strip, the onward movement of diesel fuel faces the same extreme challenges as other humanitarian and commercial goods, with little fuel reaching the northern governorates. Regarding fuel to North Wadi Gaza, two (10 percent) of 21 planned missions were facilitated. Both deliveries were facilitated to a single hospital, leaving other hospitals and WASH facilities without fuel. For fuel to areas South of Wadi Gaza, 15 (71 percent) of 21 planned missions to areas requiring coordination were facilitated. A total of 300,600 litres were delivered. However, convoys to Nasser hospital were denied access five times in a row. Fuel shortages in hospitals force them to cease most operations and may lead to preventable deaths.53 About 250 tons of cooking gas entered the Gaza Strip per day on average from January to August 2023.54 Daily entry into the Gaza Strip from 24 November 2023 through 10 March 2024 has consistently been roughly 30-40 percent of that pre- escalation amount.55 This has further challenged the ability of the Gaza Strip population to cook food that they are able to access, presenting challenges to physical and biological utilization. As of January-February 2024, nearly 80 percent of the population in all governorates reported using firewood as their primary cooking fuel, covering any form of wood available. Around 10-15 percent of the population across governorates reported burning waste as their main cooking fuel, while almost no respondents reported using cooking gas. Between 7 and 10 percent of respondents reported that there was no cooking fuel available.56 This is a particular concern as these populations face major challenges with consuming food that they may still have access to, in particular flour. Stability Continued conflict and worsening acute food insecurity and nutritional status also contribute to civil unrest, which further lowers the stability of all food security dimensions. Civil unrest is a major challenge to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to humanitarian staff, and hampers their ability to reach the people in need as well as for the most vulnerable to access and make full use of assistance. Recent deaths related to the airdrops and swarming of the trucks entering the Gaza Strip are key evidence of the level of desperation and acute hunger among the people of Gaza. These also show that even a minimal degree of order to facilitate access to food and other essential supplies, such as medicines, cannot be guaranteed, given the absence of civil authorities or organized police. Social cohesion in Gaza is strained, exposing the most vulnerable, such as children - particularly those who are unaccompanied, women, the elderly, the chronically ill and people living with disabilities to extreme levels of food and water deprivation. Food Security Outcomes The most recent WFP survey relied on data collected through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) between 6 December 2023 and 19 February 2024. The number of observations were: For North Gaza and Gaza Governorates: 104 observations; for Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates: 369 observations; for Rafah Governorate: 892 observations. Households were randomly selected from a master list of 320,000 WFP pre-conflict beneficiary households representing 80 percent of the total pre-conflict population in the Gaza Strip. Overall, 10,320 households were selected and called. Of them, 1,365 respondents completed the questionnaires (success rate of 13.3 percent - in line with the 10 percent to 20 percent typical of CATI analyses in the region), while 19 (0.2 percent) answered the call but hung-up and did not complete it. The rest did not answer.57
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF14 Food Consumption Score (FCS). According to the survey, most households across the Gaza Strip have inadequate food consumption with almost 88 percent of households in the North reporting Poor Food consumption (indicative of IPC Phase 4 and 5, Emergency and Catastrophe) and 9 percent reporting Borderline food consumption (indicative of IPC Phase 3, Crisis). An additional disaggregation of the FCS ‘poor’ category (<14) shows that in the North Gaza Governorates, 36 percent of the respondents are not even able to eat cereals daily. In Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah around 53 percent of households reported poor consumption and 31 percent reported borderline consumption, among them 11 percent had a value below 14. In Rafah, around 48 percent of households reported poor food consumption and 31 percent reported borderline consumption of which 5 percent had a value below 14.58 Across all governorates, the food consumption gaps are clear as most households are unable to consume cereals daily. In the north, the mean number of days of cereal consumption is 4.4 per week, in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates and Rafah Governorate the mean number of days is 5.14 and 5.15, respectively. Consumption of protein rich food is extremely low in Northern Gaza at 0.33 days a week and a little over one day a week in the rest of the Gaza Strip. Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI). Results from reduced coping strategies index indicates that nearly 100 percent of respondents in the Gaza Strip are engaging in extreme coping strategies. The indicator assesses the frequency with which households resorted to coping strategies that altered their consumption patterns such as reducing meals, restricting consumption by adults for children to eat, and borrowing food, in the previous week to cover gaps in their consumption. Household Hunger Scale (HHS). An increase in the proportion of households facing extreme food consumptions gaps is observed across all analysed governorates when compared with November 2023 data. About 84 percent of households in Northern Gaza (Gaza and North Gaza) experienced ‘very severe hunger’ , indicative of IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), while 8 percent of households reported ‘severe hunger’ , indicative of IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Compared with the previous survey round, the deterioration has been significant. In November the proportion of households with ‘very severe hunger’ was estimated at 40 percent showing a doubling of households facing extreme food consumption gaps indicative of IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, 57 percent of households reported experiencing ‘very severe hunger’ , while 24 percent reported to experience ‘severe hunger’ , compared with November 2023 when only 22 percent of households faced ‘very severe hunger’ . In Rafah, the proportion households reportedly experiencing ‘very severe hunger’ was 56 percent and 21 percent reporting ‘severe hunger’ .59 Livelihood coping. Some indirect evidence on livelihood coping mechanisms was collected focusing on emergency strategies contextualised for the very specific conditions of Gaza. The data indicates the highest use of extreme coping strategies in the North with 18 percent of households reporting that they bartered/exchanged clothing for food, while 12 percent reported begging for food. As estimated 3 percent reported scavenging due to lack of food, and 18 percent reported gathering wild foods. Around 23 percent reported looting food from debris, and 74 percent indicated that they sought food outside their shelter, facing potential security risks. In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, the reported proportions were similar: 24 percent of households reported that they bartered/exchanged clothing for food, and in Rafah the proportion was 27 percent. Around 7 percent in Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah and Rafah Governorates reported begging for food. An estimated 1.8 percent reported scavenging due to lack of food and 15 percent gathering wild foods. Around 5 percent in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, and 6 percent in Rafah Governorate reported looting food from debris. Finally, 65 percent of the households in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and 59 percent in Rafah Governorate reported that they sought food outside their shelter facing potential security risks. The survey detected a high level of non-applicable strategies, which might indicate the pure exhaustion of these coping mechanisms. Household Economy Approach (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA): Preliminary HEA Outcome Analysis was made available by FEWS NET for this IPC analysis. For the northern governorates (North Gaza and Gaza urban area), for the period of February – August 2024, all the wealth groups categories living in these governorates are expected to face high level of Survival Deficits (SD), indicative of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The SD is calculated compared to a survival threshold defined as the amount of food and cash income needed by the households to meet the 2,100 Kcal per day per person. This also include the cost of preparing and consuming food plus any cash expenditure on water for human consumption.60 The only exception in these results appear for the Better Off (BO) wealth group living in the Semi Agriculture Gaza (SAG) livelihood zone with livelihoods more related to crops sales, livestock sales or self-employment, that will experience SD Indicative of an IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), at the limit of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). For Southern Gaza, the level of deficit for the projected period of April – August 2024 for the households living in urban areas (URB livelihood zone), will be indicative of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). For the households living in this governorate with livelihoods more related to agricultural labour, crop and livestock sales or self-employment, (SAG livelihood zone) – that represent a small portion of the population living in this governorate -, the Very Poor and the Poor wealth groups will face SD indicative of an IPC
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF15 Figure 11. Summary of food security outcome indicators. Source: WFP/ FEWS NETPhase 4 (Emergency). The Middle and the Better Off categories won’t face any SD or Livelihood Protection Deficit. This last deficit is calculated compared to a Livelihood Protection basket that include all the sources of food and income needed for the households to maintain their local livelihoods. Gender lens. Food insecurity has a multidimensional impact on women, as it not only relates to unequal access to, distribution of, consumption of, and control over food, but it also has long-term health and safety risks. UN Women data shows that the escalation in food insecurity has also increased the vulnerability of women to food insecurity. More than 4 out of 5 women (84 percent) interviewed by UN Women report that their family eats half or less of the food they used to before the conflict began, with mothers and adult women being those tasked with sourcing food, yet eating last, less, and least than everyone else. Moreover, 4 in 5 women (84 percent) in Gaza indicate that at least one of their family members had to skip meals during the past week. In 95 percent of those cases, mothers are the ones going without food, skipping at least one meal to feed their children. Nearly 9 in 10 women (87 percent) report finding it harder to access food than men. Some women are now resorting to extreme coping mechanisms, such as scavenging for food under rubble or in dumpsters.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF16Area Governorate % of total Gaza populationURB LZ SAG LZ % of governorate HHs with kcal gaps indicative of IPC 5 % of area (northern/southern) with kcal gaps indicative of IPC 5Estimated % of population in the LZ (URB) Very Poor (24% of the LZ population) Survival Deficit (SD), Indicative IPC Phase Poor (33%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Middle (41%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Better Off (4%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Estimated % of population in the LZ (SAG) Very Poor (32%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Poor (37%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Middle (25%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Better Off (7%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase SCENARIO 1 (FEBRUARY - AUGUST 2024) SCENARIO 1 (FEBRUARY - AUGUST 2024)Northern Gaza North Gaza5% 100%85%, Phase 585%, Phase 587%, Phase 555%, Phase 50% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0%Gaza5% 94%85%, Phase 585%, Phase 587%, Phase 555%, Phase 56%86%, Phase 587%, Phase 584%, Phase 549%, Phase 4100%Southern Gaza Deir al Balah (or middle Gaza)10% 99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1% N/A N/A N/A N/ATo be inferred To be inferred based on Khan Younis and Deir al Balah assumptions and convergence of other data higlighting where and to what extent conditions resemble Rafah vs. Northern GazaKhan Younis21% 99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1% N/A N/A N/A N/ATo be inferredRafah59% 97%33% survival deficit, Phase 432% survival deficit, Phase 445% survival deficit, Phase 427% survival deficit, Phase 43%13% survival deficit, 100% liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 30% survival deficit, 89% liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 30% survival/ liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 10% survival/ liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 10,0% SCENARIO 2 (APRIL - AUGUST 2024) SCENARIO 2 (APRIL - AUGUST 2024)simulation - Rafah invasion 59% 97%67% 64% 63% 54% 3%42% 31% 0% 0% Phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 5Phase 4 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 1
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF17 NUTRITION SITUATION Inadequate dietary intake According to the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster in December 2023-January 2024,61 in North Gaza, 98 percent of the children (47 observations) included in the analysis had consumed two or fewer food groups in the 24 hours preceding the survey. Among the main food groups reported, breastmilk was mentioned for 39 children (83 percent), and eggs for 17 (36 percent). The consumption of all the other food groups, such as legumes, vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables, other vegetables, grains, meat and dairy products, had almost completely disappeared from their daily diet, indicating an extremely worrying situation in terms of diet quality. 95 percent of the pregnant and breastfeeding women had consumed two or fewer food groups the previous day. The main food groups mentioned were non-vitamin A rich vegetables, grains and eggs. This situation highlights critically insufficient micronutrient intake before and during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which can affect both women and the development of their infants. In Khan Younis, 90 percent of young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women consumed two food groups or fewer in the last 24 hours. For young children, the food groups most frequently mentioned were breastmilk and eggs, while grains, pulses and eggs were the food groups most frequently mentioned for pregnant and breastfeeding women. In Deir al-Balah, 86 percent of young children had eaten two or fewer food groups during the day before the survey, while only 3 percent had consumed five food groups. The food groups most consumed were breastmilk, followed by eggs and grains. Among pregnant and breastfeeding women, 67 percent consumed only one food group the day preceding the survey, while 26 percent consumed two food groups. Pulses, grains and other vegetables were the food groups most frequently mentioned by respondents. In Rafah, 88 percent (UNICEF) – 89 percent (CATI) of young children had consumed two or fewer food groups within the past 24 hours, breastmilk, eggs and grains were the main food groups consumed by young children. Only 3 percent had eaten more than two food groups in the last 24 hours. Infant and young child feeding practices Neonates face deteriorating nutritional status if mothers are unable to breastfeed due to stress, poor mental health and/ or inadequate breastfeeding privacy, and lack of counselling and support by healthcare providers.62 Further, the high pre- conflict prevalence of formula use among Gazans (58 percent among under six-month-old infants) raises concerns with regards to potential supply disruptions. Under poor WASH conditions, keeping formula water, teats, and bottles sterile is very challenging. These disruptions can result in increased incidence of diarrhoea and other infectious diseases, both of which further exacerbate malnutrition. The prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding is projected to average between 25 percent to 35 percent under a ceasefire scenario (lower than the pre-conflict baseline of 42 percent, reflecting ongoing disruptions including overcrowding and worsened mental health), falling to 20 percent to 30 percent under a status quo scenario and 5 percent to 15 percent under the escalation scenario. These disruptions have enduring consequences on infant and child health. Based on interviews that WFP conducted with eight key informants (four interviews were held on 11 January, and the remaining interviews were conducted on 22-23 January), widespread weight loss, diseases, and malnutrition prevail due to insufficient food supplies, intensifying the health crisis in the Gaza Strip.63 Health There are now only four hospitals and two clinics remaining in Gaza Governorate and two hospitals and two clinics in North Gaza. All of them operate at a very low level and information on the health status of children under five is close to absent. The survey conducted did not reach a minimum sample allowing exploitation of the information. In Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, according to the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis, more than 97 percent of children under five reported having had one or more diseases in the past two weeks. 56 percent of the children under five had experienced Acute Respiratory Infections within the past two weeks, 70.5 percent had experienced diarrhoea, and 82.3 percent had had a fever. This shows the extremely critical health conditions children face, exposing them to high-risk nutritional deterioration. Trends from WHO corroborate these findings, showing a 55 percent increase in diarrhoea cases in children under five between November-December 2023. While the three hospitals in the Governorate of Deir al-Balah were still operational in late November, nine of the 16 Primary Health Care Centres (PHCCs) were no longer functioning, seriously impeding access to health services. On average, 0.49 litres of drinking water
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF18 was available per person per day in the households surveyed, which is far from the minimum humanitarian standard (2L/ person/day).35 The scale of needs is staggering with 100 percent of the 49 households in need of food and hygiene items, 78 percent in need of water, 69 percent shelter, and 65 percent health assistance. In Rafah, the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis also shows extreme health conditions with almost 93 percent of children under five having one or more disease within the past two weeks, 79 percent had had a fever and 56 percent had experienced vomiting. The level of diarrhoea is extremely critical with 70 percent of children under five having had one episode in the past two weeks, and almost 60 percent having ARI (Acute Respiratory Infection).64 Since mid-October, 388,200 cases of acute respiratory infections have been recorded, along with 246,000 cases of diarrhea and 3,300 cases of bloody diarrhea, 84,000 cases of skin rashes, 12,000 cases of Acute Jaundice (including confirmed Hepatitis A).65 As per OCHA, 1.9 million IDPs face at high risk of communicable disease due overcrowding of IDP sites and lack of access to proper water sanitation and hygiene facilities.66 In Gaza, cases of Hepatitis A have been confirmed in January 2024 and WHO warned that inhumane living conditions will enable Hepatitis A to continue to spread.67 Health system functionality. In February 2024, attacks against healthcare facilities, infrastructure and services continued resulting in 58 percent of the hospitals are not functioning in the Gaza Strip, especially in the northern governorates (75 percent of the hospitals not functioning). According to the Health Cluster, as of 5 March 2024, only 2 hospitals and no Primary Health Care Centres were fully functioning; 14 hospitals and 20 Primary Health Care Centres were partially functioning; while 23 hospitals and 62 Primary Health Centres were not functioning. Only 141 medical points in shelters were available, while 264 informal, public and UNRWA shelters did not have a medical centre available.68 In the northern governorates, hospitals have been offering limited maternity, trauma, surgery and emergency care services. They also face challenges such as a shortage of medical staff, including specialized surgeons, neurosurgeons, and intensive care staff, as well as a lack of medical supplies, and have an urgent need for fuel, food, and drinking water.69 In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, according to OCHA, since January 2024, three hospitals – Al Aqsa, Nasser, and Gaza European – were at risk of closure due to the issuance of evacuation orders in adjacent areas and the ongoing conduct of hostilities nearby. In Rafah, 5 hospitals are still functioning. The influx of IDPs migrating to Rafah has overwhelmed the bed availability in hospitals, leading to insufficient capacity to meet the healthcare needs of the population. There is also high need for primary health services in informal shelters hosting IDPs. The continued besiegement around some hospitals is significantly affecting their case management capacity. Referring patients outside of Gaza remains a challenge, as the waiting list continues to grow.70 In addition, people are unable to effectively access healthcare due to the lack of laboratory equipment and reagents needed for accurate diagnosis and testing.71 The risk to public health is intensified due to an acute scarcity of hygiene materials and adequate sanitation infrastructure. Persistent anecdotal reports of Hepatitis A cases in Gaza, as recorded by UNRWA and the Health Cluster, highlight ongoing concerns. Limited access to proper WASH facilities is hindering prevention of diseases. The high number of surgeries and procedures has led to increased demand for anaesthetic and analgesic medications which are in short supply. Blood and blood products in hospitals are needed for emergencies and medical procedures to ensure that patients receive timely transfusions.72 Figure 1. Gaza disease surveillance Source: WHO, Health Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF19 UNRWA stocks of medicines continue to decrease, with around 15 days’ supply remaining overall and one week’s supply of insulin; some items may run out sooner based on needs at shelters. Therefore, there is an urgent need to restock medical supplies given the depletion of stocks in the local market. Stocks of fuel and medicines continue to be at risk of depletion halting UNRWA operations at the health centres. Essential medicines and other critical medical supplies remain difficult to bring into the Gaza Strip due to strict control of allegedly dual-use items at border crossings and wider challenges with importing controlled drugs. As basic and specialty healthcare services in Gaza continue to deteriorate, an increase in excess deaths due to traumatic injuries that would otherwise be survivable with timely and appropriate care is expected. In December 2023, UNICEF delivered 962,550 doses of essential vaccines, including for measles, pneumonia, and polio. Opening of stabilization centres for acute malnutrition cases with medical complications are also planned notably in Tal as Sultan (Rafah) and another in one of the field hospitals.73 Heightened insecurity and limited access to health facilities continue to present major challenges for partners to respond and partner operations continue to be negatively affected by the displacement of staff, social stresses and telecommunication challenges.74 Water, sanitation, and hygiene Prior to the escalation of hostilities, the majority of the water supply in the Gaza Strip came from groundwater sources and the rest (around 20 percent) from desalination plants and cross border pipelines. The over pumping of groundwater in Palestine led to severe water pollution and salinization, especially in the Gaza Strip. More than 97 percent of the water pumped from the coastal aquifer in the Gaza Strip did not meet the water quality standards set by WHO (PCBS and PWA, 2021).75 Figure 13. Health system functionality. Source: WHO, Health Cluster Damage to WASH facilitiesSewage facilityWater facilityTotal% of Sewage facilities % of Water facilities% of Sewage and Water facilities Destroyed 9 68 77 7% 14% 13% Severe damage 23 64 87 19% 14% 15% Moderate damage 36 131 167 30% 28% 28% Possible damage 16 51 67 13% 11% 11% No visible damage 38 156 194 31% 33% 33% Total 122 470 592Figure 14. WASH facilities damaged, February 2024. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF20 Nitrate levels already exceeded 150 mg/litre in most areas of the Gaza Strip, which made the water undrinkable, given the World Health Organization (WHO) acceptable limit of 50 mg/litre. In 2019, the daily allocation of water per capita for domestic purposes was 77 litres/ capita in the Gaza Strip.77 Taking the high percentage of water pollution in the Gaza Strip and calculating the quantity of water suitable for human use, the per capita share of fresh water was 22.4 litres per day.78 Damage to WASH facilities. Based on satellite damage assessments on WASH infrastructure dated 21 February,79 13 percent of all sewage and water facilities have been destroyed (7 percent and 14 percent respectively), while in total over 56 percent have been either destroyed or damaged (13 percent and 34 percent respectively). Another 11 percent are assessed to have possible damage. Overall, this assessment identifies 77 facilities destroyed and 254 facilities damaged, with another 67 facilities with possible damage. Northern Gaza and Gaza Governorates have the highest concentration of reported damaged or destroyed infrastructure. The functionality of, or access to, the 194 facilities (38 and 156 respectively) that were found with no visible damage is conditional to access to fuel and spare parts, which are in very limited supply, as well as availability of technicians and access to areas with these assets. The combined damaged and conditional access to the remaining WASH infrastructure is expected to have a profound impact on the availability of water, water quality and presence of unsafe water or contaminants for populations in these areas. Water availability and drinking water. Water availability continues to be a major concern across the Gaza Strip. In February 2024, the water produced from all the water sources in Gaza accounted for only 5.7 percent of the pre-escalation production levels.80 According to OCHA, only 17 percent of the 284 groundwater wells are operating with limited hours and 39 wells have been reported as destroyed and 93 as moderately to severely damaged.81 Still according to OCHA, only one of the three cross border water pipelines is operating, functioning at 47 percent of its capacity. Plans to repair the non-functioning pipelines face challenges in terms of access, communication, or repair coordination considering the current context. The United Arab Emirate’s small desalination plant located on the Egyptian side of Rafah, operates at full capacity, providing 2,400 cubic metres per day, following the construction of a 3-kilometre transmission line. In addition, only two out of the three main water desalination plants are partially functional, mainly in the southern governorates.82 Water quality appears low due to lack of processing facilities or other way of contamination. According to another study (sample size of 1,200 people)83 conducted in the Gaza Strip in February 2024, access to water for drinking, bathing and cleaning, is estimated at 1.5 litre per person per day compared to the 15 litres minimum amount of water required for survival as per as the international SPHERE standards. Similar results from the WASH cluster rapid assessment conducted in 41 sites indicate a median value of 2 litres per person per day.84 Water production and distribution is a fuel intensive process and the overall WASH fuel allocation is currently 30,000 litres per day. From 24 January through 4 March, the WASH sector in the Gaza Strip accounted for 30 percent to 60 percent Map 5. WASH facilities damaged, February 2024. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF21 of all fuel entering the Gaza Strip, with limitations on diesel fuel entry a major impediment to meeting minimum water requirements throughout the Gaza Strip, especially in the northern governorates.85 In the northern governorates, water supply remains limited and no access to clean water has been reported.86 According to OCHA, as of 12 January 2024, the combination of water trucking, water from the functional desalination plant, and the restoration of one of the three main water supply lines on 30 December 2023, has yielded only seven percent of water production in Gaza, compared with the pre-October 2023 supply.87 In Rafah Governorate, according to the WASH cluster rapid assessment, the majority of the sites rely mainly on water trucking and piped water in scattered sites, and collective centres rely more heavily on wells.88 More than half of the sites provide water that is unsafe for drinking (67 percent in collective centres) and only 12 percent can provide water treatment at source. According to the Euromed study, in Rafah Governorate out of the 15 litres minimum amount of water a day required as per sphere standard, only 8 litres are available on average across sites (3 litres in collective centres), with a median of 2 litres per person per day, indicating high level of disparities among sites. Hygiene. According to the WASH cluster, in Rafah, 61 percent of the sites in collective centres and 71 percent in scattered sites have no shower89 and the average number of showers per person is about 3,500 in collective centres and 1,050 in scattered sites. Access and protection of most vulnerable population is also of high concern, with only 12 percent of the showers being accessible for people living with disabilities and only 24 percent of the sites having separated showers for women (14 percent in collective centres). Figure 15. Quantity and type of water sources per site. Source: WASH cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF22 An NRC assessment90 conducted in nine shelters in Rafah also stated that every assessed location had reported cases of “hepatitis A, gastroenteritis, diarrhoea, smallpox, lice, [and] influenza.” Solid Waste Management. In terms of waste management, most of the wastewater treatment systems have been suspended and non-functioning since November 2023, due to damage, lack of fuel/power supply, and lack of maintenance.91 Regarding solid-waste management, which was already a crucial issue before the escalation, the last UNRWA update on 16 January states that solid waste management continues in Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates and partially in Deir al-Balah Governorate, where approximately 45 truck loadings were transferred to temporary sites.92 However, according to the WASH cluster,93 93 percent of the sites (89 percent in collective centres and 100 percent in scattered sites) have some type of visible waste, mainly solid waste or trash and 68 percent of all the sites present informal or uncontrolled dumping areas. The accumulation of tens of thousands of tons of solid waste on the streets, around hospitals, IDP shelters, and various random dump sites, represent high public health risks. The Gaza Municipality also estimates that approximately 50,000 tons of solid waste remain unmanaged.94Figure 16. Quantity and type of water sources per site. Source: WASH cluster Figure 17. Waste management. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF23 Sanitation. Sanitation situation continues to deteriorate and remains a major issue in all governorates. Despite significant efforts by UNICEF and its partners to construct family latrines, sanitation coverage remains very low and efforts to increase coverage are hindered by a lack of cement and other construction materials, including due to constraints on the entry of items considered to be dual use into the Gaza Strip.95 With wastewater treatment plants non-functioning and many sewage facilities destroyed, especially in Gaza city, flooding has been a major health hazard through the rainy period as floodwater mixes with untreated sewage in urban areas with dense displaced populations.96 This is further compounded by the enduring fuel shortage, which impedes the operation of remaining sewage stations and wastewater treatment plants. According to the WASH Cluster, there is also an increasing concern about the potential for additional flooding of already contaminated rainwater harvesting lagoons, particularly if rainfall intensifies. This situation poses a critical threat to both the environment and public health.97 In early 2023, UNICEF reported that “insufficient safely managed water supply to households, poor sanitation, limited public WASH services, and risk of flooding expose 1.36 million Palestinians to water-related diseases risks” .98 The situation is exacerbated by continuous restricted access to essential sanitation supplies and services in Gaza.99 The inability to transport sufficient fuel into the Gaza Strip, and especially to the northern governorates, also significantly compounds the challenges faced by the WASH response.100 A rapid assessment of displacement sites, including scattered sites and collective centres, in Rafah Governorate was conducted by the WASH cluster in February 2024.101 63 percent of assessed sites reportedly had access to a sewer connection (78 percent in collective centres and 36 percent in scattered sites). Few sites reported using buckets/plastic bags, flush to open drain, septic tank, or flush to elsewhere as a sanitation facility. The median number of persons per toilet across all sites was 341, though 994 in collective centres and 57 in scattered sites. 80 percent of the 41 sites had non-functional latrines (74 percent in collective centers and 93 percent in scattered sites). Only 15 percent of sites had handwashing facilities near latrines. 24 percent of assessed sites offered safe and private latrine access and 51 percent had separate facilities for men and women. Sanitation facilities in collective centres and informal sites are overcrowded also due to the high number of displaced populations. According to UNRWA, on average, there are 1,109 IDPs per toilet in shelters in Rafah Governorate, 619 IDPs per toilet in shelters in Deir al-Balah Governorate, and 1,349 IDPs per toilet in Khan Younis Governorate.102 UNRWA also reports that there are at least 486 people per toilet in UNRWA shelters in Rafah Governorate.103 Figure 18. Sanitation quantities. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF24 Figure 19. Sanitation facilities. Source: WASH Cluster Summary of Acute Malnutrition Drivers According to the Nutrition Vulnerability Study,104 conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster, over 90 percent of children aged 6-23 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women are eating two or fewer food groups each day, often those of the lowest nutritional value. At least 90 percent of children under five have had at least one infectious disease, with 70 percent having had diarrhoea in the previous two weeks. Against a minimum standard of 15 litres per person, 81 percent of households lack safe and clean water, with average daily household access to water reportedly less than one litre per person per day. This extreme lack of safe water access is especially concerning for the greater number of infants now reliant on infant formula than before the most recent escalation. Low clean water availability and access further exposes young children to infection and subsequently malnutrition. Figure 20: Acute malnutrition drivers. Source: Global Nutrition Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF25 Nutrition Outcomes There is very limited data on acute malnutrition available in Gaza since the start of the conflict on 7 October 2023. The only data that is available on acute malnutrition as of 9 Mar 2024 come from Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) screenings conducted in the three IPC AFI units of analysis, i.e. northern, middle and southern governorates. While some screenings included children 6-59 months, others almost exclusively measured only children between 6 and 23 months of age. Additionally, although some screenings contained individual MUAC and age data, others only had MUAC data at aggregate level. Of the screening data made available for the analysis, one set only included 45 children and therefore was not considered in the analysis. The remaining screening datasets were analysed as follows: Figure 21. Metadata, MUAC screening results. Source: Various - reanalysis conducted by the Global Smart Team For every screening that contained only aggregate MUAC data on children 6-59 months, first, unweighted prevalence estimates were calculated for the following age groups: (i) 6-59 months, (ii) 6-23 months, and (iii) 24-59 months. Secondly, weighted prevalence of MUAC among children between 6-59 months were calculated from the unweighted prevalence estimates of children 6-23 months and 24-59 months by applying weights of 0.33 and 0.66,105 respectively. Finally, the weighted prevalence estimates of 6-59 months were compared with the IPC Acute Malnutrition (IPC AMN) reference table and the IPC AMN Phases were determined. For each screening that only contained aggregate MUAC data on children 6-23 months, the MUAC prevalence of children between 23-59 months and weighted prevalence of MUAC among children 6-59 months were estimated using the following procedure. First, using data from screenings that contained MUAC data on children 6-59 months, the ratio between the MUAC prevalence of 6-23 months and 24-59 months was determined (this ranged from 3.07 to 9.68). Secondly, using sensitivity analysis, expected ranges of MUAC prevalence among children between 24-59 months were calculated using the lowest (3.07) and the highest (9.68) empirically observed ratios. Thirdly, a weighted analysis was performed, and a range of weighted prevalence estimates of children 6-59 months were obtained. Finally, the weighted prevalence estimates of 6-59 months were compared with the IPC Acute Malnutrition (IPC AMN) reference table and the possible IPC AMN Phases were determined.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF26 In conclusion: • In North Gaza Governorate , MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 2 - 3 (Alert - Critical) in January, having rapidly deteriorated to an indicative IPC AMN Phase of 4 - 5 (Critical - Extremely Critical) in February 2024. • In Khan Younis Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 3 - 4 (Serious - Critical) in February 2024. • In Deir al-Balah Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 1 - 2 (Acceptable - Alert) in February – early March 2024. • In Rafah Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 1 - 2 (Acceptable - Alert) in late January – early March. Figure 22. MUAC screening results. Source: Various - reanalysis conducted by the Global Smart Team
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF27 Mortality The analysis could not benefit from representative evidence of non-trauma mortality as intended by IPC Protocols (Crude Death Rate and Under Five Death Rate). The data available consisted in death counts issued by the Gaza Ministry of Health and reported by the Health Cluster, and interview data collected during CATI surveys conducted by WFP . Furthermore, a study on mortality and public health106 was conducted to inform humanitarian and other decision-makers working on the Gaza crisis by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Center for Humanitarian Health at Johns Hopkins University (LSHTM). The mortality data collected by the Ministry of Health are not disaggregated by area and appears to only be those attributable to conflict related violence. The WFP CATI survey data results can be disaggregated by area but not by cause of death. Therefore, no direct measurements of CDR or U5DR after trauma exclusion are currently available. Nonetheless, it worths noticing that the modelled projections published by LSHTM, while considered useful for indicating the expected direction of travel and scale of the expected excess mortality, the IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) found some of the assumptions factored in the study published in early February might have evolved in different directions, especially regarding food intake estimates and acute malnutrition. The absence of usable mortality data in both governorates leaves a high degree of uncertainty on the translation of these acute malnutrition rate into children and adult mortality in the current period in North Gaza. It is likely that these extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet translated into 2/10,000/day Crude Death Rate. The likelihood of having surpassed U5DR thresholds (4/10,000/day for children) is higher but impossible to ascertain.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF28 PROJECTED SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (16 March - 15 July 2024 ) Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.GovernorateTotal population analysedPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 3+Area Phase#people % #people % #people % #people % #people % #people % Deir al-Balah & Khan Younis governorates600,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 300,000 50 300,000 50 600,000 100 4 North Gaza & Gaza governorates300,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 90,000 30 210,000 70 300,000 100 5 Rafah governorate1,326,544 0 0 0 0265,309 20 464,290 35 596,945 45 1,326,544 100 4 Grand Total 2,226,544 0 0 0 0 265,309 12 854,290 38 1,106,945 50 2,226,544 100 Population table for the projected situation: 16 March - 15 July 2024
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF29 PROJECTED SITUATION OVERVIEW (16 March - 15 July 2024 ) In the most likely scenario, the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine), with reasonable evidence. Famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months. The Governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and the Governorate of Rafah, are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). During the projection period (16 March - 15 July), in the most likely scenario and under the assumption of an escalation of the conflict including a ground offensive in Rafah, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1,107,000 people) is expected to face IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), the most severe level in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. The rest of the population is likely to be either in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (854,000 people, 38 percent of the population) or in Crisis (265,000 people, 12 percent of the population). During this period, the whole population of the Gaza Strip (2,230,000 people) will face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). North Gaza and Gaza Governorates In the most likely scenario, the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine), with reasonable evidence. Famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months. In terms of magnitude, 70 percent of the population is likely to be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and 30 percent in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Continued conflict and the near-complete lack of access to the northern governorates for humanitarian organizations and commercial trucks will likely compound heightened vulnerabilities and extremely limited food availability, access, and utilization, as well as access to healthcare, water, and sanitation services. People’s ability to exit the northern governorates and move to locations with relatively greater food availability and access is likely to be very limited. Within the north, displacements are likely to remain frequent and localized; yet conditions in the shelters will continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs. As food stocks or sources (wild foods, livestock, or other types of food – from domestic stocks, shelters or agricultural assets) will continue to reduce, food availability is expected to be limited. With the very few humanitarian and commercial trucks entering these governorates, it is unlikely that households will be able to restock or stabilize their food consumption patterns. Due to scarce food availability, the vast majority of markets are either not functioning or availing very few Assumptions for the most likely scenario in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates Conflict: In the most likely scenario, the pop - ulation will likely remain fully exposed and highly susceptible to conflict. Conflict and related casualties will likely continue at simi - lar levels to January-February 2024, including the wider besiegement, neighbourhood-lev - el clearing operations, occasional armed actor clashes, and a comparable rate of bombardment (air, land, sea). Basic services infrastructure will likely remain extremely de - graded, and the proportion of all buildings damaged or destroyed will likely continue to steadily approach 100%. Humanitarian access to provide food, water, medicines, and provision of health and WASH services: The northern governorates are likely to be mostly inaccessible and intermittently hard-to-reach, given continued ground operations, bombardment (air, land, sea), civil unrest, bureaucratic impediments, and physical obstruction. The humanitarian space in the northern governorates will continue to be extremely restricted, thereby hampering the provision of the necessary supplies and services to the most vulnerable population. It will also hamper the capacity of humanitarian actors to monitor closely the situation on the ground and to intervene promptly to provide relief. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely continue to worsen, including due to intense and widespread conflict, largely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will increasingly inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance within the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely remain frequent and localized and conditions in shelters will continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs. food commodities at excessively high prices. As a result, communities’ coping capacity and social cohesion will be further strained. Social tensions are also likely to increase putting the most vulnerable at higher risk of exposure to violence and lower access to food. Physical access to markets is also of concern, due to restrictions of civilian mobility and conflict intensity. Utilization of food resources will also be heavily impacted as seasonal higher temperatures reduce food storage options in a context of no or extremely limited access to electricity, fuel and/or gas to preserve, process or cook food. The lack of access to sufficient and safe water, sanitation facilities and health services is likely to increase the risk of cholera and the spread of infectious diseases impacting people’s nutrition and health status and increasing mortality from non- trauma related causes. The restoration of public services will be a major challenge given that the majority of WASH facilities and infrastructure are damaged or destroyed.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF30 FRC analysis of acute malnutrition trends A detailed analysis of the drivers (risk factors) for acute malnutrition and the available data on nutritional status was provided by the Global Nutrition Cluster report on Nutrition Vulnerability in February 2024.7 Based on this report and their own analysis the IPC Analysis Team concluded that the key driver of acute malnutrition in the North Gaza governorate was the highly inadequate dietary diversity in Children 6–23m, with 79% consuming ≤2 food groups, 8 and also in Pregnant and Breastfeeding Women, with 95% consuming ≤2 food groups. The main food groups mentioned were non-vitamin A rich vegetables (24 affirmations), grains (20) and eggs (17). This situation highlights critically insufficient diet diversity and micronutrient intake before and during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which can affect both the women and the development of their infants. Infant and Young Chil - dren Feeding practices are highly constrained by the lack of resources and health seeking behavior is also highly constrained. Interviews conducted by the FRC with key informants and a review of available reports confirmed that the situation in the northern governates during the current analysis period was similar to that reported by the Analysis Team. The health and WASH situations are also considered separately belo w. Figure 23: Trends in GAM by MUAC Prevalence in North Gaza (children aged 6-59 mo.) Within the IPC unit of analysis, MUAC screening data9 was available from the North Governorate but not from Gaza City. The available data was collected as part of a vaccination programme and measurements were only taken from children aged 6-23 months. The FRC explored different methods for using this data to estimate the prevalence of GAM by MUAC in children aged 6-59 months. This was a necessary step to allow the classification of malnutrition according to IPC Phases. To provide a starting point for the trend analysis the prevalence of GAM by MUAC in North Gaza in 2023, before October 7th, was estimated at 1%. This is consistent with previous studies.11 Age-adjustment of the MUAC screening data resulted in a GAM by MUAC prevalence in January 2024 of 6.8% to 9.1%. By February this had risen to give a range of 12.4% to 16.5%, indicating a very steep increase in the incidence of acute malnutrition in children 6-59 mo. To estimate what the prevalence would be at the time of the current analysis in March 2024, two nowcasting scenarios were examined. Given the extremely poor situation regarding the drivers of malnutrition, the best-case scenario was that there had been a continued linear increase in prevalence, while the more likely scenario was that the rate of increase would have followed the observed trend and have increased further in the time since the February screening. These two scenarios were then applied to the high and low estimates for age-adjusted GAM by MUAC prevalence, resulting in the four dotted lines shown in Figure 2. This analysis indicates that in all scenarios the GAM by MUAC prevalence had passed the IPC Phase 4/5 threshold (Critical/Extremely Critical) in the current analysis period. Given the current trajectory in MUAC prevalence data it is clear that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition prevalence, measured using weight-for-height Z-scores, may have already been crossed or will be crossed imminently. These data were collected exclusively in North Gaza governorate.Healthcare availability and access will likely continue to decline, including due to lack of humanitarian access and inadequate delivery of critical supplies, as well as a decline in the functionality of the few remaining health centres. The risk of infectious diseases will likely continue to increase due to the extreme deterioration of the overall health environment. In line with the Famine Review Committee findings, people’s livelihoods and food consumption are likely to continue deteriorating, resulting in more than two thirds of the population (70 percent) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Acute Malnutrition will increase at a high pace as already observed in the past few weeks (current period) and mortality levels will likely breach the Famine thresholds (extremely critical) - by the end of May 2024.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF31 Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates These Governorates are projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), though with half of the population (300,000 people) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), up from 30 percent in the current period; and the other half (300,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). While this unit of analysis includes both Governorates, the conditions for the population in Khan Younis Governorate are expected to be worse than those in Deir al-Balah. The onset of a major ground operation in Rafah Governorate will likely be a major driver of deterioration in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, including through an influx of displaced populations – many already displaced multiple times – into parts of these Governorates and the impact of the ground operation on humanitarian access. Ground operations are likely to continue throughout Khan Younis Governorate and in eastern Deir al-Balah Governorate. Displacement will likely escalate with large populations moving into the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis Governorate and into Deir al- Balah Governorate, especially in and around Deir al-Balah city and camp. Further displacement will likely stress already highly limited resources and basic services, exacerbating existing conditions. Shelter conditions are likely to deteriorate with continued deprivation of basic needs. Food availability and access are expected to further decline as the major ground operation in Rafah Governorate reduces humanitarian and commercial traffic into and throughout the Gaza Strip. This will be exacerbated by continued civil unrest outside the Kerem Shalom crossing, which will likely further reduce humanitarian and commercial truck entry. Fewer humanitarian convoys to these governorates are expected, including those unsuccessfully attempting to reach the northern governorates and offloading assistance in Deir al-Balah instead. The already limited agricultural production, mostly of vegetables, observed in the current period will likely continue to decline as ground operations are pursued within and near production areas of both governorates, especially in all areas of Khan Younis Governorate; and the harvest period for several vegetables comes to an end. Market functionality is likely to continue falling as agricultural production and humanitarian and commercial truck arrivals decline. Civilian mobility is likely to be severely constrained, further reducing access to food, including through coping strategies like gathering wild foods or scavenging. The end of the typical rainy period may also limit wild food availability. Compared to other governorates, Deir al-Balah Governorate had higher food availability in the current period, including due to higher deliveries of humanitarian food assistance (proportional to estimated Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Deir al Balah and Khan Younis Governorates Conflict: Conflict and related casualties will likely continue at similar levels to February 2024, including ground operations in mul - tiple but not all urban areas of Deir al-Balah and throughout Khan Younis governorate, frequent armed actor clashes especially in Khan Younis governorate, and a compa - rable rate of bombardment (air, land, sea). The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip will likely continue. Humanitarian access: Humanitarian access to Khan Younis and Deir al Balah governorate - including for the delivery of life-saving multi-sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations - is likely to be intermittently reduced, especially relative to the higher proportional delivery of assistance made to Deir al- Balah Governorate compared to other governorates in early 2024. This decrease in access is likely due to the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis governorate, bombardment (air, land, sea) in these governorates and within Deir al-Balah Governorate, and worsening civil unrest. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely escalate, driven by intense and widespread conflict as well as largely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will likely increasingly inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance throughout the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely escalate, with large populations moving into the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis governorate and into Deir al Balah governorate, especially the area of Deir al Balah city/camp. Shelter conditions will likely continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and increased sheltering in open spaces. population) in parts of January and February 2024. These deliveries appear to have partially resulted from the offloading of humanitarian food assistance that could not be delivered to the northern governorates. Any accumulated stocks in markets and households will provide at least a short-term buffer to some of the people in the early part of the projection period. Khan Younis Governorate received lower levels of humanitarian food assistance during that period, resulting in households likely to face larger food consumption gaps from the beginning of the projection period. With no major improvements in the availability of electricity, fuel, cooking gas, and safe water, food utilization will likely be a major limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates. This includes challenges to the safe storage and preparation
