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International Court of Justice Reports of Judes, Advisory Opinions and Orders Legal Consequences for the Continuated Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory Opinion of June 1971 International Court of Justice Collection Stops, advisory advice and orders Legal consequences for the States of the continuous presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West African) notwithstanding resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council Advisory Notice of June 21, 1971
Official Quote: LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATES OF THE CONTITIUD PREENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA in NAMIBIA (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Reso- LUTION 276 (1970), Adrisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16. Official Citation mode: Legal consequences for the ETARS of the continuous presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West African) notwithstanding resolution 276 (1970) of the security cotzseil, ASIS Consultil C.I.J. Collection 1971, p. 16. Sales Number Sale: 352 1
1971 June 21 General List No. 53 International Court of Justice Year 1971 21 June 1971 Legal Consequences for the continued presence of South Africa in Namlbia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Composition of 'The Courtence of' The Court -Propriety of the Court's Giving the Opinion-Concept of Mandates-Characteristics of the League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa-Situation on the Dissolution of the League of Nations and the Setting-Utp of the United Nations: Survival of the Mandate and Transference of supervision and accountability to the United Nations-Development in the United Nations Prior to the Termination of the Mandate-Revoca- Bilify of the Mandate-Termination of the Mandate by the General- Action in the Security Council and Effect of'Security Council Resolutions Leading to the Request for Opinion-Records by South Africa to Supply Further A also information and for the holding of a plebiscite-thegal consequences for stats Advisory Opinion Present: Presiden! Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN; Vice-President Ammoun; Judes Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Padilla Nervo, Forster, Gros, Bengzon, Pétrén, Lachs, Onyeama, Dillard, Ignacio-Pinto, De Castro, Morozov, Jimenez de Aréchaga; Aquarone registrar. Concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continance of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
International Court of Justice Year 1971 June 21, 1971 1971 June 21 General role No 53 Legal consequences for the States of the continuous presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West African) notwithstanding resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council Composition and jurisdiction of the Court - question whether it should be the court given the notice - concept of mandate - Characteristics of the mandate for the South West Africa conferred by the Company of Nations - Situation created by the dissolution of the Company of Nations and the creation of the United Nations: Maintaining the mandate, surveillance is transferred to the United Nations and the obligation to account is due to them - Events occurring to the United Nations before the cessation of the mandate - revocability of the mandate - The General Assembly puts an end to the mandate - Measures taken by the Security Council and effect of the Security Council resolutions having led to the request for consulting advice - requests for 1: South Africa tending to provide additional information on the facts And concerning the organization of a plebiscite - Legal consequences for the States Advisory Reviews present: SIR Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN, President; Mr. Ammoun, vice-president; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, MM. Padilla Nervo, Forster, Gros, Bengzon, Pétrén, Lachs, Onyeama, Dillard, Ignacio-Pinto, de Castro, Morozov, Jiménez de Aréchaga, judges; Mr. Aquarone, clerk. Regarding the legal consequences for the States of the continuous presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West African), notwithstanding resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council,
Cornposed as Above, Gives the following Advisory Opinion: 1. The question Upon which the Advisory Opinion of the Court has been asked was before the court by a letter drted 29 July 1970, Filed in the Registry on 10 August, and Addresed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ThePresident of the Court. In His Letter the Secretary-General Inform the Court That, by Resolution 284 (1 970) Adopted on July 29, 1970, Certified True Copies of the English and French Texts of Which Were Transrnitted with his Letter, the Security COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATION Decided to subrnit to the short, with the Request for an Advisory Opinion to be Transmitted to the Security Council at an Early Date, the question set in the resolution, which was in the following terrns: "The Security Council, Reafirming the special responsibility of the United Nations with regard to the territory and the people of Narnibia, Recalling Security Council resolution 276 (1970) on the question of Narnibia, Taking note of the report and recornmendations subrnitted by the Ad Hoc Sub-Cornmittee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 276 (1 970), Taking further note of the recomrnendation of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the possibility of requesting an advisory opinion from the lnternational Court of Justice, Considering that an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice would be useful for the Security Council in its further consideration of the question of Narnibia and in furtherance of the objectives the Council is seeking 1. Decides to subrnit in accordance with Article 96 (1) of the Charter, the following question to the International Court of Justice with the request for an advisory opinion which shall be transmitted to the Security Council at an early date: 'What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Narnibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolu- tion 276 (1970)?' 2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, accompanied by al1 documents likely to throw light upon the question." 2. On 5 August 1970, that is to say, after the despatch of the Secretary- General's letter but before its receipt by the Registry, the English and French texts of resolution 284 (1970) of the Security Council were comrnunicated to the President of the Court by telegram frorn the United Nations Secretariat. The President thereupon decided that the States Mernbers of the United Nations were likely to be able to furnish information on the question, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and by an Order dated 5 August 1970, the President fixed 23 Septernber 1970 as the tirne-limit within which the
LA COUR, ainsi composée, donne l'avis consultatif suivant: 1. La Cour a été saisie de la question sur laquelle l'avis consultatif lui est demandé par une lettre du Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Président de la Cour datée du 29 juillet 1970 et reçue au Greffe le 10 août. Dans cette lettre, le Secrétaire général porte à la connaissance de la Cour que, par la résolution 284(1970)adoptéele29juillet 1970 dont letextecertifié con- formeen anglais et en français est joint à sacommunication, le Conseil de sécu- rité des Nations Unies a décidé de soumettre à la Cour, en demandant qu'un avis consultatif lui soit transmis a une date rapprochée, la question énoncée dans la résolution dont les termes sont les suivants: «Le Conseil de sécurité, Réafirrnanr la responsabilité spéciale de l'organisation des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne le territoire et le peuple de la Namibie, Rappelant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil sur la question de Namibie, Prenant note du rapport et des recommandations présentés par le Sous- Comité ad hoc en application de la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité, Prenant note également de la recommandation du Sous-Comité ad hoc touchant la possibilité de demander un avis consultatif à la Cour inter- nationale de Justice, Considérant qu'un avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de Justice serait utile au Conseil de sécurité.pour continuer à examiner la question de la Namibie et pour la réalisation des objectifs recherchés par le Conseil, 1. Décide de soumettre, conformément au paragraphe 1 de l'article 96 de la Charte, la question suivante à la Cour internationale de Justice en demandant qu'un avis consultatif soit transmis au Conseil de sécurité à une date rapprochée: «Quelles sont les conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l'Afrique dl! Sud en Namibie, nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité?» 2. Prie le Secrétaire général de transmettre la présente résolution à la Cour internationale de Justice, conformément à l'article 65 du Statut de la Cour, en y joignant tout document pouvant servir à élucider la question.)) 2. Le 5 août 1970, après l'envoi de la lettre du Secrétaire général mais avant sa réception au Greffe, les textes anglais et français de la résolution 284 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité ont été communiqués au Président de la Cour télé- graphiquement par le Secrétariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Le Président a décidé alors que les Etats Membres des Nations Unies étaient susceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question, conformément à l'article 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut et, par ordonnance du 5 août 1970 il a fixé au 23 septembre 1970 la date d'expiration du délai dans lequel la Cour
18 NAMIBIA (S.W. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) Court would be prepared to receive written statements from them. The same day, the Registrar sent to the States Men-ibers of the United Nations the special and direct communication provided for in Article 66 of the Statute. 3. The notice of the request for advisory opinion, prescribed by Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Statute, was given by the Registrar to al1 States entitled to appear before the Court by letter of 14 August 1970. 4. On 21 August 1970, the President decided that in addition to the States Members of the United Nations, the non-meinber States entitled to appear before the Court were also likely to be able to furnish information on the question. The same day the Registrar sent to those States the special and direct communication provided for in Article 66 of the Statute. 5. On 24 August 1970, a letter was received by the Registrar from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of South Atrica, whereby the Government of South Africa, for the reasons therein set out, requested the extension to 31 January 1971 of the time-limit for the submission of a written statement. The President of the Court, by an Order dated 28 August 1970, extended the time-limit for the submission of written statements to 19 November 1970. 6. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in two instalments, and the following States submitted to the Court written statements or letters setting forth their views: Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Hungary, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, the United States of Arnerica, Yugoslavia. Copies of these communications were transrnitted to al1 States entitled to appear before the Court, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and, in pursuance of Articles 44, paragraph 3, and 82, para- graph 1, of the Rules of Court, they were made accessible to the public as frorn 5 February 197 1. 7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in pursuance of Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute transrnitted to the Court a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon the question, together with an lntroductory Note; these documents were received in the Registry in instalments between 5 Novem- ber and 29 December 1970. 8. Before holding public sittings to hear oral statements in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Court had first to resolve two questions reIating to its composition for the further proceedings. 9. In its written statement, filed on 19 November 1970, the Government of South Africa had taken objection to the participation of three Members of the Court in the proceedings. Its objections were based on staternents made or other participation by the Members concerned, in their former capacity as representatives of their Governments, in United Nations organs which were dealing with matters concerning South West Africa. The Court gave careful consideration to the objections raised by the Government of South Africa, examiningeachcase separately. In each of them the Court reached the conclusion that the participation of the Member concerned in his former capacity as representative of his Government, to which objection was taken in the South African Government's written statement, did not attract the application of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. In making Order No. 2 of 26 January 1971, the Court found no reason to depart in the present advisory proceedings from the decision adopted by the Court in the Order of 18 March 1965 in the South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) after hearing the same contentions as have now been advanced by the Government of South Africa. In deciding the other two objections, the
serait disposée à recevoir de ces Etats des exposés écrits. Le même jour, le Greffier a envoyé aux Etats Membres des Nations Unies la communication spéciale et directe prévue à I'article 66 du Statut. 3. La notification de la requête pour avis consultatif, prescrite par I'article 66, paragraphe 1, du Statut, a été adressée par le Greffier, dans une lettre du 14 août 1970, à tous les Etats admis à ester devant la Cour. 4. Le 21 août 1970, le Président a décidé que, outre les Etats Membres des Nations Unies, les Etats non membres admis à ester devant la Cour étaient aussi susceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question. Le même jour, le Greffier leur a envoyé la communication spéciale et directe prévue à l'article 66 du Statut. 5. Le 24 août 1970, le Greffier a. reçu du secrétaire aux affaires étrangères de l'Afrique du Sud une lettre par laquelle le Gouvernement sud-africain, pour les raisons par lui indiquées, demandait le report au 31 janvier 1971 de la date d'expiration du délai pour la présentation d'un exposé écrit. Par ordonnance du 28 août 1970, le Président a reporté au 19 novembre 1970 la date d'expiration du délai dans lequel des exposés écrits pouvaient être déposés. 6. Ont soumis à la Cour des exposés Writings or letters expressing their views the secretary general of the United Nations (in two deliveries) and the states below: South Africa, United States of America, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia. Copies of these communications have been transmitted to all the states admitted to Ester before the Court as well as to the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization and, in application of articles 44, paragraph 3, and 82, paragraph 1, of the regulation, the written presentations presented in the case were made accessible to the public to date from February 5, 1971. 7. In accordance with the article 65, paragraph 2, of the statute, the secretary general of the United Nations A Nations A Transmitted to the Court, with an introductory note, a file of documents which can be used to elucidate the question; These documents reached the registry, under several folds, between November 5 and December 29, 1970. 8. Before holding public hearings to hear oral presentations in accordance with articles 66, paragraph 2, of the status, the court had To decide two questions relating to its composition for the rest of the procedure. 9. In its written presentation, presented on November 19, 1970, the South African government had formulated objections in the participation of three members of the Court in the procedure. He was based on declarations that these members had made, at the time when they represented their government, before United Nations bodies dealing with problems relating to the southwest African or on their participation in the same quality in the work of These organs. The Court carefully examined the objections of the South African government, considering each case separately. For each of them, the court reached the conclusion that the participation of the judge in question, as a representative of his government, to which the South African government had objected in its written presentation, did not call the application of i 'Article 17, paragraph 2, of the status. By adopting its ordinance no 2 of January 26, 1971, the Court saw no reason to deviate in this advisory procedure of the decision it had taken in its order of March 18, 1965 in the affairs of the Southwest African (Ethiopia c. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) after hearing the same observations as those that the South African government is formulating today. To decide on the other two cases, the
19 Namibia (S.W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) Court Took Intoconsideration That the Activities in United Nations Organs of the Mernbers concerned, Prior to Their Election to the Court. and that are closer to the warten statterntent of the governrnent of South Africa, do not frenish groups for treating these objections differently froin those raised in the appliament to which the court decided not to accede in 1965, a decision confirmed by its order No. 2 of January 26, 1971. With Reference to Order No. 3 of the Same Date, the Court also Took Into Cor Circumstance To Which Its Attention Was Draw, Although it was not iementized in the Written statternent of the Governrne of South Africa , Narnely the Participation of the Mernber concerned, Prior to His Election to the Court, in the Formulation of Security CoNCil Resolution 246 (1968), which concerned the trial at furtoria of Thirty- Seven South West Africans and which in its prearnble Took Into Account General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXL). The Court Considered that this participation of the mernber concerned in the work of the United Nations, as a repressen- tative of His Governrnent, Did not justify a conclusion different frorn that already reached with look to the objections raised by the governrne of south Africa. Account rust also also be Taken in this respect of precederts establised by the present court and the permanent court wherein judges sat in certain boxes even though they had taken part in the formulation of texts the court was asked to interpret. (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, p. 1 I; P.C.I.J., Series C, No. 84, p. 535; P.C.I.J., Series E, No. 4, p. 270; P.C.I.J., Series E, No. 8, p. 251.) After Deliberation, The Court Decided, by Three Orders Date 26 January 1971, and Made Public on That Date, not to accede to the objections that had been raised. 10. by a lettei- from the secretary for Foreign Affairs Dated 13 Novern 1970, The Governrnent of South Africa Made An Application for the Appointment of A Judge Ad Hoc to the Proceedings, in Ternis of Article 31, Paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. The Court Decided, in Accordance With the Terms of Article 46 of the Statute of the Court, To Hear the Contends of South Africa on this point in Camera, and a closed hearing, at which representatives of India, the Netherlands, Nigeria and the United States of America Were also present, was held for the purpose on 27 January 1971. 1 1. By an Order dated 29 January 1971, the Court decided to reject the application of the Governrnent of South Africa. The Court thereafter decided that the record of the closed hearing should be made accessible to the public. 12. On 29 January 1971, the Court decided, upon the application of the Organization of African Unity, that that Organization was also likely to be able to furnish information on the question before the Court, and that the Court would therefore be prepared to hear an oral staternent on behalf of the Organization. 13. The States entitled to appear before the Court had been inforrned by the Registrar on 27 Novernber 1970 that oral proceedings in the case would be likely to open at the beginning of February 1971. On 4 February 1971, notifica- tion was given to those States which had expressed an intention to rnake oral staternents, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, that 8 February 'had been fixed as the opening date. At 23 public sittings held between 8 February and 17 Mai-ch 1971, oral staternents were made to the Court by the following representatives:
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 19 Cour a tenu compte du fait que l'activité des membres de la Cour en question, dans des organes des Nations Unies, avant leur élection à la Cour, activité à laquelle le Gouvernement sud-africain s'est référé dans son exposé écrit, ne justifiait pas que ces objections soient traitées différemment de celles qu'avait soulevées la requête à laquelle la Cour n'avait pas fait droit en 1965, dans une décision qui a été confirmée par l'ordonnance no 2 du 26 janvier 1971. En ce qui concerne l'ordonnance no 3 de la même date, la Cour a tenu compte aussi d'un élément sur lequel son attention a été appelée bien qu'il n'ait pas été mentionné dans l'exposé écrit du Gouvernement sud-africain: il s'agit du fait que le membre de la Cour en question a participé, avant son élection à la Cour, à l'élaboration de la résolution 246 (1968) du Conseil de sécurité qui concernait le procês de trente-sept ressortissants du Sud-Ouest africain à Pretoria et tenait compte dans son préambule, de la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale. La Cour a estimé que la participation de ce membre aux travaux des Nations Unies, comme représentant de son gouvernement, ne justifiait pas une conclusion différente de celle qui avait déjà été adoptée à l'égard des objections formulées par le Gouvernement sud-africain. On doit prendre aussi en considé- ration à cet égard des précédents établis par la Cour actuelle et la Cour perma- nente et d'après lesquels des juges ont siégé dans certaines affaires bien qu'ils aient pris part à l'élaboration de textes que la Cour était invitée à interpréter (C.P.J.I. série A no I, p. II; C.P.J.I. série Cn084, p. 535; C.P.J.I. sévie En04, p. 262; C.P.J.I. série E no 8, p. 242). Après délibéré en chambre du conseil, la Cour a décidé, par trois ordonnances du 26 janvier 1971 rendues publiques à cette dat:, de ne pas faire droit aux objections soulevées. 10. Par lettre du secrétaire aux affaires étrangères en date du 13 novembre 1970, le Gouvernement sud-africain avait présenté une demande tendant à la désignation d'un juge ad hoc pour siéger en l'affaire aux termes de l'article 31, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour. Conformément à l'article 46 de son Statut, la Cour a décidé d'entendre à huis clos les observations de l'Afrique du Sud sur ce point et elle a tenu à cette fin, le 27 janvier 1971, une audience à huis clos à laquelle ont assisté également des représentants des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, de l'Inde, du Nigéria et des Pays-Bas. 1 1. Par ordonnance du 29 janvier 1971, la Cour a décidé de rejeter la demande du Gouvernement sud-africain. Elle a décidé ensuite de rendre accessible au public le compte rendu de l'audience à huis clos. 12. Le 29 janvier 1971, statuant sur une demande présentée par l'organisation de l'unité africaine, la Cour a décidé que cette organisation était, elle aussi, susceptible de fournir des renseignements sur la question dont la Cour était saisie, et que la Cour serait donc disposée à entendre un exposé oral qui serait fait au nom de cette organisation. 13. Le 27 novembre 1970, le Greffier avait informé les Etats admis à ester devant la Cour que la procédure orale en l'affaire commencerait probablement au début du mois de février 1971. Le 4 février 1971, les Etats qui avaient manifesté l'intention de présenter des exposés oraux, le Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies et l'organisation de l'unité africaine ont été informés que la date d'ouverture de la procédure orale était fixée au 8 février. Au cours de vingt-trois audiences publiques, tenues entre le 8 février et le 17 mars 197 1, la Cour a entendu, en leurs exposés oraux, les représentants ci-après:
for the Secretary-General Mr. C. A. Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary- of the United Nations: General, Legal Counsel of the United Nations, and Mr. D. B. H. Vickers, Senior Legal Officer, Office of Legal Affairs; for Finland: for the Organization of African Unity : for India : for the Netherlands: for Nigeria: for Pakistan: for South Africa: for the Republic of Viet-Nam : for the United States of America : Mr. E. J. S. Castrén, Professor of International Law in the University of Helsinki; Mr. T. O. Elias, Attorney-General and Com- missioner for Justice of Nigeria; Mr. M. C. Chagla, M.P., Former Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of India; Mr. W. Riphagen, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. T. O. Elias, Attorney-General and Com- n,iissioner for Justice; Mr. S. S. Pirzada, S.Pk., Attorney-General of Pakistan; Mr. J. D. Viall, Legal Adviser to the Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs, Mr. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Mr. E. M. Grosskopf, S.C., Member of the South African Bar, Mr. H. J. 0. van Heerden, Member of the South African Bar, Mr. R. F. Botha, Member of the South African Bar, Mr. M. Wiechers, Professor of Law in the University of South Africa; Mr. Le Tai Trien, Attorney-General, Supreme Court of Viet-Nam; Mr. J. R. Stevenson, The Legal Adviser, Department of State. 14. Prior to the opening of the public sittings, the Court decided to examine first of al1 certain observations made by the Government of South Africa in its written statement, and in a letter dated 14 January 1971, in support of its submission that the Court should decline to give an advisory opinion. 15. At the opening of the public sittings on 8 February 1971, the President of the Court announced that the Court had reached a unanimous decision thereon. The substance of the submission of the Governmen: of South Africa and the decision of the Court are dealt with in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Advisory Opinion, below. 16. By a letter of 27 January 1971, the Government of South Africa had submitted a proposal to the Court regarding the holding of a plebiscite in the Territory of Namibia (South West Africa), and this proposal was elaborated in a further letter of 6 February 1971, which explained that the plebiscite was to determine whether it was the wish of the inhabitants "that the Territory should continue to be administered by the South African Government or should henceforth be administered by the United Nations".
NAMIBIE (S.-O. pour le Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies: pour la Finlande: pour l'organisation de l'unité africaine: pour l'Inde: pour les Pays-Bas: pour le Nigéria: pour le Pakistan : M. C. A. Stavropoulos, Secrétaire général adjoint, conseiller juridique de I'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies, et M. D. B. H. Vickers, administrateur hors classe au service juridique de l'organisation; M. E. J. S. Castrén, professeur de droit international à l'université d'Helsinki; M. T. O. Elias attorney-general et commissaire à la Justice du Nigéria; M. M. C. Chagla, membre du Parlement, ancien ministre des affaires étrangères; M. W. Riphagen, jurisconsulte du ministère des affaires étrangères; M. T. O. Elias attorney-general et commissaire à la Justice; M. S. S. Pirzada, S.Pk., attorney-general; pour l'Afrique du Sud: M. J. D. Viall, jurisconsulte du département des affaires étrangères; M. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., avocat à la Cour suprême d'Afrique du Sud ; M. E. M. Grosskopf, S.C., membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud; M. H. J. 0. van Heerden, membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud; M. R. F. Botha, membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud; M. M. Wiechers, professeur de droit à l'Uni- versité d'Afrique du Sud; pour la République du M. Le Tai Trien, procureur général près la Viet-Nam : Cour suprême; pour les Etats-Unis M. .i. R. Stevenson, jurisconsulte du départe- d' Amériq ue : ment d'Etat. 14. Avant I'ouverture des audiences publiques, la Cour avait décidé d'exa- miner en premier lieu certaines observations que le Gouvernement sud-africain avait formulées dans son exposé écrit et dans une lettre du 14 janvier 1971 à l'appui de sa thèse selon laquelle la Cour devrait refuser de donner un avis consultatif. 15. A l'ouverture des audiences publiques, le 8 février 1971, le Président a annoncé que la Cour était parvenue à une décision unanime à cet égard. La thèse du Gouvernement sud-africain et la décision de la Cour sont traitées aux paragraphes 28 et 29 du présent avis consultatif. 16. Dans une lettre du 27 janvier 1971, le Gouvernement sud-africain avait soumis à la Cour une proposition relative à l'organisation d'un plébiscite dans le territoire de la Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain), proposition qu'il avait déve- loppée dans une lettre du 6 février 1971, où il précisait que le plébiscite aurait pour objet de déterminer si les habitants souhaitaient que «le territoire continue à être administré par le Gouvernement sud-africain ou soit désormais administré par les Nations Unies*.