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF32 Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Rafah Governorate Conflict: Conflict will likely escalate, in - cluding the continuation of the wider besiegement, the onset of a new, major ground operation throughout Rafah gov - ernorate and concentrated on Rafah city, with armed actor clashes, and an increase in bombardment (air, land, sea). Humanitarian access: Humanitarian access to Rafah Governorate, including for the delivery of life-saving multi- sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, will likely be intermittently reduced, though without total access loss to the Rafah Governorate portion of the Al-Mawasi area, where an extreme concentration of displaced people is likely. Loss of access will be particularly high to populations remaining within Rafah city during the major ground operation likely to occur there. This disruption will likely result from the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), and civil unrest. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely continue, including due to intense and widespread conflict and severely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will continue to inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance within the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely increase substantially, with most of the current population of Rafah city forced into the Al-Mawasi area of Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates and into Deir al-Balah Governorate, especially the area of Deir al- Balah city/camp. Conditions in shelters will likely continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and increased sheltering in open spaces.of food, lack of safe access to water, and an increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. Full resumption of cross border water pipeline activity is unlikely, and the functionality of remaining wells and water distribution systems will likely decline. Wastewater treatment plants are likely to remain non-functioning. Solid waste management will continue to be limited. Healthcare availability and access will likely continue to decline, including due to lack of humanitarian access and inadequate delivery of critical supplies as well as a decline in the functionality of remaining health centres. Infectious disease risk will continue to increase due to the extreme deterioration of the overall health environment. Low and declining food availability, access, and utilization will likely lead to extreme gaps in food consumption and a collapse of coping capacities for the estimated 300,000 people (50 percent of the population) experiencing IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe); while large food consumptions gaps are expected for the 300,00 people (50 percent of the population) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). With the drivers of acute malnutrition expected to worsen (infectious diseases expected to increase, dietary diversity still severely restricted), the nutritional status of the people of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis will likely continue to deteriorate towards critical levels of acute malnutrition (IPC AMN Phase 4) during this period. Rafah Governorate The onset of a major ground operation in Rafah Governorate will likely drive a significant increase in acute food insecurity alongside other severe humanitarian consequences. The situation is projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), though with nearly half (45 percent) of the population (around 600,000 people) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), up from 25 percent in the current period. The whole population of Rafah will likely be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, including over one third (about 464,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 12 percent (about 265,000 people) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Relative improvement in access into and within Rafah have been observed compared to the previous analysis, with the opening of a second border crossing in Kerem Shalom allowing more humanitarian and commercial supply for aid and markets, However, for the projection period, considering the most likely scenario of a major ground operation in Rafah, the humanitarian access and space are likely to reduce due to the escalating hostilities and populations will face continued and repeated displacement in search of “safer” areas. As many IDPs already face poor food security, nutrition, health and WASH outcomes, further displacement will likely cause further deterioration. Existing mitigation measures from humanitarian services or programmes are likely to be disrupted by conflict or sizeable displacements and may cause further family separation or marginalization of the most vulnerable. Local production will be minimal and difficult to access and agricultural activities (crop production, livestock herding or fishing) will either not be pursued or remain very limited due to lack of agricultural inputs, access to assets or land and geographical concentration of displaced populations. Further disruptions to market supplies and prices are likely to continue and decrease access to food through markets. Markets or traders may be displaced along with the population, impacting their ability to restock or remain functional, especially as populations move further away from border crossings and fewer trucks enter the Gaza
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF33 Strip. Market-based interventions will continue to be challenged by high levels of displacement, including of the staff of financial service providers, and a wider loss of enabling condition, including an adequate electricity supply and functional telecommunications services, physical cash availability and access, and functioning markets able to absorb any rapid increases in demand. Physical access to humanitarian assistance and markets will be hindered. There will likely be a disruption in social support systems (e.g. community kitchens) and increased tensions within the community. Rising temperatures and declining access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene will likely lead to challenges in safe food storage and preparation, and a rise in waterborne diseases or food borne illnesses. Scarcity of firewood will force people to resort to using unsafe materials, increasing health risks. Explosive remnants will raise concerns about personal, food and water safety. Health outcomes and morbidity are expected to deteriorate in this period and even more so with increased overcrowding, further displacement and/or lower access to health services. A major decrease in food availability, access, and utilization will likely cause extreme gaps in food consumption and the exhaustion of people’s coping strategies. Acute malnutrition is likely to increase towards IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) as food insecurity, the health environment, and infant and young childcare and feeding practices deteriorate due to conflict escalation, displacement, and reduced delivery of, and access to multi-sector humanitarian assistance.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF34 COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS In comparison to the previous analysis (projection period December 2023 – 7 February 2024), the total share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) across the Gaza Strip continues to increase, from 26 percent to 30 percent in the current period (mid-February to mid-March 2024) and 50% in the projection period (mid-March to mid-July). In the northern governorates, the share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) increased from 30 percent to 55 percent in the current period and 70% in the projected period, representing an increase of about 100,000 people and 530,000 people, respectively. Figure 24. Population phase classifications in the Gaza StripFigure 25. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in the Gaza Strip Figure 27. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Northern Governorates Figure 29. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Southern GovernoratesFigure 26. Population phase classifications in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates Figure 28. Population phase classifications in Southern Governorates
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF35 From the first WFP survey of November-December 2023 to its second survey of December 2023-February 2024, the proportion of households reporting a Poor FCS increased 14 percentage points to 66 percent in the northern governorates, nine points to 27 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and remained steady at 22 percent in Rafah Governorate. Over the same two surveys, the proportion of households reporting Severe and Very Severe HHS results increased by 44 percentage points to 84 percent in the northern governorates, 35 percentage points to 57 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and 37 percentage points to 56 percent in Rafah Governorate. 107 Figure 30. FCS in the Gaza Strip Figure 31. HHS trends in the Gaza Strip
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF36 RISK OF FAMINE ANALYSIS As per the IPC tools and technical guidance, an IPC statement on the risk of Famine differs from a Famine classification. While a projected Famine classification is based on the most likely scenario, the risk of Famine refers to the worst case scenario that has a reasonable and realistic chance of happening. The risk of Famine is only a statement and not a classification and was designed to complement the standard IPC projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of a potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated. The elements considered when developing the worst case scenario are described below. Factor/element Risk of Famine Scenario - Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis GovernoratesRisk of Famine Scenario – Rafah Governorate Primary Drivers ConflictConflict would escalate to levels seen in December 2023-January 2024 when a major ground operation was conducted in Bureij and Maghazi camps of Deir al-Balah Governorate. This would include expanding and intensified ground operations across all central camps alongside neighbourhood-level clearing operations throughout Khan Younis Governorate, frequent armed actor clashes, and increased bombardment (air, land, sea).. Expanded ground operations within Deir al-Balah Governorate would not necessarily be concurrent with a major ground operation on Rafah. The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip would intensify.Conflict would rapidly escalate, including the onset of a new, wide-ranging, and large- scale ground operation throughout Rafah Governorate and concentrated on Rafah city, intense and frequent armed actor clashes, and a large increase in bombardment (air, land, sea). The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip would intensify. Humanitarian AccessHumanitarian access, including for the delivery of life-saving multi-sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, to Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorate would severely reduce, including due to the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, the later resumption of major ground operations in Deir al-Balah Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), the closure of the Rafah border crossing and reduction in crossings at Kerem Shalom, and public order collapse.Humanitarian access to Rafah Governorate, including for the delivery of life-saving multi- sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, would severely reduce. Access to populations remaining within Rafah city during the major ground operation would be completely lost, while access to the extreme concentration of displaced people in the Rafah portion of the Al-Mawasi area would be intermittent. This disruption would result from the onset of major, rapid ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), the closure of the Rafah border crossing and reduction in crossings at Kerem Shalom, and public order collapse.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF37 Factor/element Risk of Famine Scenario - Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis GovernoratesRisk of Famine Scenario – Rafah Governorate Secondary Drivers Civil unrestAlready strained, public order would collapse, involving widespread and intense civil unrest, including looting, riots, vigilantism, escalating violence among various social groups, and a wider breakdown of social cohesion. This collapse would heavily constrain humanitarian operations through reducing access and inhibiting the ability to conduct critical activities like distributions, especially to the most vulnerable population groups. The United Nations presence within the Gaza Strip, including offices and storage facilities, would be particularly impacted, including by violence and looting. The loss of social cohesion would involve the loss of most remaining socially- based coping, such as receiving food or cash through social networks outside of immediate family.Already strained, public order would collapse, involving widespread and intense civil unrest, including looting, riots, vigilantism, escalating violence among various social groups, and a wider breakdown of social cohesion. This collapse would heavily constrain humanitarian operations through reducing access and inhibiting the ability to conduct critical activities like distributions, especially to the most vulnerable population groups. The United Nations presence within the Gaza Strip, including offices and storage facilities, would be particularly impacted, including by violence and looting. The loss of social cohesion would involve the loss of most remaining socially- based coping, such as receiving food or cash through social networks outside of immediate family. DisplacementRapid mass displacement would occur, mostly to the Al-Mawasi area across Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates, with an extreme concentration of IDPs there. Outflow to Deir al-Balah Governorate would be limited. No mass exit of civilians from the Gaza Strip is considered. Rapid mass displacement would occur, mostly to the Al-Mawasi area across Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates, with an extreme concentration of IDPs there. A small civilian population in Rafah city would be isolated and inaccessible. Outflow to Deir al-Balah Governorate would be limited. No mass exit of civilians from the Gaza Strip is considered. Shelter conditionsShelter conditions would deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and a large increase in sheltering in open spaces. Shelter conditions would collapse, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and widespread sheltering in open spaces.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF38 Impact on Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition elements Food availability (from assistance, private sector and production)Food Availability would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates, including due to intensified besiegement, severe humanitarian access constraints, conflict escalation, severely reduced market functionality, and extreme population concentration. Food Availability would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate, including due to intensified besiegement, severe humanitarian access constraints, conflict escalation, severely reduced market functionality, and extreme population concentration in the Al-Mawasi area. Food access (physical, social, prices)Food Access would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates due to declining food availability, freedom of movement, and reduced humanitarian and commercial traffic. Food Access would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate due to large declines in food availability, freedom of movement, and humanitarian and commercial traffic, including for populations remaining within Rafah city during conflict escalation and those in extremely crowded conditions within the Al-Mawasi area. UtilizationUtilization would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates. This includes challenges to the safe storage and preparation of food, lack of access to water, and a rapidly increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. Utilization would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate. This includes severe challenges to the safe storage and preparation of food, extreme lack of access to water, and a rapidly increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. HealthThe provision of healthcare would largely end, driven by extremely inadequate delivery of critical supplies and a final collapse in the functionality of the remaining health centres. The provision of healthcare would largely end, driven by extremely inadequate delivery of critical supplies and a final collapse in the functionality of the remaining health centres. WASHAccess to water – safe or unsafe – would be extremely limited, with no cross-border water distribution, a limited number of functional wells, and limited water trucking. Wastewater treatment facilities would remain non-functioning. Access to water – safe or unsafe – would be extremely limited, with no cross-border water distribution, a limited number of functional wells, and limited water trucking. Wastewater treatment facilities would remain non- functioning.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF39 Conclusions on the Risk of Famine Following the Famine Review Committee Recommendations, the risk of Famine conclusions for the two unit of analysis has been merged. Given the continued catastrophic food security situation across the entire Gaza Strip, a risk of Famine analysis was done for Deir al Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah Governorates. This analysis considered whether Famine will occur under a reasonable worst-case scenario during the projection period through 15 July 2024. An analysis for the northern governorates was not performed as the FRC is projecting Famine in those areas under the most likely scenario. The FRC considered the assumptions for the worst-case scenario made by the Analysis Team regarding the evolution of the conflict and the expected impacts on food security and acute malnutrition to be plausible for all three governorates. The intensity of the conflict and the extent of humanitarian space will determine the magnitude and directions of population movement within the Gaza Strip. It is currently impossible to ascertain the destination(s) of these human-made displacements, however any further concentration of population in any already highly populated area, for instance as a consequence of an escalation in the Rafah Governorate driving hundreds of thousands towards Al-Mawasi and the surrounding areas, will significantly increase the risk of Famine. The FRC considered the risk of Famine statement made by the Analysis Team about Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates to be plausible. Given the high degree of uncertainty and fluidity of the situation with displacements likely forcing people to move to and from multiple localities, the FRC felt it was appropriate to group together all three of the southern governates for a risk of Famine analysis rather than to separate the governates as different units of analysis. Forced displacement will increase the risk of Famine because of overcrowding, poor supply of food, water, and medicines, and limited provision of health and wash services, which will expose the displaced population to epidemic outbreaks. The FRC reached technical consensus that, under a reasonable worst-case scenario, there is a risk of Famine across the entire middle and southern areas of the Gaza Strip during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July 2024. The cessation of hostilities together with the restoration of humanitarian space to deliver multi-sectoral assistance and restore services are essential steps in mitigating the risk of Famine.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF40 CONCLUSIONS OF THE FAMINE REVIEW COMMITTEE (FRC) This report is the second time that the Famine Review Committee has reviewed analysis conducted by a multi-agency, multi-sectoral Analysis Team to determine the current and projected food security situation in the Gaza Strip. The first analysis, conducted in December 2023, determined that there was a risk of Famine within the projection period of December 2023 to May 2024, and that the risk would increase for each day that the intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened. The findings of the FRC’s latest review confirm that Famine is now projected and imminent in the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates and is expected to become manifest between mid-March 2024 and May 2024. The Famine threshold for acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and the steeply increasing trend in malnutrition data indicates that it is highly likely that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. The FRC expects the upward trend in non-trauma mortality to accelerate and for all Famine thresholds to be passed imminently. It is vital to note that the projected Famine can be prevented or alleviated. All evidence points towards a major acceleration of deaths and malnutrition. Waiting for a retrospective Famine classification before acting is indefensible. The FRC concludes that Famine is imminent unless there is an immediate cessation of hostilities and full access is granted to provide food, water, medicines, and protection of civilians as well as to restore and provide health, water, and sanitation services, and energy (electricity, diesel, and other fuel) to the population in the northern governorates. In the current period (leading up to mid-March), the FRC finds the conclusions of the IPC Analysis Team for the northern governorates to be plausible (IPC Phase 4 Emergency). However, the FRC highlighted that: (i) Famine thresholds for acute food insecurity have already been surpassed; (ii) Famine thresholds for acute malnutrition (Extremely Critical) have likely already been surpassed; (iii) It is likely that these extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet translated into a Crude Death Rate above 2/10,000/day. The likelihood of having surpassed Under-Five Death Rate thresholds (4/10,000/day for children) is higher but impossible to ascertain. For the Governorates of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah , the FRC considers the findings of the Analysis Team for the current period (IPC Phase 4 – Emergency) to be plausible. The projection period identified by the Analysis Team is mid-March 2024 to mid-July 2024. The FRC considers the most likely scenarios and conclusions of the Analysis Team for the projected period (IPC Phase 4 – Emergency) to be plausible. However, given the high uncertainty over how the situation will evolve and a high degree of fluidity given the intensity of the conflict, forced displacements, and constricted humanitarian access in the next 4 months, the FRC recommends grouping all southern governates together for a risk of Famine analysis . Thus, for the combined southern and middle governates, the FRC concludes that there is a risk of Famine during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July in a worst-case scenario with a reasonable chance of occurring. The primary drivers of the food security, nutrition, and mortality situation in Gaza Strip are the conflict intensity and highly constrained/restricted access, defined as the ability of humanitarian and private actors to deliver the necessary supplies and services to the most vulnerable population. Only an immediate and sustainable cessation of hostility, accompanied by a sustained supply of food, water, medicines, protection services, and provision of health and sanitation services to the population can reduce acute malnutrition and excess mortality. Provision of electricity/fuel supplies for water trucking, pumps, health services, restoration of agricultural production, and other essential needs are also critical, along with support for unrestricted civilian communications within and outside of the Gaza Strip. The actions needed to prevent Famine require an immediate political decision for a ceasefire together with a significant and immediate increase in humanitarian and commercial access to the entire population of Gaza. If this does not happen fully and immediately, even if Famine is avoided in the near term, the impact on mortality and the lives of Palestinians now, and in future generations, will increase markedly with every day.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF41 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION Famine can be halted. The rapidly escalating hunger crisis in the Gaza Strip must immediately be curbed. This requires putting an end to the hostilities, mobilizing necessary resources and ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza. Response Priorities Overall recommendations • Restore humanitarian access to the entire Gaza Strip. • Stop the fast-paced deterioration of the food security, health and nutrition situation leading to excess mortality through: (i) the restoration of health, nutrition, and WASH services and the protection of civilians; and (ii) the provision of safe, nutritious, and sufficient food to all the population in need. • The sustained supply of sufficient aid commodities, including but not limited to food, medicines, specialist nutrition products, fuel, and other necessities should be allowed to enter and move throughout the entire Gaza Strip by road. Traffic of commercial goods should also be fully resumed to meet the volume of commodities required. Programmatic recommendations • Deliver acute malnutrition treatment services, specifically CMAM and IYCF-E services throughout the Gaza Strip, with a particular emphasis on opening stabilization centres in the north. • Supply ready-to-use formula for non-breastfed infants and ensure sufficient access to safe drinking water if preparation is required. • Provide complimentary foods and micronutrient supplements for young children, as well as pregnant and lactating women, the chronically ill, and the elderly. • Restore the functioning of market infrastructures and bakeries combined with cash-based interventions where feasible. • Rehabilitate food production systems as soon as possible, including horticulture, livestock, and fishing. Situation Monitoring and Update Considering the volatility of the context and the changing environment, the following risk factor elements should be monitored continuously: • Intensity and extension of hostilities • Humanitarian access to supply food, water medicines, non-food items • Functionality and access to the health system and WASH supplies and services • Entry of commodities though the Gaza Strip whether through commercial trucks or food assistance by truck or airdrops • Population displacements and conditions in collective centres and scattered sites • Morbidity and disease outbreaks • Acute malnutrition and mortality, with a distinction of the trauma and non-trauma causes
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF42 PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY Similar to the previous analysis conducted in December 2023, the IPC Global Partnership completed an IPC analysis for the Gaza Strip to inform critical humanitarian information needs. Country led IPC analyses are the cornerstone of the IPC process and will continue to be so. In the case of the Gaza Strip, with the onset of the conflict and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe, there was a critical need for an IPC analysis. Without an active country Technical Working Group, the IPC Global Partnership made use of its non-TWG led analysis process to inform decision-making around the crisis in the Gaza Strip. The analysis was conducted remotely from 26 February to 1 March by over 40 experts from 18 agencies, applying standard IPC protocols, and made use of publicly available data from a wide range of courses on the conditions in the Gaza Strip (see below). Based on IPC protocols, the level of evidence of this analysis was assessed as “Medium” (level 2) for each of the three units of analysis. At the analysis completion, the Famine Review Committee was activated to review the Analysis Team’s findings. Their conclusions were adopted by the Analysis Team. Sources The main sources of data used to conduct this analysis include: • FAO, A rapid geospatial damage assessment of the 2023 conflict in the Gaza Strip on agricultural land and infrastructure , February 2024. • Food Security Sector, Sitrep #7 - 13 , 1 December 2023 to March 2024, FSS Gaza Updates. • Gaza Cash Working Group, Emergency MPCA – Gaza 2023, Joint PDM results overview , 15 February 2024. • Global Nutrition Cluster, Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis / Gaza , February 2024. • Health Cluster, Dashboard . • iDMC, Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip , February 2014. • London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024 • OCHA, Damage to Gaza’s agricultural sector , 30 September 2014. • OCHA, Flash Updates #70 - 136 , 15 December 2023 – 11 March 2024. • OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshots - Gaza Strip , March 2024. • OCHA, Population Estimates , February 2024. • Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey , 2022 - Annual Report , 2022. • Shelter Cluster Palestine, Shelter in Crisis: Joint Advocacy Statement , 24 November 2023. • UNICEF, Post-distribution Monitoring Repor t, 29-31 January 2024. • UNITAR and UNOSAT, I mpact of the 2014 Conflict in the Gaza Strip , September 2014. • UNOSAT, Agricultural damage assessments , 17 November 2023, 13 December 2023, 31 January 2024. • UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch tracking , March 2024. • Van den Hoek, J. and Scher, C., Gaza Strip Damage Maps, 2023-2024, Decentralized Damage Mapping Group. • WASH Cluster, Rapid WASH Assessment Preliminary Findings, 21 February 2024. • WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #4-7 , December 2023 – March 2024. • WFP , mVAM Survey , 19 February 2024. • World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy , December 2023.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF43 What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity? The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on interna - tional standards. The IPC consists of four mu - tually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consen - sus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and compa - rability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and pro - gramming. For the IPC, acute food insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity. Contact for further Information IPC Global Support Unit www.ipcinfo.org IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in the Gaza Strip. Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Contre la Faim, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC, FAO, FEWS NET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP , UNICEF, WFP , WHO and the World Bank. Phase 1 None/Minimal Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.Phase 2 Stressed Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress- coping strategies.Phase 3 Crisis Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.Phase 4 Emergency Households either: • have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidationPhase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine Households experience an extreme lack of food and/or cannot meet other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For Famine Classi cation, area needs to have extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.Acute Food Insecurity Phase name and descriptionLimitations of the Analysis Given the major access constraints, data on food security outcomes was collected using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). Quality concerns regarding the use of this methodology including the representativeness, and potential biases associated with mobile network coverage and ownership were discussed at length during the previous round of IPC analysis (for data collected in November 2023). The Analysis Team concluded that the data meets the requirements set by the IPC and were the same for this analysis, especially considering the number of observations. Through the efforts of partners, gaps in nutrition information were filled through screening information. The high degree of volatility around the conflict limits the ability to consider longer analysis periods. Scenarios on the evolution of the conflict were developed in conjunction with conflict experts to the best of their knowledge and expertise.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF44 ENDNOTES 1 PCBS Labour Force Survey, 2022 - Annual Report , 2022, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2658.pdf 2 World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy , December 2023, https://thedocs. worldbank.org/en/doc/7600aee6c75eff4cf9b71ea1fe4016db-0280012023/original/NoteWBG-dec11-CLEAN.pdf 3 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Occupied Palestinian Territories , January 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ humanitarian-needs-overview-2023 4 OCHA and REACH, Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 2022 conducted in the occupied Palestinian territory , July 2022, https://www.ochaopt.org/msna/2022/MSNA-Cross-cutting-Report-2022.pdf 5 WFP , Palestine Country Brief , September 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/wfp- palestine-country-brief-september-2022 6 Health Cluster Dashboard, Occupied Palestinian Territory , March 2024, Microsoft Power BI 7 OCHA, Escalation in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #1 as of 18:00, 7 October 2023, https://www.unocha. org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/escalation-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-1-1800-7- october-2023 8 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #21, 27 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-21 9 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #56, 1 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-56 10 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #116, 12 Feb 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-116 11 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update , 26 December 2023, https://www.understandingwar.org/ backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2023 12 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update , 28 February 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ iran-update-february-28-2024 13 WFP , UN Food Agency pauses deliveries to the North of Gaza , 20 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/un-food- agency-pauses-deliveries-north-gaza 14 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024 6 March 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024 15 ACAPS, Palestine - Humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip: five months into the recent hostilities , 8 March 2024, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240308_ACAPS_Palesstine_Gaza_humanitarian_ access_note.pdf 16 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #8, 14 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-8 17 IDF Spokesman, IDF evacuation route announcement (Tweet), 13 October 2023, X, https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/ status/1712846493747495223 18 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #56, 1 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-56 19 IASC, Statement by Principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Humanitarian chiefs will not take part in unilateral proposals to create “safe zones” in Gaza , 16 November 2023, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/about-inter- agency-standing-committee/statement-principals-inter-agency-standing-committee-humanitarian-chiefs-will-not- take-part 20 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #20, 26 October 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-20-enarhe 21 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #49, 24 November 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-49
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF45 22 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #6, 12 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-6 23 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #117, 13 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-117 24 OCHA, Shelters and IDPs dashboard , February 2024. 25 UNHCR, Gaza Crisis 2023 Shelter Situation Update , 7 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-crisis-2023-shelter-situation-update-7th-january-2024 26 OCHA, Shelters and IDPs dashboard , February 2024 27 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #117, 13 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-117 28 Van den Hoek, J. and Scher, C., Gaza Strip Damage Maps , Decentralized Damage Mapping Group, 2023-2024, https:// www.conflict-damage.org/ 29 UNOSAT, Agricultural damage assessments , 17 November 2023, 13 December 2023, 31 January 2024, https://unosat. org/products/ 30 FAO, A rapid geospatial damage assessment of the 2023 conflict in the Gaza Strip on agricultural land and infrastructure , February 2024, https://www.nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition- vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf 31 FAO, Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 15 February 2024 , 28 February 2024, http://www.fao.org/3/cc9792en/cc9792en.pdf 32 WFP , mVAM Survey , 19 February 2024 33 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch tracking , March 2024. 34 WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #6 , 2 February 2024, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP- 0000156177/download/?_ga=2.88114139.1989739434.1710023558-981095887.1696492379 From 19 December 2023 to 21 January 2024, WFP sought to contact 72 shops but received a response from only 11 shops, of which 7 were operational. This limited response was attributed to frequent telecommunication disruptions in the Gaza Strip during the mentioned period. The primary focus was on Rafah, where 6 shops participated in the WFP survey on January 21, and one in Khan Younis. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Food Security Sector (Palestine), Sector Update #13 , 19 January 2024, https://fscluster.org/state-of-palestine/ document/fss-gaza-updates 38 Gaza Cash Working Group, Meeting Minutes , 6 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 39 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact , 19 February 2024 at 15:00, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-19-february-2024-1500 40 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024, 6 March 2024, https://www. ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024?_gl=1*tdp1i0*_ ga*MTEwNjk4NDg0LjE3MDk3NDIwNzg.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwOTgwMDIxOC4yLjEuMTcwOTgwMTI3OS41NS4wLjA 41 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 42 WFP , UN Food Agency pauses deliveries to the North of Gaza , 20 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/un-food- agency-pauses-deliveries-north-gaza 43 WFP , WFP food deliveries to northern Gaza face further setbacks, 5 March 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-food- deliveries-northern-gaza-face-further-setbacks 44 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #136 , 11 March 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-136
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF46 45 Gaza Cash Working Group, Emergency MPCA – Gaza 2023, Joint PDM results overview , 15 February 2024, https://drive. google.com/drive/folders/17wI2GlSITludiA126Bry6L37E4aO0Plx 46 Ibid. 47 Gaza Cash Working Group, Meeting Minutes , 13 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 48 FAO, European Union and CIRAD, Food Systems Profile - Palestine, 2023, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc7323en 49 ECHO, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Palestine, 19 December 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/humanitarian-implementation-plan-hip-palestine-echopsebud202491000-version-1 50 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #71 , 16 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-71 51 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #71 , 16 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-71 ; OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #99, 22 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-99 52 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 53 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-January 2024 , 5 February 2024, https://www.unocha.org/ publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-january-2024 54 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #54 , November 2023, https://www.unocha.org/publications/ report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-54 55 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 56 WFP , mVAM Survey, 19 February 2024. 57 In the November - December mVAM survey of WFP , the sampling design was not designed to be representative at governorate-level for Rafah, nor for any other single governorate. Only 63 completed questionnaires were recorded in that survey round for Rafah governorate. Comparisons between the November-December 2023 survey round and the December 2023-February 2024 survey round for Rafah governorate are only indicative given the non- representative sample from the first round. Additionally, the continued displacement recorded in the governorate of Rafah after 5 December 2023 calls for additional caution when comparing Rafah governorate results across the two survey rounds. 58 WFP , mVAM Survey , 6 December 2023 and 19 February 2024. 59 Ibid. 60 Food Economy Group, The practitioner’s guide to the Household Economy Analysis , p 141. https://foodeconomy.com/ wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-Practitioners-Guide-to-HEA.pdf 61 This paragraph is uniquely informed by the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster. Most of the text is a direct quote. The report is based on: (1) UNICEF, Post-distribution Monitoring Report , 29-31 January 2024. In North Gaza, the UNICEF PDM survey gathered responses on the diet diversity for 47 children aged 6-23 month in North Gaza; in Khan Younis: PBW=31, children aged 6-23 month = 31; Deir Al Balah: PBW = 34, children aged 6-23 month = 103, Rafah: PBW = 299, children aged 6-23 month = 270. (2) WFP , mVAM CATI Survey. 62 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario- Based Health Impact Projections (gaza-projections.org) 63 WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #6 , 2 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/publications/202324-wfp- palestine-monthly-market-dashboard 64 Ibid. 65 WHO, oPT emergency Situation Update Issue 22 , 30 January 2024, https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/Sitrep_-_ issue_22.pdf?ua=1
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF47 66 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #88 , 9 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-88 67 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #97 , 19 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-97 68 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 69 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #89 , 10 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-89-enar#:~:text=A%20total%20of%2019%20 homes,demolished%20and%2078%20people%20displaced 70 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incidents 71 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #115 , 9 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-115 72 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incident) 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 FAO, Food systems profile on Palestine, 2023 https://www.fao.org/3/cc7323en/cc7323en.pdf ; PCBS and PWA, Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day, 22 March 2021, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post. aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4468 76 Fanack Water, Why is there a water crisis in Gaza? , 201521, https://water.fanack.com/why-gaza-is-running-out-of-fresh- water/ 77 PCBS and PWA, Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day, 22 March 2021, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post. aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4468 78 FAO, Food systems profile on Palestine, 2023 , https://www.fao.org/3/cc7323en/cc7323en.pdf 79 WASH Cluster, Gaza Strip: WASH facilities damage assessment , February 2024. 80 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 14 February 2024 , Meeting minutes -URL 84 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting minutes - URL 85 Ibid. 86 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #124 , 22 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-124 87 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #91 , 12 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-91 88 WASH Cluster, Rapid WASH Assessment Preliminary Findings, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 89 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 90 NRC, Gaza: Israel’s military operation in Rafah would be fatal for displaced civilians and humanitarian aid, 8 February 2024, https://www.nrc.no/news/2024/february/gaza-israels-military-operation-in-rafah-would-be-fatal-for-displaced- civilians-and-humanitarian-aid/
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF48 91 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incident 92 UNRWA, UNRWA Situation Report # 80 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, 21 February 2024, https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation- report-80-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-Jerusalem?__cf_chl_tk=Fbky2q_ a29r0Fy3TD8TlVYbtpJ1PGIxBrGSYCIw7nMw-1710157363-0.0.1.1-1727 93 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 94 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #105 , 30 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-105-enarhe 95 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 96 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #124 , 22 February 2024, https://www.unocha.org/ publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-124 97 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 24 January 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 98 UNICEF, State of Palestine Humanitarian Situation Report No. 3 : 1 January to 31 December 2022, March 2023, https:// reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unicef-state-palestine-humanitarian-situation-report-no-3-1- january-31-december-2022 99 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 100 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 24 January 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 101 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 21 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 102 WASH Cluster. Sanitation data in collective centers shared with the IPC Analysis Team , 28 February 2024. 103 UNRWA, Situation Report #64 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem , 15 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unrwa-situation-report-64-situation-gaza-strip-and- west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-all-information-11-13-january-2024-valid-13-january-2024-2230-enar 104 Global Nutrition Cluster, Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis / Gaza , February 2024, https://www. nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition-vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf 105 In an age-balanced sample, approximately two thirds (~66%) of the sample is over 2 years old. 106 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario- Based Health Impact Projections (gaza-projections.org) 107 In the November - December mVAM survey of WFP , the sampling design was not designed to be representative at governorate-level for Rafah, nor for any other single governorate. Only 63 completed questionnaires were recorded in that survey round for Rafah governorate. Comparisons between the November-December 2023 survey round and the December 2023-February 2024 survey round for Rafah governorate are only indicative given the non- representative sample from the first round. Additionally, the continued displacement recorded in the governorate of Rafah after 5 December 2023 calls for additional caution when comparing Rafah governorate results across the two survey rounds.

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Gaza: Famine is imminent – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


Featured image: Palestinians gather to collect aid in Gaza City. Source: Mahmoud Issa /Reuters

As part of the genocide being developed in Gaza by the State of Israel the people are suffering from rapidly increasing starvation. According to a recent report 1.1 million people, half of the population of Gaza, are experiencing “catastrophic food insecurity”, the 5th and last phase of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). The whole population in Gaza, 2.23 million people are facing high acute food insecurity. The rest of the population is mostly in phase 4 “emergency” while some are in phase 3 “crisis”.

The whole population of Gaza is facing high acute food insecurity. Source: IPC

In northern Gaza, the acute lack of food is far exceeding the threshold of famine, acute malnutrition has likely exceeded the threshold, and deaths from starvation are likely soon reaching the threshold of famine. According to a UN official the situation is headed toward more than 200 people dying from starvation every day. Already at least 27 children are reported to have died from starvation in the last weeks. The IPC projects that northern Gaza will start suffering from famine any time from now and May. Southern Gaza is projected to face famine by July.

A Palestinian boy suffering from acute malnutrition is treated in Rafah, Gaza. Source: Reuters

Since the 7th of October 2023, every hour in Gaza 15 people are killed, six of them children, 35 people are injured and 12 buildings are destroyed. In total at least 31,726 people have been killed by the State of Israel since the beginning of the current genocidal campaign. More than 73,792 people have been injured, more than 8,000 are missing, and half of Gaza’s homes have been destroyed or damaged.

While the imperialists are acting as if what is going on in Gaza is some kind of natural disaster, where the only thing they can do is try to give a little aid, what is happening is no mystery. Even officials of the Yankee-dominated UN imply that the State of Israel is using starvation as a weapon of war.

The laws of war, which the imperialist regularly negate it unless it fits their interests, are clearly defined and well known to any soldier in any army. Grave breaches of these laws are considered war crimes. Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states clearly that the State of Israel is responsible for the needs of the people under its occupation:

To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.

The facts about the situation in Gaza stated above shows clearly that the State of Israel is committing a war crime by breaking this law.

On the 26th of January the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made a preliminary ruling, which stated the following: “The State of Israel shall, in accordance with its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of this Convention.”

The British NGO Oxfam has denounced that despite the ICJ ruling the State of Israel is still deliberately blocking aid to Gaza. Among the ways the State of Israel is: blocking aid is creating choke points by only allowing aid via two crossings; imposing a bureaucratic inspection system which delays trucks for 20 days on average; and rejecting necessary supplies such as fuel, generators, protective gear and communication equipment, claiming that they can be used for military purposes.

By not only neglecting to provide the occupied population with nessesary supplies, but also blocking other parties from doing so, the State of Israel is also committing a war crime by breaking Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This article requires States to “allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores” intended only for civilians and “the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases”. Paragraph 2 of Article 70 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions broadens this obligation: “The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the adverse Party.

Paragraph 1 of Article 54 the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions defines using starvation as a weapon of war as a war crime: “Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.

Furthermore Paragraph 2 of the Article states that: “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.” In Gaza 83% of groundwater wells are reported to not be operational.

While ignoring the obvious war crimes committed by the State of Israel, the imperialists, acting like this is a natural disaster, tries to give the impression that they want to help the people of Gaza with insufficient measures such as their air drops. When these do not fall in the sea or kill people after failing to deploy parachutes, they are still a drop in the ocean for the starving Palestinians. German imperialism has deployed two transport aircraft for dropping aid in Gaza, however the aircraft can only carry 18 tons each. This is less than the capacity of a truck which carries around 20 tons. While the population of Gaza needs around 500 trucks of aid each day, only 2,874 trucks entered Gaza in February, less than 100 per day. The current trend is that the amount of aid is decreasing.