17. At the hearing of 5 March 1971, the representative of South Africa explained further the position of his Government with regard to the proposed plebiscite, and indicated that his Governrnent considered it necessary to adduce considerable evidence on the factual issues which it regarded as under- lying thequestion before the Court. At the close of the hearing, on 17 March 1971, the President made the following statement: "The Court has considered the request submitted by the representative of South Africa in his letter of 6 February 1971 that a plebiscite should be held in the Territory of Narnibia (South West Africa) under the joint supervision of the Court and the Government of the Republic of South Africa. The Court cannot pronounce upon this request at the present stage without anticipating, or appearing to anticipate, its decision on one or more of the main issues now before it. Consequently, the Court must defer its answer to this request until a later date. The Court has also had under consideration the desire of the Govern- ment of the Republic to supply the Court with further factual material concerning the situation in Namibiü (South West Africa). However, until the Court has been able first to examine some of the legal issues which must, in any event, be dealt with, it will not be in a position to determine whether it requires additional material on the facts. The Court rnust accordingly defer its decision on this matter as well. If, at any tirne, the Court should find itself in need of further arguments or information, on these or any other rnatters, it will notify the govern- ments and organizations whose representatives have participated in the oral hearings." 18. On 14 May 1971 the President sent the following letter to the represen- taiives of the Secretary-General, of the Organization of African Unity and of the States which had participated in the oral proceedings: "i have the honour to refer to the staternent which 1 made at the end of the oral hearing on the advisory proceedings relating to the Territory of Narnibia (South West Africa) on 17 March last . . . , to the effect that the Court considered it appropriate to defer until a later date its decision regarding the requests of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (a) for the holding in that Territory of a plebiscite under the joint super- vision of the Court and the Governrnent of the Republic; and (b) to be allowed to supply the Court with further factual rnaterial concerning the situation there. 1 now have the honour to inforrn you that the Court, having examined the rnatter, does not find itself in need of further arguments or information, and has decided to refuse both these requests." 19. Before examining the merits of the question submitted to it the Court must consider the objections that have been raised to its doing so. 20. The Government of South Africa has contended that for several reasons resolution 284 (1970) of the Security Council, which requested
17. A l'audience du 5 mars 1971, le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a donné des explications complémentaires sur l'attitude de son gouvernement à l'égard du plébiscite proposé et il a indiqué que ce gouvernement estimait nécessaire de produire de nombreux éléments de preuve quant aux points de fait qui, selon lui, sont à la base de la question dont la Cour est saisie. A la clôture des audiences publiques, le 17 mars 197 1, le Président a prononcé la déclaration suivante: «La Cour a examiné la demande présentée par le représentant de ['Afrique du Sud dans sa lettre du 6 février 1971 tendant à ce qu'un plébiscite soit organisé sur le territoire de la Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) sous le contrôle conjoint de la Cour et du Gouvernement de la République sud-africaine. La Cour ne peut, à ce stade, se prononcer sur cette demande sans anticiper ou paraître anticiper la décision qu'elle prendra sur une ou plusieurs des questions importantes dont elle est saisie. En conséquence, elle doit remettre à plus tard la réponse à cette demande. La Cour a également pris en considération le désir du Gouvernement de la République sud-africaine de fournir à la Cour une documentation complémentaire sur les faits en ce qui concerne la situation en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain). Mais tant que la Cour n'aura pu d'abord examiner certains des points juridiques qu'elle doit de toute manière traiter, elle ne sera pas en mesure de dire si elle a besoin de renseignements complé- mentaires sur les faits. La Cour doit donc aussi différer sa décision sur cette question. Si, à un moment quelconque, la Cour estime avoir besoin d'explications ou de renseignemefits complémentaires sur ces questions ou sur d'autres, elle le notifiera aux gouvernements et organisations ayant participé à la procédure orale par l'intermédiaire de représentants.» 18. On May 14, 1971, the president sent the following letter to the representatives of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the organization of the African Unit and the States which had participated in the oral procedure: "In the Declaration that I made at the end of the oral procedure in the advisory case relating to the territory of Namibia (South West African) on March 17 ... I indicated that it had appeared appropriate to the court of Put its decision on the requests of the South African government to what a) a plebiscite to be rejected to this territory under the joint control of the Court and the Government of the Republic; b) Authorization is given to him to provide the Court additional documentation on the facts with regard to the situation in the territory. I have the honor to let you know that, after examining the question, the Court does not consider having complementary explanations or information and decided to reject these two requests. ” 19. Before tackling the question put to it, the Court must consider the objections which have been raised against this examination. 20. The South African government argued that, for several reasons, resolution 284 (1970) of the Security Council requesting an opinion
22 Namibia (S.W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) The Advisory Opinion of the Court, is Invalid, and that, therefore, the short is not compete to deliver the opinion. A resolution of a properly constituted organ oftheunited nations which is passed in accordance with that organ's rules of procedure, and is declared by its president to have been so passed, must be presiimed to have been validly adopted. However, since in this instance the objections made concern the Comperte of the Court, the Court Will Proceeds to examine them. 21. The First Objection is that in the voting on the resolution Two per- manent Members of the Security Council abstament. Lt is content that resolution was consequently not adopted by an affirmative vote of nine members, included the competitor votes of the permanent members, as required by article 27, paragraph 3, of the charter of the united nations. 22. Howwever, the Proceedings of the Security Council Exndling Over A Long Period Supply Abundant Evidence that Presidential Rulings and the Positions Taken by Members of the Council, in Particular Its Permanent Members, have consisted and uniformly interpretated the Practice of Voluntary Abstension by Member as not constitution a bar to the adoption of resolutions. By abstaining, a membcr do not meaning its objection to the approval of what is being proposed; In order to take the adoption of a resolution requiring unanimity of the permanent mem- bers, a permanent member has only to cast a negative vote. This procedure Followed by the Security Council, which has continued unchanged after the amendment in 1965 of article 27 of the charter, has been gener- Ally accepts by Members of the United Nations and Evencies a General Practice of that Organization. 23. The Government of South Africa Has also argued that as the question relates to a dispute between the South Africa and other Members of the United Nations, South Africa, as a member of the United Nations, Nota Member of the Security Council and A Party to a dispute, Should have been invited under article 32 of the charter to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to it. It Further Contented that Proviso at the end of article 27, paragraph 3, of the charter, Requiring Members of the Security Council that are parts to a dispute to abstain fruoin voting, should have been conspiracy with. 24. The Language of Article 32 of the Charter is Mandate, But the question where the Security Council Must extend an invitation in Accord with that provision depends on where it has made a deter- mation that the matter under its consider is in the nature of he argued. In the absence of such a determination article 32 of the charter do not apply. 25. The Question of Namibia was placed on the agenda of the Security Council as a "situation" and not as a "dispute". No Membrr State Made Any Suggestion or Proposal That the Matter Should be examined as a dispute, Although Due Notice was given of the placing of the question
to the court is not valid and that, consequently, the court did not compete to make an opinion. Any resolution emanating from a regularly constituted United Nations body, taken in accordance with its regulations and declared adopted by its president, must be presumed valid. However, since in this case the objections raised concern the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will examine them. 21. The first objection comes from the fact that two permanent members of the Security Council abstained during the vote on the resolution. We argue that consequently the Resolution was not adopted by an affirmative vote of nine members, in which the votes of all permanent members would be understood, as required by article 27, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter. 22. But the debates taking place in the Security Council for many years prove abundantly that the practice of the voluntary abstention of a permanent member has always and uniformly been interpreted, to judge according to the decisions of the presidency and The positions taken by the members of the Council, in particular by permanent members, as not preventing the adoption of resolutions. The abstention of a member of the council does not mean that he is opposed to the approval of what is proposed; To prevent the adoption of a demanding resolution 'the unanimity of permanent members, a permanent member must issue a negative vote. The procedure followed by the Sécite Council, which remained unchanged after the amendment brought to article 27 of the Charter in 1965, was generally accepted by the members of the United Nations and constitutes proof of a general practice organisation. 23. The South African government also argued that, in the case of a dispute between South Africa and other members of the United Nations, South Africa should have been invited, as the United Nations Member State not a member of the Security Council and ~ Artie to a dispute. To participate, without the right to vote, in the discussions relating to this dispute under the article 32 of the Charter. He also argued that the clause would have had to be applied at the end of paragraph 3 of the article 27 of the Charter, which obliges the members of the Security Council parties to a dispute to refrain from voting. 24. The Label of Article 32 of the Charter is imperative but the Security Council has the obligation to invite a State in accordance with this provision only if it notes that the question of which it is seized has the character of a disagreement. In the absence of a very observation. The article 32 of the charter does not apply. 25. The question of Namibia has been entered on the agenda of the Security Council as a situation and not as Drfferend. No state has suggested or proposed to study the question as a dispute, although its registration on the agenda of the Security Council
23 Namibia (S.W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) On the Security Council's Agenda Under the Title "Situation in Namibia". Had the Government of South Africa Considered that the question Should Have Been Treated in the Security Council as a Dispute, It Should Have Draw the Council's attention to that aspect of the Matter. Having failed to raise the question at the appropriate time in the proper forum, it is not open to it to raise it before the court at this internship. 26. A Similar ANSWER MUST Be Given to the related objection based on the proviso to paragraph 3 of article 27 of the charter. This proviso also requires for its application the private determination by the security coucil that a dispute exist and that certain members of the council are involved as parts to such a dispute. 27. In The Alternative The Government of South Africa Has Contented that Even if the Court Had Compence to Give the Requestd, It Should Nevertheless, as a Matter of Judicial Propiety, refuse to exercise its compensation. 28. The First Reason Invoked in Support of This Contest is the Sup- Pose Disability Of The Court to Give the Requested by the Security Concil, Because of Political Pressure to Which the Court, According to the Government of South Africa, Has Been or Might be subject. 29. It would not be proper for the court to entertain these observations, bearing as they do on the very nature of the court as the main judicial organ of the united nations, an organ that, in that capacity, acts only on the Basis of the Law, independently of al1 outside influence or interventions WhatSoever, in the exemplius of the judicial function en- trusted to it alone by the charter and its status. A Court Functioning As A Court of Law Can Act in No Other Way. 30. The Second Reason Advanced on Behalf of the Government of South Africa in support of its Contesting that the Court Should Refuse to accede to the Request of the Security Council is that the receiver Legal Relative question to an existing dispute BetWeen South Africa and Other States . In this Context it releases on the Case of Eastern Carelia and Argues that the Permanent Court of International Justice Declined to Rule the Question Retrred to It Because it was Directly related to the Main Point of A Dispute Actuelly Pending BetWeen Two States. 31. However, that box is not, as it differs from the present one. For Instance One of the States concerned in that case was not at the time a member of the league of nations and Did not appear before the Short permanent. South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations, is bound by article 96 of the charter, which empowers the security council to request advisory opinions on any legal question. Tt has ap- peared before the court, participated in both the writer and oral pro-
Namibia (African S.-O.) (advisory opinion) 23 under the title "The situation in Namibia)) was duly notified. If the South African government had estimated that the question should be contained before the Security Council as a dispute, it should have called the council's attention on this point. Failing to have lifted the proper in time before the proceedings that suit, it is no longer free to do it at this stage before the courtyard. 26. In the same way, in the same way, the related objection drawn from the clause appearing at the end of paragraph 3 of article 27 of the charter. This clause also requires, to be applicable, that the Security Council has noted beforehand that there is a dispute to which certain members of the Council are parties. 27. The South African government argued in the alternative that, even if the Court had jurisdiction to meet the request for an opinion, it should nonetheless, to remain in its legal role, refuse to exercise its competence. 28. The first reason invoked in support of this thesis is the alleged incapacity where the Court would give the advisory opinion requested by the Security Council because of the political pressures to which, according to the South African government, it would have been or could be submissive. 29. There is no need for the Court to retain these observations on the very nature of the Court, the main judicial body of the United Nations, which, in this capacity, is only pronounced on the basis of the law, regardless of Any influence or intervention on the part of anyone, in the exercise of the jurisdictional function entrusted alone by the Charter and by its status. A courtyard, fulfilling a function of court of justice, cannot act in another way. 30. The second reason put forward by the South African government to support its thesis according to which the Court should refuse to follow up on the request of the Security Council is that the legal question in question relates to a dispute between the 'South Africa and other states. On this subject, the South African government invokes the affair of the status of the Eastern Carélie and argues that the permanent court of international justice refused to decide on the question posed because it directly concerned the essential point of a Dispute now born between two states. 31. This case is not relevant because it differs from this species. This is how one of the interested states was not at the time a member of the League of Nations and had not appeared before the Permanent Court. However, South Africa is linked, as a member of the United Nations, by article 96 of the Charter which authorizes the Security Council to request an advisory opinion on any legal question. In addition, she appeared before the Court, participated both in the procedure
Ceedings and, While Raising Specific Objections Against the Cornpertence of the Court, Has Addressed Itself to the Merits of the Question. 32. Nor does the Court Find that in this case the Security Council's Request Request to a Legal Dispute Actually Pending Between Two Or More States. Zt is not the purpose of the Request to get the Assistance of the Court in the Exemprity of the Security Concil's Functions Relating to the Pacific Settlement of A Dispute Pending Before It BetWeen Two or More States. The Request is Put Forward by a United Nations Organ With Retr- En to its Own Decisions and It Seeks Legal Advice from the Court on the Consequences and implications of these decisions. This Objective is stressed by the preamble to the resolution requesting the opinion, in which the Security COUNCIL has been "that an Advisory Opinion from the Rinternational Court of Justice WOULD BE USEFUL for the Security Council in its Further Consideration of the question of Narnibia and in Further- ance of the Objectives The Council is Seeking ". Tt is Worth Recalling that in its Advisory Opinion On Reservations To the Convention on the Prevent and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, The Court Stated: "The Object of This Request for An Opinion is to guide the United Natiors In Respect of its OWN Action "(I.C.J. Reports 1951 p. 19). 33. The Court Does Not Find Eith that in this case the Advisory Opinion Concerns A Contested Between South Africa and the United Nations. In the race of the oral procedures counsel for the government of South Africa stat:. are actually in dispute between South Africa and other States" 34. The fact that, in the course of its reasoning, and in order to answer the question submitted to it, the Court may have to pronounce on legal issues upon which radically divergent views exist between South Africa and the United Nations, does not convert the present case into a dispute nor bring it within the coinpass of Articles 82 and 83 of the Rules of Court. A similar position existed in the three previous advisory proceed- ings concerning South West Africa: in none of them did South Africa claim that there was a dispute, nor did the Court feel it necessary to apply the Rules of Court concerning "a legal question actually pending between two or more States". Differences of views among States on legal issues have existed in practicall!r every advisory proceeding; if al1 were agreed, the need to resort to the Court for advice would not arise. 35. ln accordance with Article 83 of the Rules of Court, the question whether the advisory opinion had been requested "upon a legal question actually pending betneer: two or more States" was also of decisive im-
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 24 écrite qu'à la procédure orale et, tout en soulevant certaines objections précises contre la compétence de la Cour, a traité du fond. 32. La Cour n'estime pas non plus qu'en l'espèce la requête du Conseil de sécurité ait trait à un différend juridique actuellement pendant entre deux ou plusieurs Etats. L'objet de la requête n'est pas de faire en sorte que la cour assiste le conseil-de sécurité dans l'exercice de ses fonctions relatives au règlement pacifique d'un différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats dont il serait saisi. II s'agit d'une requête présentée par un organe des Nations Unies, à propos de ses propres décisions, en vue d'obtenir de la Cour un avis juridique sur les conséquences et les incidences de ces décisions. C'est cet objectif que souligne le préambule de la résolution sollicitant I'avis, où le Conseil de sécurité indique ((qu'un avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de Justice serait utile au Conseil de sécurité pour continuer à examiner la question de Namibie et pour la réalisaticn des objectifs recherchés par le Conseil ». Il convient de rappeler que, dans son avis consultatif sur les Réserves à la convention pour la préllention er la répression du crime de génocide, la Cour a dit: <( L'objet de la présente demande d'avis est d'éclairer les Nations Unies dans leur action propre » (C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 19). 33. La Cour ne considère pas non plus qu'en l'espèce l'avis consultatif concerne un différend entre l'Afrique du Sud et les Nations Unies. Au cours de la procédure orale, l'un des conseils du Gouvernement sud- africain s'est exprimé en ces termes: nous affirmons, non pas que la question constitue un différend, mais que, pour y répondre, la Cour devra trancher des points de droit et de fait qui font l'objet d'un différend actuellement né entre l'Afrique du Sud et d'autres Etats )). 34. Le fait que, dans l'énoncé de ses motifs et pour répondre à la question qui lui est sounise, la Cour puisse avoir à se prononcer sur des questions juridiques au sujet desquelles les vues de l'Afrique du Sud et celles des Nations Unies s'opposent radicalement ne suffit pas à trans- former la présente affaire en un différend et n'entraîne pas l'application des articles 82 et 83 du Règlement. La situation était comparable dans les trois procédures consultatives précédentes concernant le Sud-Ouest africain: dans aucune d'elles, l'Afrique du Sud n'a prétendu qu'il y eût un différend, pas plus que la Cour n',jugé nécessaire d'appliquer les articles de son Règlement visant (( une question juridique actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats ». Presque toutes les procédures consultatives ont été marquées par des divergences de vues entre Etats sur des points de droit; si les opinions des Etats concordaient, il serait inutile de demander I'avis de la Cour. 35. Etant donné l'article 83 du Règlement, la question de savoir si I'avis consultatif a été demandé ((au sujet d'une question juridique actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats 1) revêtait aussi une
25 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) portance in the Court's consideration of the request made by the Govern- ment of South Africa for the appointment of a judge ad hoc. As already indicated, the Court heard argument in support of that request and, after due deliberation, decided, by an Order of 29 January 1971, not to accede to it. This decision was based on the conclusion that the terms of the request for advisory opinion, the circumstances in which it had been submitted (which are described in para. 32 above), as well as the con- siderations set forth in paragraphs 33 and 34 above, were such as to preclude the interpretation that an opinion had been "requested upon a legal question actually pending between two or more States". Thus, in the opinion of the Court, South Africa was not entitled under Article 83 of the Rules of Court to the appointment of a judge ad hoc. 36. Tt has been urged that the possible existence of a dispute was a point of substance which was prematurely disposed of by the Order of 29 January 1971. Now the question whether a judge ad hoc should be appointed is of course a matter concerning the composition of the Bench and possesses, as the Government of South Africa recognized, absolute logical priority. It has to be settled prior to the opening of the oral proceedings, and indeed before any further issues, even of procedure, can be decided. Until it is disposed of the Court cannot proceed with the case. Tt is thus a logical necessity that any request for the appointment of a judge ad hoc must be treated as a preliminary matter on the basis of a prima facie appreciation of the facts and the law. This cannot be construed as meaning that the Court's decision thereon may involve the irrevocable disposal of a point of substance or of one related to the Court's compe- tence. Thus, in a contentious case, when preliminary objections have been raised, the appointment of judges ad hoc must be decided before the hearing of those objections. That decision, however, does not prejudge the Court's competence if, for instance, it is claimed that no dispute exists. Conversely, to assert that the question of the judge ad hoc could not be validly settled until the Court had been able to analyse substantive issues is tantamount to suggesting that the composition of the Court could be left in suspense, and thus the validity of its proceedings left in doubt, until an advanced stage in the case. 37. The only question which was in fact settled with finality by the Order of 29 January 1971 was the one relating to the Court's compo- sition for the purpose of the present case. That decision was adopted on the authority of Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and in accordance with Article 55, paragraph 1, of the Statute. Consequently, after the adoption of that decision, while differing views might still be held as to the applicability of Article 83 of the Rules of Court in the present case, the regularity of the composition of the Court for the
importance décisive du point de vue de l'examen par la Cour de la demande introduite par le Gouvernement sud-africain en vue de la désignation d'un juge ad hoc. Comme il a déjà été indiqué, la Cour a entendu des observations à l'appui de cette demande et, après délibéré, a décidé par son ordonnance du 29 janvier 1971 de ne pas y faire droit. Cette décision était fondée sur la conclusion que les termes de la demande d'avis consultatif, les circonstances de sa présentation (qui sont décrites au par. 32 ci-dessus) et les considérations exposées aux paragraphes 33 et 34 étaient de nature à exclure l'interprétation selon laquelle l'avis aurait été ademandé au sujet d'une question juridique actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats ». Ainsi, selon la Cour, l'Afrique du Sud n'était pas fondée en vertu de l'article 83 du Règlement à désigner un juge ad hoc. 36. On a fait valoir que l'existence éventuelle d'un différend constituait une question de fond réglée prématurément par l'ordonnance du 29 janvier 197 1. Or, la question de savoir si un juge ad hoc doit être nommé concerne évidemment la composition de la Cour et présente, comme le Gouver- nement sud-africain l'a reconnu, une priorité logique absolue. Elle doit être tranchée avant l'ouverture de la procédure orale et même avant que toute autre question, fût-elle procédurale, puisse être décidée. Tant qu'elle n'est pas réglée, la Cour ne peut pas poursuivre l'examen de I'affaire. II est donc logiquement indispensable que toute demande tendant à la désignation d'un juge ad hoc soit traitée comme une question préliminaire sur la base d'une première appréciation des faits et du droit. On ne saurait déduire de cela que la décision de la Cour à ce sujet pourrait trancher de façon irrévocable un point de fond ou un point ayant trait à la compétence de la Cour. C'est ainsi que, dans une affaire contentieuse, lorsque des exceptions préliminaires sont soulevées, la question de la désignation de juges ad hoc doit être réglée avant les débats sur ces exceptions. La décision prise ne préjuge cependant pas de la compétence de la Cour, au cas où l'on prétendrait, par exemple, qu'il n'existe pas de différend. Inversement, affirmer que la question du juge ad hoc ne saurait être valablement réglée tant que la Cour n'a pas été en mesure d'analyser des questions de fond revient à dire qu'il faudrait laisser en suspens la question de la composition de la Cour et, partant, laisser planer un doute sur la validité de la procédure, jusqu'à un stade avancé de I'affaire. 37. La seule question que l'ordonnance du 29 janvier 1971 ait en fait définitivement adjusted is that which concerns the composition of the court for the purposes of this body. This decision was made on the basis of article 3, paragraph 1, of the regulation and in accordance with article 55, paragraph 1, of the status. Consequently, if the differences of view remain possible as to the applicability of article 83 of the regulation in this case, as soon as the decision is adopted, it is no longer free to call into question the regular nature of the composition of the courtyard for
26 Namibia (S. W. Afkica) (Advisory Opinion) Purposes of Delivering The Present Advisory Opinion, in Accord with the Statute and the Rules of Court, is no long to question. 38. Ln Connection With the Possible Appointment of Judes Ad Hoc, It has Further been suggested that the final clause in paragraph 1 of article 82 of the Rules of Court Obliges the Court to Determine As A Preliminary Quest Actually pending between two or more state. The Court Cannot Accept This Reading, which Overstrains the Literal Meaning of the Words "above all". It is difficult to conceive that an article Providing General Guidelines in the Relatively Unschematic Context of Advisory Proceedings Should prescribe a Rigid Sequence in the Action of the Court. This is confirmed by the Practice of the Court, which in No Previous Advisory Proceedings has found it neces- sary to make an independent prelimainary determination of this question or of its own competence, Even when specificly Requested to do so. Likewise, the interpretation of the Rules of Court as Imposing A Proceeding in Limin Litis, which has been suggested, corresponds neather to the text of the Nor to its purpose, which is to regulate Advisory procedures without impairing the flexibility that 66, paragraph, paragraph 4, and 68 of the statute allow the short so that it may add it procedure to the require- mennts of each particular case. The Phrase in Question Merely Indicates That The Test of Legal Pendecy is to be considered "Above All" by the Court for the Purpose of Exercise the Latitude Grantond by Article 68 of the Statute to be Guided by the Provisions that Apply in Contentious Cases to the EXTERT TO WHICH THE COURT RECOGNIZES THEM TO BE APPLICABLE. From a Pratical Point of View It May be added that procedure suggested, analogous to that followed in contentious procedure with respect to prelimina objections, would not have dispensed with the need to decide on the request for the cupointment of a judge ad hoc as a Previous, independent decision, just as in contentious boxes the question of judges ad hoc must be settled before any hearings on the prelination objections may be proceeded with. Finully, it must be observed that such proposed preliminary decision under article 82 of the Rules of Court would not needarillary have predetermined the decision that it is suggested should have been taken subsequently under article 83, since the later provision a more restrichesis: The Advisory Opinion is Requested Upon a Legal Question Actuelly Pending and not that it relates to such a question. 39. The view has been express that express that even if south Africa is not entitled to a judge ad hoc as a matter of right, the short should, in the exercise of the discretion grantd by article 68 of the statute, have allowed such an appointment , in Recognition of the fact that South Africa's interest are specially affected in the present case. In this connection the court wishes to recall a decision taken by the permanent court at a time when the statute did not include any provisioning advisor advice, the entire regulation of the procedure in the matter being thus left to the short (p.c.i.j. , No. 4, p. 76). Confronted with a
Namibia (African S.-O.) (advisory opinion) 26 The pronouncement of this advisory notice, under its status and its regulation. - 38. With regard to the possible designation of ad hoc judges, it was also indicated that the clause appearing at the end of paragraph 1 of the article 82 of the regulation forced the Court to establish, as a preliminary question, if The request for an opinion relates or not to a legal question currently hanging between two or more states. The Court cannot admit this interpretation which forces the literal sense of words ((above all ". It is difficult to imagine that an article giving general directives within the relatively flexible framework of the consultative procedure strictly prescribes the order in which the Court must proceed. This is what confirms the practice of the court which did not deem it necessary, in any previous advisory procedure, to decide on a preliminary and independent basis on this question or on its competence, even when it was expressly asked to do so. Likewise, interpret the regulations as imposing a In limin litis procedure, as has been done, does not correspond to the text of the article or its object, which is to regulate the consultative procedure without harming the latitude that article 66, paragraph 4, and The article 68 of the status grant the court so that it can adapt its procedure to the necessities of each species. The sentence member in question simply shows that the court must ((above all)) seek to know if there is a hanging legal question for the effect of exercising the faculty given to him by article 68 of the status to draw inspiration from the provisions relating to the procedure in contentious matters insofar as it recognizes them applicable. We can add that in practice the suggested procedure, similar to that which is followed in matters of preliminary exceptions, would not have deleted the need for a preliminary and independent decision on the request for the designation of a judge Ad hoc, exactly as well as in litigation, the question of ad hoc judges must be settled above all debate on preliminary ex-cits. Finally, it should be noted that the preliminary decision that it was proposed to take under article 82 of the regulation would not necessarily have predetermined the decision that should then have been made, according to this proposal, by virtue of the 'Article 83, since it envisages a more limited hypothesis: that where the advisory opinion is requested concerning a current legal question and not that where it relates to such a question. 39. We also expressed the opinion that, even if South Africa is not entitled to an ad hoc judge, the Court should nevertheless, in the exercise of the discretionary power conferred on it Article 68 of the status, allow him to designate one, to take into account the fact that his interests are particularly affected in this body. In this regard, the Court will recall a decision taken by the Permanent Court at a time when the status did not contain any provision on advisory opinions, the care to settle the procedure in the matter being left entirely to the Court (C.P.J.I. Series No 4 , p. 72). Seizure of a request for the designation
27 Namibia (S.W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) Request for the Appointment of A Judge Ad Hoc in a Case in Which It Found there was no dispute, the Court, in Rejecting the Request, Stated That "The Decision of the Court must be in Agreement with its status and with the Rules Duly Framed by it in pursuance of Article 30 of the Statute "(Order of October 31, 1935, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 65, Annex 1, p. 69 at p. 70) . It found Further that the "Exception cannot be given a wider app that is provided for by the rules" (ibid., P. 71). In the present case the court, having look to the rules of court adopted under article 30 of the statute, cam to the conclusion that it was unable to exercise discretion in this respect. 40. The Government of South Africa Has also expressd Doubts as to where the short is competing to, or Should, Give An Opinion, If, in Order to Do So, It Should Have To Make Findings As To Extensive Equests. Tn the view of the short, the contingency that there may be affectual underlying the question posed do not alter its character as a "legal question" as envisaged in article 96 of the charter. The Reference in this Provision to Legal Questions Cannot be interpreted as Opposing Legal to Billed. Normally, to Enable a Court to Proncounce On Legal Questions, It must also be acquainted with, Take Into Account and, If necessary, make findings as to the receiving billing. The Limitation of the PowerS of the Court Contended for by the Government of South Africa has no basis in the charter or the statute. 41. The Court Could, Of Course, Acting On Its Own, Exercise The Dis- Cretion Vested in It by Article 65, Paragraph 1, of the Statute and Decline to Accede to the Request for An Advisory Opinion. In Considering this possibility the Court Must Bear in mind that: "A Reply to a Request for an Opinion Should not, in Principle, be refused." (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 19.) The Court has considered where are anna any "Comelling Reasons", as referred to in the past practical of the court, which would justify such a refusal. It has found no Such Reasons. Moreover, it feels that by replying to the Request it would not only "Remain Faithful to the requirements of its judicial character" (I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 153), but also discharge its functions as "the main judicial organ of the United Nations "(Art. 92 of the charter). 42. HAVING ESTABLISHED that it is properly seized of a request for an Advisory Opinion, the Court Will Now Proceeds to an Analysis of the Question Place Before it: "What are the Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, Notwithsunding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)? "43. The Government of South Africa in Both Its Written and Oral Statements has been wide Field of History, Going Back to the Origin and Functioning of the Mandate. The Same and Similar Problems WERE
of an ad hoc judge in a case where she estimated that there was no dispute, the permanent court said, by rejecting this request: "The court can only rule in accordance with its status and regulation , duly established in application of article 30 of the status ”(Order of October 31, 1935, C.P.J.I. AIB series no 65, Ann. 1, p. 70). It noted that the application [of the exception does not] be extended beyond the limits which have been regulated to it 1) (ibid., P. 71). In this case, the Court, taking into account the regulation adopted under article 30 of the status, came to the conclusion that it was unable to exercise discretionary power in this regard. 40. The South African government has also questioned that the Court is competent to give an opinion or that it must do it if, for that, it must decide on affected issues of extensive scope. According to the Court, it is not because the question posed involves the facts that it loses the character of ((legal question)) within the meaning of article 96 of the charter. We cannot consider this saying ~ OSITION opposes the questions of law to the de facto points. To be able to decide on legal issues, a court must normally be aware of the corresponding facts, take them into consideration and, if necessary, rule on them. The limits that the South African government claims to assign to the powers of the court in the foundation neither in the charter nor in the status. 41. It is true that the Court could, on its own initiative, use the discretionary power given to it by article 65, paragraph 1, of the status and not to follow up on the request for an advisory opinion. When it examines this possibility, the Court must not lose sight of only ((in principle the response to a request for an opinion should not be refused)) (C.I.J. Collection 1951, p. 19). The court wondered, having regard to her past practice, if reasons (decisive "would justify such a refusal. She could not discover any. She considers moreover that by responding to the request not only she would remain ((faithful to the requirements of its judicial character "(C.I.J. Collection 1960, p. 153), but also it would pay its functions as ((main judicial body of the United Nations" (Charter, art. 92). 42. Having established that it was validly seized of a request for advisory opinion, the Court will analyze the question subject to it: ((what are the legal consequences for the States of the continuous presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council?)) 43. In his written presentation as in his oral presentations, the South African government has made a large history, going back to the origin of the mandate, which he examined functioning. Other governments,