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THE GAZA STRIP FAMINE IS IMMINENT AS 1.1 MILLION PEOPLE, HALF OF GAZA, EXPERIENCE CATASTROPHIC FOOD INSECURITY Overview The IPC acute food insecurity analysis conducted in December 2023 warned of a risk that Famine may occur by the end of May 2024 if an immediate cessation of hostilities and sustained access for the provision of essential supplies and services to the population did not take place. Since then, the conditions necessary to prevent famine have not been met and the latest evidence confirms that Famine is imminent in the northern governorates and projected to occur anytime between mid-March and May 2024. CURRENT: 15 FEBRUARY - 15 MARCH 2024 2.13M 95% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTIONPhase 5 677,000 People in Catastrophe Phase 4 876,000 People in Emergency Phase 3 578,000 People in Crisis Phase 2 96,000 People Stressed Phase 1 0 People in food security PROJECTED: 16 MARCH - 15 JULY 2024 2.23M 100% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTIONPhase 5 1,107,000 People in Catastrophe Phase 4 854,000 People in Emergency Phase 3 265,000 People in Crisis Phase 2 0 People Stressed Phase 1 0 People in food security IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS 15 FEBRUARY - 15 JULY 2024 Published on 18 March 2024IPC Global Initiative - Special Brief IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in Palestine. This analysis factors in all data and information available up to 10 March 2024 and does not take into account the latest developments on the ground. Key Drivers Restricted humanitarian access Extremely limited humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip continues to impede the safe and equitable delivery of life-saving multi-sector humanitarian assistance critical for Famine prevention and response. This includes severe limitations to the supply of goods as well as basic services.Hostilities Hostilities continue to involve the besiegement of the entire population and widespread, intense and sustained ground and air operations and clashes. This has caused over 31,000 deaths and injured 73,000 people, displaced about 1.9 million people, damaged or destroyed over half of the buildings, and devastated assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival, including across the food, health and water systems.Current Acute Food Insecurity | 15 February - 15 March Projected Acute Food Insecurity | 16 March - 15 July
According to the most likely scenario, both North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine) with reasonable evidence, with 70% (around 210,000 people) of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Continued conflict and the near-complete lack of access to the northern governorates for humanitarian organizations and commercial trucks will likely compound heightened vulnerabilities and extremely limited food availability, access, and utilization, as well as access to healthcare, water, and sanitation. The famine threshold for household acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and, given the latest data showing a steeply increasing trend in cases of acute malnutrition, it is highly likely that the famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. In North Gaza, acute malnutrition (by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference - MUAC) moved from a pre-escalation estimated of 1 percent to 6.8 – 9.1 percent in January and 12.4 to 16.5 percent in February (weighted for children 6-59). Acute malnutrition (by MUAC) among children 6-23 months old increased in the same period from 16.2 percent to 29.2 percent. The upward trend in non-trauma mortality is also expected to accelerate, resulting in all famine thresholds likely to be passed imminently. The southern governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and the Governorate of Rafah, are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). However, in a worst-case scenario, these governorates face a risk of Famine through July 2024. The entire population in the Gaza Strip (2.23 million) is facing high levels of acute food insecurity. From mid-March to mid-July, in the most likely scenario and under the assumption of an escalation of the conflict including a ground offensive in Rafah, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1.11 million people) is expected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5), the most severe level in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. This represents an increase of 530,000 people (92 percent) compared to the previous analysis. Between the current and the projection period, around 400,000 more people are expected to slide into IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The rest of the population faces Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (854,000 people, 38 percent of the population) or Crisis (IPC Phase 3) (265,000 people, 12 percent of the population). The escalation of the hostilities has caused widespread damage to assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival. About 50 percent of buildings - and more than 70 percent in the northern governorates - have been damaged or destroyed. This has included dwellings, shops and infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, as well as water, sanitation and other facilities. Assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limiting the functionality of the food system. From a pre-escalation average of 500 trucks a day of which 150 carrying food, in the period between 7 October 2023 to 24 February 2024, only 90 trucks per day, of which only 60 carrying food, entered the Gaza Strip. Consequently, virtually all households are skipping meals every day and adults are reducing their meals so that children can eat. In the northern governorates, in nearly two thirds of the households, people went entire days and nights without eating at least 10 times in the last 30 days. In the southern governorates, this applies to one third of the households.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF3 CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (15 February - 15 March 2024 ) Population table for the current situation: 15 February - 15 March 2024 Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.GovernorateTotal population analysedPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 3+Area Phase#people % #people % #people % #people % #people % #people % Deir al-Balah & Khan Younis governorates600,000 0 030,000 5120,000 20 270,000 45 180,000 30 570,000 95 4 North Gaza & Gaza governorates300,000 0 0 0 0 60,000 20 75,000 25 165,000 55 300,000 100 4 Rafah governorate1,326,544 0 066,327 5397,963 30 530,618 40 331,636 25 1,260,217 95 4 Grand Total 2,226,544 0 096,327 5 577,963 26 875,618 39 676,636 30 2,130,217 95
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF4 CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (15 February - 15 March 2024) Vulnerabilities and Acute Events Prior to the current hostilities, vulnerability was high in the Gaza Strip due to prolonged blockade and periodic escalations in hostilities that severely damaged the food system in the area. At 5,900 residents per square kilometre, one of the most densely populated areas in the world even before the concentration of most of the population in only one of five governorates, the Gaza Strip population is extremely reliant on the cross-border movement of goods and utilities like electricity and water. In 2022, the Gaza Strip faced an unemployment rate of nearly 45 percent 1 and, by September 2023, the poverty rate was at 60 percent 2, among a population that included nearly 70 percent of refugees. 3 Due to severely constrained livelihood opportunities, in 2022, over half of the population was relying on humanitarian assistance as their main income source and about one-third on casual labour, 4 with 70 percent of the population food insecure. 5 Conflict . As of 14 March 2024, the ongoing hostilities have reportedly caused nearly 105,000 casualties within the Gaza Strip – nearly 5% of the total population. 6 This includes over 73,000 people injured, about half of them women and children, and over 31,000 deaths. The escalation of hostilities within the Gaza Strip began with heavy bombardment on 7 October 2023. 7 On 27 October, major ground operations and clashes reportedly began within the Gaza Strip. 8 These started in the northern governorates and continued through 23 November, with a humanitarian pause from 24 November through 30 November. 9 Hostilities subsequently resumed at high intensity, with major ground operations and bombardment by air, land, and sea. This included the continued expansion of a ground operation in Khan Younis Governorate, centred on Khan Younis city. 10 Another large ground operation began in Deir al-Balah Governorate on 24 December 2023, 11 expanding across multiple though not all refugee camps and urban areas in the governorate. These operations were accompanied by continued clashes among armed actors. Clashes in the northern governorates, especially some neighbourhoods of Gaza city like Zeitoun, re-escalated in late February 2024. 12 Bombardment by air, land, and sea of all areas of the Gaza Strip has continued throughout this period, intensifying particularly before and during major ground operations. Humanitarian access. Conflict continues to place severe limitations on the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving food, nutrition, health, water, hygiene, sanitation and other life-saving assistance to the besieged population. Commercial traffic is similarly impeded. Humanitarian access, and the ability of the most vulnerable populations to access and participate in humanitarian activities safely is highly limited and uneven across the Gaza Strip. Once humanitarian assistance and commercial goods enter the Gaza Strip, onward access to the northern governorates is extremely limited and unavailable for extended periods, while access is relatively higher for the southern governorates, particularly Rafah Governorate. While there has been improvement in access to the Gaza Strip relative to early October 2023, including the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing in Mid-December 2023, access to the Gaza Strip continues to fluctuate and remains insufficient for meeting the basic needs of the overall population. Severe limitations and attacks on humanitarian staff and assets forced major providers of humanitarian food and other assistance to the northern governorates to suspend convoys to these areas, including the World Food Programme, on 20 February. 13 Since the previous IPC analysis on the Gaza Strip in December 2023, access denial increased significantly, especially in the northern governorates. In January 2024, only nine humanitarian missions to the northern governorates were facilitated, dropping to six missions in February. 14 Figure 1. Casualties in the Gaza Strip reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health as of 14 March 2024. Source: Health Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF5 According to OCHA, constraints on humanitarian action throughout the Gaza Strip include direct strikes with explosive weapons on humanitarian convoys, detention of humanitarian staff, road closures, checkpoints, and related blockages or delays on main transportation corridors. Swarming of humanitarian convoys subsequently increased, including at several hotspots throughout the Gaza Strip, such as immediately after crossing Wadi Gaza into the northern governorates. Physical access constraints further limit the movement of humanitarian and commercial traffic, including road damage from bombardment and traffic of heavy military vehicles as well as the accumulation of an estimated 12,000 metric tons of debris that may take up to four years to fully clear. 15 Displacement and Movement Restrictions. Displacement continues to be driven by conflict. An evacuation order was issued to the entire population residing north of Wadi Gaza (1.1 million people) on 13 October, 16 followed by orders and accompanying maps indicating to move as far south as Khan Younis Governorate. 17 After the humanitarian pause on 24- 30 November 2023, new evacuation orders covering at least 30 percent of the entire Gaza Strip were issued. 18 The unilaterally declared Al-Mawasi “Humanitarian Zone” was first announced on 18 October 2023, however, humanitarian agencies did not agree to the establishment of such zones. 19 The proposed area has limited pre-existing services, with OCHA reporting there is “almost no sheltering capacity” . 20 In addition to the closure of some of the main transportation corridors within the Gaza Strip, other movement restrictions have also been announced, including a ban on movement from southern to northern governorates. 21 Additional restrictions imposed on populations affect livelihoods and food access, such as a de facto prohibition on fishing and movement within one kilometre of the border fence, which covers a significant proportion of farmland. 22 The movement of livestock together with displaced populations has not generally been reported and livestock abandonment is likely high.Map 1. Missions planned, facilitated and denied, October 2023 to Mid-February 2024. Source: OCHA Map 2. Distribution of IDPs staying in Collective Centres. Source: Shelter Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF6 As new evacuation orders are issued alongside with continuation of bombardments and ground operations, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are constantly moving in search of safety. Most of them have moved south, largely to Rafah Governorate. 23 The population in Rafah has increased about five-fold as a result, rapidly rising from 276,000 pre-escalation to over 1.3 million as of February 2024. A large proportion of the displaced population is from Gaza and North Gaza Governorates, which have seen their population decrease by 84 percent and 75 percent respectively. 24 Rafah Governorate, which spans over 65 km 2, now hosts around 1.3 million people. 25 In Rafah, there are 35 UNRWA shelters hosting 882,800 people and another 30 informal shelters hosting 506,300 people, 26 corresponding to over 30 percent of the population staying in shelters. The formal shelters managed by UNRWA are overcrowded with severely limited access to safe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and other services. People in informal shelters face even more difficulties accessing health, food and non-food services. The lack of Non-food Items (NFIs) provision in informal settlements has led people to set up makeshift shelters and tents, which are subject to flooding on rainy days, further exacerbating the suffering of displaced people. 27 Damages . Destruction and damage of buildings, particularly from bombardment by air, land, and sea, is evident in all governorates of the Gaza Strip. According to the recent satellite assessments, by late February 2024, at least 54 percent of all buildings in the Gaza Strip were likely damaged or destroyed. The largest scale destruction is in Gaza Governorate where more than 73 percent of buildings are estimated to be destroyed, followed by North Gaza (70 percent), Deir al-Balah (44 percent), Khan Younis (52 percent) and Rafah (28 percent). 28 This has included dwellings, shops and various types of infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, and other public buildings, as well as WASH infrastructure and storage facilities, among others. Food Availability Production . The escalation of hostilities and mass displacements have caused food shortages and unavailability throughout the Gaza Strip as the food system and agriculture value chains have collapsed or are marginally surviving through the informal market. A significant portion of agriculture land, encompassing orchards, greenhouses, and farmlands has suffered extensive destruction. According to the UNOSAT, the percent of damaged agriculture land has increased from 25 percent to 60 percent, between November 2023 and January 2024.29 Extensive damage has been inflicted on the local food system, including agricultural infrastructure. More than 300 home barns, 100 agricultural warehouses, 46 farm storages, 119 animal shelters, 200 farms, as well over 600 wells used for irrigation have been destroyed, amongst other agriculture facilities.30 According to the FAO damage assessment of February 2024, damage to wells was found to be most concentrated in the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates; and in some areas, all the wells were damaged. Additionally, over 26 percent (336) of all greenhouses have been damaged across all governorates. The governorates with the highest Map 3. Gaza Damage Mapping 26.02.2024. Source: Decentralized Damage Mapping Group Map 4. Damage to Agriculture Areas Imagery Analysis Maps - November 2023 (left), December 2023 (middle) and January 2024 (right). Source: UNOSAT, 2023-2024
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF7 damage are Gaza (55 percent), North Gaza (48 percent), Khan Younis (35 percent), Deir al-Balah (20 percent) and Rafah (16 percent). The Governorate of Khan Younis had the largest area of damaged greenhouses (149 hectares), followed by Rafah (89 hectares). More than 40 percent (6,694 ha) of all croplands has been damaged since 7 October, with the highest reported damages in Gaza (55 percent, 1,941 ha), Deir al-Balah (51 percent, 1,408 ha), North Gaza (45 percent, 1,402 ha), Khan Younis (33 percent, 1,492 ha) and Rafah (25 percent, 451 ha) Governorates. In terms of cropland type, 41 percent of irrigated land, 43 percent of orchards and 42 percent of rainfed land have been damaged.31 The hostilities have not only led to the destruction of agricultural assets and infrastructure, they also resulted in the displacement of populations away from agricultural land and constrained access for agricultural activities. Other assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limited the functionality of the food system. Although some local production, primarily of vegetables, is still ongoing, it is very limited. Lack of access to land and destruction of crops are compounded by a lack of access to essential agriculture inputs (fuel, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides). Most livestock were abandoned during the large-scale displacement in October 2023. Remaining livestock are being slaughtered or sold due to the lack of fodder and water or due to the need for cash or other resources. Similarly, poultry lack animal feed, and the availability of poultry meat and eggs is reduced throughout the Gaza Strip. The comparison among the preliminary reports from the FAO Loss and Damage assessment and the baseline figure from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), shows about 70 percent of livestock and other animals have been lost since 7 October 2024. Fishing production is largely halted due to the damage of boats, lack of fuel and security/safe access. Some fishing is still happening, but it is only available to those who still possess equipment and have access to fuel. Food security assessments indicate32 that, due to the lack of food availability, some households are resorting to eating wild foods. These range from mallow ( khebbayze in Arabic) to unconventional food sources such as animal fodder and other unsafe foods. Figure 2. Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 15 February 2024. Source: FAO
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF8 Imports . Between January and September 2023, a daily average of 150 food trucks entered the Gaza Strip. Between 8 October 2023 and 9 March 2024, this number decreased to an average of 65 trucks per day33 and the availability of food commodities has dramatically declined. Since the escalation of the hostilities, the number of trucks allowed into the Gaza Strip has been severely restricted, reducing the inflow of humanitarian assistance and preventing the entry of commercial goods completely until 8 December 2023. Since then, there was an initial increase in the flow of food and non-food commodities, facilitated through the opening of a second border crossing (Kerem Shalom). However, in February, the flow of commodities decreased again and has been intermittent from late January through February. The month of February in particular saw major variations highlighted in figure 3. The entry of humanitarian and commercial trucks into Gaza is significantly limited to the southern governorates, mainly Rafah. Conversely, there are very few items reaching the northern governorates and other areas in the rest of the south of Gaza Strip.34 OCHA estimates that less than 5 percent of all the food trucks have reached North Gaza and Gaza Governorates in the past four weeks, while 45 percent remained in Rafah and about 50 percent reached Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis. An in-depth analysis of the border crossing manifest allowed to generate approximate kilocalories values per truck and per unit of analysis then distributed per area, using information provided by OCHA and the Food Security Sector. This reveals that in most days, the quantity of food translated in kilocalories entering in Gaza has been extremely below the requirements in North Gaza Governorates, and mostly half the requirements in Rafah. The only areas appearing to have benefited from an almost sufficient amount of kilocalories (although irregular) are in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates (with higher quantities in the later). This may suggest that most Figure 3. Reanalysis of food-only trucks entering Gaza through Kerem Shalom and Rafah border crossing. Source: UNRWA Figure 4. Reanalysis of the Kcal availability per unit of analysis. Source: UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF9 requirements in Rafah. Based on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 21 October 2023 to 3 March 2024, the proportion of average kilocalories per day (using a 7-day rolling average) has been consistently below the daily kilocalorie requirements (calculated using demographic data considering variations by age and gender), with the exception of a short period of time around mid-January. A survey conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP)35 highlights that interviewed shop owners are faced with a significant shortage of basic food items, with 81 percent indicating depletion. Furthermore, 19 percent highlighted that the available food items are in short supply, and not expected to last more than a week. The formal market has been heavily impacted with a non-functioning supply chain, and severely damaged shops. Consequently, the informal market has surged. Informal markets, provide 1 or 2 types of foods (canned foods mainly), and are supplied by the beneficiaries of assistance (selling or bartering). The WFP market monitoring indicates that most respondents have stocks inferior to 1 week or inexistent for the vast majority of the food commodities, with the exception of vegetables. All respondents have exhausted dairy products.36 Despite the presence of at least a hundred bakeries in northern Gaza, few are able to operate due to significant challenges. The main obstacle is the persistent shortage of flour, other bakery inputs, and fuel. In early January, WFP began supporting 12 bakeries in Rafah and Deir al-Balah.37 Access Market functionality. Informal markets now dominate both food and non-food item transactions across the Gaza Strip as formal markets have collapsed following the depletion of stocks and damage to primary places of business. Selling and buying is mostly taking place in the street along with potential barter activities. People, and more particularly vulnerable groups, are increasingly facing protection risks to access markets with the lack of social order and high levels of food insecurity. There is a risk associated to transporting and carrying food in the street, especially in Northern Gaza and Gaza Governorates where people have resorted to going out in groups to buy food and/or carrying knives to protect themselves. The scarcity of items is driving food prices up and reducing household purchasing power. The overall Consumer Price index (CPI) was approximately 49 percent higher in December 2023 compared to the onset of the conflict; the CPI for food and soft drinks was 76 percent higher.38 Food aid. The flow of humanitarian assistance into and across the Gaza Strip continues to be severely disrupted. Between 1 January and 12 February 2024, 51 percent of aid missions planned for the north of Wadi Gaza and 25 percent of those planned for the areas requiring coordination south of Wadi Gaza were denied access..39 In February, the UN and its humanitarian partners planned only 24 missions to areas north of Gaza, of which six (25 percent) were facilitated. This stands in stark contrast to January, when 61 missions were planned to the north, with nine (15 percent) facilitated.40Figure 5. Stocks availability at shops as of 21 January (% of respondents). Source: WFP
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF10 Based on data from UNRWA,41 the maximum number of trucks entering daily from both the Kerem Shalom and the Rafah crossings was 300 (compared to an average of 500 daily pre-escalation), approximately 70 percent of these trucks carried food or a mixture of food and non-food items. On 20 February 2024, WFP decided to suspend its food aid deliveries to northern Gaza as a result of chaos and violence.42 On 5 March, a 14-truck food convoy, the first by WFP to the north since it paused deliveries on 20 February, was denied access after a three-hour wait at the Wadi Gaza checkpoint and then looted on its way back.43 On 7 March, 11 food trucks from private sector were allowed to enter. In total, from 5 February to 5 March, 10-15 food trucks were allowed into the Gaza Governorate to feed about 300,000 people (less than 1 Kg per person for a full month). Given the spread of the conflict, restrictions on movement and the displacement of the population, the humanitarian space is constantly decreasing, and humanitarian food assistance is being distributed unequally among areas. Airdrop operations of food aid along the Gaza Strip coastline began on 26 February 2024. Airdrops mainly consist of ready-made meals that do not require cooking methods and are of high nutritional value. However, they are erratic, small-scale, cover a limited geographic area, and are primarily accessible to populations located near the coast, including those physically able to recover food pallets and packages from the sea in a context of heightened civil unrest. Airdrops without ground coordination are also dangerous and falling assistance may strike civilians, as occurred on 8 March when Figure 6. Food CPI in Gaza Strip (December 2022 - December 2023). Source: WFP/ PCBS Figure 7. Inflation rate (September 2023 vs. December 2023). Source: WFP/ PCBS
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF11 OCHA reported that five civilians died.44 In light of this, airdrops account for a negligible share of the humanitarian food security assistance in the Gaza Strip compared to what is trucked in overland. Cash Assistance. The functionality of cash assistance in the Gaza Strip is limited. As of 15 February 2024, cash actors had delivered emergency multi-purpose cash assistance to over 125,000 households (over 828,000 people) since the onset of the conflict.45 According to the most recent Cash Post Distribution Monitoring,46 about 71 percent of the respondents reported that the cash assistance received helped them to either access urgent/basic items and services needed. Most expenditures were on food (89 percent), followed by medicines, debt repayment, water and hygiene products, and transportation. In Rafah, cash liquidity is a significant challenge47 because of the high number of displaced individuals and the logistical difficulties banks face in transferring cash. Poor electricity supply and connectivity are also affecting the ability of financial service providers to make cash accessible. Figure 8. Planned aid missions by month. Source: OCHA Figure 9a. Use of cash, since 7 October 2023 and January 2024. Source: Cash Working Group
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF12 Figure 9b. Challenges in use of cash, since 7 October 2023 and January 2024. Source: Cash Working Group Figure 10. Quantity of Diesel and Domestic Gas imported per day. Source: UNRWAUtilization Before the escalation of hostilities, electricity was unreliable and only available for a few hours each day. The lack of electricity negatively affected all aspects of life, including food safety, and made it almost impossible to operate food processing units effectively.48 The main water and electricity networks, fuel and food supplies are now almost completely suspended.49 Frequent communication blackouts make it extremely challenging to coordinate the distribution of aid, and let people know how to access it, and when. The complete electricity blackout that began on 11 October 2023 continues, with only limited electricity generated inside the Gaza Strip from generators and solar panels. Hostilities in the Gaza Strip continue to prevent the delivery of fuel to the Gaza power plant, which remains non-functioning, and block cross-border electricity distribution.50 This severely impacts all aspects of daily life, including the processing and storage of food, pumping and distribution of drinking water, treatment of wastewater, and the functionality of telecommunications and financial systems.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF13 The lack of electricity and damage to telecommunication systems has also limited the ability of populations to communicate and access information like evacuation orders or humanitarian assistance delivery. There have been rolling telecommunication blackouts since 7 October, with several lasting around one week.51 Fuel was not permitted to enter the Gaza Strip from 7 October until 15 November 2023. UNRWA reported that for only the bare minimum of critical services in which it is involved, 160,000 litres per day of diesel fuel are needed. This minimum requirement, which is still insufficient for a full restoration of humanitarian operations and other basic services, has been met only about 10 percent of days from 7 October through 9 March. No fuel was permitted to enter the Gaza Strip from 20 December 2023 through 7 January 2024, a period of new or expanding major ground operations, including in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates. From 24 January through 6 March, fuel was permitted to enter the Gaza Strip only on alternative days.52 Even once inside the Gaza Strip, the onward movement of diesel fuel faces the same extreme challenges as other humanitarian and commercial goods, with little fuel reaching the northern governorates. Regarding fuel to North Wadi Gaza, two (10 percent) of 21 planned missions were facilitated. Both deliveries were facilitated to a single hospital, leaving other hospitals and WASH facilities without fuel. For fuel to areas South of Wadi Gaza, 15 (71 percent) of 21 planned missions to areas requiring coordination were facilitated. A total of 300,600 litres were delivered. However, convoys to Nasser hospital were denied access five times in a row. Fuel shortages in hospitals force them to cease most operations and may lead to preventable deaths.53 About 250 tons of cooking gas entered the Gaza Strip per day on average from January to August 2023.54 Daily entry into the Gaza Strip from 24 November 2023 through 10 March 2024 has consistently been roughly 30-40 percent of that pre- escalation amount.55 This has further challenged the ability of the Gaza Strip population to cook food that they are able to access, presenting challenges to physical and biological utilization. As of January-February 2024, nearly 80 percent of the population in all governorates reported using firewood as their primary cooking fuel, covering any form of wood available. Around 10-15 percent of the population across governorates reported burning waste as their main cooking fuel, while almost no respondents reported using cooking gas. Between 7 and 10 percent of respondents reported that there was no cooking fuel available.56 This is a particular concern as these populations face major challenges with consuming food that they may still have access to, in particular flour. Stability Continued conflict and worsening acute food insecurity and nutritional status also contribute to civil unrest, which further lowers the stability of all food security dimensions. Civil unrest is a major challenge to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to humanitarian staff, and hampers their ability to reach the people in need as well as for the most vulnerable to access and make full use of assistance. Recent deaths related to the airdrops and swarming of the trucks entering the Gaza Strip are key evidence of the level of desperation and acute hunger among the people of Gaza. These also show that even a minimal degree of order to facilitate access to food and other essential supplies, such as medicines, cannot be guaranteed, given the absence of civil authorities or organized police. Social cohesion in Gaza is strained, exposing the most vulnerable, such as children - particularly those who are unaccompanied, women, the elderly, the chronically ill and people living with disabilities to extreme levels of food and water deprivation. Food Security Outcomes The most recent WFP survey relied on data collected through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) between 6 December 2023 and 19 February 2024. The number of observations were: For North Gaza and Gaza Governorates: 104 observations; for Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates: 369 observations; for Rafah Governorate: 892 observations. Households were randomly selected from a master list of 320,000 WFP pre-conflict beneficiary households representing 80 percent of the total pre-conflict population in the Gaza Strip. Overall, 10,320 households were selected and called. Of them, 1,365 respondents completed the questionnaires (success rate of 13.3 percent - in line with the 10 percent to 20 percent typical of CATI analyses in the region), while 19 (0.2 percent) answered the call but hung-up and did not complete it. The rest did not answer.57