Dealt with by Other Governments, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity in Their Written and Oral Statements. 44. A Series of Important Issues is Involved: The Nature of the Mandate, Its Working Under the League of Nations, the Consequences of the Demise of the League and of the Establishment of the United Nations and the Impact of Further Developments Within the New Organization . While the Court is aware that this is the sixth time it has been toal with the outlets involved in the Mandate for South West Africa, it has nonetheless reached the conclusion that it is necessary for it to consider and summarize some Question Addressed to it. ln Particular, The Court Will Examine the Substance and Scope of Article 22 of the League Covenant and the Nature of "C" Mandates. 45. The Government of South Africa, in Its Written Stament, presented a detailed analysis of the intentions of some of the participants in the Paris Peace Conference, Who Approved A Resolution which, With Some Alterations and Additions, Eventually Became Article 22 of the Covenant . At the Conclusion and in the Light of this Analysis it Suggestized that it was careful for commentators to fer to "'c' mandates as being in their practical effect not Far Removed from annexation". This view, which the goverqment of South Africa appears to have adopted, always be tantamount to admit that the receiver of the covenant we of a purely nominal character and that the right they are of their very Nature Imperfect and anForceable. Tt puts too much emphasis on the intentions of some of the parts and too Little on the instrument that emerged from those negotiations. Tt is Thus necessary to fer to the actual text of Article 22 of the Covenant, paragraph 1 of which declares: "1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant." As the Cocrt recalled in its 1950 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South- West Africa, in the setting-up of the mandates system "two principles were considered to be of paramount importance: the principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form 'a sacred trust of civilization'" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 131). 46. It is self-evident that the "trust" had to be exercised for the benefit of the peoples concerned, who were adm.itted to have interests of their
ainsi que le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et l'organisation de l'unité africaine, ont évoqué les mêmes problèmes ou des problèmes analogues dans leurs exposés écrits et oraux. 44. Toute une série de questions importantes sont en jeu: la nature du mandat, son application à l'époque de la Société des Nations, les con- séquences de la disparition de la Société, de l'établissement des Nations Unies et des faits survenus depuis lors au sein de la nouvelle organisation. La Cour n'ignore pas qu'elle est appelée pour la sixième fois à connaitre des problèmes liés au mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, mais elle n'en a pas moins conclu qu'il lui fallait examiner et résumer certains des problèmes mis en jeu par la question qui lui est posée. Elle se propose d'étudier en particulier le contenu et la portée de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et la nature des mandats C. 45. Dans son exposé écrit, le Gouvernement sud-africain a présenté une analyse détaillée des intentions de certains des participants à la conférence de la paix de Paris, où fut approuvée la résolution qui, avec certaines modifications et adjonctions, devait devenir ultérieurement l'article 22 du Pacte. En conclusion, et à la lumière de cette analyse, il a estimé qu'il était très naturel que les commentateurs aient parlé des mandats C a comme très proches, dans leur effet pratique, de l'annexion ». Cette manière de voir, que le Gouvernement sud-africain paraît avoir adoptée, reviendrait à admettre que les dispositions pertinentes du Pacte avaient un caractère de pure forme et que les droits qu'elles consacraient étaient par nature imparfaits et non exécutoires. Elle accorde trop d'importance aux intentions de certaines des parties et pas assez à l'instrument issu des négociations. Il faut donc se reporter au texte même de l'article 22, paragraphe 1, du Pacte: (( 1. Les principes suivants s'appliquent aux colonies et territoires qui, à la suite de la guerre, ont cessé d'être sous la souveraineté des Etats qui les gouvernaient précédemment et qui sont habités par des peuples non encore capables de se diriger eux-mêmes dans les con- ditions particulièrement difficiles du monde moderne. Le bien-être et le développement de ces peuples forment une mission sacrée de civilisation et il convient d'incorporer dans le présent Pacte des garanties pour l'accomplissement de cette mission. 1) La Cour a rappelé dans son avis consultatif de 1950 sur le Statut inter- national du Sud-Ouest africain que, lorsque le système des mandats fut créé, (( deux principes furent considérés comme étant d'importance pri- mordiale: celui de la non-annexion et celui qui proclamait que le bien- être et le développement de ces peuples formaient (( une mission sacrée de civilisation )) (C.I.J. Recueil 19.50, p. 13 1). 46. 11 est évident que la (1 mission 1) dont il s'agit devait être exercée au profit des populations en cause auxquelles on reconnaissait des intérêts
29 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) own and to possess a potentiality for independent existence on the attainment of a certain stage of development: the mandates system was designed to provide peoples "not yet" able to manage their own affairs with the help and guidance necessary to enable them to arrive at the stage where they would be "able to stand by themselves". The requisite means of assistance to that end is dealt with in paragraph 2 of Arti- cle 22: "2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League." This made it clear that those Powers which were to undertake the task envisaged would be acting exclusively as mandatories on behalf of the League. As to the position of the League, the Court found in its 1950 Advisory Opinion that: "The League was not, as alleged by [the South African] Government, a 'mandator' in the sense in which this term is used in the national law of certain States." The Court pointed out that: "The Mandate was created, in the interest of the inhabitants of the terri- tory, aiid of humanity in general, as an international institution with an international object-a sacred trust of civilisation." Therefore, the Court found, the League "had only assumed an international function of supervision and control" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 132). 47. The acceptance of a mandate on these terms connoted the assump- tion of obligations not only of a moral but also of a binding legal character; and, as a corollary of the trust, "securities for [its] performance" were instituted (para. 7 of Art. 22) in the form of legal accountability for its discharge and fulfilment : "7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge." 48. A further security for the performance of the trust was embodied in paragraph 9 of Article 22: "9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on al1 matters relating to the observance of the mandates." Thus the reply to the essential question, quis custodiet ipsos custodes?, was given in terms of the mandatory's accountability to international
propres et la possibilité de vivre indépendantes lorsqu'elles auraient atteint un certain stade de développement: le système des mandats devait fournir aux peuples (( non encore » capables de gérer leurs propres affaires l'aide et les conseils nécessaires pour leur permettre d'arriver au stade où ils seraient ((capables de se diriger eux-mêmes )). Le mode d'assistance nécessaire à cet effet était défini à l'article 22, paragraphe 2: (( 2. La meilleure méthode de réaliser pratiquement ce principe est de confier la tutelle de ces peuples aux nations développées qui, en raison de leurs ressources, de leur expérience ou de leur position géographique, sont le nieux à même d'assumer cette responsabilité et qui consentent à l'accepter: elles exerceraient cette tutelle en qualité de Mandataires et au nom de la Société. )) II ressort clairement de ce texte que les puissances qui allaient se charger de la tâche envisagée agiraient exclusivement en qualité de mandataires et au nom de la société des Nations. Pour ce qui est de la position de la SdN, la Cour a dit, dans son avis de 1950, que cc la Société des Nations n'était pas, comme l'a allégué [le Gouvernement sud-africain], un ((mandant », au sens où ce terme est employé dans la législation interne de certains Etats 11. La Cour faisait observer: (( Le Mandat a été créé, dans l'intérêt des habitants du Territoire et de l'humanité en général, comme une institution internationale à laquelle était assigné un but international: une mission sacrée de civilisation ». Elle estimait donc que la Société des Nations cc avait seulement assumé une fonction internationale de sur- veillance et de contrôle 1) (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 132). 47. Accepter un mandat dans ces conditions supposait que l'on con- tractait des obligations non seulement morales mais aussi juridiquement contraignantes et, comme corollaire de la mission, ((des garanties pour [son] accomplissement 1) étaient prévues (art. 22, par. 7) sous forme d'une obligation juridique de rendre compte de la manière dont on s'en acquit- tait: (( 7. Dans tous les cas le Mandataire doit envoyer au Conseil un rapport annuel concernant les territoires dont il a la charge. )) 48. Une autre garantie de l'accomplissement de la mission était prévue au paragraphe 9 de l'article 22: a9. Une commission permanente sera chargée de recevoir et d'examiner les rapports annuels des mandataires et de donner au Conseil son avis sur toutes questions relatives à l'exécution des mandats. 11 La réponse à la question essentielle quis custodiet ipsos custodes? était donc que les mandataires étaient tenus de rendre compte à des organismes
organs. An additional measure of supervision was introduced by a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, adopted on 31 Jan- uary 1923. Under this resolution the mandatory Governments were to transmit to the League petitions from communities or sections of the populations of mandated territories. 49. Paragraph 8 of Article 22 of the Covenant gave the following directive : "8. The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercjsed by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council." In pursuance of this directive, a Mandate for German South West Africa was drawn up which defined the terms of the Mandatory's administration in seven articles. Of these, Article 6 made explicit the obligation of the Mandatory under paragraph 7 of Article 22 of the Covenant by providing that "The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumea under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5" of the Mandate. As the Court said in 1950: "the Mandatory was to observe a number of obligations, and the Council of the League was to supervise the administration and see to it that these obligations were fulfilled" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 132). In sum the relevant provisions of the Covenant and those of the Mandate itself preclude any doubt as to the establishment of definite legal obligations designed for the attainment of the object and purpose of the Mandate. 50. As indicated in paragraph 45 above, the Government of South Africa has dwelt at some length on the negotiations which preceded the adoption of the final version of Article 22 of the League Covenant, and has suggested that they lead to a different reading of its provisions. It is true that as that Government points out, there had been a strong tendency to annex former enemy colonial territories. Be that as it may, the final outcome of the negotiations, however difficult of achievement, was a rejection of the notion of annexation. It cannot tenably be argued that the clear meaning of the mandate institution could be ignored by placing upon the explicit provisions embodying its principles a construction at variance with its object and purpose. 51. Events subsequent to the adoption of the instruments in question should also be considered. The Allied and Associated Powers, in their Reply to Observations of the German Delegation, referred in 1919 to "the mandatory Powers, which in so far as they rnay be appointed trustees by the League of Nations will derive no benefit from such trusteeship". As to the Mandate for South West Africa, its preamble
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 30 internationaux. Une résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations adoptée le 3 1 janvier 1923 a introduit une mesure de surveillance supplé- mentaire. En vertu de cette résolution, les gouvernements mandataires devaient transmettre à la Société les pétitions de communautés ou d'éléments de la population des territoires sous mandat. 49. L'article 22, paragraphe 8, du Pacte contenait la directive suivante: (18. Si le degré d'autorité, de contrôle ou d'administration à exercer par le Mandataire n'a pas fait l'objet d'une convention antérieure entre les Membres de la Société, il sera expressément statué sur ces points par le Conseil. 1) Conformément à cette directive, il a été établi un mandat pour le Sud- Ouest africain allemand qui définissait en sept articles les conditions de l'administration du territoire par le mandataire. L'article 6 précisait l'obligation qui incombait au mandataire en vertu de l'article 22, para- graphe 7, du Pacte; il stipulait que celui-ci devait (1 envoyer au Conseil dela Société des Nations un rapport annuel satisfaisant le Conseil et contenant toute information intéressant le territoire et indiquant les mesures prises pour assurer les engagements pris suivant les articles 2, 3, 4 et 5 )) du mandat. Ainsi que la Cour l'a dit en 1950: 11 le mandataire était tenu de respecter un certain nombre d'obligations, et le Conseil de la Société des Nations devait surveiller l'administration et veiller à ce que ces obli- gations fussent rspectées » (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 132). En bref, les dispositions pertinentes du Pacte et celles du mandat lui-même ne laissent subsister aucun doute quant à la création d'obligations juridiques précises visant à atteindre le but et l'objet du mandat. 50. Comme il est indiqué au paragraphe 45 ci-dessus, le Gouvernement sud-africain s'est étendu assez longuement sur les négociations qui ont précédé l'adoption de la version définitive de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et a soutenu qu'on pouvait en tirer une interprétation différente de cette disposition. 11 est vrai, comme ce gouvernement le fait observer, qu'il y avait eu une tendance marquée à l'annexion des anciens territoires coloniaux ennemis. Quoi qu'il en soit, le résultat final de ces négociations - même s'il n'a pas été obtenu sans mal - a été le rejet de l'idée d'annexion. Prétendre qu'on peut méconnaître le sens évident de l'institution des mandats, en donnant aux dispositions explicites qui en expriment les principes une interprétation contraire à son but et à son objet, est une thèse insoutenable. 51. Il faut aussi tenir compte des événements qui ont suivi l'adoption des instruments en question. The powers. Allied and associated, in their response to the remarks of the German delegation on the conditions of peace, referred in 1919 to the mandatory powers which, being made up of the fidels by the League of the Nations, will not benefit from this loyalty) ). The mandate for the South West Africa
Recited that "His Britannic Majesty, for and on Behalf of the Government of the Union of South Africa, has agreed to accept the mandate in respect of the Said Territory and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the league of nations". 52. Furthermore, The Subsequent Development of International Law in Looking to Non Self-Governing Territories, as Enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, Made The Principle of Self-Determination Applicable To Al1 of Them. The Concept of the Sacred Trust was confirmed and expanded to al1 "Territories Whose Peoples have not Yet Attained a Full Measure of Self-Government" (art. 73). Thus it clearly embraced territories under a colonial diet. Obviously the Sacred Trust continued to apply to the League of Nations Mandated Territories on which An International Status Had Been Conferred Earlier. A Further Important Stage in this Development was the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial country and peoples (General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), which embraces al1 peoples and territories which "have not yet attanedence". Nor is it possible to leave out of account the political history of mandated territories in general. Al1 Those which Did not acquire independence, excluding namibia, were placed under trusteeship. TODAY, Only Two OUT OF FIFTEEN, Excluding Namibia, Remain Under United Nations Tutelage. This is but a manifestation of the general development which has led to the birth of so many new stats. 53. All these considations are Germane to the Court's evaluation of the present case. Mindful as it is of the primary need of interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parts at the time of its conclusion, the court is bound to take into account the fact that concepts embodied in article 22 of the covenant- " STRENUOUS CONDITIONS OF THE MODERN WORLD "AND" THE WELL-BEING AND DEVELOPMENT "OF THE PEOPLES ADDITED-WE NOT STATIC, But we by Definition Evolutionary, As Also, Therefore, WAS THE CONCEPT OF THE" SACRED TRUST ". The parts to the covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. That is Why, Viewing the Institutions of 1919, the Court Must Take Into Consideration the Changes Which Have Occurred in the Superventing Half-Century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the charter of the united nations and by WAY OF CUSTOMARY LAW. Moreover, an inter- National Instrument has been interpreted and applied with the frame- work of the Entire Legal System Prevailing at the time of the interpretation. In the Domain to Which the Present Proceedings Relates, The Last Fifty Years, as indicated aboo, have an important developments. These developments leave little Doubt that the ultimate objective of the Sacred Trust was the self-further and independence of the peoples con- Cerned. In this domain; As Elsewher, The Corpus Iuris Gentium has been
specified on the other hand in its preamble: ((His British Majesty, acting for the government of the Union of South Africa, and on its behalf, undertook to accept the mandate on said territory and undertook to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations)). 52. In addition, the subsequent evolve of international law with regard to non -autonomous territories, as devoted by the Charter of the United Nations, has made self -determination a principle applicable to all these territories. The concept of sacred mission has been confirmed and extended to all (territories whose populations do not yet administer themselves to each other 1) (art. 73). Ji is clear that these terms aimed colonial. Obviously the sacred mission agreed to apply to the territories placed under the mandate of the League of Nations to which an international status had been conferred on the other. Another important step in this development was the declaration on granting of independence to countries and coloniaux peoples (resolution 1514 (XV) of the general meeting dated 14 Désm- Bre 1960) applicable to all peoples and to all territories (which have not yet Access to independence 11. Similarly, it is impossible to neglect the political history of territories under mandate in general. All those who have not accessed independence, with the exception of Namibia, were placed under guardianship. Today out of fifteen of these territories, not including Namibia, only two are still under the supervision of nations United. This is not a manifestation of penetral evolution U which led to the birth of many new states. 53. All these considerations are related to the way in which the Court considers this case. Without forgetting the primordial necessity of inserting an instrument given in accordance with the intentions that the-parties had when it was concluded, the Court must take into account that the concepts devoted by article 22 of the pact- 11 The Particularly difficult conditions of the modern world "and has the well-being and the development))) of interested peoples- were not static but by evolutionary challenge and that it was the same as a result of the concept de ((sacred mission of civilization ". We must therefore admit that the parties to the pact accepted them as such. This is why, when it considers the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consiced the transformations which occurred in the half century which followed and its intervention cannot fail to take into account the evolution that the law has later known thanks to the Charter of the United Nations and the custom. In addition, any international instrument must be interpreted and applied in the framework of the entire legal system in force at the time when interpretation takes place. In the field to which this procedure is attached, the last fifty years have marked, as said above, an important evolution. Because of this evolution there is little doubt that the (Sacred Mission of Civilization "had the ultimate objective of self -determination and independence of the peoples in question. In this area as in others, the Corpus Juris Gentium
Considerably enriched, and this the court, if it is faitfully to discharge its functions, May not ignore. 54. In the Light of T5e Foregoing, the Court is unable to accept any construction that wow attach to "c" mandates an object and purposes different from "a" or "b" mandates. The Only Differentés Were Those Appearing from the Language of Article 22 of the Covenant, and from the Particular Mandate Instruments, But the Objective and Safeguards Remained the Same, With No Exemptions Such As Considerations of Geo-Graphical Contiguit. To hold Otherwise WOULD MEAN THAT TERROIRS UNDER "CM MANDATE BELONGED TO The Family of Mandates Only in Name, Being in Fact the Objects of Disguised Cessions, as if the affirmation that they could" be best administer under the laws of the Mandate Portions Portions of its territory "(art. 22, para. 6) Conferred Upon the Adistic Power A Special Title Not Vested in States Entrusted With" A "or" B "Mandates. The Court Would Recall in This Respect What Was Stated in the 1962 Judgment In the South West Africa Cases As Applying To Al1 Categories of Mandate: "The Rights of the Mandate in Relation to the Mandated Territory and the Inhabitants Have Their Foundation in The Obligations of the Mandate and They Are, So To Speak, Mere Tools Given To Enable it to fulfil its obligations. "(I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 329.) 55. The Court will now to the situation that arose on the demise of the league and with the birth of the United Nations. As Alredy Recalled, The League of nations was the international organization entrusted with the exempliise of the supervisory functions of the mandate. Those Functions we an essential element of the mandate. But that does not mean that the mandates institution was to collapse with the disappears of the original supervisory machinery. To the question where the continuance of a mandate was inseparably linked with the existence of the league, the ANSWER Must be that an institution established for the fulfilment of a sacred trust cannot be presumed to lapse before the achievement of its purpose. The responsibility of Both Mandate and Supervisor Resulting from the Mandates Institution Were Complemen- Tary, and the Disappearance of One or the Other Could Not Affect the Survival of the Institution. That is why, in 1950, the short remark, in connection with the bonds corresponding to the sacred trust: "their reason of being and original object remain. Since their fulfilment did not depend on the existence of the league of nations, they could Not be B3
has enriched a lot and, in order to be able to faithfully pay its functions, the court cannot ignore it. 54. Given the above, the Court cannot make its interpretation which would attribute to mandates C an object and a goal different from those of mandates A or B. The only differences are those which emerge from the wording of article 22 of the pact and relevant mandate instruments, but the objective and the guarantees are the same, no exception being made in particular for reasons of geographical continuity. Support the opposite would mean that the territories under mandate C belonged only by name to the family of mandates and were in fact only the subject of disguised transfers, as if, in saying that they could not ((to be better administered than Under the laws of the agent, as an integral part of its territory)) (art. 22, para. 6), a special title had been given to the administering power which was not granted to the states to which mandates A or B had been entrusted. The Court will recall on this subject an observation that it made in its 1962 judgment on the affairs of the South West Africa and which applies to all categories of mandates: (I The rights of the agent concerning the territory under mandate and Its inhabitants are based on the obligations of the agent and they are, so to speak, only simple instruments allowing it to fulfill its obligations. 1) (C.I.J. Collection 1962, p. 329.) 55. The court is now coming to the Situation created by the disappearance of the League of Nations and the birth of the United Nations. We have seen above that the League of Nations was the international organization responsible for exercising the surveillance functions with regard to mandates. These functions were an essential element in the system of mandates. However, this does not mean that the institution of mandates had to end when the original monitoring mechanism would disappear. To the question of whether the maintenance of the mandate was inseparable linked to the existence of the League of Nations, it must be replied that one cannot presume the lapicality of an institution established in order to accume a Sacred mission until its objective has been achieved. The responsibilities of the agent and the supervisory authority in the instance of the mandates were complementary and the disappearance of one or the other could not affect the survival of the institution. It is for this reason that in 1950 the Court declared, with regard to the obligations discovered of the sacred mission: (I in all respects their raison d'être and their primitive object remain. As their execution did not depend on The existence of the League of Nations, these obligations could not become obsolete for
Organ Ceased to Exist. Nor Could the right of the population to have the territory adrninistred in accordance with these rules depend thereon. "(I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 133.) In the Particular Case, specific provisions WERE MADE AND DECISIONS Taken for the Transfer of Functions from the Organization Which was to be wound up to that that card Into Being. 56. Within the Framework of the United Nations An International Trusteeship System was Established and it was kenly contemplated that rnandated territories considering as not yet ready for independence. Under the United Nations International Trusteeship System. This System Established A Wider and More Effective International Supervision Than Had Been the Case Under the Mandates of the League of Nations. 57. It would have been been contrary to the Overriding Purpose of the Mandates System to Assome That Difficulties in the way of the replacement of one regime by another designed to irnprove international supervision should has been permitted to bring about, on the dissolution of the league, a complete disappearance of international supervision. To accept the Contestation of the Government of South Africa on this Point Would Have started the Reversion of Mandated Territories to Colonial Status, and the Virtual Replacement of the Mandates Rime by Annexation, so Determinedly Excluded in 1920. 58. These compelling Considerations Brought About the Insertion in the Charter of the United Nations of the Safeguarding Clause contained in article 80, paragraph 1, of the charter, which reads as follows: '' 1. Exception as rnay be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under articles 77, 79 and 8 1, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, Nothing in this chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter In Any Rnanner the Rights Whatsoever of Any States or Any Peoples or the Terms of Existing International Instruments to Which Members of the United Nations Rnay Respectively Be parts. "59. A Striking feature of this provision is the Stipulation in Favour of the Presert of the Rights of "Any Peoples", Thus Clearly Including the Inhabitants of the Mandated Territories and, in Particular, Their Indigenous Populations. These Rights Wree Thus Confirmed to have an existence independent of that of the League of Nations. The Court, in the 1950 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa, Relised on this provision to reach the conclusion that "No Such Rights of the Peoples Could Be Effectively Safeguarded Without Inter-
the only reason that this surveillance body had ceased to exist. The right of the population to see the territory administered in accordance with these rules could not depend on it either. )) (C.I.J. Collection 1950, p. 133.) In this particular case, special provisions have been drawn up and decisions were made in order to transfer the functions of the Galisation which was to be dissolved to that which was born . 56. When the United Nations has been created an inter-supervisory regime in the United Nations, it was obviously considered that the territories under the mandate that was not yet considered ripe for independence would be placed under the international regime of United Nations guardianship. This regime included broader and more effective international surveillance than that of the mandates of the League of Nations. 57. It would have been contrary to the essential goal of the system of mandates to admit that the difficulties due to the reinforcement of one regime by another regime intended to improve international surveillance can lead, to the dissolution of the Society of Nations, the disappearance any international surveillance. Accepting the thesis of the South African government on this point would have resulted in the return of the territories under the date of the colonial status and the virtual replacement of the managers system by the annexation, a solution which had been resolutely dismissed in 1920. 58. It is these decisive reasons that have. Determined the introduction into the United Nations Charter of the safeguard clause that Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter: (1. With the exception of what Can be agreed in the specific agreements of supervision concluded in accordance with articles 77, 79 and 81 and placing each territory under the supervision regime, and until these agreements have been concluded, no provision of this chapter will be interpreted as amending Directly or in any way in any way in any way the rights of any state or any people or the provisions of international acts in force to which members of the organization may be parties.)) 59. One of the notable features of this provision is the stipulation of the maintenance of the rights of peoples, which undoubtedly applies to the inhabitants of the territories under mandate and in particular to the indigenous populations. This is confirming that these rights have an independent existence of that of the League of Nations. In its 1950 advisory opinion on the international status of the South West Africa, the Court was based on this provision to conclude that I (these rights of peoples cannot be effectively guaranteed without international control and without
34 Namibia (S.W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) National Supervision and a Duty to Render Reports to A Supervisory Organ "(I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 137). In 1956 The Court Confirmed the Conclusion that" The effect of article 80 (1) of the charter "was that of" preserving the right of states and peoples "(I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 27). 60. Article 80, paragraph 1, of the charter was thus interpreted by the short as probing that the system of replacement of Mandates by Trusteeship Agreements, Resulting from Chapter XII of the Charter, Shall not "Be Construed in or of Itself to Alter in Any Manner the Rights What-Sover of Any States or Any Peoples". 61. The exception made in the initial words of the provision, "Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under articles 77, 79 and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and unit such agreements have been concluded", establised a particular method quo of a mandate regime. This could be Achieved Only by Means of A Trusteeship Agreement, Unless the "Sacred Trust" Had Come to an End by the Imprementation of Its Objective, that is, the attainment of independent existence. In this way, by the use of the expression "Until such agreements have been concluded", a legal hiatus between the two system was obviated. 62. The Final Words of Article 80, Paragraph 1, Fer to "The Terms of Existing International Instruments to Which Members of the United Nations May respectivei be parties". The Records of the San Francisco Conference Show That these Words We Inserted in Replacement of the Words "Any Mandate" in An Earlier Draft in Order to Preserve "Any Rights Set Fortth in Paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations" . 63. In Approving This Amendment and Inserting these Words in the Report of Cornmitted 1114, The States Participating At the San Francisco Conference Obviously Took Into Account the Fact that the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations Would Render the Disappearance of the League of Nations inevitable. This shows the common understanding and intention at San Francisco that article 80, paragraph 1, of the charter had the purpose and effect of keeping in force al1 rights whatsoever, including those contained in the Covenant itself, against any claim as to their possible lapse with the dissolution of the League. 64. The demise of the League could thus not be considered as an unexpected supervening event entailing a possible termination of those rights, entirely alien to Chapter XII of the Charter and not foreseen by the safeguarding provisions of Article 80, paragraph 1. The Members of the League, upon effecting the dissolution of that organization, did not declare, or accept even by implication, that the mandates v~ould be cancelled or lapse with the dissolution of the League. On the contrary,
l'obligation de soumettre des rapports à un organe de contrôle » (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 137). En 1956, la Cour a confirmé la conclusion d'après laquelle (( l'effet de l'article 80, paragraphe 1, de la Charte ... garantit les droits [des] Etats et [des] peuples )) (C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 27). 60. Ainsi, selon l'interprétation de la Cour, l'article 80, paragraphe 1, de la Charte disposait que l'opération de remplacement des mandats par des accords de tutelle, en vertu du chapitre XII de la Charte, ne devait pas être ((interprétée comme modifiant directement ou indirecte- ment en aucune manière les droits quelconques d'aucun Etat ou d'aucun peuple )). 61. Le début du paragraphe I précisait la méthode par laquelle le statu quo en matière de mandat pouvait être modifié (( A l'exception de ce qui peut être convenu dans les accords particuliers de tutelle conclus conformément aux articles 77, 79 et 81 et plaçant chaque territoire sous le régime de tutelle, et jusqu'à ce que des accords aient été conclus ». La transformation ne pouvait s'effectuer qu'au moyen d'un accord de tutelle, à moins que la (1 mission sacrée )) ne soit arrivée à son terme par suite de la réalisation de l'objectif auquel elle répondait: l'accession à l'indépendance. En employant la formule ajusqu'à ce que ces accords aient été conclus », on évitait toute solution de continuité juridique entre les deux régimes. 62. A la fin de l'article 80, paragraphe 1, il est fait mention des (( dis- positions d'actes internationaux en vigueur auxquels des Membres de l'organisation peuvent être parties 1). Les documents officiels de la con- férence de San Francisco montrent que cette formule a été introduite à la place des mots (( d'un mandat quelconque )), qui figuraient dans un texte antérieur, afin de préserver (t les droits stipulés au paragraphe 4 de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations )). 63. Si les Etats participant à la conférence de San Francisco ont ap- prouvé cet amendement et introduit cette précision dans le rapport du comité 4 de la Commission II, c'est manifestement parce qu'ils consi- déraient que l'adoption de la Charte des Nations Unies rendrait inéluc- table la disparition de la Société des Nations. Cela montre que, selon l'interprétation et l'intention des participants à la conférence de San Francisco, l'article 80, paragraphe 1, de la Charte avait pour but et pour effet de maintenir en vigueur tous les droits, quels qu'ils soient, y compris les droits stipulés dans le Pacte lui-même, pour qu'on ne puisse pas pré- tendre que la dissolution de la Société des Nations les avait rendus caducs. 64. La disparition de la SdN ne saurait donc être considérée comme un événement fortuit entraînant une éventuelle extinction de ces droits, événement entièrement étranger au chapitre XII de la Charte et que n'auraient pas prévu les dispositions de sauvegarde de l'article 80, para- graphe 1. Lorsque les Membres de la Sociétk des Nations ont dissout l'organisation, ils n'ont ni déclaré ni accepté, même implicitement, que cette dissolution entraînerait l'abrogation ou la caducité des mandats. Au
35 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) paragraph 4 of the resolution on mandates of 18 April 1946 clearly assumed their continuation. 65. The Government of South Africa, in asking the Court to reappraise the 1950 Advisory Opinion, has argued that Article 80, paragraph 1, must be interpreted as a mere saving clause having a purely negative effect. 66. If Article 80, paragraph 1, were to be understood as a mere inter- pretative provision preventing the operation of Chapter XII from affecting any rights, then it would be deprived of al1 practical effect. There is nothing in Chapter XII-which, as interpreted by the Court in 1950, constitutes a framework for future agreements-susceptible of affecting existing rights of States or of peoples under the mandates system. Likewise, if paragraph 1 of Article 80 were to be understood as a mere saving clause, paragraph 2 of the same Article would have no purpose. This paragraph provides as follows: "2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and con- clusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77." This provision was obviously intended to prevent a mandatory Power from invoking the preservation of its rights resulting from paragraph 1 as a ground for delaying or postponing what the Court described as "the normal course indicated by the Charter, namely, conclude Trustee- ship Agreements" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 140). No method of inter- pretation would warrant the conclusion that Article 80 as a whole is meaningless. 67. In considering whether negative effects only may be attributed to Article 80, paragraph 1, as contended by South Africa, account must be taken of the words at the end of Article 76 (d) of the Charter, which, as one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system, ensures equal treatment in commercial matters for al1 Members of the United Nations and their nationals. The proviso "subject to the provisions of Article 80" was included at the San Francisco Conference in order to preserve the existing right of preference of the mandatory Powers in "CM mandates. The delegate of the Union of South Africa at the Conference had pointed out earlier that "the 'open door' had not previously applied to the 'C' mandates", adding that "his Government could not contemplate its application to their mandated territory". If Article 80, paragraph 1, had no conservatory and positive effects, and if the rights therein preserved could have been extinguished with the disappearance of the League of Nations, then the proviso in Article 76 (d) infine would be deprived of any practical meaiiing.
contraire, le paragraphe 4 de la résolution du 18 avril 1946 sur les man- dats suppose nettement leur maintien en vigueur. 65. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a demandé à la Cour de reconsi- dérer son avis consultatif de 1950 et soutenu à ce propos que I'article 80, paragraphe 1, devait être interprété comme une simple clause de sauve- garde ayant un effet purement négatif. 66. Si l'on devait voir dans I'article 80, paragraphe 1, une simple dis- position interprétative empêchant que l'application du chapitre XII ne porte atteinte à des droits, ce paragraphe serait dépourvu de toute portée pratique. Rien dans le chapitre XII - qui, selon l'interprétation donnée par la Cour en 1950, est un cadre pour des accords de tutelle à venir - ne peut affecter les droits que des Etats ou des peuples tiennent du système des mandats. De plus, si l'on devait considérer l'article 80, paragraphe 1, comme une simple clause de sauvegarde, le paragraphe 2 de cet article serait sans objet. Ce paragraphe dispose: (( 2. Le paragraphe 1 du présent article ne doit pas être interprété comme motivant un retard ou un ajournement de la négociation et de la conclusion d'accords destinés à placer sous le régime de tutelle des territoires sous mandat ou d'autres territoires ainsi qu'il est prévu à I'article 77. )) Cette disposition visait manifestement à empêcher une puissance man- dataire d'invoquer le maintien de ses droits en vertu du paragraphe 1 pour retarder ou ajourner le moment de prendre ce que la Cour a appelé ((la voie normale tracée par la Charte, c'est-à-dire: conclure des Accords de Tutelle )J (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 140). Aucune méthode d'interprétation n'autorise à conclure que l'article 80 n'ait dans son ensemble aucune signification. 67. Quand on se demande si l'on ne peut attribuer à I'article 80, para- graphe 1, qu'un effet purement négatif, ainsi que le soutient l'Afrique du Sud, il faut tenir compte des derniers mots de I'article 76, alinéa d), de la Charte, qui visent à assurer, comme une des fins essentielles du régime de tutelle, l'égalité de traitement dans le domaine commercial à tous les Membres de l'Organisation et à leurs ressortissants. La clause ((sous réserve des dispositions de I'article 80 )) a été introduite à la con- férence de San Francisco pour préserver le droit de préférence que pos- sédaient les puissances mandataires dans les territoires placés sous man- dat C. Le représentant de l'Union sud-africaine à la conférence avait fait observer que (( la ((porte ouverte )l n'était pas applicable, auparavant, aux mandats CD, ajoutant que ((son gouvernement n'en envisageait pas I'ap- plication au territoire placé sous son mandat ». Si I'article 80, paragraphe 1, n'avait pas eu d'effet conservatoire et positif et si les droits qu'il main- tenait avaient pu s'éteindre à la disparition de la Société des Nations, le dernier membre de phrase de l'article 76, alinéa d), aurait été dépourvu de toute signification pratique.
36 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) 68. The Government of South Africa has invoked as "new facts" not fully before the Court in 1950 a proposa1 introduced by the Chinese delegation at the final Assembly of the League of Nations and another submitted by the Executive Committee to the United Nations Preparatory Commission, both providing in explicit terms for the transfer of super- visory functions over mandates from the League of Nations to United Nations organs. It is argued that, since neither of these two proposals was adopted, no such transfer was envisaged. 69. The Court is unable to accept the argument advanced. The fact that a particular proposa1 is not adopted by an international organ does not necessarily carry with it the inference that a collective pronouncement is made in a sense opposite to that proposed. There can be many rea- sons determining rejection or non-approval. For instance, the Chinese proposal, which was never considered but was ruled out of order, would have subjected mandated territories to a form of supervision which went beyond the scope of the existing supervisory authority in respect of mandates, and could have raised difficulties with respect to Article 82 of the Charter. As to the establishment of a Temporary Trusteeship Com- mittee, it was opposed because it was felt that the setting up of such an organ might delay the negotiation and conclusion of trusteeship agree- ments. Consequently two United States proposals, intended to authorize this Committee to undertake the functions previously performed by the Mandates Commission, could not be acted upon. The non-establishment of a temporary subsidiary body empowered tiassist the General Assembly in the exercise of its supervisory functions over mandates cannot be interpreted as implying that the General Assembly lacked competence or could not itself exercise its functions in that field. On the contrary, the general assumption appeared to be that the supervisory functions over mandates previously performed by the League were to be exercised by the United Nations. Thus, in the discussions concerning the proposed setting-up of the Temporary Trusteeship Committee, no observation was made to the effect that the League's supervisory functions had not been transferred to the United Nations. Tndeed, the South African representative at the United Nations Preparatory Commission declared on 29 November 1945 that "it seemed reasonîble to create an interim body as the Mandates Commission was now in abeyance and countries holding mandates should have a body to which they could report". 70. The Government of South Africa has further contended that the provision in Article 80, paragraph 1, that the terms of "existing inter- national instruments" shall not be construed as altered by anything in Chapter XII of the Charter, cannot justify the conclusion that the duty to report under the Mandate was transferred from the Council of the
68. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a invoqué en tant que ((faits nou- veaux » dont la Cour n'aurait paseupleinement connaissance en 1950 une proposition de la délégation chinoise, présentée à la dernière Assemblée de la Société des Nations, ainsi qu'une autre proposition soumise par le Comité exécutif à la Commission préparatoire des Nations Unies, qui toutes deux prévoyaient expressément le transfert à des organes des Nations Unies des fonctions de surveillance de la SdN relatives aux man- dats. II a fait valoir que, ni l'une ni l'autre de ces propositions n'ayant été adoptée, aucun transfert de ce genre n'a été envisagé. 69. La Cour ne peut accepter cette argumentation. Le fait que telle ou telle proposition n'ait pas été adoptée par un organe international n'implique pas nécessairement qu'une décision collective inverse ait été prise. Le rejet ou la non-approbation d'une proposition peut tenir à de nombreux motifs. Par exemple, la proposition chinoise, qui n'a jamais été examinée et a été considérée comme irrecevable, aurait eu pour effet d'assujettir les territoires sous mandat à un mode de surveillance allant au-delà des pouvoirs de surveillance applicables aux mandats et elle aurait pu soulever des difficultés au sujet de l'article 82 de la Charte. Quant à la proposition tendant à constituer un comité temporaire de tutelle, elle a été repoussée parce qu'on estimait que la création d'un tel organe aurait risqué de retarder la négociation et la conclusion d'accords de tutelle. En conséquence deux propositions des Etats-Unis visant à auto- riser ce comité à assumer les fonctions exercées jusque-là par la Commis- sion permanente des mandats sont restées sans suite. On ne saurait con- sidérer que le fait de ne pas créer un organe subsidiaire temporaire chargé d'aider l'Assemblée générale dans l'exercice de ses fonctions de surveil- lance à l'égard des mandats implique que l'Assemblée générale n'avait pas compétence ou ne pouvait exercer elle-même ses fonctions pro- pres dans ce domaine. On semble avoir supposé au contraire que les fonctions de surveillance sur les mandats, auparavant assumées par la Société des Nations, seraient exercées par l'organisation des Nations Unies. C'est ainsi que, dans les débats sur la proposition concernant la création du comité temporaire de tutelle, personne n'a signalé que The surveillance functions of the League of Nations had not been transfered to the United Nations. What is more, the representative of South Africa to the United Nations Preparatory Commission declared on November 29, 1945: (it seems reasonable to create a temporary organization since the commission of mandates is in sleep and the countries agents should have an organization to which they can submit their report. ”70. The South African government argued on the other hand that article 80, paragraph 1, which provides that no provision of Chapter XII will be interpreted as modifying the provisions ((of international acts in force)), cannot authorize that, as a result of a transfer, the obligation to report to the Council of the Society of
League to the United Nations. 71. This objection fails to take into considering article 10 in Charter IV of the Charter, a provision that was relied upon in the 1950 Opinion to justify the Transference of Supervisory Powers from the League Council to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Court then Said: "The Comperte of the General Assembly of the United Nations to Exercise Such Supervision and to Receive and examine reports is derived from the Provisions of Article 10 of the Charter, Which Authorizes The General Assembly to Discuss any questions or any matters Within the scope of the charter and to make recommendations on these questions or matters to the Members of the United Nations. " (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 137.) 72. since a provision of the charter-article 80, paragraph 1-Had maintained the obligations of the Mandate, the United Nations Had Become the Appropriat for Supervising the Fulfilment of Those Obligations. Thus, by Virtue of Article 10 of the Charter, South Africa Agreed to submit its Administration of South West Africa to the ballot of the General Assembly, on the basis of the Information Farnished by the Mandate or Obtained from Other Sources. The Transfer of the Obligation to Report, from the League Council to the General Assembly, was merely a corollary of the power grants to the general assembly. These powerers we in fact in fact exercise by it, as found by the short in the 1950 Advisory Opinion. The Court Rightly concluded in 1950 That- ". The General Assembly of the United Nations is Legally qualified to exercise the supervisory functions previously exercise by the league of nations with look to the administration of the territory, and that the union of South Africa is under an obligation to submit to supervision and control of the general assembly and to render annual reports to it "(I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 137). In its 1955 Advisory Opinion On Voting Procedure On Questions Relating To Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South West Afiica, After Recalling Some Passages from the 1950 Advisory Opinion, The Court Stated: "Thus, the Authority of the General Assembly to Exercise Supercise Super - Vision over the Administration of South West A.Frica as a mandated territory is based on the provisions of the charter. " (I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 76.) In the 1956 Advisory Opinion On Admisibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Again After Refrming to certain passages from the 1950 Advisory Opinion, The Court Stated:
Namibia (African S.-O. (advisory opinion) 3 7 Nations imposed by the mandate is now due to the United Nations. 71. This objection does not take into account the article 10, Chapter IV, of the Charter, on which the notice of 1950 relied on to justify the transmission of surveillance functions of the Council of the Nations to the United Nations General Assembly. The Court then declared: I (the jurisdiction of the United Nations General Assembly to exercise such control and to receive and examine reports is deducted from the general terms of article 10 of the charter which authorizes the general assembly to Discuss any questions or cases falling within the framework of the Charter and to formulate on these questions or affairs recommendations to the members of the United Nations. ”(C.I.J. Collection 1950, p. 137.) 72. As soon as a provision of the Charter - The article 80, para- graph 1- maintained the obligations of the agent, it was for the organization of the United Nations that it was up to ensuring compliance with these obligations. Consequently, by virtue of the article 10 of the Charter, South Africa agreed to submit its administration of the South West Africa to the examination of the General Assembly, on the basis of the Information Fournis by the Agent or obtained from other sources. The Transfer to the general asset of the obligation to report existing towards the CONSEIL OF THE COMPANY OF NATIONS was only a corollary of the powers devolved the general assembly. She actually has them exercised, as the Court noted in its advisory opinion from 1950. It rightly concluded: the General Assembly of the United Nations is justified in the right to exercise the surveillance functions previously exercised by the Company Nations with regard to the administration of the territory and ... The South African Union has the obligation to lend itself to the surveillance of the General Assembly and to submit annual reports 1) (C.I.J. Collection 1950, p. 137). In its 1955 advisory opinion on the Rote procedure applicable to the questions that are the reports and petitions relating to the territory of South West Africa, the Court said, after having recalled certain passages of the 1950 opinion: (as , the jurisdiction of the general meeting to exercise surveillance on the administration of the South West Africa as a territory under mandate is based on the provisions of the Charter.) L (C.I.J. Collection 1955, p. 76.) In its Consultative opinion of 1956 on the admissibility of the hearing of petitioners by the Southwest African Committee, having again referred to certain passages of the opinion of 1950, the Court was expressed in these terms ::
38 Namibia (S. W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) "Accordingly, the obligations of the Mandate continues unim- paired with this different, that the supervisory functions exercise by the Council of the League of nations are now to be exerted by the United Nations." (I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 27.) In The Sale Opinion The Court Further Stated "... The Paramount Purpose Underlying the Taking over by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the Supervisory Functions In Respect of the Mandate for South West Africe Trainly Exercised by the Council of the League of Nations was to safeguard the Sacred Trust of Civilization through the Maintenance of Effective International Supervision of the Administration of the Mandated Territory "(Ibid., P. 28). 73. With look to the intention of the league, it is essential to recall that, at its last session, the assembly of the league, by a resolution adopted on 12 April 1946, attributed to itself the responsibility of the coucil in the following terms : "The Assembly, With the Competition of Al1 the Members of the Council that are representing at its present session: Decides that, so far as required, it will, During the present session, assumes the functions falling with the cornpeence of the council. "" Thereupon, Before Finully Dissolving The League, The Assembly On 18 April 1946, Adopted A Resolution Providing As follows for the Mandates and the Mandates System: "The Assembly.................. .......... 3. Recognized that, on the Termination of the League's existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will corne to an end, but notes that chapters xi, xii and xii1 of the Charter of the United Nations Embody Principles corresponding to Those Declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League; 4. Takes Note of the express intentions of the Members of the League Now Cittle Territories Under Mandate to Continue to Administer Them for the Well-Bei ~ G and Development of the PEOPLES CONTROL IN CONCERNED WITH THE CONSUNATED IN THE CONSUTANT Mandates, UNTIL Other Arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective Mandate POWERS. "
((By consgquent, the obligations of the agent remain in all their strength, with this difference that the control functions exercised by the Council of the Society of Nations must now be exercised by the United Nations.)) (C.I.J. Collection 1956, p. 27.) In the same opinion, the Court also said: ((the main intention which is the basis of the resumption by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the surveillance functions with regard to the mandate on the South -Wey African, previously exercised by the Council of the League of Nations, is to safeguard the sacred mission of civilization, thanks to the maintenance of an effective inter- national surveillance of the territory administration under mandate ”(ibid., P. 28). 73. With regard to the intentions of the League of Nations, it is essential to note that in its last meeting The Assembly of the Company has attributed the responsibilities of the Council by a resolution of April 12, 1946 or We can read: ((the assembly, with the assent of all the members of the council represented in this session, decides that, as far as it is necessary, it will assume, during this session, all the functions entering the jurisdiction of the council. "As a result of which, before definitively dissolving the Society of Nations, the Assembly adopted on April 18, 1946 a resolution whose provisions mentioned below provided for the continuation of mandates and DII system of mandates: ((the Assembly. . 3. Acknowledges that the Dissolution of the League of Nations will end its functions with regard to the territories under mandate, but notes that principles corresponding to those declared by ARTICLE 22 of the Pact are incorporated in chapters XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter of the United Nations; 4. Note that the members of the company currently administering territories under mandate have exorked their intention to continue to administer them, with a view to the well-being and the development of interested peoples, in accordance with the obligations contained in the various mandates, until What new arrangements are taken between the United Nations and the various agents. »»
As statéd in the court's 1962 Judgment: "... The League of Nations in Ending its Own Existence Did not terminate the Mandates But... Definitely intended to continue them by its resolution of 1846" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 334). 74. That the Mandate Had Not Lapsed was also admitted by the Govern- ment of South Africa on Several Occasions During the Early Period of Transition, when the United Nations was being formed and the League dissolved. In Particular, On 9 April 1946, The Reprintative of South Africa, After Announcing His Government's intention to Transform South West Africa Into Integral part of the Union, Declared Beforely of the League: "In the Meantime, The Union Will continues to Administering the territory scrubulously in Accordance with the obligations of the mandate, for the Advancement and Promotion of the interests of the uninhabitants, as she has done daring the past six years when Meetings of the Mandates Commission COULD NOT BE HELD. The Disappearance of Those Organs of the league concerned with the supervision of mandates, primary the mandates commission and the league council, will requirement preclude compliance with the letter of the mandate. the union government will nevertheless look the dissolution of the league as in no way dirninising its Obligations under the mandate, which it will continue to discharge with the full and proper learning ofes responsibil- ities until such time as other arrangements are agreed upon con- Cerning the future status of the territory. " The Court Retrred to This Stament in Its Judgment of 1962, Finding That "There Could Be No Cleare Recognition on the part of the Government of South Africa of the Continuance of its obligations under the Mandate After the Dissolution of the League of Nations" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 340). 75. Sirnilar Assurances Were Given on Behalf of South Africa in A Rnernorandurn Transmitted On 17 October 1946 To the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and in Statements to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 4 November and November 13, 1946. Refronto to Refrontre Some of this and other assurances the Court Stated in 1950: "These Declarations Constitute Recognition by the Union Government of the Continuance of its obligations under the mandate and not a mere indication of the future conduct of that government." (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 135.) 76. Even before the Dissolution of the League, on January 22, 1946, The Government of the Union of South Africa Had Announced to the General Assembly of the United Nations ITS intentain the
As the Court said it in its 1962 judgment ((by ending its own existence, the League of Nations did not end the mandates but ... it certainly heard them maintain them by its resolution of 18 April 1946)) (C.I.J. Collection 1962, p. 334). 74. At the beginning of the transitional period, during the constitution of the United Nations Origanization and the dissolution of the League of Nations, the South African government also admitted several times that the mandate n 'had not become a lap. In particular, on April 9, 1946, after having announced the intention of his government to make the South West African part of the Union, the representative of South Africa declared before the Assembly of the Society of Nations: ((in the interval, the South African Union will continue to administer it by scrupulously complying with the obligations of the mandate, in order to ensure the progress and to safeguard the interests of its inhabitants, as it did During the last six years during which the commission of mandates has had to meet. The disappearance of the bodies of the League of Nations who deal with the control of the mandates, namely, in the first place the commission of the mandates and the council of The company, will obviously prevent fully compliance with the letter of the mandate. The government of the Union will, however, be a duty to consider that the disappearance of the League of Nations does not in any way decrease the obligations which arise from the mandate; it will continue to fulfill it in full consciousness and with the fair feeling of his responsibilities, until the moment There are other arrangements will have been concluded about the future status of this territory. )) The Court spoke about this declaration in its 1962 judgment, where it noted that ((there could not be there from the South African government of clearer recognition, after the dissolution of the Society of Nations , of its obligations under the mandate for the South West Africa)) (C.I.J. Collection 1962, p. 340). 75. similar insurances were given by South Africa in a memorandum sent on October 17, 1946 to the Secretary General of the United Nations and in declarations made before the fourth Commission of the General Assembly on 4 and 13 November 1946. Referring to some of these insurances among others, the Court said in 1950: C (these declarations constituted the recognition by the union of the continuation of its obligations under the mandate and not A simple indication of the future conduct of this government N (C.I.J. Collection 1950, p. 135). 76. From January 22, 1946, even before the dissolution of the Society of Nations, the Government of the South African Union A expresses the United Nations general assum of its intention to give the population
40 Namibia (S. W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) Views of the Population of South West Africa, Stting that "when that had been done, the Decision of the Union Would be submitted to the General Assembly for Judgment". Thereafter, the representative of the Union of South Africa Submitted A proposed1 to the second part of the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946, Requesting the Approval of South West Africa Into the Union. On 14 December 1946 The General Assembly Adopted Resolution 65 (1) Noting- ". Wirh satisfaction that of South Africa, by presenting this Matter to the United Nations, Recognizes The Interest and Con- Cern of the United Nations In the Matter of the Future Status of Ter- Ritories Now Held Under Mandate "and Declared that it was was-". Unable to accede to the incorporation of the territory of South West Africa in the Union of South Africa ". The General Assembly, The Resolution Went On, "Recommends that the Mandated Territory of South West Africa Be placed Under the International Trusteeship System and invites the Government of the Union of South Africa to propose for the Con- Sideration of the General Assembly A Trusteeship Agreement For the Aforeid Territory. " A Year Later the General Assembly, by Resolution 141 (II) of November 1, 1947, Took Note of the South African Government's Decision Not to Proceed with its Plan for the Incorporation of the Territory. As the Court Stated in 1950: "By Thus Submitting the Question of the Future International Status of the Territory to the 'Judgment' of the General Assembly As the 'Cometent International Organ', the Union Government Recognized the Compertence of the General Assembly in the Matt. " (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 142.) 77. In the race of the following Years South Africa's Acts and De- Clarations made in the United Nations in South West Africa Were Characterized by Contradictions. Some of these acts and declarations confirmed the Recognition of the Supervisory Authority of the United Nations and South Africa's obligations Towards It, While Others Clearly means intention to withdraw such recognition. It was only only on July 11, 1949 that the Southafricangovernment Addressed to thesesecretary- General A Letter in Which It Stated That It Could "No Longer See That Any
Namibia (African S.-O.) (advisory opinion) 40 of the South West Africa the opportunity to express its will, indicating: "When this will is known, the Union will submit its decision to the judgment of the General Assembly 1). Subsequently, the representative of the South African Union presented to the General Assembly, during the second part of his first session of 1946, a proposal by which he asked him to approve of the South- West Africa at the South Afri-Caine Union. The General Assembly adopted on December 14, 1946 resolution 65 (1), where it noted ((AREC satisfaction that the South African Union, by subjecting this question to the United Nations, recognizes interest and The concern that the United Nations testifies for the question of the future status of the territories currently under mandate 1) and has declared that it (cannot admit the incorporation of the territory of South West Africa to the South African Union)))) . Further the general assembly ((recommends that the territory under mandate of the South West Africa be placed under the international regime of guardianship and invites the government of the South African Union to submit to the examination of the General assessment a supervision agreement for said territory.)) A year later, by its resolution 141 (II) of November 1, 1947, the as- Seen General took note of the South African government's decision not to carry out the incorporation of the territory. As the Court said in 1950: ((by submitting the question of the future international status of the territory to ((Judgment 1) of the General Assembly as "competent international body 11, the government of Union recognized the competence of the general assembly in this matter. 1) (C.Z.J. Collection 1950, p. 142.) 77. During the following years, South Africa contradicted itself in its acts and its declarations to the nations United with regard to the South West Africa. Some acts and certain statements have confirmed that South Africa recognized the supervisory power of the United Nations and the obligations which incumbent it up in the face when others denoted an intention of Return to this recognition. It was not until 1 July 1, 1949 that the South African government sent to the secretary general a letter in which he declared that he could not (no longer believe
Real Benefit is to be derived from the submission of special reports on South West Africa to the United Nations and [Had] regretfully Come to the Conclusion that in the Interests of Efficient Administration No Further Reports Should be forWarded ". 78. In the Light of The Foregoing Review, there can be no doubt that, as consistently recognized by this court, the mandate survivated the Demise of the League, and that South Africa admitted as much for a number of years. Thus the supervisory element, an integral part of the Mandate, was bound to survive. And the Mandate Continue to be Accountable for the Performance of the Sacred Trust. Was not entitled, and at the same time to depriving the peoples of the territory of Rights that they had Guaranteed. It always that the Mandate Wow be unilaterally entitled to decide the Destiny of the People of South West Afrjca at its discretion. As the Court, Refronting to its Advisory Opinion of 1950, Stated in 1962: "The Findings of the Court on the Obligation of the Union Govern- ment to International Supervision Are Thustal Clear. Indeed, to exclude the bonds connected with the Mandate WOULD Be to Excluded the very Essence of the Mandate. " (I.C.J. RE- Ports 1962, p. 334.) 79. The Cogency of this finding is well illustrated by the views present- ed on behalf of South Africa, Which, in its final submissions in the South West Africa Cases, presented as an Alternative submission, "In the Event of it being held that the mandate as such continued in existence despite the dissolution of the league of nations", ". To the Supervision, of the Council of the League of Nations, Lapsed Upon the Dissolution of the League, and have not ben replacement by any similar obligations Relonvision by Any organ of the United Nations or Any Other Organization or Body "( I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 16). The main submission, However, Had Been: "That the Whole Mandate for South'West Africa Lapsed on the Dissolution of the League of Nations and that breathe is, in consequence thereof, no long subject to any legal obligations there." (Ibid.)