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF14 Food Consumption Score (FCS). According to the survey, most households across the Gaza Strip have inadequate food consumption with almost 88 percent of households in the North reporting Poor Food consumption (indicative of IPC Phase 4 and 5, Emergency and Catastrophe) and 9 percent reporting Borderline food consumption (indicative of IPC Phase 3, Crisis). An additional disaggregation of the FCS ‘poor’ category (<14) shows that in the North Gaza Governorates, 36 percent of the respondents are not even able to eat cereals daily. In Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah around 53 percent of households reported poor consumption and 31 percent reported borderline consumption, among them 11 percent had a value below 14. In Rafah, around 48 percent of households reported poor food consumption and 31 percent reported borderline consumption of which 5 percent had a value below 14.58 Across all governorates, the food consumption gaps are clear as most households are unable to consume cereals daily. In the north, the mean number of days of cereal consumption is 4.4 per week, in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates and Rafah Governorate the mean number of days is 5.14 and 5.15, respectively. Consumption of protein rich food is extremely low in Northern Gaza at 0.33 days a week and a little over one day a week in the rest of the Gaza Strip. Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI). Results from reduced coping strategies index indicates that nearly 100 percent of respondents in the Gaza Strip are engaging in extreme coping strategies. The indicator assesses the frequency with which households resorted to coping strategies that altered their consumption patterns such as reducing meals, restricting consumption by adults for children to eat, and borrowing food, in the previous week to cover gaps in their consumption. Household Hunger Scale (HHS). An increase in the proportion of households facing extreme food consumptions gaps is observed across all analysed governorates when compared with November 2023 data. About 84 percent of households in Northern Gaza (Gaza and North Gaza) experienced ‘very severe hunger’ , indicative of IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), while 8 percent of households reported ‘severe hunger’ , indicative of IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Compared with the previous survey round, the deterioration has been significant. In November the proportion of households with ‘very severe hunger’ was estimated at 40 percent showing a doubling of households facing extreme food consumption gaps indicative of IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, 57 percent of households reported experiencing ‘very severe hunger’ , while 24 percent reported to experience ‘severe hunger’ , compared with November 2023 when only 22 percent of households faced ‘very severe hunger’ . In Rafah, the proportion households reportedly experiencing ‘very severe hunger’ was 56 percent and 21 percent reporting ‘severe hunger’ .59 Livelihood coping. Some indirect evidence on livelihood coping mechanisms was collected focusing on emergency strategies contextualised for the very specific conditions of Gaza. The data indicates the highest use of extreme coping strategies in the North with 18 percent of households reporting that they bartered/exchanged clothing for food, while 12 percent reported begging for food. As estimated 3 percent reported scavenging due to lack of food, and 18 percent reported gathering wild foods. Around 23 percent reported looting food from debris, and 74 percent indicated that they sought food outside their shelter, facing potential security risks. In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, the reported proportions were similar: 24 percent of households reported that they bartered/exchanged clothing for food, and in Rafah the proportion was 27 percent. Around 7 percent in Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah and Rafah Governorates reported begging for food. An estimated 1.8 percent reported scavenging due to lack of food and 15 percent gathering wild foods. Around 5 percent in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, and 6 percent in Rafah Governorate reported looting food from debris. Finally, 65 percent of the households in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and 59 percent in Rafah Governorate reported that they sought food outside their shelter facing potential security risks. The survey detected a high level of non-applicable strategies, which might indicate the pure exhaustion of these coping mechanisms. Household Economy Approach (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA): Preliminary HEA Outcome Analysis was made available by FEWS NET for this IPC analysis. For the northern governorates (North Gaza and Gaza urban area), for the period of February – August 2024, all the wealth groups categories living in these governorates are expected to face high level of Survival Deficits (SD), indicative of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The SD is calculated compared to a survival threshold defined as the amount of food and cash income needed by the households to meet the 2,100 Kcal per day per person. This also include the cost of preparing and consuming food plus any cash expenditure on water for human consumption.60 The only exception in these results appear for the Better Off (BO) wealth group living in the Semi Agriculture Gaza (SAG) livelihood zone with livelihoods more related to crops sales, livestock sales or self-employment, that will experience SD Indicative of an IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), at the limit of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). For Southern Gaza, the level of deficit for the projected period of April – August 2024 for the households living in urban areas (URB livelihood zone), will be indicative of an IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). For the households living in this governorate with livelihoods more related to agricultural labour, crop and livestock sales or self-employment, (SAG livelihood zone) – that represent a small portion of the population living in this governorate -, the Very Poor and the Poor wealth groups will face SD indicative of an IPC
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF15 Figure 11. Summary of food security outcome indicators. Source: WFP/ FEWS NETPhase 4 (Emergency). The Middle and the Better Off categories won’t face any SD or Livelihood Protection Deficit. This last deficit is calculated compared to a Livelihood Protection basket that include all the sources of food and income needed for the households to maintain their local livelihoods. Gender lens. Food insecurity has a multidimensional impact on women, as it not only relates to unequal access to, distribution of, consumption of, and control over food, but it also has long-term health and safety risks. UN Women data shows that the escalation in food insecurity has also increased the vulnerability of women to food insecurity. More than 4 out of 5 women (84 percent) interviewed by UN Women report that their family eats half or less of the food they used to before the conflict began, with mothers and adult women being those tasked with sourcing food, yet eating last, less, and least than everyone else. Moreover, 4 in 5 women (84 percent) in Gaza indicate that at least one of their family members had to skip meals during the past week. In 95 percent of those cases, mothers are the ones going without food, skipping at least one meal to feed their children. Nearly 9 in 10 women (87 percent) report finding it harder to access food than men. Some women are now resorting to extreme coping mechanisms, such as scavenging for food under rubble or in dumpsters.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF16Area Governorate % of total Gaza populationURB LZ SAG LZ % of governorate HHs with kcal gaps indicative of IPC 5 % of area (northern/southern) with kcal gaps indicative of IPC 5Estimated % of population in the LZ (URB) Very Poor (24% of the LZ population) Survival Deficit (SD), Indicative IPC Phase Poor (33%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Middle (41%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Better Off (4%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Estimated % of population in the LZ (SAG) Very Poor (32%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Poor (37%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Middle (25%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase Better Off (7%) SD, Indicative IPC Phase SCENARIO 1 (FEBRUARY - AUGUST 2024) SCENARIO 1 (FEBRUARY - AUGUST 2024)Northern Gaza North Gaza5% 100%85%, Phase 585%, Phase 587%, Phase 555%, Phase 50% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0%Gaza5% 94%85%, Phase 585%, Phase 587%, Phase 555%, Phase 56%86%, Phase 587%, Phase 584%, Phase 549%, Phase 4100%Southern Gaza Deir al Balah (or middle Gaza)10% 99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1% N/A N/A N/A N/ATo be inferred To be inferred based on Khan Younis and Deir al Balah assumptions and convergence of other data higlighting where and to what extent conditions resemble Rafah vs. Northern GazaKhan Younis21% 99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1% N/A N/A N/A N/ATo be inferredRafah59% 97%33% survival deficit, Phase 432% survival deficit, Phase 445% survival deficit, Phase 427% survival deficit, Phase 43%13% survival deficit, 100% liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 30% survival deficit, 89% liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 30% survival/ liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 10% survival/ liveli - hoods pro- tection deficit, Phase 10,0% SCENARIO 2 (APRIL - AUGUST 2024) SCENARIO 2 (APRIL - AUGUST 2024)simulation - Rafah invasion 59% 97%67% 64% 63% 54% 3%42% 31% 0% 0% Phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 5 Phase 5Phase 4 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 1
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF17 NUTRITION SITUATION Inadequate dietary intake According to the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster in December 2023-January 2024,61 in North Gaza, 98 percent of the children (47 observations) included in the analysis had consumed two or fewer food groups in the 24 hours preceding the survey. Among the main food groups reported, breastmilk was mentioned for 39 children (83 percent), and eggs for 17 (36 percent). The consumption of all the other food groups, such as legumes, vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables, other vegetables, grains, meat and dairy products, had almost completely disappeared from their daily diet, indicating an extremely worrying situation in terms of diet quality. 95 percent of the pregnant and breastfeeding women had consumed two or fewer food groups the previous day. The main food groups mentioned were non-vitamin A rich vegetables, grains and eggs. This situation highlights critically insufficient micronutrient intake before and during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which can affect both women and the development of their infants. In Khan Younis, 90 percent of young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women consumed two food groups or fewer in the last 24 hours. For young children, the food groups most frequently mentioned were breastmilk and eggs, while grains, pulses and eggs were the food groups most frequently mentioned for pregnant and breastfeeding women. In Deir al-Balah, 86 percent of young children had eaten two or fewer food groups during the day before the survey, while only 3 percent had consumed five food groups. The food groups most consumed were breastmilk, followed by eggs and grains. Among pregnant and breastfeeding women, 67 percent consumed only one food group the day preceding the survey, while 26 percent consumed two food groups. Pulses, grains and other vegetables were the food groups most frequently mentioned by respondents. In Rafah, 88 percent (UNICEF) – 89 percent (CATI) of young children had consumed two or fewer food groups within the past 24 hours, breastmilk, eggs and grains were the main food groups consumed by young children. Only 3 percent had eaten more than two food groups in the last 24 hours. Infant and young child feeding practices Neonates face deteriorating nutritional status if mothers are unable to breastfeed due to stress, poor mental health and/ or inadequate breastfeeding privacy, and lack of counselling and support by healthcare providers.62 Further, the high pre- conflict prevalence of formula use among Gazans (58 percent among under six-month-old infants) raises concerns with regards to potential supply disruptions. Under poor WASH conditions, keeping formula water, teats, and bottles sterile is very challenging. These disruptions can result in increased incidence of diarrhoea and other infectious diseases, both of which further exacerbate malnutrition. The prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding is projected to average between 25 percent to 35 percent under a ceasefire scenario (lower than the pre-conflict baseline of 42 percent, reflecting ongoing disruptions including overcrowding and worsened mental health), falling to 20 percent to 30 percent under a status quo scenario and 5 percent to 15 percent under the escalation scenario. These disruptions have enduring consequences on infant and child health. Based on interviews that WFP conducted with eight key informants (four interviews were held on 11 January, and the remaining interviews were conducted on 22-23 January), widespread weight loss, diseases, and malnutrition prevail due to insufficient food supplies, intensifying the health crisis in the Gaza Strip.63 Health There are now only four hospitals and two clinics remaining in Gaza Governorate and two hospitals and two clinics in North Gaza. All of them operate at a very low level and information on the health status of children under five is close to absent. The survey conducted did not reach a minimum sample allowing exploitation of the information. In Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, according to the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis, more than 97 percent of children under five reported having had one or more diseases in the past two weeks. 56 percent of the children under five had experienced Acute Respiratory Infections within the past two weeks, 70.5 percent had experienced diarrhoea, and 82.3 percent had had a fever. This shows the extremely critical health conditions children face, exposing them to high-risk nutritional deterioration. Trends from WHO corroborate these findings, showing a 55 percent increase in diarrhoea cases in children under five between November-December 2023. While the three hospitals in the Governorate of Deir al-Balah were still operational in late November, nine of the 16 Primary Health Care Centres (PHCCs) were no longer functioning, seriously impeding access to health services. On average, 0.49 litres of drinking water
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF18 was available per person per day in the households surveyed, which is far from the minimum humanitarian standard (2L/ person/day).35 The scale of needs is staggering with 100 percent of the 49 households in need of food and hygiene items, 78 percent in need of water, 69 percent shelter, and 65 percent health assistance. In Rafah, the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis also shows extreme health conditions with almost 93 percent of children under five having one or more disease within the past two weeks, 79 percent had had a fever and 56 percent had experienced vomiting. The level of diarrhoea is extremely critical with 70 percent of children under five having had one episode in the past two weeks, and almost 60 percent having ARI (Acute Respiratory Infection).64 Since mid-October, 388,200 cases of acute respiratory infections have been recorded, along with 246,000 cases of diarrhea and 3,300 cases of bloody diarrhea, 84,000 cases of skin rashes, 12,000 cases of Acute Jaundice (including confirmed Hepatitis A).65 As per OCHA, 1.9 million IDPs face at high risk of communicable disease due overcrowding of IDP sites and lack of access to proper water sanitation and hygiene facilities.66 In Gaza, cases of Hepatitis A have been confirmed in January 2024 and WHO warned that inhumane living conditions will enable Hepatitis A to continue to spread.67 Health system functionality. In February 2024, attacks against healthcare facilities, infrastructure and services continued resulting in 58 percent of the hospitals are not functioning in the Gaza Strip, especially in the northern governorates (75 percent of the hospitals not functioning). According to the Health Cluster, as of 5 March 2024, only 2 hospitals and no Primary Health Care Centres were fully functioning; 14 hospitals and 20 Primary Health Care Centres were partially functioning; while 23 hospitals and 62 Primary Health Centres were not functioning. Only 141 medical points in shelters were available, while 264 informal, public and UNRWA shelters did not have a medical centre available.68 In the northern governorates, hospitals have been offering limited maternity, trauma, surgery and emergency care services. They also face challenges such as a shortage of medical staff, including specialized surgeons, neurosurgeons, and intensive care staff, as well as a lack of medical supplies, and have an urgent need for fuel, food, and drinking water.69 In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, according to OCHA, since January 2024, three hospitals – Al Aqsa, Nasser, and Gaza European – were at risk of closure due to the issuance of evacuation orders in adjacent areas and the ongoing conduct of hostilities nearby. In Rafah, 5 hospitals are still functioning. The influx of IDPs migrating to Rafah has overwhelmed the bed availability in hospitals, leading to insufficient capacity to meet the healthcare needs of the population. There is also high need for primary health services in informal shelters hosting IDPs. The continued besiegement around some hospitals is significantly affecting their case management capacity. Referring patients outside of Gaza remains a challenge, as the waiting list continues to grow.70 In addition, people are unable to effectively access healthcare due to the lack of laboratory equipment and reagents needed for accurate diagnosis and testing.71 The risk to public health is intensified due to an acute scarcity of hygiene materials and adequate sanitation infrastructure. Persistent anecdotal reports of Hepatitis A cases in Gaza, as recorded by UNRWA and the Health Cluster, highlight ongoing concerns. Limited access to proper WASH facilities is hindering prevention of diseases. The high number of surgeries and procedures has led to increased demand for anaesthetic and analgesic medications which are in short supply. Blood and blood products in hospitals are needed for emergencies and medical procedures to ensure that patients receive timely transfusions.72 Figure 1. Gaza disease surveillance Source: WHO, Health Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF19 UNRWA stocks of medicines continue to decrease, with around 15 days’ supply remaining overall and one week’s supply of insulin; some items may run out sooner based on needs at shelters. Therefore, there is an urgent need to restock medical supplies given the depletion of stocks in the local market. Stocks of fuel and medicines continue to be at risk of depletion halting UNRWA operations at the health centres. Essential medicines and other critical medical supplies remain difficult to bring into the Gaza Strip due to strict control of allegedly dual-use items at border crossings and wider challenges with importing controlled drugs. As basic and specialty healthcare services in Gaza continue to deteriorate, an increase in excess deaths due to traumatic injuries that would otherwise be survivable with timely and appropriate care is expected. In December 2023, UNICEF delivered 962,550 doses of essential vaccines, including for measles, pneumonia, and polio. Opening of stabilization centres for acute malnutrition cases with medical complications are also planned notably in Tal as Sultan (Rafah) and another in one of the field hospitals.73 Heightened insecurity and limited access to health facilities continue to present major challenges for partners to respond and partner operations continue to be negatively affected by the displacement of staff, social stresses and telecommunication challenges.74 Water, sanitation, and hygiene Prior to the escalation of hostilities, the majority of the water supply in the Gaza Strip came from groundwater sources and the rest (around 20 percent) from desalination plants and cross border pipelines. The over pumping of groundwater in Palestine led to severe water pollution and salinization, especially in the Gaza Strip. More than 97 percent of the water pumped from the coastal aquifer in the Gaza Strip did not meet the water quality standards set by WHO (PCBS and PWA, 2021).75 Figure 13. Health system functionality. Source: WHO, Health Cluster Damage to WASH facilitiesSewage facilityWater facilityTotal% of Sewage facilities % of Water facilities% of Sewage and Water facilities Destroyed 9 68 77 7% 14% 13% Severe damage 23 64 87 19% 14% 15% Moderate damage 36 131 167 30% 28% 28% Possible damage 16 51 67 13% 11% 11% No visible damage 38 156 194 31% 33% 33% Total 122 470 592Figure 14. WASH facilities damaged, February 2024. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF20 Nitrate levels already exceeded 150 mg/litre in most areas of the Gaza Strip, which made the water undrinkable, given the World Health Organization (WHO) acceptable limit of 50 mg/litre. In 2019, the daily allocation of water per capita for domestic purposes was 77 litres/ capita in the Gaza Strip.77 Taking the high percentage of water pollution in the Gaza Strip and calculating the quantity of water suitable for human use, the per capita share of fresh water was 22.4 litres per day.78 Damage to WASH facilities. Based on satellite damage assessments on WASH infrastructure dated 21 February,79 13 percent of all sewage and water facilities have been destroyed (7 percent and 14 percent respectively), while in total over 56 percent have been either destroyed or damaged (13 percent and 34 percent respectively). Another 11 percent are assessed to have possible damage. Overall, this assessment identifies 77 facilities destroyed and 254 facilities damaged, with another 67 facilities with possible damage. Northern Gaza and Gaza Governorates have the highest concentration of reported damaged or destroyed infrastructure. The functionality of, or access to, the 194 facilities (38 and 156 respectively) that were found with no visible damage is conditional to access to fuel and spare parts, which are in very limited supply, as well as availability of technicians and access to areas with these assets. The combined damaged and conditional access to the remaining WASH infrastructure is expected to have a profound impact on the availability of water, water quality and presence of unsafe water or contaminants for populations in these areas. Water availability and drinking water. Water availability continues to be a major concern across the Gaza Strip. In February 2024, the water produced from all the water sources in Gaza accounted for only 5.7 percent of the pre-escalation production levels.80 According to OCHA, only 17 percent of the 284 groundwater wells are operating with limited hours and 39 wells have been reported as destroyed and 93 as moderately to severely damaged.81 Still according to OCHA, only one of the three cross border water pipelines is operating, functioning at 47 percent of its capacity. Plans to repair the non-functioning pipelines face challenges in terms of access, communication, or repair coordination considering the current context. The United Arab Emirate’s small desalination plant located on the Egyptian side of Rafah, operates at full capacity, providing 2,400 cubic metres per day, following the construction of a 3-kilometre transmission line. In addition, only two out of the three main water desalination plants are partially functional, mainly in the southern governorates.82 Water quality appears low due to lack of processing facilities or other way of contamination. According to another study (sample size of 1,200 people)83 conducted in the Gaza Strip in February 2024, access to water for drinking, bathing and cleaning, is estimated at 1.5 litre per person per day compared to the 15 litres minimum amount of water required for survival as per as the international SPHERE standards. Similar results from the WASH cluster rapid assessment conducted in 41 sites indicate a median value of 2 litres per person per day.84 Water production and distribution is a fuel intensive process and the overall WASH fuel allocation is currently 30,000 litres per day. From 24 January through 4 March, the WASH sector in the Gaza Strip accounted for 30 percent to 60 percent Map 5. WASH facilities damaged, February 2024. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF21 of all fuel entering the Gaza Strip, with limitations on diesel fuel entry a major impediment to meeting minimum water requirements throughout the Gaza Strip, especially in the northern governorates.85 In the northern governorates, water supply remains limited and no access to clean water has been reported.86 According to OCHA, as of 12 January 2024, the combination of water trucking, water from the functional desalination plant, and the restoration of one of the three main water supply lines on 30 December 2023, has yielded only seven percent of water production in Gaza, compared with the pre-October 2023 supply.87 In Rafah Governorate, according to the WASH cluster rapid assessment, the majority of the sites rely mainly on water trucking and piped water in scattered sites, and collective centres rely more heavily on wells.88 More than half of the sites provide water that is unsafe for drinking (67 percent in collective centres) and only 12 percent can provide water treatment at source. According to the Euromed study, in Rafah Governorate out of the 15 litres minimum amount of water a day required as per sphere standard, only 8 litres are available on average across sites (3 litres in collective centres), with a median of 2 litres per person per day, indicating high level of disparities among sites. Hygiene. According to the WASH cluster, in Rafah, 61 percent of the sites in collective centres and 71 percent in scattered sites have no shower89 and the average number of showers per person is about 3,500 in collective centres and 1,050 in scattered sites. Access and protection of most vulnerable population is also of high concern, with only 12 percent of the showers being accessible for people living with disabilities and only 24 percent of the sites having separated showers for women (14 percent in collective centres). Figure 15. Quantity and type of water sources per site. Source: WASH cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF22 An NRC assessment90 conducted in nine shelters in Rafah also stated that every assessed location had reported cases of “hepatitis A, gastroenteritis, diarrhoea, smallpox, lice, [and] influenza.” Solid Waste Management. In terms of waste management, most of the wastewater treatment systems have been suspended and non-functioning since November 2023, due to damage, lack of fuel/power supply, and lack of maintenance.91 Regarding solid-waste management, which was already a crucial issue before the escalation, the last UNRWA update on 16 January states that solid waste management continues in Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates and partially in Deir al-Balah Governorate, where approximately 45 truck loadings were transferred to temporary sites.92 However, according to the WASH cluster,93 93 percent of the sites (89 percent in collective centres and 100 percent in scattered sites) have some type of visible waste, mainly solid waste or trash and 68 percent of all the sites present informal or uncontrolled dumping areas. The accumulation of tens of thousands of tons of solid waste on the streets, around hospitals, IDP shelters, and various random dump sites, represent high public health risks. The Gaza Municipality also estimates that approximately 50,000 tons of solid waste remain unmanaged.94Figure 16. Quantity and type of water sources per site. Source: WASH cluster Figure 17. Waste management. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF23 Sanitation. Sanitation situation continues to deteriorate and remains a major issue in all governorates. Despite significant efforts by UNICEF and its partners to construct family latrines, sanitation coverage remains very low and efforts to increase coverage are hindered by a lack of cement and other construction materials, including due to constraints on the entry of items considered to be dual use into the Gaza Strip.95 With wastewater treatment plants non-functioning and many sewage facilities destroyed, especially in Gaza city, flooding has been a major health hazard through the rainy period as floodwater mixes with untreated sewage in urban areas with dense displaced populations.96 This is further compounded by the enduring fuel shortage, which impedes the operation of remaining sewage stations and wastewater treatment plants. According to the WASH Cluster, there is also an increasing concern about the potential for additional flooding of already contaminated rainwater harvesting lagoons, particularly if rainfall intensifies. This situation poses a critical threat to both the environment and public health.97 In early 2023, UNICEF reported that “insufficient safely managed water supply to households, poor sanitation, limited public WASH services, and risk of flooding expose 1.36 million Palestinians to water-related diseases risks” .98 The situation is exacerbated by continuous restricted access to essential sanitation supplies and services in Gaza.99 The inability to transport sufficient fuel into the Gaza Strip, and especially to the northern governorates, also significantly compounds the challenges faced by the WASH response.100 A rapid assessment of displacement sites, including scattered sites and collective centres, in Rafah Governorate was conducted by the WASH cluster in February 2024.101 63 percent of assessed sites reportedly had access to a sewer connection (78 percent in collective centres and 36 percent in scattered sites). Few sites reported using buckets/plastic bags, flush to open drain, septic tank, or flush to elsewhere as a sanitation facility. The median number of persons per toilet across all sites was 341, though 994 in collective centres and 57 in scattered sites. 80 percent of the 41 sites had non-functional latrines (74 percent in collective centers and 93 percent in scattered sites). Only 15 percent of sites had handwashing facilities near latrines. 24 percent of assessed sites offered safe and private latrine access and 51 percent had separate facilities for men and women. Sanitation facilities in collective centres and informal sites are overcrowded also due to the high number of displaced populations. According to UNRWA, on average, there are 1,109 IDPs per toilet in shelters in Rafah Governorate, 619 IDPs per toilet in shelters in Deir al-Balah Governorate, and 1,349 IDPs per toilet in Khan Younis Governorate.102 UNRWA also reports that there are at least 486 people per toilet in UNRWA shelters in Rafah Governorate.103 Figure 18. Sanitation quantities. Source: WASH Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF24 Figure 19. Sanitation facilities. Source: WASH Cluster Summary of Acute Malnutrition Drivers According to the Nutrition Vulnerability Study,104 conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster, over 90 percent of children aged 6-23 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women are eating two or fewer food groups each day, often those of the lowest nutritional value. At least 90 percent of children under five have had at least one infectious disease, with 70 percent having had diarrhoea in the previous two weeks. Against a minimum standard of 15 litres per person, 81 percent of households lack safe and clean water, with average daily household access to water reportedly less than one litre per person per day. This extreme lack of safe water access is especially concerning for the greater number of infants now reliant on infant formula than before the most recent escalation. Low clean water availability and access further exposes young children to infection and subsequently malnutrition. Figure 20: Acute malnutrition drivers. Source: Global Nutrition Cluster
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF25 Nutrition Outcomes There is very limited data on acute malnutrition available in Gaza since the start of the conflict on 7 October 2023. The only data that is available on acute malnutrition as of 9 Mar 2024 come from Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) screenings conducted in the three IPC AFI units of analysis, i.e. northern, middle and southern governorates. While some screenings included children 6-59 months, others almost exclusively measured only children between 6 and 23 months of age. Additionally, although some screenings contained individual MUAC and age data, others only had MUAC data at aggregate level. Of the screening data made available for the analysis, one set only included 45 children and therefore was not considered in the analysis. The remaining screening datasets were analysed as follows: Figure 21. Metadata, MUAC screening results. Source: Various - reanalysis conducted by the Global Smart Team For every screening that contained only aggregate MUAC data on children 6-59 months, first, unweighted prevalence estimates were calculated for the following age groups: (i) 6-59 months, (ii) 6-23 months, and (iii) 24-59 months. Secondly, weighted prevalence of MUAC among children between 6-59 months were calculated from the unweighted prevalence estimates of children 6-23 months and 24-59 months by applying weights of 0.33 and 0.66,105 respectively. Finally, the weighted prevalence estimates of 6-59 months were compared with the IPC Acute Malnutrition (IPC AMN) reference table and the IPC AMN Phases were determined. For each screening that only contained aggregate MUAC data on children 6-23 months, the MUAC prevalence of children between 23-59 months and weighted prevalence of MUAC among children 6-59 months were estimated using the following procedure. First, using data from screenings that contained MUAC data on children 6-59 months, the ratio between the MUAC prevalence of 6-23 months and 24-59 months was determined (this ranged from 3.07 to 9.68). Secondly, using sensitivity analysis, expected ranges of MUAC prevalence among children between 24-59 months were calculated using the lowest (3.07) and the highest (9.68) empirically observed ratios. Thirdly, a weighted analysis was performed, and a range of weighted prevalence estimates of children 6-59 months were obtained. Finally, the weighted prevalence estimates of 6-59 months were compared with the IPC Acute Malnutrition (IPC AMN) reference table and the possible IPC AMN Phases were determined.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF26 In conclusion: • In North Gaza Governorate , MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 2 - 3 (Alert - Critical) in January, having rapidly deteriorated to an indicative IPC AMN Phase of 4 - 5 (Critical - Extremely Critical) in February 2024. • In Khan Younis Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 3 - 4 (Serious - Critical) in February 2024. • In Deir al-Balah Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 1 - 2 (Acceptable - Alert) in February – early March 2024. • In Rafah Governorate, MUAC screenings are indicative of an IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 1 - 2 (Acceptable - Alert) in late January – early March. Figure 22. MUAC screening results. Source: Various - reanalysis conducted by the Global Smart Team