Namibia (African S.-O.) (advisory opinion) 4 1 that the presentation to the United Nations of special reports on South Africa can have any real advantage and it has regretted with the conclusion that, in the Interest of an effective administration, no report should be sent anymore ”. 78. Given the above, there is no doubt that, as the Court invariably recognized it, the mandate has survived the disappearance of the League of Nations and that South Africa admitted it during several years. As a result, the surveillance element, which is an integral part of the mandate, had to survive and the agent remained required to account for the execution of the sacred mission. Making the responsibility of the agent a sim ~ the case of conscience or moral obligations would be conferred on this power of the rights to which it cannot claim and, at the same time, deprive the populations of the territory of rights which have been guaranteed to them . It would be to give the agent the faculty to decide unilaterally and at the end of the destiny of the population of the South West Africa. Comnized the Court, referring to its advisory opinion of 1950, declared it in 1962: 11 The conclusions of the Court concerning the obligation of the government of the Union to submit to international surveillance are therefore perfectly clear. In fact, excluding obligations related to the mandate would amount to excluding petrol even of the mandate. "(C.I. J. Collection 1962, p. 334.) 79. The merits of this declaration appears to read the theses presented by South Africa which, in its final conclusions in the affairs of the South West Africa, argued subsidiary, for the ([case where it is estimated that the mandate as such remained in force despite the dissolution of the League of Nations)), ((that the obligations incumbent up before the defendant under the mandate and consisting in Report and report to the Council of the League of Nations and to submit to the supervision of this Council ended during the dissolution of the Company and were not replaced by similar obligations concerning monitoring by a body any United Nations, by any other organization or by any other organization)) (C.I.J. Collection 1966, p. 1 6-1 7). The defendant's main conclusion was as follows: (that the mandate for the South West Africa as a whole became obsolete during the dissolution of the Company of the Nations and that the defendant is no longer subject to any of the obligations legal arising from the mandate.)) (ibid., P. 16.)
80. In the present procedures, at the public sitting of 15 March 1971, the representative of South Africa Sumrned Up His Government's position in the following Terms: "Our contents concerning the Falling Away of Supervisory and According . On the other hand, our contents concerning the possible Lapse of the Mandate as a Whole Are Secondary and Consequential and Depend On Primary Consection that the Supervision and the accounts- Bility Provisions Fell Away on the Dissolution of the League. We Accordly Make Talie Formal Sub- Mission That the Mandate Has Lapsed As A Whole By Reason of the Falling Away of Supervision by the League, but for the rest we assume that the mandate still continued..... that after dissolution of the league there no long was an obligation to report and account under the mandate. " He Thus Place the Emphasis on the "Falling-Away" of the "Supervisory and Accountability Provisions" and Treated "The Possible Lapse of the Mandate as a Whole" as a "Secondary and Consequential" Consideration. 8 1. Thus, by South Africa's Own Admission, "Supervision and Account- Ability" Were of the Essence of the Mandate, as the Court Had Consis- Tently Santéed. Theory of the Lapse of the Mandate on the Demise of the League of Nations is in Fact inseparable from the Claim that there is no obligation to submit to the supervision of the United Nations, and vice versa. Consequently, Both or Either of the Claims Advanced, Namely that the Mandate has lapsed and/or that there is no obligation to submit to international supervision by the united nations, are destructive of the very institution upon which the presence of south africa in namibia rests , for: "The Authority which the Union Government exercises over the territory is based on the mandate. If the Mandate Lapsed, as the Union Government CONTANTS, The LATTER's Authority WOULD EQUALLY Have Lapsed. To retain the RIGHTS DERIVED FROM THE MANDATE AND TO DENY The obligations Thereunster COULD NOT BE justified. " (Z.C.J. RE- PORTS 1950, p. 133; CITED IN Z.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 333.) 82. Of This South Africa WOULD APPERAR TO BE AWARE, AS IS IS EVAGENDE BY ITS TRADE AT VARIOUS TIMES OF OTHER TITLES TO PLEASTIF Presence in Namibia, for Example Before the General Assembly on 5 October 1966:
Namibia (African S.-O. (advisory opinion) 42 80. During this body, at the public hearing of March 15, 1971, the representative of South Africa summed up as follows the position of his government : "Consequently, our argument on the extinction of clauses concerning surveillance and the obligation to account is absolute and without reservations. But our argument on the possible obsolete of the mandate as a whole is secondary and accessory; It is subject to our essential thesis, namely that the provisions of the mandate concerning surveillance and the obligation to account have disappeared to the dissolution of the Société des Nments. We therefore formally conclude in this procedure that the mandate has become deciduous as a whole due to the disappearance of the surveillance of the League of Nations but, for the rest, we consider that it has survived ... We nevertheless support that , in both cases, there was no longer, after the disappearance of the League of Nations, no obligation to report or report under the mandate. )) The representative of South Africa thus emphasized (1 extinguction ", ((the disappearance)) of the clauses concerning surveillance and the obligation to account and estimated secondary and accessory))) IRGU- MENTATION PORTZNT on the ((possible obsolete of the mandate as a whole)). 81. Thus, the very confession of South Africa, ((surveillance and obligation to account)) were essential elements of the mandate, which the Court has always affirmed. The thesis that the mandate would have become deciduous to the dissolution of the League of Nations is in fact inserted by the assertion that there is no obligation to submit to the surveillance of the United Nations. It follows that, together or separately, the two assertions, namely that the mandate has become obsolete and that there is no obligation to submit to international surveillance of the United Nations, are incompatible with the institution even on which Rests the presence of South Africa in Namibia, because (the authority that the government of the Union exercises on the land is based on the mandate. If the mandate had ceased to exist, as the claim Government of the Union, the authority of the latter would also have ceased to exist. Nothing allows to keep the rights derived from the mandate while repudiating the obligations which result from it. 1) (C.I.J. Collection 1950, p. 133; Cited in C.I.J. Collection 1962, p. 333.) 82. It seems that South Africa is aware of the above, as evidenced by the fact that it has invoked other titles to justify the maintenance of her presence in Namibia. Thus she dkclared before the General Assembly on October 5, 1966:
"South Africa has for a long time content that mandate is no long legally in force, and that south africa's right to administer the territory is not derived from the mandate but from military conquest, Together with South Africa's Openly Declared and Con- Sistient Practice of Continuing to Administer the Territory as a Sacred Trust Towards the Inhabitants. " In the present proceedings the representative of South Africa Santailed on 15 March 1971: ".. If it is accepted that the Mandate has lapsed, the South African Governrnent Would have the right to Administer the Territory by Reason of A Combination of Factors, Being Being, Being (a) its original conquest; (6) its long occupation; (c) the continuation of the sacred trust basis agreed upon in 1920; and, finully (d) because its administration is to the benefit of the unusual of the territory and is desired by them. In these circumstances the South African Government can- Not accepted that any state or organization can have a better title to the territory. " 83. These claims of title, which apart from other considering are inadmissible in look to a mandated territory, lead by south Africa's owl admission to a situation that vitiates the object and purposes of the mandate. Their significance in the Context of the Sacred Trust has been revealed by a stattement made by the representative of South Africa in the present proceedings on 15 March 1971: "It is the view of the South African Government That No Legal Provision Prevents its annexing South West Africa. " As the short pointd out in its Advisory Opinion On the International Status of South West Africa, "The Principle of Non-Annex-tion" was "considering to be ofparamount importance" when the future of South West Africa and Other Territories was the subject of Decision after the First World War (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 13 1). What was in agreement Excluded by Article 22 of the League Covenant is even less acceptable Today. 84. Where the United Nations is concerned, the records show that, throughout a period of Twenty Years, the General Assembly, by Virtue of the Powers Vested in it by the Charter, Called Upon the South African Government to Perform its obligations arisjng out of The mandate. On 9 february 1946 The General Assembly, by Resolution 9 (1), invited al1 states administering territories Held under Mandate to submit trustee- Ship Agreements. All, with the Exception of South Africa, Responded by Placing the Respective Territories Under the Trusteeship System or Offering
Namibia (African S.-O. (advisory opinion) 43 C (South Africa has long supported that the mandate is no longer legally in force and that the right that South Africa has to administer the territory does not result from the mandate but from the military conquest as well as its declared and constant practice consisting in continuing the administration of the territory as a sacred mission towards the inhabitants)). In this procedure, the representative of South Africa said on March 15, 1971: ((the South African government believes that being accepted the lapter of the mandate, he would have the right to administer the territory thanks to the game of 'A series of factors which are a) the initial conquest, 6) prolonged occupation, c) the maintenance of the sacred mission entrusted and accepted in 1920, d) the fact that its Administration is exercised for the benefit of the inhabitants of the territory and that it is wanted by them. Under these conditions, the South African government cannot consider that a state or an organization may have a better title to administer the territory. )) 83. To invoke these titles which, all other considerations aside, are inadmissible with regard to a territory under mandate, leads to a situation which, of the very admission of South Africa, is contrary to the 'object and the goal of the mandate. The following declaration of the representative of South Africa, made on March 15, 1971 during this procedure will make it possible to assess the whole meaning in relation to the sacred mission: "The South African government is of the opinion that No legal provision- that it prevents it from annexing the South West African 1). As the Court noted in its advisory opinion on the international status of South West Africa, the principle of (non-personal "was considered" as being of primordial importance 1) when it was necessary Stonoring the future of the South West Africa and other territories after the First World War (C.I.J. Collection 1950, p. 13 1). What article 22 of the Pact of the Society of Nations excluded accordingly is Even less acceptable today. 84. As for the United Nations, documents appear that, for twenty years, under the powers that the Charter gives it, the General Assembly prayed to the South African government of S 'Acquire obligations arising from the mandate. On February 9, 1946, by its resolution 9 (1), the General Assembly invited all the States which administered territories under a mandate to be submitted to the guardianship agreements. The reaction of All, with the exception of South Africa, was to place the territories in question under the regime of guardianship or to offer them
Them independence. The General Assembly Further Made A Special Remunmendation to this Effect in Resolution 65 (1) of December 14, 1946; On November 1, 1947, in Resolution 141 (II), it "URGED" The Government of the Union of South Africa to propose to Trusteeship Agreement; by resolution 227 (III) of 26 November 1948 It maintained its Earlier re- Commendations. A Year Later, in Resolution 337 (IV) of 6 December 1949, it expressed "regret that the government of the union of Africa has withdrawn its previous undertaking to submit reports on it its admin- istration of the territory of south west Africa for the Information of the United Nations ", Reitered its previous resolutions and invited South Africa" to Resume the Submission of Such Reports to the General Assembly ". At the same time, in Resolution 338 (IV), it added species concerning the International Status of South West Africa to this Court. In 1950, by resolution 449 (V) of 13 December, it accepted the result Advisory Opinion and Urged the Government of the Union of South Africa "to Take the necessary Steps to Give Effect to the Opinion of the International Court of Justice". By the same resolution, it established a committee "to confer with the union of South Africa concerning the procedural Measures necessary for implementing the Advisory Opinion.". In the Race of the Ensuing Negotiations South Africa continued to keep that neither the united nor any International Organization Had Succeeded to the Supervisory Func- tions of the League. The Cornmittee, for its part, presented a proposition closely following the terms of the mandate and providing for imple- mentation "through the united nations by a procedure as nearly as possible analogous to that which which is the league of nations, Thus Provviding Terms No More extensive or onerous Than Those which existed before ". This procedure would have been involved the submission by South Africa of Crews to a General Assembly Committee. Which WOULD FURTHER SET UP A SPECIAL Commission to Take Over the Functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. Thus the United Nations, which undoubtedly Conduct the Negotiations in Good Faith, Did not insist on the conclusion of a trusteeship agrement; It Suggested A System of Supervision which "Should not exceed that which applied under the Mandates System.". These proposed we rejected by South Africa, which refused to accept the principle of the supervision of its administration of the territory by the United Nations. 85. Further Fruitless Negotiations Were Held from 1952 to 1959. In Total, Negotiations Extended Over A Period of Thirteen Years, from 1946 to 1959. In Practice the Actual Length of Negotiations is no test of that the possibilitities of agrement have been exhausted; It may be sufficient to show that an early deadlock was reached and that one side adamantly refuses compromise. In the Case of Narnibia (South West Africa) this
Namibia (African S.-O.) (advisory opinion) 44 pendant. Furthermore The General Assembly made a special recommendation in this regard in its resolution 65 (1) of December 14, 1946; On November 1, 1947, by its resolution 141 (II), it ((prayed outraged 1) the Government of the South African Union to submit to its examination a guardianship agreement; by its resolution 227 (111) of 26 November 1948, she maintained her previous recommendations. A year later, by her resolution 337 (IV) of December 6, 1949, she regretted that the government of the South African union withdrew her previous promise ... to present reports on its administration of the territory of the South West Africa, for information, to the United Nations ", confirmed its previous resolutions and invited South Africa ((to be resumed the presentation of ... reports to The general assembly 11. At the same time, it submitted to the Court, by its resolution 338 (IV), precise questions about the international status of the South West Africa. In 1950, by its resolution 449 (V) of 13 December, the assembly accepted the consul- tutive opinion that the Court had given her following his request and she ((invited the government of the South African Union to open the ~- measures necessary to give Effect to be visited by the International Court of Justice)). By the same resolution, the assembly created a committee ((responsible for conferring with the South African union about the procedure measures necessary to implement the advisory opinion ...) i. During the negotiations which followed, South Africa persisted in arguing that neither the United Nations nor any other international organization had inherited the surveillance functions of the League of Nations. The committee, for its part, presented a proposal that followed near the terms of the mandate and provided for an implementation (1 which would be ensured through the United Nations by means of a procedure as close as possible to that which was applied by the Society of Nations; thus The imposed obligations would be neither more extensive nor heavier than the previous obligations 11. This procedure would have included the sending of reports by the South Ferical to a general assembly commission, which would also have instituted a special committee responsible for Resume the functions of the permanent commission of mandates. Thus the United Nations, who undoubtedly led to good faith negotiations, did not insist on the conclusion of a guardianship agreement; They suggested a con- trôle system which would not be ((more extensive than under the regime of mandates. " For its administration of the territory. 85. Other unsuccessful negotiations took place from 1952 to 1959. Thus the negotiations were stood out over thirteen years in total, from 1946 to 1959. In practice the duration of negotiations does not allow whether The possibilities of agreement have been exhausted; it may be enough to show that one quickly resulted in a dead end and that, on the one hand, we firmly refused to compromise. In the case of Namibia
internship had patently been reached long before the United Nations Finlly Abandoned Its Efforts to Reach Agreement. Even so, for so long as South Africa was the Mandate the way was still open for it to see arrangement. But that chapter cam to an end with the Termination of the Mandate. 86. To Complete this Brief Summary of the Events Preceding the Present for Advisory Opinion, It must be Recalled that in 1955 and 1956 The Court Gave at the Request of the General Assembly Two Further Ad- Visory Opinions On Matters Concerning the Territory. Eventually the general assembly adopted resolution 2145 (XXI) on the Termination of the Mandate for South West Africa. Subsequently the Security Council Adopted Resolution 276 (1970), Which Declared the Continance of South Africa in Namibia to Be Illegal and Called Upon States to Act Agreement. 87. The Government of France in Its Written Stament and the Government of South Africa Throughout the Present Proceedings have raised the objection that the general assembly, in adopting resolution 2145 (xxi), actd ultra vires. 88. Before considering this objection, it is necessary for the court to examine the observations made and the contentions advanced as to white the short should go into this question. It was Was Suggested that Though the Request was not direct to the question of the validity of the general assembly and of the related security coucil resolu- tions, this Did not preclude the court from Making Such an Inquiry. On the other hand it was helped that the court was not athorized by the Terms of the Request, in the Light of the discussions preceding it, to go into the validity of these resolutions. It was argued that the Court should not assume powers of judicial review of the action taken by the other principal organs of the United Nations without specific request to that effect, nor act as a court of appeal from their decisions. 89. Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers ofjudicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned. The question of the validity or conformity with the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does not form the subject of the request for advisory opinion. However, in the exercise of its judicial function and since objections have been advanced the Court, in the course of its reasoning, will consider these objections before determining any legal consequences arising from those resolutions. 90. As indicated earlier, with the entry into force of the Charter of the United Nations a relationship was established between al1 Members of the United Nations on the one side, and each mandatory Power on the other. The mandatory Powers while retaining their mandates assumed,
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 45 (Sud-Ouest africain), ce stade a été manifestement atteint bien avant que les Nations Unies abandonnent finalement leurs efforts pour parvenir à un accord. Mais tant que l'Afrique du Sud restait la puissance manda- taire, il lui était toujours loisible de chercher un arrangement. Ce chapitre s'est clos avec la cessation du mandat. 86. Pour achever ce bref résumé des événements qui ont précédé la présente requête pour avis consultatif, il convient de rappeler qu'en 1955 et 1956 la Cour a rendu, à la demande de l'Assemblée générale, deux autres avis consultatifs sur des questions intéressant le territoire. L'Assem- blée générale a finalement adopté la résolution 2145 (XXI) sur la cessation du mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain. Ultérieurement le Conseil de sécurité a pris la résolution 276 (1970) qui déclarait illégale la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie et invitait les Etats à agir en conséquence. 87. Le Gouvernement français, dans son exposé écrit, et le Gouverne- ment sud-africain, tout au long de la procédure en la présente affaire, ont objecté qu'en adoptant la résolution 2 145 (XXI), l'Assemblée générale, avait excédé ses pouvoirs. 88. Avant d'examiner cette objection, la Cour doit considérer les observations et les arguments avancés sur le point de savoir si elle de- vrait aborder la question. On a dit que le fait que la demande d'avis ne portait pas sur la question de la validité de la résolution de l'Assemblée générale ou des résolutions connexes du Conseil de sécurité n'empêchait pas la Cour de procéder à cet examen. On a soutenu d'autre part que, vu les termes de la requête et compte tenu des débats qui l'ont précédée, la Cour n'était pas autorisée à étudier la validité de ces résolutions. On a fait valoir en ce sens que la Cour ne devait pas s'arroger des pouvoirs de contrôle judiciaire quant aux mesures prises par les autres organes principaux des Nations Unies sans y avoir été expressément invitée, ni jouer le rôle d'une cour d'appel à l'égard de leurs décisions. 89. Il est évident que la Cour n'a pas de pouvoirs de contrôle judiciaire ni d'appel en ce qui concerne les décisions prises par les organes des Nations Unies dont il s'agit. Ce n'est pas sur la validité de la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale ou des résolutions connexes du Conseil de sécurité ni sur leur conformité avec la Charte que porte la demande d'avis consultatif. Ce~endant. dans l'exercice de sa fonction judiciaire et puisque des objections ont été formulées, la Cour examinera ces objections dans son exposé des motifs, avant de se prononcer sur les conséquences juridiques découlant de ces résolutions. 90. Ainsi qu'il a été rappelé plus haut, l'entrée en vigueur de la Charte des Nations Unies a instauré un rapport entre tous les Membres des Nations Unies, d'une part, et chacune des puissances mandataires. d'autre part. Tout en conservant leurs mandats. les puissances mandataires
46 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) under Article 80 of the Charter, vis-à-vis al1 United Nations Members, the obligation to keep intact and preserve, until trusteeship agreements were executed, the rights of other States and of the peoples of mandated territories, which resulted from the existing mandate agreements and related instruments, such as Article 22 of the Covenant and the League Council's resolution of 31 'January 1923 concerning petitions. The man- datory Powers also bound themselves to exercise their functions of ad- ministration in conformity with the relevant obligations emanating from the United Nations Charter, which member States have undertaken to fulfil in good faith in al1 their international relations. 91. One of the fundamental principles governing the international relationship thus established is that a party which disowns or does not fulfil its own obligations cannot be recognized as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship. 92. The terms of the preamble and operative part of resolution 2145 (XXI) leave no doubt as to the character of the resolution. In the pre- amble the General Assembly declares itself "Convinced that the admin- istration of the Mandated Territory by South Africa has been conducted in a manner contrary" to the two basic international instruments directly imposing obligations upon South Africa, the Mandate and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Tn another paragraph of the preamble the conclusion is reached that, after having insisted with no avail upon performance for more than twenty years, the moment has arrived for the General Assembly to exercise the right to treat such violation as a ground for termination. 93. In paragraph 3 of the operative part of the resolution the General Assembly "Declares that South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous in- habitants of South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Man- date". Tn paragraph 4 the decision is reached, as a consequence of the previous declaration "that the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa is therefore terminated . . .". (Emphasis added.) It is this part of the resolution which is relevant in the present proceedings. 94. In examining this action of the General Assembly it is appropriate to have regard to the general principles of international law regulating termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach. For even if the mandate is viewed as having the character of an institution, as is maintained, it depends on those international agreements which created the system and regulated its application. As the Court indicated in 1962 "this Mandate, like practically al1 other similar Mandates" was "a special type of instrument composite in nature and instituting a novel inter- national régime. Tt incorporates a definite agreement . . ." (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 331). The Court stated conclusively in that Judgment that the
ont, en vertu de l'article 80 de la Charte, assumé à l'égard de tous les Membres des Nations Unies l'obligation de maintenir intacts et de sauvegarder. jusqu'à ce que des accords de tutelle aient été conclus, les droits des autres Etats et des pop~ilations des territoi~es sous mandat qui découlaient des accords de mandat en vigueur et des instruments connexes, notamment de I'aiticle 22 du Pacte et de la résolution du Conszil de la Société des Nations du 31 janvier 1923 relative aux pétitions. Les puissances mandataires s'engageaient aussi à s'acquitter de lews fonctions d'administration conformément aux obligations que la Charte des Nàtions Unies imposait à cet égard et que les Etats Membres sont tenus de remplir de bonne foi dans toutes leurs relations internationales. 91. L'un des principes fondamentaux régissant le rapport ainsi établi sur le plan international est qu'une partie qui renie ou ne remplit pas ses propres obligations ne saurait être considérée comme conservant les droits qu'elle prétend tirer de ce rapport. 92. Le libellé du préambule et du dispositif de la résolution 2145 (XXI) ne laisse aucun doute sur la nature de cette résolution. Dans le préambule l'Assemblée générale se déclare (1 Conilaincue que l'administration du Territoire sous mandat par l'Afrique du Sud a été assurée d'une manière contraire j) aux deux instruments internationaux fondamentaux imposant directement des obligations à l'Afrique du Sud, le mandat et la Charte des Nations Unies, ainsi qu'à la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme. Dans un autre alinéa du préambule, l'Assemblée générale arrive à la conclusion qu'après avoir insisté en vain pendant plus de vingt ans sur l'exécution le moment est venu pour elle d'exercer son droit de considérer une telle vioiztion comme un motif pour mettre fin au mandat. 93. Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution, l'Assemblée générale (( Déclare que ['Afrique du Sud a failli à ses obligations en ce qui concerne l'administration du Territoire sous mandat, n'a pas assuré le bien-être moral et matériel et la sécurité des autochtones du Sud-Ouest africain et a, en fait, dénoncé le Mandat. 1) Au paragraphe 4, elle décide, comme suite à la déclaration qi!i précède, ((que le Mandat confié à Sa Majesté britannique pour être exercé en son nom par le Gouvernement de l'Union sud-africaine est dotzc terminé (italiques a.joutées). C'est cette partie de la résolution qui est pertinente pour la présente procédure. 94. Pour examiner l'acte ainsi accompli par The General Assembly, it is necessary to take into account the general principles of international law which govern the cessation of a conventional relationship as the consequence of a violation. Indeed, even being admitted that the mandate has the character of an institution, as it is supported, it is nonetheless taken from the international agreements which created the system and regulated its application. The Court said in 1962: ((like almost all other similar mandates, this mandate constitutes an act of a special type, of composite ïiature, instituting a new international regime. It contains a specific agreement) 1 (C.I.J. Collection 1962, p. 331).
47 Namibia (S.W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) Mandate ". The Rules Laid Down by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Concerning Termination of A Treaty Relationshipship On Account of Breach (Adopted Without A Dissenting Voting) May in Many Respects be considered as a codification of existing Custamary Law on the subject. In the Light of these Rules, Only a Material Breach of A Treaty justifies Termination, Such Breach Being Defined As: "(A) A Repudiation of the Treaty Not Sanctioned by the presentation; or (6) The Violation of A Provision of Essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty "(art. 60, para. 3). 95. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) Determines that Both Forms of Material Breach had occurred in this case. By stressing thatsouth Africa "has, in fact, disavowed the mandate", the general assembly declared in fact that it had repudiated it. The resolution in question is therefore to be viewed as the exercise of the right to terminate a relation- Ship in Case of a deliberate and persisting violation of obligations which very object and purposes of that relationship. 96. It has been contented that the Covenant of the League of Nations Did not Confer on the Council of the League Power to Terminate A Man- Date for Misconduct of the Mandate and That No Such Power Could Therefore Be EXEREDED BY It could not derive from the League Greater Powers Than The Later Itself Had. For this objection to prevail it would be necessary to show that the mandates system. As is established under the league, excluded the Application of the General Principle of Law That A Right of Termination On Account of Breach Must Be Presume to Exist Of Al1 Treaties, Except as Regards Provisions Relating to the Protection of the Human Persond In Treaties of a Humanitarian Character (as indicated in art. 60, para. 5, of the Vienna Convention). The Silence of A Treaty As to the Existence of Such A Right cannot be interpreted as Implying the Exclusion of A Right Which has its source outside of the Treaty, in general inter- national law, and is depend on the occurrence of circumstances that are not not not Normally envisaged when a Treaty is concluded. 97. The Government of South Africa Has Contented that it was the intention of the Drafters of the Mandates that they should not be revocable Even in Cases of Serious Breach of Obligation or Gross Misconduct on the part of the Mandate. This compression Seeks to Draw Support from the Fact that at the Paris Peace Confeience A Resolution was adopted in which the proposition in President Wilson's Draft of the Covenant looking a right for the substitution of the Mandate Was Not
It concluded in its judgment that the mandate (1 is in fact and in law an international commitment having the character of a treaty or a convent ”(C.I.J. Collection 1962, p. 330). The rules of the Convention Convention From Vienna on the law of treaties concerning the cessation of a violated treaty (which have been adopted without opposition), may, in many respects, be considered as a codification of customary law existing in this area. According to these rules, The extinction of a treaty is only justified in the event of substantial violation, defined as constituted by: ((a) a rejection of the treaty not authorized by this Convention; or 6) the violation of an essential provision for the realization of Ob.iet or the Dutraité 1 goal) (art. 60, para. 3). 95. Resolution 2145 (XXI) of the General Assembly notes that there has been in this case substantial violation in both form. When she emphasizes that South Africa ((A, in fact, denounced the mandate 11, the General Assembly declares in reality that South Africa rejected it. It is therefore necessary to see in the resolution in question the Exercise of the right to put an end to a certain report following a deliberate and persistent violation of obligations, which destroys the very object and the purpose of this report. 96. It was argued that the Pact of the Nations Society did not give the Council of the Society the Power to end a mandate due to a fault of the agent and that the United Nations cannot therefore exercise such power since they could not inherit the older powers in the more extensive powers than it had . For this objection to be valid, it would be necessary to show that the system of mandates established by the League of Nations excluded the application of the general legal principle according to which the right to end a treaty as a consequence of its violation must be presumed to exist for all The treaties, except with regard to the provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character (Vienna Convention, art. 60, para. 5). The silence of a treaty on this subject cannot be interpreted as implying the exclusion of a right of which the source is outside the treaty, in general international law, and which depends on circumstances that we do not envisage normally not when concluding the treaty. 97. The South African government argued that, with the intention of the editors of the mandates, they should not be revocable, even in the event of a serious violation of the agent's obligations or a serious misconduct on its part. This thesis seeks to take advantage of the fact that at the Paris Peace Conference a resolution was adopted which did not take up the proposal appearing in the project of pact presented by President Wilson and relating to the right to request the replacement of the Agent .
Included. It Should be recalled that discussion at the Paris Peace Conference Réred Upon by South Africa West Not Directly Addressed to An Examination of President Wilson's Propals Concerning the Regulation of the Mandates System in the League Covenant, and the Participants Were Not Not Contesting These Particular proposition. What Took Place Was A General Exchange of Views, On a Political Plane, looking the questions of the dispatch of the German colonies and where the principle of annexation or the Mandate Principle SHOULD APPRY TO THEM. 98. President Wilson's proposed draft Did not include a specific provocation for revocation, on the assumption that mandates were revocable. What was proposed was a special procedure reserving "to the people of any such territory or governmental unit the right to appeal to the league for the redress or correction of any break of the mandate by the mandate state or agency or for the substitution of smo State Gold Agency, As Mandate ". That this special right of appeal was not in-served in the Covenant cannot be interpreted as Excluding the Application of the General Principle of Law According To Which A Power of Termina- Tion of Breach, Even If Unxpresd, Must Be Presumed to Exist as inherent in any mandate, as indeed in any agrement. 99. As Indicated Earlier, at the Paris Peace Conference there was position to the institution of the mandates since a mandate would be inherently revoclable, so that there would be no guarantee of long-term continuance of administration by the mandate power. The Difficulties Thus Arising Were Eventually Resolved by the Assurance That the Council of the League Would Not Interfere With The Day-To-Day Administration of the Territories and that the Council Would Intervene Only in Case of A Fundamental Breach of its obligations by the Mandate Power . 100. The Revocabibility of a Mandate was envisaged by the first proposition1 that was made concerning a mandates system: "in Case of Any Flagrant and prolonged abuse of this trust the population concerned should be able to appear for the league, who should in A Proper CASE ENSERT ITS AUTHORITY TO The Full, Even to the EXTENT OF REMOVING THE MANDATE AND ENTRUSTING IT TO SEME OTHER STATE IF Necessary. " (J. C. Smuts, The League of Nations: a Practical Suggestion, 19 18, pp. 21 -22.) Although this proposed1 Redderred to differentities, The Principle Remains The Same. The possibility of Revocation in the Event of Gross Violation of the Mandate was subsequently confirmed by Authorities on International 1aw and Members of the Permanent Mandates Commission
It should be recalled that the debates of the Paris Peace Conference invoked by South Africa did not directly focus on the proposals of President Wilson relating to the regulation of the system of mandates in the pact of the Company of nations and the participants did not dispute these proposals. There has been a general, political character exchange, on the fate of the former German colonies and the question of whether to apply the principle of annexation or that of the mandate to them. 98. Starting from the idea that the mandates were revocable, the project of President Wilson did not contain an express provision relating to the revocatiun. What he proposed was a special reserving procedure ((to the peoples of These territories or administrative constituencies The right to appeal to the League of Nations so that it remedies any violation of the Maudat which would be committed by state or the mandatory organization or to substitute it as an agent another State or other organization 1). The fact that this special right of appeal has not been incorporated into the pact cannot be interpreted as excluding the application of the general principle of law according to which it must be assumed that the power to end, as a consequence of a Violation, a mandate as well as any convention, exists in an inherent way, even if it is not expressed. 99. We have seen that at the Paris peace conference an opposition had manifested itself against the institution of mandates, because they were intrinsically revocable and that nothing would therefore have guaranteed the mandatory powers continuity in the long term of their administration. The difficulties thus raised were ultimately resolved when the assurance that the Council of the Corporate of Nations was made to interfere in the current administration of the territories and that it would only intervene if where the mandatory power would basically violate its obligations. 100. The initial proposal relating to the system of mandates envisaged revocability: ((in the event of blatant and extended abuse of this mission, the population in question should have the right to address the company so that 'He is remedied and it should, if the case presents itself, fully exercise its authority, possibly going so far as to remove the mandate to entrust it to another State if necessary. 11 (J. C. Smuts, the company nations: a practical proposal, 191 8, p. 21-22.) [Translation of the Greefe.] Certainly this proposal concerned other territories, but the principle remained the same. The possibility of a revocation in the event of serious violation of the mandate was subsequently confirmed by specialists in international law authority as well as by the members of the Commission
who interpreted and applied the mandates system under the league of nations. 101. It has been suggested that, Even if the Council of the League Had Possessed the Power of Revocatiori of the Mandate in an extreme Case, it that could not have been exercised unilaterally but only in co-operation with the mandate power. However, revocation COULD ONLY RESULT from a situation in which the Mandate HAD COMMITTED A SERIOUS BREACH OF THE OBLUCTIONS IT HAD UNDERTAKEN. To content, on the basis of the prin- ciple of unanimity that applied in the league of nations, that in this case revocation could only take place with the competition of the man- datory, would not only run contrary to the general principle of law Gov- erning Termination on birth of break, but also postulate an im- possibility. For Obvious Reasons, The Consent of the Wrongdoer to Such A Form of Termination Cannot be Required. 102. In a further objection to general assembly 2145 (xxi) it is content that it makes pronouncements that the assembly, not being a judicial organ, and not having previously redired the matter to any such organ, was not competent to make. Without Dwelling on the Conclusions Reached in the 1966 Judgment in the South West Africa Contentious Cases, it is Worth Recalling That in Those Cases The Applicant States, Which Complained of Material Breaches of Substantive Provisions of the Mandate, Were Held Not To "Possess Any Separate Self-Conted Right Which They Could Entret ... to require the due performance of the mandate in Discharge of the 'Sacred Trust' "(I.C.J. Reports 1966, pp. 29 and 51). On the other hand, the court declared that: ".. Any divences of view concerning the conduct of a mandate we have looked at being matters that had their place in the political field, the settlement of which lay between the mandate and the Competient Organs of the League "(Ibid., P. 45). To deny to a political organ of the United Nations which is a successor of the league in this respect the right to act, on the argument that it lacks cornpertence to render what is described as a judicial decision, would not only To a Complete Denial of the Remedies Available Against Fundamental Breaches of An International Undertaking. 103. The Court is unable to appreciate the view that the general Assembly Acted Unilaterally as Party and Judge in its Own Cause. In the 1966 Judgment in the South West Africa Cases, Retrred to Above, it was found that the function to cal1 for the due execution of the receiving provisions of the mandate instruments appertaled to the league acting as an entity through its appropriat organs. The right of the league "in the pursuit of its collective, institutional activity, to require the due performance of the mandate in discharge of the 'sacred trust'", was Specifically recognized (ibid., P. 29). Having Regard to This Finding, The United Nations as a Successor to the League, Acting Through Its com- petent organs, Must be seen Above Al1 as the supervisory institution, Competient to Pronounce, in That Capacity, on the Conduct of the Man-
Namibia (African S.-O. (Advisory opinion) 49 permanent mandates that interpreted and applied the system of mandates at the time of the League of Nations. 101. It was indicated that, even if the Council of the League of Nations had had the power to revoke the mandate in an extreme case, it could only have used cooperation with the mandatory power but not unilaterally. However, the revocation could only result from a serious violation by the agent of the obligations he had assumed. Take argument for the principle of unanimity applied by the League of Nations to maintain that the revocation could not take place in this case with the agreement of the agent would not only go against the general principle of law governing extinction As a consequence of a violation, but also apply an impossibility. For obvious reasons, it cannot be extinction of this kind, demand the consent of the fault. 102. We have also objected to resolution 2145 (XXI) of the General Assembly that it contains pronouncements that the Assembly did not compete to formulate, failing to be a judicial body and not to have not referred the question to such an organ. Without emphasizing the conclusions of the judgment rendered in 1966 in the contentious affairs of the South West Africa, it should be recalled that in the present case it has been considered that the states of demands, who complained of substantial violations of provisions from the bottom of the mandate, (((did not have any own and autonomous right that can be invoked ... to claim ... The proper execution of the mandate in accordance with the (Sacred Mission of Civilization 1) (C.I.J. Collection 1966, p . 29 and 51). On the other hand the Court declared that "we considered the disputes relating to the management of a mandate as under the political order and as having to be settled between the agent and the competent bodies of the League of Nations)) (ibid., P. 45). Refuse the right to act to a political body of the United Nations, successful of the League of Nations in this regard, because it is 'would not have been as a result to make what is qualified as a judicial decision, it would not only be contradictory, but it would all be up to a total denial of the appeals available against the fundamental violations of an international commitment. 103. The Court cannot subscribe to the opinion that the General Assembly acted unilaterally, as a party and judge in its own cause. In the 1966 judgment on the South West Africa, mentioned above, it has been concluded that it was to the League of Nations, acting as an entity through its competent bodies, which the function of 'require the proper implementation of the relevant provisions of the mandate. The law of the League of Nations (to claim, in the accomplishment of its collective and institutional activity, the good execution of the mandate in accordance with the sacred mission of civilization 1) has been expressly recognized (ibid., P. 29). Given this conclusion, we must see above all in the United Nations, successor to the League of Nations, acting through its competent bodies, the instruction
datory with respect to its international bonds, and compete to act accordingly. 104. It is argued on Behalf of South Africa that the considering set in paragraph 3 of Resolution 2145 (XXI) of the general assembly, Relating to the Failure of South Africa to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the mandated territory, Called for a detailed invoice investigation before the general assembly could adopt resolute 2145 (xx1) or the court pronounce upon its validity. The Failure of South Africa to Com7ly with the Obligation to Submit to Supervision and To Render Refracts, an Estaistial Part of the Mandate, Cannot be Disputeed in the Light of Determinations Made by this Court on More Occasions Than One. In Relying on theses, as on Other Findings of the Court In Previous Proceedings Concerning South West Africa, The Court Adheres to Its Own Jurisprudence. 105. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), After Declaring the Termination of the Mandate, Added in Operative Paragraph 4 "That South Africa Has No Other Right to Administer the Territory". This part of the resolution has been objected to as decider a transfer of territory. That in fact is not so. The pronouncing made by the general assembly is based on conclusion, Retrred to earlier, Reached by the Court in 1950: "The Authority Which the Union Government Execpies Over the Territory is based on the Mandate. If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Government contends, the latter's authority would equally have lapsed." (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 133.) This was confirmed by the Court in its Judgment of 21 December 1962 in the South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 333). Relying on these decisions of the Court, the General Assembly declared that the Mandate having been terminated "South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory". This is not a finding on facts, but the formulation of a legal situation. For it would not be correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative design.
tution de surveillance qui a compétence pour se prononcer, en cette qualité, sur le comportement du mandataire à l'égard de ses obligations internationales et pour agir en conséquence. 104. L'Afrique du Sud a fait valoir que, vu les considérations énoncées au paragraphe 3 de la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale, où il est dit que l'Afrique du Sud a failli à ses obligations en ce qui con- cerne l'administration du territoire sous mandat, un examen approfondi des faits était nécessaire avant que l'Assemblée générale puisse adopter la résolution 2145 (XXI) et la Cour se prononcer sur sa validité. L'inob- servation par l'Afrique du Sud de l'obligation de se soumettre à une surveillance et de présenter des rapports, ce qui constituait une partie essentielle du mandat, ne peut être contestée, compte tenu des prononcés formulés par la Cour à diverses reprises. En invoquant ces prononcés, ainsi que d'autres conclusions émises dans des procédures antérieures relatives au Sud-Ouest africain, la Cour s'en tient à sa propre juris- prudence. 105. Ayant déclaré le mandat terminé, la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale ajoute, au paragraphe 4 du dispositif, (1 que l'Afrique du Sud n'a aucun autre droit d'administrer le Territoire )). On a objecté que ce passage de la résolution décidait un transfert de territoire. Or tel n'est pas le cas. Ce qu'a dit l'Assemblée générale repose sur une conclu- sion de la Cour, déjà mentionnée, qui a été formulée en 1950: (( L'autorité que le Gouvernement de l'Union exerce sur le Terri- toire est fondée sur le Mandat. Si le Mandat avait cessé d'exister, comme le prétend le Gouvernement de l'Union, l'autorité de celle- ci aurait également cessé d'exister. )) (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 133.) Cette conclusion a été confirmée par la Cour dans son arrêt du 21 décem- bre 1962 dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud; Libéria c. Afrique du Sud) (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 333). S'appuyant sur ces décisions de la Cour, l'Assemblée générale a déclaré que, le mandat étant terminé, ((l'Afrique du Sud n'a aucun autre droit d'ad- ministrer le Territoire )). Elle n'a pas ainsi tranché des faits mais décrit une situation juridique. II serait en effet inexact de supposer que, parce qu'elle possède en principe le pouvoir de faire des recommandations, l'Assemblée générale est empêchée d'adopter, dans des cas déterminés relevant de sa compétence, des résolutions ayant le caractère de décisions ou procédant d'une intention d'exécution
5 1 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) 106. By resolution 2145 (XXI) the General Assembly terminated the Mandate. However, lacking the necessary powers to ensure the with- drawal of South Africa from the Territory, it enlisted the CO-operation of the Security Council by calling the latter's attention to the resolution, thus acting in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter. 107. The Security Council responded to the cal1 of the General Assem- bly. It "took note" of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XX1) in the preamble of its resolution 245 (1968); it took it "into account" in reso- lution 246 (1968); in resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969) it adopted certain measures directed towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and, finally, in resolution 276 (1970), it reaffirmed resolution 264 (1969) and recalled resolution 269 (1969). 108. Resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council, specifically mentioned in the text of the request, is the one essential for the purposes of the present advisory opinion. Before analysing it, however, it is necessary to refer briefly to resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969), since these two resolutions have, together with resolution 276 (1970), a com- bined and a cumulative effect. Resolution 264 (1969), in paragraph 3 of its operative part, calls upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately. Resolution 269 (1969), in view of South Africa's lack of compliance, after recalling the obligations of Members under Article 25 of the Charter, calls upon the Government of South Africa, in paragraph 5 of its operative part, "to withdraw its administra- tion from the territory immediately and in any case before 4 October 1969". The preanble of resolution 276 (1970) reaffirms General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and espouses it, by referring to the decision, not merely of the General Assembly, but of the United Nations "that the Mandate of South-West Africa was terminated". on the operative part, after condemning the non-compliance by South Africa with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions pertaining to Narnibia, the Security Council declares, in paragraph 2, that "the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal" and that consequently al1 acts taken by the Government of South Africa "on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid". In paragraph 5 the Security Council "Calls upon al1 States, particularly those which have economic and other interests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with the Government of South Africa which are in- consistent with operative paragraph 2 of this resolution". 109. It emerges from the communications bringing the matter to the Security Council's attention, from the discussions held and particularly from the text of the resolutions themselves, that the Security Council, when it adopted these resolutions, was acting in the exercise of what it deemed to be its primary responsibility, the maintenance of peace and security, which, under the Charter, embraces situations which might 3 9
106. Par sa résolution 2145 (XXI) l'Assemblée générale a mis fin au mandat. Cependant, comme elle ne dispose pas des pouvoirs nécessaires pour obtenir que l'Afrique du Sud se retire du territoire, elle a fait appel au concours du Conseil de sécurité en attirant son attention sur la résolu- tion, conformément à l'article 11, paragraphe 2, de la Charte. 107. Le Conseil de sécurité a répondu à l'appel de l'Assemblée générale. 11 a pris note de la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée dans le préambule de sa résolution 245 (1968); il en a tenu compte dans sa résolu- tion 246 (1968); dans ses résolutions 264 (1969) et 269 (1969), il a adopté certaines mesures visant à la mettre en œuvre et, pour finir, dans sa résolu- tion 276 (1970), il a réaffirmé sa résolution 264 (1969) et rappelé sa résolu- tion 269 (1 969). 108. C'est la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité, expressé- ment visée dans le texte de la requête, qui est essentielle aux fins du présent avis consultatif. Avant d'en entreprendre l'analyse, il convient cependant de dire un mot des résolutions 264 (1969) et 269 (1969), dont l'effet se conjugue et s'ajoute à celui de la résolution 276 (1970). Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution 264 (1969), le Conseil de sécurité demande à l'Afrique du Sud de retirer immédiatement son ad- ministration de la Namibie. L'Afrique du Sud n'ayant pas obtempéré, dans la résolution 269 (1969), le Conseil, après avoir rappelé les obliga- tions des Etats Membres en vertu de l'article 25 de la Charte, demande au Gouvernement sud-africain, au paragraphe 5 du dispositif, ((de retirer son administration du territoire immédiatement, et en tout état de cause, avant le 4 octobre 1969 )). La résolution 276 (1970) réaffirme dans son préambule la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale, et même la fait sienne, dans la mesure où il y est dit que ce n'est pas seulement l'Assemblée générale, mais les Nations Unies qui ((ont décidé que le mandat sur le Sud-Ouest africain était terminé n. Dans le dispositif, après avoir condamné le refiis de l'Afrique du Sud de se conformer aux résolutions de l'Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité relatives à la Namibie, le Conseil de sécurité déclare, au paragraphe 2, que ((la présence continue des autorités sud-africaines en Namibie est illégale )) et qu'en conséquence toutes les mesures prises par le Gouvernement sud-africain ((au nom de la Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne après la cessation du mandat sont i!légales et invalides)). Au paragraphe 5, le Conseil de sécurité ((Demande à tous les Etats, en particulier ceux qui ont des intérêts économiques et autres en Namibie, de s'abstenir de toutes relations avec le Gouvernement sud-africain qui sont incompatibles avec le paragraphe 2 du dispositif de la présente résolution )). 109. 11 ressort des commun~cations par lesquelles la question a été portée à l'attention du Conseil de sécurité, des débats qui s'y sont déroulés et en particulier du texte même des résolutions, que le Conseil de sécurité, lorsqu'il a adopté ces résolutions, agissait dans l'exercice de ce qu'il estimait sa responsabilité principale - le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité - qui, en vertu de la Charte (art. 1, par. l), s'étend aux situations
lead to a breach of the peace. (Art. 1, para. 1 .) In the preamble of resolu- tion 264 (1969) the Security Council was "Mindful of the grave conse- quences of South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia" and in paragraph 4 of that resolution it declared "that the actions of the Govern- ment of South Africa designed to destroy the national unity and territo- rial integrity of Namibia through the establishment of Bantustans are contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter". In operative paragraph 3 of resolution 269 (1969) the Security Council decided "that the continued occupation of the territory of Namibia by the South Afri- can authorities constitutes an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations, . . .". In operative paragraph 3 of resolution 276 (1970) the Security Council declared further "that the defiant attitude of the Government of South Africa towards the Council's decisions under- mines the authority of the United Nations". 110. As to the legal basis of the resolution, Article 24 of the Charter vests in the Security Council the necessary authority to take action such as that taken in the present case. The reference in paragraph 2 of this Article to specific powers of the Security Council under certain chapters of the Charter does not exclude the existence of general powers to dis- charge the responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1. Reference may be made in this respect to the Secretary-General's Statement, presented to the Security Council on 10 January 1947, to the effect that "the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted to the specific grants of authority contained in Chapters VI, VET, VI11 and XII . . . the Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The only limitations are the fundamental principles and purposes found in Chapter 1 of the Charter." 11 1. As to the effect to be attributed to the declaration contained in paragraph 2 of resolution 276 (1970), the Court considers that the quali- fication of a situation as illegal does not by itself put an end to it. It can only be the first, necessary step in an endeavour to bring the illegal situ- ation to an end. 112. It would be an untenable interpretation to maintain that, once such a declaration had been made by the Security Council under Article 24 of the Charter, on behalf of a11 member States, those Members would be free to act in disregard of such illegality or even to recognize violations of law resulting from it. When confronted with such an internationally unlawful situation, Members of the United Nations would be expected to act in consequence of the declaration made on their behalf. The question therefore arises as to the effect of this decision of the Security Council for States Members of the United Nations in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter. 1 13. It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 52 susceptibles de mener à une rupture de la paix. Dans le préambule de la résolution 264 (1969), le Conseil de sécurité se disait a Conscient des graves conséquences de l'occupation continue de la Namibie par l'Afrique du Sud )) et, au paragraphe 4 de la même résolution, il déclarait ((que les actes du Gouvernement sud-africain visant à détruire l'unité nationale et l'intégrité territoriale de la Namibie par la création de Bantoustans sont contraires aux dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies )). Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution 269 (1969), le Conseil décidait ((que l'occupation continue du territoire de la Namibie par les autorités sud-africaines constitue une atteinte agressive à l'autorité de l'organisa- tion des Nations Unies ». Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution 276 (1970), le Conseil déclarait en outre ((que l'attitude de défi du Gou- vernement sud-africain envers les décisions du Conseil sape l'autorité des Nations Unies ». 110. Pour ce qui est du fondement juridique de la résolution, l'article 24 de la Charte confère au Conseil de sécurité les pouvoirs nécessaires pour prendre des mesures comme celle qu'il a adoptée dans le cas présent. Au paragraphe 2 de cet article, la mention des pouvoirs spécifiques accordés au Conseil de sécurité en vertu de certains chapitres de la Charte n'exclut pas l'existence de pouvoirs généraux destinés à lui permettre de s'acquitter des responsabilités conférées par le paragraphe 1. A cet égard, on peut se reporter à la déclaration du Secrétaire général, présentée Ie 10 janvier 1947 au Conseil de sécurité, où il est dit que e les pouvoirs du Conseil, découlant de I'article 24, ne se limitent pas aux attributions spécifiques d'autorité mentionnées aux chapitres VI, VII, VI11 et XII ... les Membres des Nations Unies ont reconnu au Conseil de sécurité des pouvoirs en rapport avec les responsabilités qui lui incombent relating to the maintenance of peace and security. The only restrictions of the fundamental principles and goals which appear in chapter of the charter. )) 1 1 1. As for the effect to be attributed to the declaration appearing in paragraph 2 of resolution 276 (1970), the Court considers that by qualifying a situation of illegal. facto. It can only be the first measure that is essential if we want to put an end to the illegal situation. 112. It would be an unbearable interpretation to affirm that, when the Security Council makes such a declaration under article 24 of the Charter on behalf of all the member states. These are free to make no cases of illegality or even the violations of the law which re-sult. In the presence of an internationally illicit situation of this nature, one must be able to count on the members of the United Nations to draw the consequences of the declaration made on their behalf. The question is therefore to know what is the effect of this decision of the Security Council with regard to the United Nations Member States in accordance with the Charter 25 of the Charter. 113. It has been argued that article 25 only applies to measures
To enlighten measures adopted under chapter vi1 of the charter. It is not possible to find in the charter any support for this view. Article 25 is not confined to decisions in look to enhancement action but application to "the decisions of the security coucil" adopted in accordance with the charter. Moreover, that article is placed, not in chapter VII, but Immondately after article 24 in that part of the charter that deals with the functions and powerers of the Security Council. If Article 25 HAD RED- ENLY SOLELY TO DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACCOURNING Action Under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, that is to say, if it were only such decisions Which Had Binding Effect, then Article 25 WOULD BE Superfluous This effect is secured by articles 48 and 49 of the charter. 114. It has also been contented that the receiving Security Council resolutions are CLAID in exhortatory rather Than MandaNE LANGUAGE AND THAT, THEREFORE, they do not purport to impose any legal duty on any state to affect legally any right. The Language of A Reso-Lotion of the Security Council Should be careful analysis before conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In View of the Nature of the Powers Under Article 25, the Question Whether They Have Been in Fact Exercise is to be Determined in Each Case, Having Regard to the Terms of the Resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the charter provisions invoked and, in general, al1 circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the security council. 115. Applying these tests, The Court Recalls that in the Preamble of Resolution 269 (1969), the Security Council was "mindful of its respon- sibility to take necessary action to secure strict compliance with the obligations agreement into by states members of the united Nations under the provisions of article 25 of the charter of the united nations ". The Court Has Therefore Reached the Conclusion that decisions made by the Security Council in paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolutions 276 (1970), as related to paragraph 3 of resolution 264 (1969) and paragraph 5 of resotion 269 (1969), Were adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the charter and in accordance with its articles 24 and 25. The decisions are consequently binding on al1 states members of the united nations, which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them. 116. In Pronouncing Upon the Binding Nature of the Security Council Decisions in Question, the Court Would Recall the following Passage in its Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949 On Reparation for Injuds Suffered in the Service of the United Nations: "The Charter has not been Content to make the Organization Created by it Merely A Center 'For Harmonizing The Actions of Nations in the Attack of these Common Ends' (Article 1, Para. 4). It has equipped that center with organs, and has given it specials. Tt has defined the position of the members in relation to the organization
Coercives taken under Chapter VI1 of the Charter. Nothing in the charter comes to support this idea. Article 25 is not limited to decisions concerning coercive measures but applies to the CC decisions of the Security Council "adopted in accordance with the Charter. In addition, this article is placed not in Chapter Vi1 but immediately after article 24, in the part of the charter which deals with the functions and powers of the Security Council. If article 25 only targeted the decisions of the Security Council relating to coercive measures taken under articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, in other words if only these Decisions had a compulsory effect, article 25 would be superfluous because this effect results from the 48 and 49 of the Charter. 114. It has also been argued that the relevant resolutions of the Security Council are written in terms which give the character of an exhortation rather than that of an injunction and that in consequence they claim or impose a legal obligation to any state or touch on the legal level at any of its rights. We must carefully analyze the wording of a Security Council resolution before being able to conclude with its compulsory effect. Given the character of the powers arising from article 25, it is advisable to determine in each case if these powers were in fact exercised, taking into account the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the debates which preceded its adoption, of the Provisions of the invited charter and in general of all the elements which could help to specify the jurisdiction consequences of the resolution of the Security Council. 115. Applying these criteria, the Court recalls that, in the preamble to resolution 269 (1969), the Security Council has declared itself ((consider that it has the duty to take the measures wanted to ensure that the States United Nations members faithfully pay the obligations they have assumed in accordance with article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations 1). The Court concludes that the decisions taken by the Security Council in paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Resolution 276 (1970), compared to paragraph 3 of resolution 264 (1969) and paragraph 5 of resolution 269 (1969), were adopted in accordance with the goals and prin- Cipes de la Charte and its articles 24 and 25. They are therefore compulsory for all the United Nations member states, which are thus required to accept them and apply them. 116. In connection with the compulsory nature of these decisions of the Security Council, the Court will recall the following passage from the 'Advisory opinion that she rendered on April 11, 1949 on the repair of the damage suffered in the United Nations: 11 Ka Charter did not limit himself to simply making the organization created by it a center where S' would harmonize the efforts of nations for the common ends defined by it (art. 1, para. 4). She gave him organs; She assigned him a clean mission. It defined the position of the members in relation to the organization in
by Requiring them to give it every assistance in any action undertaken by it (article 2, para. 5), and to accept and carry out the decisions of the security council. "(I.c.j. Reports 1949, p. 178.) Thus when the Security Council adopts a decision under article 25 in accordance with the charter, it is for member stats to comply with that decision, include those members of the security council which voting against it and those members of the united nations who are not members of the coucil . To hold Otherwise WOULD BE TO DEPRIVE This main organ of its Essential Functions and POWERS UNDER The Charter. 117. HAVING REACHED these conclusions, The Court Will Now Address Itself to the Legal Consequences Arising For States from the Continued PRESENCE OF SOUTH Africa in NAMIBIA in NAMIBIA in NAMIBIA in NAMIBIA in NAMIBIA IN NAMIBIA , Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). A Binding Determination Made by a Competient Organ of the United Nations to the Effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence. Ounce the short is faced with such a situ- ation, it would be failing in the Discharge of its judicial functions if it did not declare that there is obligation, eSpecially upon members of the United Nations, to Bring that situation to an end. As this short has held, Refronting to one of its decisions declaring a situation as contrary to a rule of international law: "this decision stuirs a legal consequence, namely that of putting an end to an illegal situation" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 82). 1 18. South Africa, Being Responsible for Having Created and Sentained A situation which short has found to have validly declared illegal, has the obligation to put an end to it. It is there in compulsory to withdraw its administration from the territory of namibia. By keeper the present illegal situation, and occupying the territory without title, South Africa International Responsibility Arising from a continuing violation of an international obligation. It also re- hands accountable for any violations of its international bonds, or of the right of the people of namibia. The Fact that South Africa No Longer has any title to administer the territory do not release it from its bonds and responsibilities under international Lawards Other stats in Respect of the Exempise of its Powers in Relation to this territory. Physical Control of A Territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of state Liabibility for acts Affecting Other States. 119. The Member States of the United Nations Are, for the Reasons Given in Paragraph 115 Above, under obligation to recognize the Ille- Gatity and Invalidity of South Africa's continued in Namibia. They are also under obligation to refrain from lending any support or form of assistance to South Africa with reference to its occupation of namibia, subject to paragraph 125 below.