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF27 Mortality The analysis could not benefit from representative evidence of non-trauma mortality as intended by IPC Protocols (Crude Death Rate and Under Five Death Rate). The data available consisted in death counts issued by the Gaza Ministry of Health and reported by the Health Cluster, and interview data collected during CATI surveys conducted by WFP . Furthermore, a study on mortality and public health106 was conducted to inform humanitarian and other decision-makers working on the Gaza crisis by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Center for Humanitarian Health at Johns Hopkins University (LSHTM). The mortality data collected by the Ministry of Health are not disaggregated by area and appears to only be those attributable to conflict related violence. The WFP CATI survey data results can be disaggregated by area but not by cause of death. Therefore, no direct measurements of CDR or U5DR after trauma exclusion are currently available. Nonetheless, it worths noticing that the modelled projections published by LSHTM, while considered useful for indicating the expected direction of travel and scale of the expected excess mortality, the IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) found some of the assumptions factored in the study published in early February might have evolved in different directions, especially regarding food intake estimates and acute malnutrition. The absence of usable mortality data in both governorates leaves a high degree of uncertainty on the translation of these acute malnutrition rate into children and adult mortality in the current period in North Gaza. It is likely that these extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet translated into 2/10,000/day Crude Death Rate. The likelihood of having surpassed U5DR thresholds (4/10,000/day for children) is higher but impossible to ascertain.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF28 PROJECTED SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (16 March - 15 July 2024 ) Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.GovernorateTotal population analysedPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 3+Area Phase#people % #people % #people % #people % #people % #people % Deir al-Balah & Khan Younis governorates600,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 300,000 50 300,000 50 600,000 100 4 North Gaza & Gaza governorates300,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 90,000 30 210,000 70 300,000 100 5 Rafah governorate1,326,544 0 0 0 0265,309 20 464,290 35 596,945 45 1,326,544 100 4 Grand Total 2,226,544 0 0 0 0 265,309 12 854,290 38 1,106,945 50 2,226,544 100 Population table for the projected situation: 16 March - 15 July 2024
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF29 PROJECTED SITUATION OVERVIEW (16 March - 15 July 2024 ) In the most likely scenario, the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine), with reasonable evidence. Famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months. The Governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and the Governorate of Rafah, are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). During the projection period (16 March - 15 July), in the most likely scenario and under the assumption of an escalation of the conflict including a ground offensive in Rafah, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1,107,000 people) is expected to face IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), the most severe level in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale. The rest of the population is likely to be either in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (854,000 people, 38 percent of the population) or in Crisis (265,000 people, 12 percent of the population). During this period, the whole population of the Gaza Strip (2,230,000 people) will face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). North Gaza and Gaza Governorates In the most likely scenario, the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates are classified in IPC Phase 5 (Famine), with reasonable evidence. Famine is imminent and likely to occur within the next two months. In terms of magnitude, 70 percent of the population is likely to be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and 30 percent in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Continued conflict and the near-complete lack of access to the northern governorates for humanitarian organizations and commercial trucks will likely compound heightened vulnerabilities and extremely limited food availability, access, and utilization, as well as access to healthcare, water, and sanitation services. People’s ability to exit the northern governorates and move to locations with relatively greater food availability and access is likely to be very limited. Within the north, displacements are likely to remain frequent and localized; yet conditions in the shelters will continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs. As food stocks or sources (wild foods, livestock, or other types of food – from domestic stocks, shelters or agricultural assets) will continue to reduce, food availability is expected to be limited. With the very few humanitarian and commercial trucks entering these governorates, it is unlikely that households will be able to restock or stabilize their food consumption patterns. Due to scarce food availability, the vast majority of markets are either not functioning or availing very few Assumptions for the most likely scenario in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates Conflict: In the most likely scenario, the pop - ulation will likely remain fully exposed and highly susceptible to conflict. Conflict and related casualties will likely continue at simi - lar levels to January-February 2024, including the wider besiegement, neighbourhood-lev - el clearing operations, occasional armed actor clashes, and a comparable rate of bombardment (air, land, sea). Basic services infrastructure will likely remain extremely de - graded, and the proportion of all buildings damaged or destroyed will likely continue to steadily approach 100%. Humanitarian access to provide food, water, medicines, and provision of health and WASH services: The northern governorates are likely to be mostly inaccessible and intermittently hard-to-reach, given continued ground operations, bombardment (air, land, sea), civil unrest, bureaucratic impediments, and physical obstruction. The humanitarian space in the northern governorates will continue to be extremely restricted, thereby hampering the provision of the necessary supplies and services to the most vulnerable population. It will also hamper the capacity of humanitarian actors to monitor closely the situation on the ground and to intervene promptly to provide relief. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely continue to worsen, including due to intense and widespread conflict, largely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will increasingly inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance within the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely remain frequent and localized and conditions in shelters will continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs. food commodities at excessively high prices. As a result, communities’ coping capacity and social cohesion will be further strained. Social tensions are also likely to increase putting the most vulnerable at higher risk of exposure to violence and lower access to food. Physical access to markets is also of concern, due to restrictions of civilian mobility and conflict intensity. Utilization of food resources will also be heavily impacted as seasonal higher temperatures reduce food storage options in a context of no or extremely limited access to electricity, fuel and/or gas to preserve, process or cook food. The lack of access to sufficient and safe water, sanitation facilities and health services is likely to increase the risk of cholera and the spread of infectious diseases impacting people’s nutrition and health status and increasing mortality from non- trauma related causes. The restoration of public services will be a major challenge given that the majority of WASH facilities and infrastructure are damaged or destroyed.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF30 FRC analysis of acute malnutrition trends A detailed analysis of the drivers (risk factors) for acute malnutrition and the available data on nutritional status was provided by the Global Nutrition Cluster report on Nutrition Vulnerability in February 2024.7 Based on this report and their own analysis the IPC Analysis Team concluded that the key driver of acute malnutrition in the North Gaza governorate was the highly inadequate dietary diversity in Children 6–23m, with 79% consuming ≤2 food groups, 8 and also in Pregnant and Breastfeeding Women, with 95% consuming ≤2 food groups. The main food groups mentioned were non-vitamin A rich vegetables (24 affirmations), grains (20) and eggs (17). This situation highlights critically insufficient diet diversity and micronutrient intake before and during pregnancy and breastfeeding, which can affect both the women and the development of their infants. Infant and Young Chil - dren Feeding practices are highly constrained by the lack of resources and health seeking behavior is also highly constrained. Interviews conducted by the FRC with key informants and a review of available reports confirmed that the situation in the northern governates during the current analysis period was similar to that reported by the Analysis Team. The health and WASH situations are also considered separately belo w. Figure 23: Trends in GAM by MUAC Prevalence in North Gaza (children aged 6-59 mo.) Within the IPC unit of analysis, MUAC screening data9 was available from the North Governorate but not from Gaza City. The available data was collected as part of a vaccination programme and measurements were only taken from children aged 6-23 months. The FRC explored different methods for using this data to estimate the prevalence of GAM by MUAC in children aged 6-59 months. This was a necessary step to allow the classification of malnutrition according to IPC Phases. To provide a starting point for the trend analysis the prevalence of GAM by MUAC in North Gaza in 2023, before October 7th, was estimated at 1%. This is consistent with previous studies.11 Age-adjustment of the MUAC screening data resulted in a GAM by MUAC prevalence in January 2024 of 6.8% to 9.1%. By February this had risen to give a range of 12.4% to 16.5%, indicating a very steep increase in the incidence of acute malnutrition in children 6-59 mo. To estimate what the prevalence would be at the time of the current analysis in March 2024, two nowcasting scenarios were examined. Given the extremely poor situation regarding the drivers of malnutrition, the best-case scenario was that there had been a continued linear increase in prevalence, while the more likely scenario was that the rate of increase would have followed the observed trend and have increased further in the time since the February screening. These two scenarios were then applied to the high and low estimates for age-adjusted GAM by MUAC prevalence, resulting in the four dotted lines shown in Figure 2. This analysis indicates that in all scenarios the GAM by MUAC prevalence had passed the IPC Phase 4/5 threshold (Critical/Extremely Critical) in the current analysis period. Given the current trajectory in MUAC prevalence data it is clear that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition prevalence, measured using weight-for-height Z-scores, may have already been crossed or will be crossed imminently. These data were collected exclusively in North Gaza governorate.Healthcare availability and access will likely continue to decline, including due to lack of humanitarian access and inadequate delivery of critical supplies, as well as a decline in the functionality of the few remaining health centres. The risk of infectious diseases will likely continue to increase due to the extreme deterioration of the overall health environment. In line with the Famine Review Committee findings, people’s livelihoods and food consumption are likely to continue deteriorating, resulting in more than two thirds of the population (70 percent) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Acute Malnutrition will increase at a high pace as already observed in the past few weeks (current period) and mortality levels will likely breach the Famine thresholds (extremely critical) - by the end of May 2024.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF31 Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates These Governorates are projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), though with half of the population (300,000 people) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), up from 30 percent in the current period; and the other half (300,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). While this unit of analysis includes both Governorates, the conditions for the population in Khan Younis Governorate are expected to be worse than those in Deir al-Balah. The onset of a major ground operation in Rafah Governorate will likely be a major driver of deterioration in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates, including through an influx of displaced populations – many already displaced multiple times – into parts of these Governorates and the impact of the ground operation on humanitarian access. Ground operations are likely to continue throughout Khan Younis Governorate and in eastern Deir al-Balah Governorate. Displacement will likely escalate with large populations moving into the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis Governorate and into Deir al- Balah Governorate, especially in and around Deir al-Balah city and camp. Further displacement will likely stress already highly limited resources and basic services, exacerbating existing conditions. Shelter conditions are likely to deteriorate with continued deprivation of basic needs. Food availability and access are expected to further decline as the major ground operation in Rafah Governorate reduces humanitarian and commercial traffic into and throughout the Gaza Strip. This will be exacerbated by continued civil unrest outside the Kerem Shalom crossing, which will likely further reduce humanitarian and commercial truck entry. Fewer humanitarian convoys to these governorates are expected, including those unsuccessfully attempting to reach the northern governorates and offloading assistance in Deir al-Balah instead. The already limited agricultural production, mostly of vegetables, observed in the current period will likely continue to decline as ground operations are pursued within and near production areas of both governorates, especially in all areas of Khan Younis Governorate; and the harvest period for several vegetables comes to an end. Market functionality is likely to continue falling as agricultural production and humanitarian and commercial truck arrivals decline. Civilian mobility is likely to be severely constrained, further reducing access to food, including through coping strategies like gathering wild foods or scavenging. The end of the typical rainy period may also limit wild food availability. Compared to other governorates, Deir al-Balah Governorate had higher food availability in the current period, including due to higher deliveries of humanitarian food assistance (proportional to estimated Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Deir al Balah and Khan Younis Governorates Conflict: Conflict and related casualties will likely continue at similar levels to February 2024, including ground operations in mul - tiple but not all urban areas of Deir al-Balah and throughout Khan Younis governorate, frequent armed actor clashes especially in Khan Younis governorate, and a compa - rable rate of bombardment (air, land, sea). The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip will likely continue. Humanitarian access: Humanitarian access to Khan Younis and Deir al Balah governorate - including for the delivery of life-saving multi-sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations - is likely to be intermittently reduced, especially relative to the higher proportional delivery of assistance made to Deir al- Balah Governorate compared to other governorates in early 2024. This decrease in access is likely due to the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis governorate, bombardment (air, land, sea) in these governorates and within Deir al-Balah Governorate, and worsening civil unrest. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely escalate, driven by intense and widespread conflict as well as largely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will likely increasingly inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance throughout the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely escalate, with large populations moving into the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis governorate and into Deir al Balah governorate, especially the area of Deir al Balah city/camp. Shelter conditions will likely continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and increased sheltering in open spaces. population) in parts of January and February 2024. These deliveries appear to have partially resulted from the offloading of humanitarian food assistance that could not be delivered to the northern governorates. Any accumulated stocks in markets and households will provide at least a short-term buffer to some of the people in the early part of the projection period. Khan Younis Governorate received lower levels of humanitarian food assistance during that period, resulting in households likely to face larger food consumption gaps from the beginning of the projection period. With no major improvements in the availability of electricity, fuel, cooking gas, and safe water, food utilization will likely be a major limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates. This includes challenges to the safe storage and preparation
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF32 Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Rafah Governorate Conflict: Conflict will likely escalate, in - cluding the continuation of the wider besiegement, the onset of a new, major ground operation throughout Rafah gov - ernorate and concentrated on Rafah city, with armed actor clashes, and an increase in bombardment (air, land, sea). Humanitarian access: Humanitarian access to Rafah Governorate, including for the delivery of life-saving multi- sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, will likely be intermittently reduced, though without total access loss to the Rafah Governorate portion of the Al-Mawasi area, where an extreme concentration of displaced people is likely. Loss of access will be particularly high to populations remaining within Rafah city during the major ground operation likely to occur there. This disruption will likely result from the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), and civil unrest. Civil unrest: Civil unrest will likely continue, including due to intense and widespread conflict and severely insufficient basic service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. This will continue to inhibit the transport, distribution, and utilization of humanitarian assistance within the Gaza Strip. Displacement: Displacement will likely increase substantially, with most of the current population of Rafah city forced into the Al-Mawasi area of Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates and into Deir al-Balah Governorate, especially the area of Deir al- Balah city/camp. Conditions in shelters will likely continue to deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and increased sheltering in open spaces.of food, lack of safe access to water, and an increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. Full resumption of cross border water pipeline activity is unlikely, and the functionality of remaining wells and water distribution systems will likely decline. Wastewater treatment plants are likely to remain non-functioning. Solid waste management will continue to be limited. Healthcare availability and access will likely continue to decline, including due to lack of humanitarian access and inadequate delivery of critical supplies as well as a decline in the functionality of remaining health centres. Infectious disease risk will continue to increase due to the extreme deterioration of the overall health environment. Low and declining food availability, access, and utilization will likely lead to extreme gaps in food consumption and a collapse of coping capacities for the estimated 300,000 people (50 percent of the population) experiencing IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe); while large food consumptions gaps are expected for the 300,00 people (50 percent of the population) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). With the drivers of acute malnutrition expected to worsen (infectious diseases expected to increase, dietary diversity still severely restricted), the nutritional status of the people of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis will likely continue to deteriorate towards critical levels of acute malnutrition (IPC AMN Phase 4) during this period. Rafah Governorate The onset of a major ground operation in Rafah Governorate will likely drive a significant increase in acute food insecurity alongside other severe humanitarian consequences. The situation is projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), though with nearly half (45 percent) of the population (around 600,000 people) in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), up from 25 percent in the current period. The whole population of Rafah will likely be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, including over one third (about 464,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 12 percent (about 265,000 people) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Relative improvement in access into and within Rafah have been observed compared to the previous analysis, with the opening of a second border crossing in Kerem Shalom allowing more humanitarian and commercial supply for aid and markets, However, for the projection period, considering the most likely scenario of a major ground operation in Rafah, the humanitarian access and space are likely to reduce due to the escalating hostilities and populations will face continued and repeated displacement in search of “safer” areas. As many IDPs already face poor food security, nutrition, health and WASH outcomes, further displacement will likely cause further deterioration. Existing mitigation measures from humanitarian services or programmes are likely to be disrupted by conflict or sizeable displacements and may cause further family separation or marginalization of the most vulnerable. Local production will be minimal and difficult to access and agricultural activities (crop production, livestock herding or fishing) will either not be pursued or remain very limited due to lack of agricultural inputs, access to assets or land and geographical concentration of displaced populations. Further disruptions to market supplies and prices are likely to continue and decrease access to food through markets. Markets or traders may be displaced along with the population, impacting their ability to restock or remain functional, especially as populations move further away from border crossings and fewer trucks enter the Gaza
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF33 Strip. Market-based interventions will continue to be challenged by high levels of displacement, including of the staff of financial service providers, and a wider loss of enabling condition, including an adequate electricity supply and functional telecommunications services, physical cash availability and access, and functioning markets able to absorb any rapid increases in demand. Physical access to humanitarian assistance and markets will be hindered. There will likely be a disruption in social support systems (e.g. community kitchens) and increased tensions within the community. Rising temperatures and declining access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene will likely lead to challenges in safe food storage and preparation, and a rise in waterborne diseases or food borne illnesses. Scarcity of firewood will force people to resort to using unsafe materials, increasing health risks. Explosive remnants will raise concerns about personal, food and water safety. Health outcomes and morbidity are expected to deteriorate in this period and even more so with increased overcrowding, further displacement and/or lower access to health services. A major decrease in food availability, access, and utilization will likely cause extreme gaps in food consumption and the exhaustion of people’s coping strategies. Acute malnutrition is likely to increase towards IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) as food insecurity, the health environment, and infant and young childcare and feeding practices deteriorate due to conflict escalation, displacement, and reduced delivery of, and access to multi-sector humanitarian assistance.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF34 COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS In comparison to the previous analysis (projection period December 2023 – 7 February 2024), the total share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) across the Gaza Strip continues to increase, from 26 percent to 30 percent in the current period (mid-February to mid-March 2024) and 50% in the projection period (mid-March to mid-July). In the northern governorates, the share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) increased from 30 percent to 55 percent in the current period and 70% in the projected period, representing an increase of about 100,000 people and 530,000 people, respectively. Figure 24. Population phase classifications in the Gaza StripFigure 25. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in the Gaza Strip Figure 27. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Northern Governorates Figure 29. Evolution of populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Southern GovernoratesFigure 26. Population phase classifications in North Gaza and Gaza Governorates Figure 28. Population phase classifications in Southern Governorates
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF35 From the first WFP survey of November-December 2023 to its second survey of December 2023-February 2024, the proportion of households reporting a Poor FCS increased 14 percentage points to 66 percent in the northern governorates, nine points to 27 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and remained steady at 22 percent in Rafah Governorate. Over the same two surveys, the proportion of households reporting Severe and Very Severe HHS results increased by 44 percentage points to 84 percent in the northern governorates, 35 percentage points to 57 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates, and 37 percentage points to 56 percent in Rafah Governorate. 107 Figure 30. FCS in the Gaza Strip Figure 31. HHS trends in the Gaza Strip
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF36 RISK OF FAMINE ANALYSIS As per the IPC tools and technical guidance, an IPC statement on the risk of Famine differs from a Famine classification. While a projected Famine classification is based on the most likely scenario, the risk of Famine refers to the worst case scenario that has a reasonable and realistic chance of happening. The risk of Famine is only a statement and not a classification and was designed to complement the standard IPC projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of a potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated. The elements considered when developing the worst case scenario are described below. Factor/element Risk of Famine Scenario - Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis GovernoratesRisk of Famine Scenario – Rafah Governorate Primary Drivers ConflictConflict would escalate to levels seen in December 2023-January 2024 when a major ground operation was conducted in Bureij and Maghazi camps of Deir al-Balah Governorate. This would include expanding and intensified ground operations across all central camps alongside neighbourhood-level clearing operations throughout Khan Younis Governorate, frequent armed actor clashes, and increased bombardment (air, land, sea).. Expanded ground operations within Deir al-Balah Governorate would not necessarily be concurrent with a major ground operation on Rafah. The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip would intensify.Conflict would rapidly escalate, including the onset of a new, wide-ranging, and large- scale ground operation throughout Rafah Governorate and concentrated on Rafah city, intense and frequent armed actor clashes, and a large increase in bombardment (air, land, sea). The wider besiegement of the Gaza Strip would intensify. Humanitarian AccessHumanitarian access, including for the delivery of life-saving multi-sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, to Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorate would severely reduce, including due to the onset of major ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, the later resumption of major ground operations in Deir al-Balah Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), the closure of the Rafah border crossing and reduction in crossings at Kerem Shalom, and public order collapse.Humanitarian access to Rafah Governorate, including for the delivery of life-saving multi- sector assistance to the most vulnerable populations and data collection, would severely reduce. Access to populations remaining within Rafah city during the major ground operation would be completely lost, while access to the extreme concentration of displaced people in the Rafah portion of the Al-Mawasi area would be intermittent. This disruption would result from the onset of major, rapid ground operations in Rafah Governorate, continued ground operations in Khan Younis Governorate, intensified bombardment (air, land, sea), the closure of the Rafah border crossing and reduction in crossings at Kerem Shalom, and public order collapse.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF37 Factor/element Risk of Famine Scenario - Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis GovernoratesRisk of Famine Scenario – Rafah Governorate Secondary Drivers Civil unrestAlready strained, public order would collapse, involving widespread and intense civil unrest, including looting, riots, vigilantism, escalating violence among various social groups, and a wider breakdown of social cohesion. This collapse would heavily constrain humanitarian operations through reducing access and inhibiting the ability to conduct critical activities like distributions, especially to the most vulnerable population groups. The United Nations presence within the Gaza Strip, including offices and storage facilities, would be particularly impacted, including by violence and looting. The loss of social cohesion would involve the loss of most remaining socially- based coping, such as receiving food or cash through social networks outside of immediate family.Already strained, public order would collapse, involving widespread and intense civil unrest, including looting, riots, vigilantism, escalating violence among various social groups, and a wider breakdown of social cohesion. This collapse would heavily constrain humanitarian operations through reducing access and inhibiting the ability to conduct critical activities like distributions, especially to the most vulnerable population groups. The United Nations presence within the Gaza Strip, including offices and storage facilities, would be particularly impacted, including by violence and looting. The loss of social cohesion would involve the loss of most remaining socially- based coping, such as receiving food or cash through social networks outside of immediate family. DisplacementRapid mass displacement would occur, mostly to the Al-Mawasi area across Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates, with an extreme concentration of IDPs there. Outflow to Deir al-Balah Governorate would be limited. No mass exit of civilians from the Gaza Strip is considered. Rapid mass displacement would occur, mostly to the Al-Mawasi area across Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates, with an extreme concentration of IDPs there. A small civilian population in Rafah city would be isolated and inaccessible. Outflow to Deir al-Balah Governorate would be limited. No mass exit of civilians from the Gaza Strip is considered. Shelter conditionsShelter conditions would deteriorate, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and a large increase in sheltering in open spaces. Shelter conditions would collapse, including extreme deprivation of basic needs, extreme overcrowding, and widespread sheltering in open spaces.