Namibia (African S.-O.) (advisory opinion) 54 prescribing them to give it full assistance in any action by it (art. 2, para. 5), to accept and apply the decisions of the Council . 1) (C.I.J. Collection 1949, p. 178.) Thus, when the Security Council adopts a decision under article 25 in accordance with the Charter, it is the responsibility of the member states to comply with this decision, in particular to the members of the Security council which voted against it and to the members of the United Nations who do not sit on the Council. Not admitting it would be to deprive this main body of the essential functions and powers he holds from the charter. 117. Being reached these conclusions, the Court now comes to the legal consequences for the States of the continuous presence of Southern South in Namibia. Notwithstanding resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council. Qiiand a competent body of the United Nations notes in a compulsory way that a situation is illegal, this observation cannot remain without consequences. Placed in front of such a situation, the Court would not pay its judicial functions if it did not declare that there is an obligation, for the members of the United Nations in particular, to put an end to this situation. Regarding one of her decisions, by which she declared that a situation was contrary to a rule of international law, the Court said: ((this decision leads to a legal consequence, that of putting an end to an irregular situation 1 ) (C.I.J. Collection 1951, p. 82). 118. South Africa, which is responsible for having created and extended a situation which, according to the Court, has been validly declared illegal, is required to put it fine. It therefore has the obligation to withdraw its administration from the territory of Namibia. As long as it leaves this illegal situation and occupies the territory without title, South Africa faces international responsibilities for the permanent violation of An international obligation. It also remains responsible for any violation of its international obligations or the rights of the Namibian people. The fact that South Africa no longer has any legal title empowering it to administer the territory does not free it from the obligations And responsibilities that international law imposes on him with other states and which are linked to the exercise of its powers in this territy. It is effective authority on a territory. and not the sovereignty or the legitimacy of the title, which constitutes the basis of the responsibility of the state due to acts concerning other states. 119. The United Nations member states have, for the reasons indicated in paragraph 1 15 above, the obligation to recognize the illegality and the lack of validity of maintaining the South African presence in Namibia. They are also required to give South Africa, for its occupation of Namibia, no help or assistance whatever the form, subject to what is said in paragraph 125 below.
5 5 NAMIBIA (S.W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) 120. The Precise Determination of the Acts Permitted or Allowed- What Measures are available and Practicable, Which of Them Should be selectrd, What Scope They Should be given and by whim -is a matter that lies within the Comperte of the Appropriat Political Organs of the United Nations Acting Within Their Authority Under the Charter. Thus it is for the Security Council to Determine Any Further Measures Consequent Upon the Decisions Already Taken by it on the question of Namibia. In this Context the Court Notes that at the same meeting of the Security Council in Which the Request for Advisory Opinion was made, the Security Council also adopted resolution 283 (1970) Which Defined Some of the Steps to Be Taken. The Court has not Been Called Upon to Advise on the Legal Effects of That Resolution. 121. The Court Will In Consequence Confine Itself to Giving Advice On Those Dealings With the Government of South Africa Which, Under the Charter of the United Nations and General International Law, Should be considering as inconsistent with the Declaration of Illegaliîy and in- Validity Made In paragraph 2 of Resolution 276 (1970), Becuse they may imply a recognition that south Africa's presence in namibia es legal. 122. For the Reasons Given Above, and Subject to the CONSUTAND in paragraph 125 observations 125 below, member States are under obligation to abstain frorn entering into treaty relations with South Africa in al1 cases in which the Government of South Africa purports to act on behalf of or concerning Namibia. With respect to existing bilateral treaties, inember States must abstain from invoking or applying those treaties or provisions of treaties concluded by South Africa on behalf of or con- cerning Namibia which involve active intergovernmental CO-operation. With respect to multilateral treaties, however, the same rule cannot be applied to certain general conventions such as those of a humanitarian character, the non-performance of which may adversely affect the people of Namibia. Tt will be for the competent international organs to take specific rneasures in this respect. 123. Member States, in compliance with the duty of non-recognition imposed by paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolution 276 (1970), are under obligation to abstain from sending diplomatic or special missions to South Africa including in their jurisdiction the Territory of Nâmibia, to abstain from sending consular agents to Namibia, and to withdraw any such agents already there. They should also make it clear to the South African authorities that the maintenance of diplomatic or consular relations with South Africa does not imply any recognition of its authority with regard to Namibia. 124. The restraints which are implicit in .the non-recognition of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the explicit provisions of paragraph 5 of resolution 276 (1970) impose upon mem.ber States the obligation to abstain from entering into economic and other forms of relationship
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 55 120. Quant à savoir exactement quels actes sont permis ou autorisés, quelles mesures sont possibles ou applicables, quelles sont celles qui devraient être retenues, quelle portée il faudrait leur donner et par qui elles devraient être appliquées, ce sont là des questions qui relèvent des organes politiques compétents des Nations Unies, agissant dans le cadre des pouvoirs conférés par la Charte. Ainsi, il appartient au Conseil de sécurité d'indiquer toutes autres mesures devant faire suite aux décisions qu'il a prises en ce qui concerne la question de la Namibie. A ce propos, la Cour note que, lors de la séance où il a formulé la présente requête pour avis consultatif, le Conseil de sécurité a aussi adopté la résolution 283 (1970) qui définit certaines des mesures à prendre. La Cour n'a pas été invitée à donner un avis sur les conséquences juridiques de cette résolution. 121. La Cour se bornera donc à exprimer un avis sur les rapports avec le Gouvernement sud-africain qui, en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies et du droit international général, doivent être considérés comme incompatibles avec la déclaration d'illégalité et d'invalidité formulée au paragraphe 2 de la résolution 276 (1970), parce qu'ils peuvent impliquer une reconnaissance du caractère Iégal de la présence sud-africaine en Namibie. 122. Pour les raisons indiauées c!us haut et sous réserve des obser- vations formulées plus loin au paragraphe 125, les Etats Membres sont tenus de ne Das établir avec l'Afrique du Sud des relations convention- nelles dans tous les cas où le Gouvernement sud-africain prétendrait agir au nom de la Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne. S'agissant des traités bilatéraux en yigueur, les Etats Membres doivent s'abstenir d'invoquer ou d'appliquer les traités ou dispositions des traités conclus par l'Afrique du Sud au nom de la Namibie ou en ce aui la concerne oui nécessitent ur.2 collaboration intergouvernementale active. Pour ce qui est des traités multilatéraux, la même règle ne peut s'appliquer à certaines conventions générales, comme les conventions de caractère humanitaire, dont l'inexécution pourrait porter préjudice au peuple namibien. Il appartiendra aux organes internationaux compétents de prendre des mesures précises à cet égard. 123. Conformément au devoir de non-reconnaissance imposé par les paragraphes 2 et 5 de la résolution 276 (1970), les Etats Membres doivent s'abstenir d'accréditer auprès de l'Afrique du Sud des missions diplo- matiques ou des missions spéciales dont la juridictioii s'étendrait au territoire de la Namibie; ils doivent en outre s'abstenir d'envoyer des agents consulaires en Namibie et rappeler ceux qui s'y trouvent déjà. Ils doivent également signifier aux autorités sud-africaines qu'en entre- tenant des relations diplomatiques ou consulaires avec l'Afrique du Sud ils n'entendent pas reconnaître par là son autorité sur la Namibie. 124. Les restrictions qu'implique la non-reconnaissance de la présence de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie et les dispositions expresses du para- graphe 5 de la résolution 276 (1970) imposent aux Etats Membres I'obli- gation de ne pas entretenir avec l'Afrique du Sud agissant au nom de la
56 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may entrench its authority over the Territory. 125. In general, the non-recognition of South Africa's administration of the Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from international CO-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhab- itants of the Territory. 126. As to non-member States, although not bound by Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter, they have been called upon in paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolution 276 (1970) to give assistance in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia. In the view of the Court, the termination of the Mandate and the declaration of the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia are opposable to al1 States in the sense of barring erga omnes the legality of a situation which is main- tained in violation of international law: in particular, no State which enters into relations with South Africa concerning Namibia may expect the United Nations or its Members to recognize the validity or effects of such relationship, or of the consequences thereof. The Mandate having been terminated by decision of the international organization in which the supervisory authority over its administration was vested, and South Afri- ca's continued presence in Namibia having been dec~aredille~al, it is for non-member States to act in occordance with those decisions. 127. As to the general consequences resulting from the illegal presence of South Africa in Narnibia, al1 States should bear in mind that the injured entity is a people which must look to the international cornmunity for assistance in its progress towards the goals for which the sacred trust was instituted. 128. In its oral statement and in written communications to the Court, the Government of South Africa expressed the desire to supply the Court with further factual information concerning the purposes and objectives of South Africa's policy of separate development or apartheid, contending that to establish a breach of South Africa's substantive international obligations under the Mandate it would be necessary to prove that a particular exercise of South Africa's legislative or administrative powers was not directed in good faith towards the purpose of promoting to the utmost the well-being and progress of the inhabitants. It is claimed by the Government of South Africa that no act or omission on its part would constitute a violation of its international obligations unless it is
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 56 Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne des rapports ou des relations de caractère économique ou autre qui seraient de nature à affermir l'autorité de 1'Afrique du Sud dans le territoire. 125. D'une manière générale, la non-recoiinaissance de l'administra- tion sud-africaine dans le territoire ne devrait pas avoir pour conséquence de priver le peuple namibien des avantages qu'il peut tirer de la coopéra- tion internationale. En particulier, alors que les mesures prises officielle- ment par le Gouvernement sud-africain au nom de la Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne après Ia cessation du mandat sont illégales ou nulles, cette nullité ne saurait s'étendre à des actes, comme l'inscription des naissances, mariages ou décès à l'état civil, dont on ne pourrait mécon- naître les effets qu'au détriment des habitants du territoire. 126. Pour ce qui est des Etats non membres, et bien que ces Etats ne soient pas liés par les articles 24 et 25 de la Charte, les paragraphes 2 et 5 de la résolution 276 (1970) les invitent à s'associer à l'action des Nations Unies concernant la Namibie. De l'avis de la Cour, la cessation du mandat et la déclaration de l'illégalité de la présence sud-africaine en Namibie sont opposables à tous les Etats, en ce sens qu'elles rendent illégale erga omnes une situation qui se prolonge en violation du droit international; en particulier aucun Etat qui établit avec l'Afrique du Sud des relations concernant la Namibie ne peut escompter que I'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies ou ses Membres reconnaîtront la validité ou les effets de ces relations ou les conséquences qui en découlent. Dès lors qu'il a été mis fin au mandat par décision de l'organisation inter- nationale chargée du pouvoir de surveillance à son égard et que le main- tien de la présence sud-africaine en Namibie a été déclaré illégal, il appartient aux Etats non membres d'agir conformément à ces décisions. 127. Quant aux conséquences générales de la présence illégale de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibia, all states must remember that it harms a people who must count on the assistance of the International Community to achieve the objectives to which the sacred mission of civilization corresponds. 128. In its oral presentations and in its written communications to the Court, the South African government expressed the desire to provide the Court with additional factual information affecting the goals and objectives of its DC Policy DC separate development or apartheid; He argues that, to establish the existence of a violation of fundamental international obligations imposed by the mandate on South Africa, it should be proven that, on this or that particular point, South Africa n 'has not exercised his legislative or administrative powers with a view to increasing in good faith, by all means in his power, the well-being and the progress of the inhabitants. The South African government affirms that an act or omission which is attributable to it would constitute a viola
Shown that such act or omission was actuated bv motivated. or direct towards a purpose other than one to promote the interests of the inhab- isants of the territory. 129. The Government of South Africa Having Made This Request, The Court Finds that No. Evidence is needed for the purpose of Deter- mining where the Policy of Apartheid as Applied by South Africa in Namibia is in conformity with the International Obligations Assomed by South Africa Under the Charter of the United Nations. In order to deter- mine where the laws and decree application by South Africa in Namibia, which are a Matter of Public Record, Constitute A Vi Viignun of the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations, the question of Intent or Governmental Discretion is not falling under; Nor is it necessary to investigate or Determine the effects of those measures upon the welfare of the uninhabitants. i30. It is undisputed, and is amply supported by documents annexed to South Africa's Written stément in these procedures, that the official governmental police pursued by South Africa in Namibia is to achieve a complete Physical Separation of Races and Ethnic Groiips in Separate Areas. The Application of this Policy has required, as has been conceived by South Africa, Restrictive Measures of Controlly Adopted and Enforced in the Territory by the Coercive Power of the Mandate. These measures establish limitations, exclusions or restrictions for the Members of the indigenous Population Groups in Respect of their Participation in Certain Types of Activities, Fields of Study or of Training, Labour or Employment and also submit them to restrictions or exclusions of residence and movement in Large parts of the territory. 13 1. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Train Mandate Had Pledged Itself to observe and respect, in A Territory Having an Inter- National Status, Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for Al1 without distinction as to race. To Establish Intead, and to Enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on groups of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin that constituting a denial of fundamental human right is a blatant violation of the purposes and principles of the charter . 132. The Government of South Africa also submitted a Request that a plebiscite Should be Held in the Territory of Namibia Under the Joint Supervision of the Court and the Government of South Africa (Para. 16 Above). This proposal was presented in connection with the Request to submit Additional Evidence and As a Means of Bringing Evidence Before the Court. The Court Having concluded that no further evidence
Namibia (African S.-O.) (advisory opinion) 57 tion of its international obligations if it was shown that this act or omission was inspired by another reason or had another goal than to serve the interests of inhabitants of the territory. 129. The South African government having made this request, the Court considers that there is no need for evidence on the facts to say if the apartheid policy practiced by South Africa in Namibia is in accordance with international obligations that South Africa has assured under the Charter of the United Nations. With regard to determining if the laws and decrees applied by South Africa in Namibia, which are of public notoriety, violate the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the question of intention or discretion - government is without relevance; It is also not necessary to examine or assess the effects of these measures on the well-being of the inhabitants. 130. It is an undisputed fact, and moreover abundantly demonstrated by the documents attached to the written presentation of South Africa, that the official policy of the South African government in Namibia tends to a complete physical separation of ethnic breeds and groups, each being installed in an area distinct from the territory. As well as South Africa has recognized it, the implementation of this policy requires restrictive control measures, adopted and applied officially in the territory by the coercive power of the former agent. The purpose of these measures is to limit, exclude or restrict the participation of members of the AT ~ TOGHTone population groups in certain types of activity, in certain areas of study or training and to certain jobs or jobs, and 'Impose restrictions or prohibitions on residence and displacement in large regions of the territory on the natives. 131. Under the Charter of the United Nations. The former agent had committed to observing and respecting, in a territory with an international status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of race. The fact of establishing and imposing, on the contrary, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations which are only based on race, color, ancestry or national or ethnic origin and which constitute a denial of fundamental rights of the human person, is a blatant violation of the goals and principles of the charter. 132. The South African government has also made a request for a plebiscite to be organized in the territory of Namibia under the joint surveillance of the Court and the South African Government (para. 16 above). This proposal was made as part of the request for presentation of additional evidence on the facts and in order to enlighten the court. The court having concluded that a complement
5 8 Namibia (S.W. Africa) (Advisory Opinion) was required, that the mandate was validly terminated and that in consequence in the Africa's presence in namibia is illegal and its acts on behalf of or concerning namibia are illegal and invalid, it follows that it cannot Entertain this proposition. * * * 133. For these reasons, in Reply to the question: "What are the legal consequences for the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)?" by 13 votes to 2. (1) That, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia Being Illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia Immondately and Thus Put an end to its occupation of the territory; by 11 votes to 4, (2) that stats members of the United Nations Are Under obligation to recognize the Illegality of South Africa's PREENCE in Namibia and the Invalidity of its Acts on Behalf of or concerning namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in Particular Any Dealings With the Government of South Africa Implying Recognition of the Legality of, or Lending Support or Assistance to, Such Presence and Administration; (3) That it is incumbent upon stats that are not a members of the United Nations to Give Assistance, Within the Scope of Subparagraph (2) Above, in the action that has been taken by the United Nations with look to namibia. Done in English and in French, the English Text Being Authoritative, At the Peace Palace, The Hague, This Twenty-First Day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-è, in Two Copies, One of Which will be placed in the Archives of the Court and the Other Transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Signed) ZAFRULLA KHAN, President. (Signed) S. aquarone, registrar.
evidence was not necessary, that it was validly put an end to the mandate, that consequently the presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal and that all the measures taken by it in the name of Namibia or in What concerns her are illegal and zero, she cannot retain this proposal. 133. By these reasons, in response to the question: (C what are the legal consequences for the States of the continuous presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council?)),) By thirteen votes against two, 1) that, the continuous presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa has the obligation to immediately withdraw its administration from Namibia and thus cease to occupy the territory ; By eleven votes against four, 2) that the member states of the United Nations have the obligation to recognize the illegality of the presence of South Africa in Namibia and the lack of validity of the measures taken by it in the name of Namibia or as far as it is concerned, and to abstain from all acts and in particular all relations with the South African government which implies the recognition of the legality of this presence and this administration, or which would constitute a help or assistance in this regard; 3) that it is the responsibility of the States which are not Not members of the United Nations to lend their assistance, within the limits of subparagraph 2 above, to the action undertaken by the United Nations regarding Namibia. Made in English and French, the English text being proof, at the Palais de la Paix, the Hague, the twenty -one June 1st hundred and sixty and eleven, in two copies, one of which will remain deposited in the Archives of the Court and whose other will be sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations. The president, (signed) ZAFRULLA KHAN. The clerk, (signed) S. Aquarone.
President Sir Muhammad ZAfrulla Khan Makes The Following Declaration: 1 am in Entrement Agrement With the Opinion of the Court But Would Wish to Add Some Observations On Two OR Three Aspects of the Pretent- tion Made to the Court On Behalf of South Africa. It was contented that under the supervisory system as faces in the Covenant of the League and the Different Mandate Agreements, the Mandate Could, in the Last Resort, Flout the Wishes of the Council of the League by Casting its Voting in Opposition to the Directions which The Council Might offers to give to the Mandate. The Argument Runs that this system was deliberately sooted, with open eyes, as to the council powerless in face of the veto of the mandate if the letter thing to exercise it. Pn Support of this Contestion Reliance was placed on paragraph 5 of article 4 of the Covenant of the League by Virtue of Which Any Member of the League not represents on the Council was to be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council During the Consideration of Matters Specially Affecting the Interests of That Member. This entitled the manda- Tory to sit as a member at any meeting of the council in which a matter affting its interest as a mandate cam under considering. Under Paragraph 1 of article 5 of the Covenant Decisions of the Council Required the Agrement of Al1 the Members of the League Represh at the Meeting. This is nown as the unanimity rule and by virtue thereof it was claimed that a mandate possed a right of veto when waiting- ing a Meeting of the council in pursuance of paragraph 5 of article 4 and consequently the last word on the manner and method of The administration of the mandate remains with the mandate. This content is unteable. Were It Wel Founded It Would Reduce The Whole System of Mandates to Mocker. As the Court, in its judgment of 1966, observed: "in Practice, the unanimity rule was frequently not insisted upon, or its impact was mitigated by a process of give-end-take, and by various procedural devices to which both and the mandatories slow themselves. So far A.S the short's information goas, there your occurred any case in which a mandate 'vetoed' What would otherwise have been a council Decision. Equally, How-Ever, Much Dis dis taked to have situations in Which The Mandate WOULD HAVE BEEN BORAGE TO ACIESCE IN THE VIEWS OF THE REST OF THE COUNCIL SHORT OF CASTING AN APROVE VOTION. The occa- sional deliberate absence of the mandate from a meeting, enabled decisions to be taken that the mandate might have felt oblige to Voting Against if it had been present. This was part of the above- mentioned process for arriving at generally acceptable conclusions. " (I.C. J. Reports 1966, pp. 44-45.)
Sir Muhammad Zaprulla Khan, President, makes the following statement: I am without reservation to the Evis of the Court but I want to add some observations on two or three aspects of the theses developed by South Africa before the Court. South Africa argued that, in the surveillance system provided for by the Corporate of the League of Nations and the various mandate agreements, a representative could, as a last resort, thwart the will of the board of the company by voting against The directives that the Council proposed to give it. His thesis is that the system had been designed, of deliberate remarks, so that the council remains disarmed before the veto of the agent if he decided to use it. In order to support this assertion, South Africa invoked article 4, paragraph 5, of the Pact of the League of Nations, under which any member of the Society who was not represented on the Council must be invited to Send a representative to sit on it when a question that particularly interested him was brought before this organ. The agent could therefore fzire on the council when he examined a question relating to his interests as an agent. However, according to article 5, paragraph 1, of the Pact, the decisions of the Council were taken unanimously by the members of the company represented in the meeting. Due to the existence of this rule, known as unanimity, South Africa argued that an agent would have had a right of veto when he attended a meeting of the Council in Virtue of article 4, paragraph 5, so that the agent, not the council, would have had the last word on how to administer the mandate. This thesis is unbearable. If it were founded, the whole mandates system would have been a simulacrum. As the Court said it in its 1966 judgment: ((in practice, it was frequent that one does not insist on the rule of unanimity or that the effects are reduced by means of compromise and procedural fireworks to which the Council and the agent lent themselves. To the attention of the Court, no agent has ever opposed his veto to a possible decision of the councilor. We also took great care to avoid putting the Agents in the obligation to have to choose between the adoption of the point of view of other members of the Council and a contrary vote. By abstaining voluntarily to sit on this or that session, the agent allowed the Council to make decisions against which he would have thought he had to vote if he had been present. It was part of the means to achieve generally acceptable conclusions, which have just been mentioned. ”(C.Z.J. Collection 1966, p. 44 and 45.)
The representative of South Africa, in ANSWER to question by a member of the short, confessed that there was not a single case on record in which the representative of a Mandate Power Ever Cast a Negative Voting in a Meeting of the Council so as Block has decision of the council. It is this established that in practical the last word always remains with the council of the league and not with the mandate. The Covenant of the League Made Ample Provision to Secure the Effectiveness of the Covenant and conformity to its provisions in Respect of the obligations beginning by Membership of the League. A Member of the League Which Had Violed Any Covenant of the League Could Be Declared to be no Longer of the League by A Voting of the Council Competition in by the Représentifies of Al1 the other Members of the League Repries Thereon (Para. 4 , Art. 16, of the Covenant). The representative of South Africa Conceded that: ".. If a conflict between a mandate and the coucil occurred and if al1 the members of the council were of the mandate the mandate had violed a covenant of the league, it would have been legally Possible for the Council to Expel the Mandate from the League and thereaft Decisions of The Council Could No Longer Be Thwarted by the Particular Mandate Instance, A Decision to Revoke the Mandate. The Mandate WOULD NOLD NO LONGE BE A MEMBER OF THE LEAGUE AND THE LEAGUE AND WOULD REDSNING NO LONGE BE ETTITLED TO Wait and vote in Council Meetings... We agree that by expelling a Mandaling The Council could have overcome the Practical or Mechanical Difficult Created by the Unanimity Requirement. " (Hearing of 15 March 1971.) It was no doubt the consumption of this position which prompt the deliberate absence of a mandate from a meeting of the council of the the 'that the évabled the Council to take decisions that the Mandate Might Have Felt obliged to vote against if it had been present. If a Mandate Ceased to Be A Member of the League and the Council Felt That the Presence of Its Reprresentative in a Meeting of the Council Dealing With Matters Affting the Mandate Would Be Helpful, it Could Still Be invited to wait as Happened in the Case of Japan after it ceased to be a member of the league. But it that is not waiting as as of right under paragraph 5 of article 4 of the Covenant. In Addition, if Need Arose The Covenant Could be fined Under Article 26 of the Covenant. In fact no such need arose but the authority was provided in the Covenant. It would thus be idle to content that the mandates system was deliberately adoiseed, with open eyes, so as to leave the council of the league powerless against the veto of the mandate if the letter thing to exercise it. Those Responsible for the Covenant Were Anxious and World Hard
The representative of South Africa, answering a question asked by a member of the court, admitted that one was not aware of a single case where the representative of a mandatory power would have issued a negative vote to A council meeting, so as to paralyze a decision. It is therefore established that in practice it is always the council of society and not the agent who had the last word. Ample precautions were taken in the Company of the Company of the Nations to guarantee its effective application as well as compliance with clauses concerning the execution of the obligations incumbent on the members. A member of the company who was guilty of the violating of one of the commitments resulting from the pact could be excluded from the company, the exclusion being pronounced by the vote of all the other members of the Society represented in the Council (Art . 16, para. 4, of the pact). The representative of South Africa admitted that: (if a confidence had raised between an agent and the council and if all the members of the council had been of the opinion that the agent had violated one of the commitments resulting from the pact, he would have been juridi- only possible that the Council excluded from the company The agent, who would no longer have been there to oppose the decisions of the Council, for example to a decision to revoke the mandate. The agent would not have been a member of the company Nations and would no longer have had the right to sit and vote on the sessions of the council. ... We admit that by pronouncing the expulsion of an agent The Council could have overcome the practical or mechanical difficulties created by the rule unanimity. ”(Audience of March 15, 1971.) It is certainly because it was aware of this situation that it happened that an agent voluntarily refers to attend a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, allowing him to adopt decisions against which this agent could have felt obliged to vote if he had been present. If, an agent who has ceased to be a member of the League of Nations, the Council nevertheless estimated useful that this agent was represented at a meeting where questions concerning the mandate should be discussed, he could still invite him to attend ; He did it in the case of Japan, after this state had left the company. But a representative in this situation could not have avoided article 4, paragraph 5, of the pact to sit down as a right. Furthermore, if the need had been felt, the pact could have been amended in accordance with its article 26. He was not thus, but the possibility existed. It would therefore be vain to to affirm that the system of mandates was designed, of deliberate remarks, so that the council of the company was disarmed if a representative decided to exercise his right of veto. The authors of the pact wanted to establish a system that allows
6 1 Namibia (S.W. Africa) (Decl. Zafrulla khan) to Institute a Systen Which Would Be Effective in Carrying Out to the Full The Sacred Trust of Civilization. HAD they Deliberately Deviseed A Framework Which Rnight Enable A Mandate So Inclined To Defy The Systen With Irnpunity, They WOULD Have Been Guilty of Defeating the Declared Purpose of the Mandates System and this is not to be Thought of; Nor is it to be irnagined that these wise statsrnen, Despite al1 the Care that they took and the Reasoning and Persuasion that tower into play, WEE FINALLY PERSUADED INCO ACCESSING AS REITY THAT WHIC COULD So EASILY BE TURNED INTO A FICT. In My View the Supervisory Authority of the General Assembly of the United Nations In Respect of the RNANDATED Territory, Being derived Frorn the Covenant of the League and the Mandate Agrement, is not restricted by any provision of the charter of the united nations. The EXTENT OF THAT AUTHORITY MUST BE DETERRNINED by Reference to the Recunition of the Covenant of the League and the Mandate Agreement. The General Assembly Was Entitled to Exercise The Sarne Authority In Respect of the Administration of the Territory by the Mandate As Was Possessed by the Council of the League and its Decisions and Determinations in That Respect Had The Same Force and Effect as the Decisions and Determinations of The Council of the League. This was well illustrated in the Case of General Assembly Resolution 289 (IV), adopted on 21 Novernber 1949 Recommending that libya shall become induentant as soon as possible and in any case not late than 1 January 1952. A Detailed procedure for the Achieverne of this Objective Was Laid Down, Including the Appointment by the General Assembly of A United Nations Comrnis- sioner in Libya and a Council to Aid and Advise Hirn, etc. AI1 The Recom- Mendations contained in this resolution Constituted Binding Decisions; Decisionc Which Had been Adopted in Accord with the Provisions of the Charter But Whose Binding Character Was Derred Frorn Annex XI to the Treaty of Peace with Italy. The representative of South Africa, During the race of his oral sub-mission, refined from using the expression "apartheid" but urged: "... South africa is in the position that its conduct would be unlawful if the differentiation that it adrnittedly Should be direct at, and have the result-of-subordinatting the interests of one or certain groups on racial or ethnic basis to those of others,... If that can be establised in fact, then South Africa WOULD BE GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF VIOLATION OF its bonds in that respect, other- wise not. '' (Hearing of 17 March 197 1.)
Effectively fulfill the sacred mission of civilization and they did not measure their sorrows to achieve it. If they had knowingly created a framework in which the agent who would have been disposed there could have been brave the system with impunity, they would have been guilty of going against the declared object of the mandates system, a hypothesis which is not to be considered; One cannot imagine either that, despite the harm they have given themselves, and despite their effort of reflection and persuasion, these wise policies were ultimately convinced to accept as real what we could so easily Transform into simple fiction. Because they arise from the Pact of the League of Nations and the Mandate Agreement, the supervisory powers of the United Nations General Assembly in the territory under the mandate are not limited, in my opinion, by any provision of the Charter of the United Nations. To determine the extent of these powers, we must refer to the relevant provisions of the pact and the mandate agreement. The General Assembly may, with regard to the administration of the territory by the agent, to exercise the powers that the Council of the League of Nations had, and its decisions and resolutions in this area have the same force and the same effect as decisions and resolutions of the said council. I do not want it as proof that resolution 289 (IV), dated November 21, 1949, by which the General Assembly recommended that Libya accesses independence as soon as possible and at least no later 1952. Any procedure was provided to achieve this result, including the designation by the General Assembly of a United Nations Commissioner for Libya and the Constitution of a Council responsible for providing him with his assistance and opinions. All the recommendations appearing in this resolution constituted as many imperative decisions, adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, but which drew their compulsory strength from Annex XI of the Peace Treaty with Italy. In his oral presentation, the Representative of Africa Su Sud was careful not to use the Apartheid word. But, according to her declarations, [(South Africa considers that her behavior would be illegal if the differentiation it practices - she did not hide it - aimed and led to subordinate for racial or ethnic reasons the interests of One or some groups to those of others ... if it could be established in fact, then South Africa would be guilty of having failed in its obligations in this regard, otherwise. ”(Audience of March 17, 1971. ))
The Policy of Apartheid was initiated by prime minister Malan and was then vigorously put into effect by his successors, strijdom and verwoerd. It has been continuously proclaimed that purposes and object of the police are the maintenance of white domination. Speaking to the South African House of Assembly, As Late AS 1963, Dr. Verwoerd Said: "Reduced to its Simplest Form is Nothing Else Than this: Vde Want to Keep South Africa White.. Keeping it White can only mean one Thing, namely, white domination, not leadership, not guidance, but control, supremacy. If we are agreed that it is the desire of the people that the white man should be able to continue himself by white domination. that it can be achieved by separate development. " (I.C.J. Pleadings, South West Africa, Vol. IV, p. 264.) South Africa's Reply to this in its join in the 1966 boxes was in effect that thesis and other similar pronouncing were qualified by "The Promise to Provide Sepa Homelands for the Bantu Groups "Wherein the Bantu Would be free to develop his capacities to the same degree as the White Could do in the rest of the country. But this Promise Itself was always subject to the qualification that the Bantu Homelands Would Development Under the Guardansthip of the White. In this coiinection it was urged that in 1361 The "Prime Minister Spoke of A Greater Degree of Ultimate Independence for Bantu Homelands Than He Had Rne Décade Earlier". This Makes Little Difference In Respect of the Main Purpose of the Policy which continued to be the Domination of the White. It Needs to be Remembered, However, that the short is not concerned in these proceedings with conditions in South Africa. The Court is concerned with the Administration of South West Africa As Carried on By the Mandate in Discharge of His obligations under the Mandate that prescribed that well-being and development of people who we not not yet able to stand by theirselves under the Strenuous Conditions of The Modern World Constituted A Sacred Trust of Civilization and that the Best Method of Giving Effect to This Principle was that tutoring of Such Peoples Should be Entrusted to Advanced Nations who, by Reason of Their Resources, Their Experience and their Geographical Position Could Best Undantake This responsibility (art. 22, paras. 1 and 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations). The Administration was to be Carried on "in the interests of the Indi- Genous Population" (para. 6, art. 22). For the Discharge of this obligation it is not enough that the administration should Believe in good Faith that the Policy it proposes to follow is in the best interests of al1 sections of the population. The Supervisory Authority must be satisfied that it is in the
Apartheid's policy was inaugurated by Mr. Malan, then Prime Minister, and vigorously prosecuted by his successors, MM. Strijdom and Verwoerd. It was constantly proclaimed that the goal and the object of this policy were the maintenance of white domination. Mr. Verwoerd still declared in 1963 before the Assembly of South Africa: I (reduced to its simplest form, the problem is none other than the following: we want South Africa to remain white. . Keeping it white cannot mean only one thing, namely to ensure the domination of the whites, assure them not the ((direction)), not i '((orientation)), but the ((control ", the ( (supremacy)). If we agree that it is the desire of the people that whites are able to continue to protect themselves by maintaining white domination ... We say that the means to achieve it is separate development. ”(C.I.J. Memoirs, South West Africa, Vol. IV, p. 264.) In the affairs of 1966, South Africa explained in substance, in its duplicate, that this declaration and others Analogous words were tempered by the "promise to create distinct homes (Homelands) for the Bantu groups 1) where the Bantu would be free to take advantage of their skills in the same way as whites in the rest of the country. But this promise itself was always subject to this restriction that the Bantu households should develop under the supervision of whites. It has been said in this regard that in 1961, (the Prime Minister spoke of granting Bantu households ultimately greater independence than he had done ten years ago)). But that hardly changes the essential goal of the policy followed, which remains the hegemony of the Whites. However, it should be recalled that, in this procedure, the Court does not have to worry about the situation in South Africa. What interests him is the administration of the South West Africa, as provided by the agent in execution of the obligations imposed on him by the mandate, which provided that well-being and the development of peoples not yet capable of directing themselves in the particularly difficult conditions of the modern world formed a sacred mission of civilization and that the best method of practicing this principle was to entrust the tutelage of these peoples to the developed nations which, due of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, were best able to assume this responsibility (art. 22, para. 1 and 2, of the Société de nments). The administration was to be exercised C (in the interest of the native population)) (art. 22, para. 6). In order for a similar obligation to be respected, it is not enough that the administration believes in good faith that the policy it proposes to follow is in accordance with the interest of all the strata of the population: again Should the authority be charged with
Best interests of the indigenous population of the territory. This follows from Article 6 of the Mandate Agreement for South West Africa, Read with paragraph 6 of article 22 of the Covenant. The representative of South Africa, While Admitting The Right of the People of South West Africa to Self-Determination, Urged in His Oral Stament that the Exercise of That Right Must Take Into Full Account The Limitations Impood, Accord to Him, on Such Exercise by The Tribal and Cultural Divisions in the territory. He concluded that in the Case of South West Africa Self-Determination "May Well Find Itself Practically Restricted to Some Kind of Automy and Local Self-Government Within A Larger Arrangement of Co-Ooperation" (Hearing of 17 March 1971). This in Effect Means a Denial of Self-Determination As envisaged in the charter of the United Nations. Whatever May Have Been the Conditions in South Africa Calling for Special Measures, Those Conditions Did Not Exist in the Case of South West Africa at the time when South Africa assumed the obligation of a manda- Tory in respect of the territory, nor have they Into existence sincere. In South West Africa the Small White Element was not and is not indi- genous to the territory. There can be no excuse in the case of South West Africa for the Application of the Policy of Apartheid So Far As the interests of the White Population are concerned. It is is claimed, However, that the various indigue Groups of the population have reached different stages of development and that there are serious ethnic considations that cal1 for the application of the policy of separate development of each group. Tea following observations of the Director of the Institute of Race Relations, London, are apposite in this context: ". . . White South African arguments are based on the different stages of development reached by various groups of people. It is undisputed fact that groups have developed at different paces in respect of the control of environment (although understanding of other aspects of life has not always grown at the same pace). But the aspect of South African thought which is widely questioned elsewhere is the assumption that an individual is permanently limited by the limitations of his group. His ties with it may be strong; indeed, when considering politics and national survival, the assumption that they will be stroi-ig is altogether reasonable. Again, as a matter of choice, people may prefer to mix socially with those of their own group, but to Say that by law people of one group must mix with no others can really only proceed from a conviction not only that the other groups are inferior but that every member of each of the other groups is permanently and irremediably inferior. It is this that rankles. 'Separate but equal' is possible so long as it is a matter of choice by both parties; legally imposed by one, it must be regarded by the other as a humiliation, and far more so if it applies not only
de la surveillance parvienne à la conviction que cette politique est con- forme à l'intérêt de la population indigène du territoire. C'est ce qui découle de l'article 6 du mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain et de l'article 22, paragraphe 6, du Pacte. Le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a reconnu, certes, le droit du peuple du Sud-Ouest africain à l'autodétermination, mais il a affirmé dans son exposé oral que, pour l'exercice de ce droit, il faIIait tenir pleine- ment compte des limites qu'imposeraient, selon lui, les divisions tribales et culturelles du territoire. Il a conclu que dans le cas du Sud-Ouest africain l'autodétermination (i peut fort bien, dans la pratique, se trouver réduite à une sorte d'autonomie locale dans le cadre d'un système de coopération plus large » (audience du 17 mars 1971). Cela revient en fait à nier le droit à l'autodétermination, tel que l'envisage la Charte des Nations Unies. Quelles qu'aient pu être les circonstances qui, en Afrique du Sud, ont amené à prendre des mesures spéciales, ces circonstances n'existaient pas dans le Sud-Ouest africain au moment où l'Afrique du Sud y a assumé les obligations de mandataire et elles n'ont pas non plus fait leur ap- parition depuis. Dans le Sud-Ouest africain, la petite minorité blanche n'a jamais constitué une population autochtone. Les intérêts de la popu- lation blanche ne sauraient donc y excuser l'application de la politique d'apartheid. On affirme cependant que les différents groupes de popula- tion indigènes sont à des niveaux de développement différents et que d'importantes considérations ethniques obligent à appliquer une politique de développement séparé à chacun de ces groupes. Les observations suivantes du directeur de l'Institut des relations interraciales de Londres méritent à ce propos d'être citées: Les Sud-Africains blancs tirent argument des différents niveaux de développement qu'auraient atteint les divers groupes de popu- lation. Il est de fait que ces groupes ont évolué plus ou moins vite pour ce qui touche la maîtrise de l'environnement (le rythme de l'évolution pouvant cependant être différent pour d'autres aspects de la vie). Mais l'aspect du raisonnement sud-africain le plus généra- lement critiqué est le postulat selon lequel les limitations du groupe s'imposent à jamais à l'individu. Les attaches de l'individu avec le groupe peuvent être fortes; sur le plan de la politique et de l'existence nationale, il est même parfaitement raisonnable de supposer qu'elles le sont. De même, s'ils ont le choix, les gens peuvent préférer fréquen- ter les membres de leur propre groupe, mais dire qu'en vertu de la loi les gens appartenant à un certain groupe ne doivent fréquenter personne d'autre procède forcément de la conviction, non seulement que les autres groupes sont inférieurs, mais encore que chaque membre de tout autre groupe l'est aussi, d'une façon permanente et irrémédiable. C'est cette idée qui révolte. ((Séparés mais égaux )), cela peut se concevoir s'il s'agit d'un libre choix des deux parties
64 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (DECL. ZAFRULLA KHAN) to the group as a whole but to individuals. In fact, of course, what separate developrnent has meant has been anything but equal. These are some reasons why it will be hard to find natives of Africa who believe that to extend the policy of separate development to South West Africa even more completely than at present is in the interest of any but the White inhabitants." (Quoted in I.C.J. Pleadings, South West Africa, Vol. IV, p. 339.) Towards the close of his oral presentation the representative of South Africa made a plea to the Court in the following terms : "In our submission, the general requirernent placed by the Charter on al1 United Nations activities is that they must further peace, friendly relations, and CO-operation between nations, and especially between member States. South Africa, as a member State, is under a duty to contribute towards those ends, and she desires to do so, although she has no intention of abdicating what she regards as her responsibilities on the sub-continent of southern Africa. If there are to be genuine efforts at achieving a peaceful solution, they will have to satisfy certain criteria. They will have to respect the will of the self-determining peoples of South West Africa. They will have to take into account the facts of geography, of economics, of budgetary requirements, of the ethnic conditions and of the state of development. If this Court, even in an opinion on legal questions, could indicate the road towards a peaceful and constructive solution along these lines, then the Court would have made a great contribution, in our respectful submission, to the cause of international peace and security and, more, to the cause of friendly relations amongst not only the nations but amongst al1 men." (Hearing of 5 March 197 1 .) The representative of the United States of America, in his oral presenta- tion, observed that : ". . . the question of holding a free and proper plebiscite under appropriate auspices and with conditions and arrangements which would ensure a fair and informed expression of the will of the people of Namibia deserves study. It is a matter which might be properly submitted to the competent political organs of the United Nations, which have consistently manifested their concern that the
intéressées; mais si c'est une solution imposée légalement par l'une des parties, l'autre ne peut qu'y voir une brimade, surtout si elle ne s'applique pas seulement au groupe en tant que tel, mais aussi aux individus. 11 est évident qu'en réalité rien n'est moins ((égal )) que le développement séparé. Voilà donc quelques-unes des raisons qui font qu'il se trouvera difficilement des Africains pour penser qu'une extension encore plus grande de la politique de développement séparé au Sud-Ouest afri- cain sert les intérêts d'autres habitants que les blancs. )) (Cité dans C.I.J. Mémoires, Sud-Ouest africain, vol. IV, p. 339.) Vers la fin de son exposé oral le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a adressé à la Cour le plaidoyer suivant: 11 Selon nous, la condition générale à laquelle la Charte soumet toutes les activités des Nations Unies est qu'elles doivent favoriser la paix, les relations amicales et la coopération entre les nations, notamment entre les Etats Membres. En tant qu'Etat Membre, l'Afrique du Sud a le devoir de contribuer à ces fins, et elle en a le désir, bien qu'elle n'ait aucunement l'intention d'abdiquer ce qu'elle considère comme ses responsabilités dans le sous-continent de l'Afrique australe. Les efforts visant à une solution pacifique devront, pour être authentiques, répondre à certains critères. Ils devront respecter la volonté des populations du Sud-Ouest africain disposant de leur propre sort. Ils devront tenir compte des réalités géographiques, économiques et budgétaires, des conditions ethniques et du degré de développement. Si la Cour, même dans un avis sur des questions juridiques, pouvait montrer la voie vers une solution pacifique et constructive en ce sens, nous estimons qu'elle contribuerait grandement - nous le lui disons respectueusement - à la cause de la paix et de la sécurité internationales et, mieux encore, à celle des relations amicales non seulement entre les nations mais aussi entre tous les hommes. )) (Audience du 5 mars 1971 .) Le représentant des Etats-Unis d'Amérique a déclaré devant la Cour ((qu'il vaut la peine d'étudier la question de l'organisation d'un plébiscite loyal et régulier, sous des auspices appropriés, dans des conditions et selon des modalités qui garantiraient à la population de la Namibie la possibilité d'exprimer sa volonté librement et en connaissance de cause. Cette question pourrait fort bien être soumise aux organes politiques compétents des Nations Unies, qui ont cons-
Namibians achieve self-determination. The Court rnay wish to so indicate in its opinion to the Security Council." (Hearing of 9 March 1971.) The Court having arrived at the conclusion that the Mandate has been terminated and that the presence of South Africa in South West Africa is illegal, 1 would, in response to the plea made by the representative of South Africa, suggest that South Africa should offer to withdraw its administration from South West Africa in consultation with the United Nations so that a process of withdrawal and substitution in its place of United Nations' control rnay be agreed upon and carried into effect with the minimum disturbance of present administrative arrangements. It should also be agreed upon that, after the expiry of a certain period but not later than a reasonable time-limit thereafter, a plebiscite rnay be held under the supervision of the United Nations, which should ensure the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite, to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory with regard to their political future. If the result of the plebiscite should reveal a clear preponderance of views in support of a particular course and objective, that course should be adop- ted so that the desired objective rnay be achieved as early as possible. South Africa's insistence upon giving effect to the will of the peoples of South West Africa proceeds presumably from the conviction that an overwhelming majority of the peoples of the Territory desire closer political integration with the Republic of South Africa. Should that prove in fact to be the case the United Nations, being wholly committed to the principle of self-determination of peoples, would be expected to readily give effect to the clearly expressed wishes of the peoples of the Territory. Should the result of the plebiscite disclose their preference for a different solution, South Africa should equally readily accept and respect such manifestation of the will of the peoples concerned and should CO-operate with the United Nations in giving effect to it. The Government of South Africa, being convinced that an overwhelming majority of the peoples of South West Africa truly desire incorporation with the Republic, would run little risk of a contrary decision through the adoption of the procedure here suggested. If some such procedure is adopted and the conclusion that rnay emerge therefrom, whatever it rnay prove to be, is put into effect, South Africa would have vindicated itself in the eyes of the world and in the estimation of the peoples of South West Africa, whose freely expressed wishes must be supreme. There would still remain the possibility, and, if South Africa's estimation of the situa- tion is close enough to reality, the strong probability, that once the peoples of South West Africa have been put in a position to manage their own affairs without any outside influence or control and they have had greater experience of the difficulties and problems with which they would be confronted, they rnay freely decide, in the exercise of their sovereignty, to establish a closer political relationship with South Africa. The adoption
tamment manifesté leur souci de voir les Namibiens obtenir l'auto- détermination et la Cour voudra peut-être indiquer cela dans l'avis qu'elle adressera au Conseil de sécurité. )) (Audience du 9 mars 1971 .) La Cour étant parvenue à la conclusicn qu'il a été mis fin au mandat et que la présence de l'Afrique du Sud dans le Sud-Ouest africain est illégale, je me permets de répondre à l'appel adressé à la Cour par le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud et de suggérer que l'Afrique du Sud offre de retirer son administration du Sud-Ouest africain en consultation avec les Nations Unies, de façon qu'une opération de retrait, suivie d'une prise en charge par les Nations Unies, puisse être envisagée d'un commun accord et menée à bien avec le moins possible de bouleversement dans l'organisation administrative existante. Il devrait également être convenu que, à l'expiration d'une certaine période mais sans dépasser un délai raisonnable, un plébiscite destiné à permettre aux habitants du territoire de faire connaître leurs vœux sur leur avenir politique aurait lieu sous la surveillance des Nations Unies, qui assureraient la liberté et l'impartialité de la consultation. Si le plébiscite dégageait une nette majorité en faveur d'une solution et d'un objectif déterminé, c'est cette solution qui devrait être adoptée en vue d'atteindre dès que possible l'objectif en question. L'Afrique du Sud insiste pour que la volonté des peuples du Sud-Ouest africain soit respectée, sans doute parce qu'elle est convaincue qu'une majorité écrasante des populations du territoire se prononcerait en faveur d'une intégration politique plus étroite avec la République sud-africaine. S'il en était ainsi, l'Organisation des Nations Unies, qui est tout acquise au principe de l'autodétermination, s'inclinerait devant le vœu clairement exprimé par les populations du territoire. Si, au contraire, le plébiscite devait révéler que ces dernières préfèrent une autre solution, l'Afrique du Sud devrait de même accepter et respecter leur volonté et coopérer avec les Nations Unies pour qu'elle soit suivie d'effet. Le Gouvernement sud-africain est certain qu'une majorité écrasante de la population du Sud-Ouest africain désire véritablement s'intégrer à la République; dans ce cas, l'adoption de la méthode que je viens de décrire ne l'exposerait guère au risque d'une décision adverse. Si l'on a recours à une méthode semblable et si la conclusion that it will have made it possible to identify, whatever it is, is actually applied, South Africa will have justified in the eyes of the world and in the esteem of the peoples of the South West Africa, whose free will Any case winning it. There would remain the possibility and, if the appreciation that South Africa relates to the situation is sufficiently close to reality, the high probability that, when the peoples of the South West Africa, once put to direct their own Aimed without pressure or ex-control, will have acquired a greater experience of the difficulties and problems to overcome, they decide freely and sovereignly to establish closer political relations with South Africa. In
66 Namlbia (S.W. Africa) (Decl. Zafrulla Khan) of the race here suggestions would indeed make a great contribution "to the cause of international peace and security and, more, to the cause of friendly relations amongst not only the nations but amongst al1 men ". Vice-president a ~~ or ~ and judges Padilla Nervo, Pétrén, Onyeama, Dillard and de Castro Append Separate Opinions to the Opinion of the Court. Judes Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Gros Append Netits Opinions to the Opinion of the Court. (Initialled) Z.K. (Initialled) S. A.
Namibia (African S.-O.) (decl. ZAFRULLA KHAN) 66 Adopting the conduct suggested here, South Africa would contribute greatly ((to the cause of international peace and security and, better still, to That of friendly relations not only between nations but also between all men ". M. Ammoun, vice-president, and Mr. Fadilla Keklo, Iri ~~ f", Onyeama, Dillard and de Castro, Jugr: ~, Joipnei -RT to advisory visits the presentations of their individual opinion. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and M. GRCS, J ~ Ges, join the presentations of their dissident opinion. (Parupé) Z.K. (r "ùi-ûphe) HER.