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF38 Impact on Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition elements Food availability (from assistance, private sector and production)Food Availability would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates, including due to intensified besiegement, severe humanitarian access constraints, conflict escalation, severely reduced market functionality, and extreme population concentration. Food Availability would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate, including due to intensified besiegement, severe humanitarian access constraints, conflict escalation, severely reduced market functionality, and extreme population concentration in the Al-Mawasi area. Food access (physical, social, prices)Food Access would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates due to declining food availability, freedom of movement, and reduced humanitarian and commercial traffic. Food Access would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate due to large declines in food availability, freedom of movement, and humanitarian and commercial traffic, including for populations remaining within Rafah city during conflict escalation and those in extremely crowded conditions within the Al-Mawasi area. UtilizationUtilization would be an extreme limiting factor in Khan Younis and Deir al- Balah gGovernorates. This includes challenges to the safe storage and preparation of food, lack of access to water, and a rapidly increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. Utilization would be an extreme limiting factor in Rafah gGovernorate. This includes severe challenges to the safe storage and preparation of food, extreme lack of access to water, and a rapidly increasing incidence of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea, among the general population. HealthThe provision of healthcare would largely end, driven by extremely inadequate delivery of critical supplies and a final collapse in the functionality of the remaining health centres. The provision of healthcare would largely end, driven by extremely inadequate delivery of critical supplies and a final collapse in the functionality of the remaining health centres. WASHAccess to water – safe or unsafe – would be extremely limited, with no cross-border water distribution, a limited number of functional wells, and limited water trucking. Wastewater treatment facilities would remain non-functioning. Access to water – safe or unsafe – would be extremely limited, with no cross-border water distribution, a limited number of functional wells, and limited water trucking. Wastewater treatment facilities would remain non- functioning.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF39 Conclusions on the Risk of Famine Following the Famine Review Committee Recommendations, the risk of Famine conclusions for the two unit of analysis has been merged. Given the continued catastrophic food security situation across the entire Gaza Strip, a risk of Famine analysis was done for Deir al Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah Governorates. This analysis considered whether Famine will occur under a reasonable worst-case scenario during the projection period through 15 July 2024. An analysis for the northern governorates was not performed as the FRC is projecting Famine in those areas under the most likely scenario. The FRC considered the assumptions for the worst-case scenario made by the Analysis Team regarding the evolution of the conflict and the expected impacts on food security and acute malnutrition to be plausible for all three governorates. The intensity of the conflict and the extent of humanitarian space will determine the magnitude and directions of population movement within the Gaza Strip. It is currently impossible to ascertain the destination(s) of these human-made displacements, however any further concentration of population in any already highly populated area, for instance as a consequence of an escalation in the Rafah Governorate driving hundreds of thousands towards Al-Mawasi and the surrounding areas, will significantly increase the risk of Famine. The FRC considered the risk of Famine statement made by the Analysis Team about Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates to be plausible. Given the high degree of uncertainty and fluidity of the situation with displacements likely forcing people to move to and from multiple localities, the FRC felt it was appropriate to group together all three of the southern governates for a risk of Famine analysis rather than to separate the governates as different units of analysis. Forced displacement will increase the risk of Famine because of overcrowding, poor supply of food, water, and medicines, and limited provision of health and wash services, which will expose the displaced population to epidemic outbreaks. The FRC reached technical consensus that, under a reasonable worst-case scenario, there is a risk of Famine across the entire middle and southern areas of the Gaza Strip during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July 2024. The cessation of hostilities together with the restoration of humanitarian space to deliver multi-sectoral assistance and restore services are essential steps in mitigating the risk of Famine.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF40 CONCLUSIONS OF THE FAMINE REVIEW COMMITTEE (FRC) This report is the second time that the Famine Review Committee has reviewed analysis conducted by a multi-agency, multi-sectoral Analysis Team to determine the current and projected food security situation in the Gaza Strip. The first analysis, conducted in December 2023, determined that there was a risk of Famine within the projection period of December 2023 to May 2024, and that the risk would increase for each day that the intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access persisted or worsened. The findings of the FRC’s latest review confirm that Famine is now projected and imminent in the North Gaza and Gaza Governorates and is expected to become manifest between mid-March 2024 and May 2024. The Famine threshold for acute food insecurity has already been far exceeded and the steeply increasing trend in malnutrition data indicates that it is highly likely that the Famine threshold for acute malnutrition has also been exceeded. The FRC expects the upward trend in non-trauma mortality to accelerate and for all Famine thresholds to be passed imminently. It is vital to note that the projected Famine can be prevented or alleviated. All evidence points towards a major acceleration of deaths and malnutrition. Waiting for a retrospective Famine classification before acting is indefensible. The FRC concludes that Famine is imminent unless there is an immediate cessation of hostilities and full access is granted to provide food, water, medicines, and protection of civilians as well as to restore and provide health, water, and sanitation services, and energy (electricity, diesel, and other fuel) to the population in the northern governorates. In the current period (leading up to mid-March), the FRC finds the conclusions of the IPC Analysis Team for the northern governorates to be plausible (IPC Phase 4 Emergency). However, the FRC highlighted that: (i) Famine thresholds for acute food insecurity have already been surpassed; (ii) Famine thresholds for acute malnutrition (Extremely Critical) have likely already been surpassed; (iii) It is likely that these extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet translated into a Crude Death Rate above 2/10,000/day. The likelihood of having surpassed Under-Five Death Rate thresholds (4/10,000/day for children) is higher but impossible to ascertain. For the Governorates of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah , the FRC considers the findings of the Analysis Team for the current period (IPC Phase 4 – Emergency) to be plausible. The projection period identified by the Analysis Team is mid-March 2024 to mid-July 2024. The FRC considers the most likely scenarios and conclusions of the Analysis Team for the projected period (IPC Phase 4 – Emergency) to be plausible. However, given the high uncertainty over how the situation will evolve and a high degree of fluidity given the intensity of the conflict, forced displacements, and constricted humanitarian access in the next 4 months, the FRC recommends grouping all southern governates together for a risk of Famine analysis . Thus, for the combined southern and middle governates, the FRC concludes that there is a risk of Famine during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July in a worst-case scenario with a reasonable chance of occurring. The primary drivers of the food security, nutrition, and mortality situation in Gaza Strip are the conflict intensity and highly constrained/restricted access, defined as the ability of humanitarian and private actors to deliver the necessary supplies and services to the most vulnerable population. Only an immediate and sustainable cessation of hostility, accompanied by a sustained supply of food, water, medicines, protection services, and provision of health and sanitation services to the population can reduce acute malnutrition and excess mortality. Provision of electricity/fuel supplies for water trucking, pumps, health services, restoration of agricultural production, and other essential needs are also critical, along with support for unrestricted civilian communications within and outside of the Gaza Strip. The actions needed to prevent Famine require an immediate political decision for a ceasefire together with a significant and immediate increase in humanitarian and commercial access to the entire population of Gaza. If this does not happen fully and immediately, even if Famine is avoided in the near term, the impact on mortality and the lives of Palestinians now, and in future generations, will increase markedly with every day.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF41 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION Famine can be halted. The rapidly escalating hunger crisis in the Gaza Strip must immediately be curbed. This requires putting an end to the hostilities, mobilizing necessary resources and ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza. Response Priorities Overall recommendations • Restore humanitarian access to the entire Gaza Strip. • Stop the fast-paced deterioration of the food security, health and nutrition situation leading to excess mortality through: (i) the restoration of health, nutrition, and WASH services and the protection of civilians; and (ii) the provision of safe, nutritious, and sufficient food to all the population in need. • The sustained supply of sufficient aid commodities, including but not limited to food, medicines, specialist nutrition products, fuel, and other necessities should be allowed to enter and move throughout the entire Gaza Strip by road. Traffic of commercial goods should also be fully resumed to meet the volume of commodities required. Programmatic recommendations • Deliver acute malnutrition treatment services, specifically CMAM and IYCF-E services throughout the Gaza Strip, with a particular emphasis on opening stabilization centres in the north. • Supply ready-to-use formula for non-breastfed infants and ensure sufficient access to safe drinking water if preparation is required. • Provide complimentary foods and micronutrient supplements for young children, as well as pregnant and lactating women, the chronically ill, and the elderly. • Restore the functioning of market infrastructures and bakeries combined with cash-based interventions where feasible. • Rehabilitate food production systems as soon as possible, including horticulture, livestock, and fishing. Situation Monitoring and Update Considering the volatility of the context and the changing environment, the following risk factor elements should be monitored continuously: • Intensity and extension of hostilities • Humanitarian access to supply food, water medicines, non-food items • Functionality and access to the health system and WASH supplies and services • Entry of commodities though the Gaza Strip whether through commercial trucks or food assistance by truck or airdrops • Population displacements and conditions in collective centres and scattered sites • Morbidity and disease outbreaks • Acute malnutrition and mortality, with a distinction of the trauma and non-trauma causes
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF42 PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY Similar to the previous analysis conducted in December 2023, the IPC Global Partnership completed an IPC analysis for the Gaza Strip to inform critical humanitarian information needs. Country led IPC analyses are the cornerstone of the IPC process and will continue to be so. In the case of the Gaza Strip, with the onset of the conflict and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe, there was a critical need for an IPC analysis. Without an active country Technical Working Group, the IPC Global Partnership made use of its non-TWG led analysis process to inform decision-making around the crisis in the Gaza Strip. The analysis was conducted remotely from 26 February to 1 March by over 40 experts from 18 agencies, applying standard IPC protocols, and made use of publicly available data from a wide range of courses on the conditions in the Gaza Strip (see below). Based on IPC protocols, the level of evidence of this analysis was assessed as “Medium” (level 2) for each of the three units of analysis. At the analysis completion, the Famine Review Committee was activated to review the Analysis Team’s findings. Their conclusions were adopted by the Analysis Team. Sources The main sources of data used to conduct this analysis include: • FAO, A rapid geospatial damage assessment of the 2023 conflict in the Gaza Strip on agricultural land and infrastructure , February 2024. • Food Security Sector, Sitrep #7 - 13 , 1 December 2023 to March 2024, FSS Gaza Updates. • Gaza Cash Working Group, Emergency MPCA – Gaza 2023, Joint PDM results overview , 15 February 2024. • Global Nutrition Cluster, Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis / Gaza , February 2024. • Health Cluster, Dashboard . • iDMC, Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip , February 2014. • London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024 • OCHA, Damage to Gaza’s agricultural sector , 30 September 2014. • OCHA, Flash Updates #70 - 136 , 15 December 2023 – 11 March 2024. • OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshots - Gaza Strip , March 2024. • OCHA, Population Estimates , February 2024. • Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey , 2022 - Annual Report , 2022. • Shelter Cluster Palestine, Shelter in Crisis: Joint Advocacy Statement , 24 November 2023. • UNICEF, Post-distribution Monitoring Repor t, 29-31 January 2024. • UNITAR and UNOSAT, I mpact of the 2014 Conflict in the Gaza Strip , September 2014. • UNOSAT, Agricultural damage assessments , 17 November 2023, 13 December 2023, 31 January 2024. • UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch tracking , March 2024. • Van den Hoek, J. and Scher, C., Gaza Strip Damage Maps, 2023-2024, Decentralized Damage Mapping Group. • WASH Cluster, Rapid WASH Assessment Preliminary Findings, 21 February 2024. • WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #4-7 , December 2023 – March 2024. • WFP , mVAM Survey , 19 February 2024. • World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy , December 2023.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF43 What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity? The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on interna - tional standards. The IPC consists of four mu - tually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consen - sus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and compa - rability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and pro - gramming. For the IPC, acute food insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity. Contact for further Information IPC Global Support Unit www.ipcinfo.org IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in the Gaza Strip. Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Contre la Faim, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC, FAO, FEWS NET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP , UNICEF, WFP , WHO and the World Bank. Phase 1 None/Minimal Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.Phase 2 Stressed Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress- coping strategies.Phase 3 Crisis Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.Phase 4 Emergency Households either: • have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidationPhase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine Households experience an extreme lack of food and/or cannot meet other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For Famine Classi cation, area needs to have extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.Acute Food Insecurity Phase name and descriptionLimitations of the Analysis Given the major access constraints, data on food security outcomes was collected using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). Quality concerns regarding the use of this methodology including the representativeness, and potential biases associated with mobile network coverage and ownership were discussed at length during the previous round of IPC analysis (for data collected in November 2023). The Analysis Team concluded that the data meets the requirements set by the IPC and were the same for this analysis, especially considering the number of observations. Through the efforts of partners, gaps in nutrition information were filled through screening information. The high degree of volatility around the conflict limits the ability to consider longer analysis periods. Scenarios on the evolution of the conflict were developed in conjunction with conflict experts to the best of their knowledge and expertise.
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF44 ENDNOTES 1 PCBS Labour Force Survey, 2022 - Annual Report , 2022, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2658.pdf 2 World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy , December 2023, https://thedocs. worldbank.org/en/doc/7600aee6c75eff4cf9b71ea1fe4016db-0280012023/original/NoteWBG-dec11-CLEAN.pdf 3 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Occupied Palestinian Territories , January 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ humanitarian-needs-overview-2023 4 OCHA and REACH, Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 2022 conducted in the occupied Palestinian territory , July 2022, https://www.ochaopt.org/msna/2022/MSNA-Cross-cutting-Report-2022.pdf 5 WFP , Palestine Country Brief , September 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/wfp- palestine-country-brief-september-2022 6 Health Cluster Dashboard, Occupied Palestinian Territory , March 2024, Microsoft Power BI 7 OCHA, Escalation in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #1 as of 18:00, 7 October 2023, https://www.unocha. org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/escalation-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-1-1800-7- october-2023 8 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #21, 27 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-21 9 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #56, 1 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-56 10 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #116, 12 Feb 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-116 11 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update , 26 December 2023, https://www.understandingwar.org/ backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2023 12 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update , 28 February 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ iran-update-february-28-2024 13 WFP , UN Food Agency pauses deliveries to the North of Gaza , 20 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/un-food- agency-pauses-deliveries-north-gaza 14 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024 6 March 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024 15 ACAPS, Palestine - Humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip: five months into the recent hostilities , 8 March 2024, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240308_ACAPS_Palesstine_Gaza_humanitarian_ access_note.pdf 16 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #8, 14 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-8 17 IDF Spokesman, IDF evacuation route announcement (Tweet), 13 October 2023, X, https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/ status/1712846493747495223 18 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #56, 1 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-56 19 IASC, Statement by Principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Humanitarian chiefs will not take part in unilateral proposals to create “safe zones” in Gaza , 16 November 2023, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/about-inter- agency-standing-committee/statement-principals-inter-agency-standing-committee-humanitarian-chiefs-will-not- take-part 20 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #20, 26 October 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-20-enarhe 21 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #49, 24 November 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-49
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF45 22 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #6, 12 October 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-6 23 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #117, 13 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-117 24 OCHA, Shelters and IDPs dashboard , February 2024. 25 UNHCR, Gaza Crisis 2023 Shelter Situation Update , 7 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-crisis-2023-shelter-situation-update-7th-january-2024 26 OCHA, Shelters and IDPs dashboard , February 2024 27 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #117, 13 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-117 28 Van den Hoek, J. and Scher, C., Gaza Strip Damage Maps , Decentralized Damage Mapping Group, 2023-2024, https:// www.conflict-damage.org/ 29 UNOSAT, Agricultural damage assessments , 17 November 2023, 13 December 2023, 31 January 2024, https://unosat. org/products/ 30 FAO, A rapid geospatial damage assessment of the 2023 conflict in the Gaza Strip on agricultural land and infrastructure , February 2024, https://www.nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition- vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf 31 FAO, Overview of the damage to agricultural land and infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 15 February 2024 , 28 February 2024, http://www.fao.org/3/cc9792en/cc9792en.pdf 32 WFP , mVAM Survey , 19 February 2024 33 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch tracking , March 2024. 34 WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #6 , 2 February 2024, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP- 0000156177/download/?_ga=2.88114139.1989739434.1710023558-981095887.1696492379 From 19 December 2023 to 21 January 2024, WFP sought to contact 72 shops but received a response from only 11 shops, of which 7 were operational. This limited response was attributed to frequent telecommunication disruptions in the Gaza Strip during the mentioned period. The primary focus was on Rafah, where 6 shops participated in the WFP survey on January 21, and one in Khan Younis. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Food Security Sector (Palestine), Sector Update #13 , 19 January 2024, https://fscluster.org/state-of-palestine/ document/fss-gaza-updates 38 Gaza Cash Working Group, Meeting Minutes , 6 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 39 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact , 19 February 2024 at 15:00, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-19-february-2024-1500 40 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-February 2024, 6 March 2024, https://www. ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024?_gl=1*tdp1i0*_ ga*MTEwNjk4NDg0LjE3MDk3NDIwNzg.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTcwOTgwMDIxOC4yLjEuMTcwOTgwMTI3OS41NS4wLjA 41 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 42 WFP , UN Food Agency pauses deliveries to the North of Gaza , 20 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/un-food- agency-pauses-deliveries-north-gaza 43 WFP , WFP food deliveries to northern Gaza face further setbacks, 5 March 2024, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-food- deliveries-northern-gaza-face-further-setbacks 44 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #136 , 11 March 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-136
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF46 45 Gaza Cash Working Group, Emergency MPCA – Gaza 2023, Joint PDM results overview , 15 February 2024, https://drive. google.com/drive/folders/17wI2GlSITludiA126Bry6L37E4aO0Plx 46 Ibid. 47 Gaza Cash Working Group, Meeting Minutes , 13 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 48 FAO, European Union and CIRAD, Food Systems Profile - Palestine, 2023, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc7323en 49 ECHO, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Palestine, 19 December 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/humanitarian-implementation-plan-hip-palestine-echopsebud202491000-version-1 50 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #71 , 16 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-71 51 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #71 , 16 December 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-71 ; OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #99, 22 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-99 52 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 53 OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | End-January 2024 , 5 February 2024, https://www.unocha.org/ publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-january-2024 54 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #54 , November 2023, https://www.unocha.org/publications/ report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-54 55 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 56 WFP , mVAM Survey, 19 February 2024. 57 In the November - December mVAM survey of WFP , the sampling design was not designed to be representative at governorate-level for Rafah, nor for any other single governorate. Only 63 completed questionnaires were recorded in that survey round for Rafah governorate. Comparisons between the November-December 2023 survey round and the December 2023-February 2024 survey round for Rafah governorate are only indicative given the non- representative sample from the first round. Additionally, the continued displacement recorded in the governorate of Rafah after 5 December 2023 calls for additional caution when comparing Rafah governorate results across the two survey rounds. 58 WFP , mVAM Survey , 6 December 2023 and 19 February 2024. 59 Ibid. 60 Food Economy Group, The practitioner’s guide to the Household Economy Analysis , p 141. https://foodeconomy.com/ wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-Practitioners-Guide-to-HEA.pdf 61 This paragraph is uniquely informed by the Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster. Most of the text is a direct quote. The report is based on: (1) UNICEF, Post-distribution Monitoring Report , 29-31 January 2024. In North Gaza, the UNICEF PDM survey gathered responses on the diet diversity for 47 children aged 6-23 month in North Gaza; in Khan Younis: PBW=31, children aged 6-23 month = 31; Deir Al Balah: PBW = 34, children aged 6-23 month = 103, Rafah: PBW = 299, children aged 6-23 month = 270. (2) WFP , mVAM CATI Survey. 62 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario- Based Health Impact Projections (gaza-projections.org) 63 WFP , Gaza Market Monitoring Flash Update #6 , 2 February 2024, https://www.wfp.org/publications/202324-wfp- palestine-monthly-market-dashboard 64 Ibid. 65 WHO, oPT emergency Situation Update Issue 22 , 30 January 2024, https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/Sitrep_-_ issue_22.pdf?ua=1
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF47 66 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #88 , 9 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-88 67 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #97 , 19 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-97 68 UNRWA, Gaza Supply and Dispatch Tracking, March 2024. 69 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #89 , 10 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-89-enar#:~:text=A%20total%20of%2019%20 homes,demolished%20and%2078%20people%20displaced 70 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incidents 71 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #115 , 9 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-115 72 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incident) 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 FAO, Food systems profile on Palestine, 2023 https://www.fao.org/3/cc7323en/cc7323en.pdf ; PCBS and PWA, Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day, 22 March 2021, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post. aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4468 76 Fanack Water, Why is there a water crisis in Gaza? , 201521, https://water.fanack.com/why-gaza-is-running-out-of-fresh- water/ 77 PCBS and PWA, Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day, 22 March 2021, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post. aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4468 78 FAO, Food systems profile on Palestine, 2023 , https://www.fao.org/3/cc7323en/cc7323en.pdf 79 WASH Cluster, Gaza Strip: WASH facilities damage assessment , February 2024. 80 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 14 February 2024 , Meeting minutes -URL 84 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting minutes - URL 85 Ibid. 86 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #124 , 22 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-124 87 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #91 , 12 January 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-91 88 WASH Cluster, Rapid WASH Assessment Preliminary Findings, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 89 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 90 NRC, Gaza: Israel’s military operation in Rafah would be fatal for displaced civilians and humanitarian aid, 8 February 2024, https://www.nrc.no/news/2024/february/gaza-israels-military-operation-in-rafah-would-be-fatal-for-displaced- civilians-and-humanitarian-aid/
THE GAZA STRIP | IPC SPECIAL BRIEF48 91 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/ occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120-enarhe#:~:text=West%20Bank%20 Updates&text=Since%207%20October%202023%2C%20OCHA,to%20property%20(61%20incident 92 UNRWA, UNRWA Situation Report # 80 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, 21 February 2024, https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation- report-80-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-Jerusalem?__cf_chl_tk=Fbky2q_ a29r0Fy3TD8TlVYbtpJ1PGIxBrGSYCIw7nMw-1710157363-0.0.1.1-1727 93 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes, 21 February 2024 , Meeting Minutes - URL 94 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #105 , 30 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied- palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-105-enarhe 95 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 96 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #124 , 22 February 2024, https://www.unocha.org/ publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-124 97 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 24 January 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 98 UNICEF, State of Palestine Humanitarian Situation Report No. 3 : 1 January to 31 December 2022, March 2023, https:// reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unicef-state-palestine-humanitarian-situation-report-no-3-1- january-31-december-2022 99 OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #120 , 16 February 2024, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-120 100 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 24 January 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 101 WASH Cluster, Meeting Minutes , 21 February 2024, Meeting Minutes - URL 102 WASH Cluster. Sanitation data in collective centers shared with the IPC Analysis Team , 28 February 2024. 103 UNRWA, Situation Report #64 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem , 15 January 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unrwa-situation-report-64-situation-gaza-strip-and- west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-all-information-11-13-january-2024-valid-13-january-2024-2230-enar 104 Global Nutrition Cluster, Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis / Gaza , February 2024, https://www. nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition-vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf 105 In an age-balanced sample, approximately two thirds (~66%) of the sample is over 2 years old. 106 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Health in Humanitarian Crises Centre, John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario-based Health Impact Projections , 6 February 2024. Crisis in Gaza: Scenario- Based Health Impact Projections (gaza-projections.org) 107 In the November - December mVAM survey of WFP , the sampling design was not designed to be representative at governorate-level for Rafah, nor for any other single governorate. Only 63 completed questionnaires were recorded in that survey round for Rafah governorate. Comparisons between the November-December 2023 survey round and the December 2023-February 2024 survey round for Rafah governorate are only indicative given the non- representative sample from the first round. Additionally, the continued displacement recorded in the governorate of Rafah after 5 December 2023 calls for additional caution when comparing Rafah governorate results across the two survey rounds.

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Norwegian: Statement of the ICL on the 18th of March – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


Proletarer i alle land, foren dere!

18. MARS – DAGEN FOR SOLIDARITET MED POLITISKE FANGER – TIL ÆRE FOR DE KOMMUNISTISKE OG REVOLUSJONÆRE FANGENE

18. mars er den internasjonale dagen for solidaritet med politiske fanger. Rød Hjelp ble grunnlagt av Komintern i 1920, og erklærte i 1923 18. mars, datoen for grunnleggelsen av Pariskommunen, som «den internasjonale dagen for solidaritet med politiske fanger» og viet den til de politiske fangene. 18. mars uttrykkes solidaritet med politiske fanger over hele verden.

I hver periode av historien har det vært stor motstand mot systemene for utbytting og undertrykkelse som vi har levd i i tusenvis av år, og en høy pris har blitt betalt. De herskende klassers reaksjon mot enhver kamp mot de herskende utbyttingssystemene, mot enhver motstand, har vært den samme: å knuse enhver bevegelse mot deres eksistens for å opprettholde sin eksistens og fremfor alt å ødelegge de som ledet disse bevegelsene. Som følge av raseriet som har bygget seg opp mot den herskende orden, kan dynamikken som springer ut av ønsket om og innsatsen for å endre den eksisterende orden bare styres i riktig retning under korrekt lederskap. Det er derfor de herskende klassene ønsker å ødelegge de som kanaliserer folkets sinne og ønske om forandring, og isolere dem som ikke kan ødelegges fra folket. Den andre dimensjonen ved de herskende klassers intoleranse og aggresjon mot de revolusjonære, kommunistiske og demokratiske folkelige bevegelsene er å sikre at de undertrykte folkemassene tier og ikke våger å gjøre opprør. Ved å massakrere og undertrykke folkets fortropp, sender de herskende klassene en beskjed til de undertrykte folkemassene: «Hvis dere handler mot oss, vil vi gjøre det samme mot dere».

«Filosofene har bare tolka verden forskjellig; men det det kommer an på, er å forandre den» sier Karl Marx, proletariatets store mester. Kommunister og revolusjonære kjemper for realiseringen av dette idealet, de blir myrdet for det, de blir fengslet for det. Kommunistiske og revolusjonære fanger har vist igjen og igjen i tortursentre og fengsler at så lenge livet fortsetter, kan det skapes gode eksempler for fortsettelsen av klassekampen under alle slags livsvilkår. Veien krever at man tar disse risikoene, og det er med denne bevisstheten kommunister og revolusjonære kjemper mot de herskende utbyttingssystemene. Kroppen til hver myrdet kommunist og revolusjonær, hver periode tilbrakt i fengsel, legger også grunnlaget for å bygge fremtidens samfunn. Borgerskapet og deres lakeier ønsker å sikre kapitulasjonen ved å sette de som ikke kan utryddes i fengsler under de mest undertrykkende forhold. De kommunistiske og revolusjonære fangene nøler derimot ikke med å gjøre fengslene, der fienden føler seg sterkest, til en arena for klassekamp. Av denne grunn må vi ikke definere de kommunistiske og revolusjonære fangene i fengslene som ofre, vi må definere dem på rettferdig grunnlag og omfavne dem. Kommunister og revolusjonære blir ikke bare myrdet, fengslet og torturert fordi de har alternative ideer til de eksisterende utbyttingssystemene, men også fordi de handler for å forandre disse ideene, for å organisere og forene folket. Det er først og fremst en ideologisk krig, legemliggjort av to fiendtlige og uforsonlige klasser. Siden de objektive forholdene i det imperialistiske systemet bevarer motsigelsen mellom undertrykkere og undertrykte konstant og aktuell, løser ikke mord og fengsling av kommunister og revolusjonære problemene for borgerskapet. Den eksisterende objektive situasjonen, de dypere motsetningene, gjenspeiles direkte i klassemotsigelsene, og tomrommet de myrdede og fengslede revolusjonære og kommunistene etterlater, fylles av nye.

I den grad det herskende systemets motsetninger fordypes og dets blindveier multipliserer, i den grad deres frykt for «de som graver deres grav» vokser, nøler ikke herskerklassene med å avsløre sin sanne karakter mer og mer konkret. Samtidig fører systemets fordypende og uløste krise borgerskapet og de utbyttende herskende klasser av alle slag, sterkere sentralisering av den den suverene statens mekanisme, både med sine lover og sine de facto organisasjoner, og til å sette undertrykkingsmekanismene mer i forgrunnen. I de imperialistiske kapitalistiske landene, som kaller seg «ideelle» og «progressive demokratier», viser innføringen av sikkerhetslovene, de nye lovene som utvider statens undertrykkende organers makt, konkret at borgerskapet har lagt bak seg evnen til å bære «den demokratiske masken». Borgerskapet gjenoppretter sin posisjon mot arbeiderklassen, de undertrykte arbeiderne og de undertrykte folkene med all sin reaksjon. I koloniale og halvkoloniale land dominert av imperialisme, er parlamentariske og utenomparlamentariske styreformer med ulike nyanser av fascisme og reaksjon de vanlige regimene. I disse landene blir alle opposisjonelle, først og fremst kommunister og revolusjonære, utsatt for systematisk og permanent statsterror. Dybden av motsigelsen mellom de herskende klassene og de undertrykte menneskene i disse landene bestemmer intensiteten i klassekampen. For de herskende klasser, som bare kan opprettholde imperialismens trelldom gjennom et tøylesløst terrorregime mot folket, er statsterror snarere en nødvendighet enn et alternativ. Lovene er bare et skalkeskjul for fascisme, reaksjon og statsterror. Fengsler, derimot, er en mekanisme for tortur og undertrykkelse. De herskende klassene i Tyrkia, India, Filippinene, Peru, Iran, Israel osv. fordyper de isolasjonen med nesten alle bokstavene i alfabetet for å isolere fangene i fengslene. Behandlingen av alvorlig syke fanger forhindres under ulike påskudd. Mange syke fanger blir etterlatt for å dø og det er gjentatte faktiske angrep på fanger. Tusenvis av medlemmer av den kurdiske nasjonen er fanget i fengsler som gjengjeldelse for den kurdiske nasjonale frigjøringskampen. I tyrkiske fengsler forhindres løslatelse av personer som har vært fengslet i mer enn 30 år med den begrunnelse at de «ikke gir opp sine ideer».

Den reaksjonære indiske staten har sperret inne over ti tusen kommunistiske, revolusjonære og politiske aktivister, deriblant Varavara Rao, Sanjoy Deepak Rao, Ayinoor Vasu, Rona Wilson og Gautam Navlakha, for å forhindre folkekrigen.

Georges Ibrahim Abdallah har vært fengslet av fransk imperialisme i 40 år og har ennå ikke blitt løslatt, selv om han har sonet sin straff. Mumia Abu-Jamal, medlem av Black Panthers, har vært fengslet av amerikansk imperialisme i over 40 år. Tusenvis av kommunister, revolusjonære og fanger av undertrykte folk fra forskjellige deler av verden har tilbrakt tiår i fengsler.

De herskende klassers frykt for de kommunistiske og revolusjonære fangene og klassehatet de føler mot dem, er så stor at de hensynsløst forhindrer kommunistene og revolusjonære de holder fanget i åpent brudd på sine egne lover fra å forlate fengslene. Mordet på formann Gonzalo i 2021, lederen av PCP, som mistet helsen etter 29 år i isolat og hvis død ble forårsaket fordi de nødvendige helsetiltakene ikke ble iverksatt, er veldig viktig for å forstå omfanget av frykten og klassehat som imperialistene og de servile eierne av herskersystemet føler på. De ansvarlige for formann Gonzalos død brente og ødela til og med kroppen hans.

De kommunistiske og revolusjonære fangene i fengslene streber etter å oppfylle klassekampens krav, med fare for eget liv ved å utfordre grensene for forholdene i fengslene. De nekter å kapitulere og nøler ikke med å stå imot all slags press, tortur og isolasjon. Vi må mobilisere for å støtte fangenes legitime kamp og motstand, for å kjempe mot enhver form for aggresjon mot fangene, for å være fangenes stemme utenfor murene, må vi støtte deres kamp under soningsforholdene som en del av klassekampen.

DE KOMMUNISTISKE OG REVOLUSJONÆRE FANGENE ER VÅR ÆRE!

Å STØTTE DE KOMMUNISTISKE OG REVOLUSJONÆRE FANGENE, BETYR Å STØTTE DEN REVOLUSJONÆRE KAMPEN!

LA OSS GJØRE DE KOMMUNISTISKE OG REVOLUSJONÆRE FANGENES MOTSTAND OG KAMP TIL VÅR EGEN, LA OSS VÆRE FANGENES STEMME!

Internasjonalt Kommunistisk Forbund
Mars 2024


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