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«Βιομηχανία» συνδικαλιστικών-πολιτικών διώξεων! Στις κεντρικές αιχμές του κινήματος η πάλη για την ανατροπή τους! - ΚΚΕ(μ-λ) (KKE m l)


Το ΚΚΕ(μ-λ) καταγγέλλει την ομοβροντία συνδικαλιστικών και πολιτικών διώξεων που έχει ξεσπάσει σε πολλούς χώρους του ιδιωτικού και του δημόσιου τομέα.

Δεκάδες εργαζόμενοι, σε επιχειρήσεις, στην εκπαίδευση, στα νοσοκομεία και αλλού, έρχονται αντιμέτωποι με πλήθος πειθαρχικών και ποινικών διώξεων για συμμετοχή σε διαδηλώσεις και σε απεργίες, αλλά ακόμα και για δημόσια διατύπωση άποψης μη αρεστής σε εργοδοσίες, σε προϊστάμενες αρχές και στην κυβέρνηση.

Εμπνευστές της πρωτοφανούς αντι-συνδικαλιστικής υστερίας, είναι τα κέντρα εξουσίας του συστήματος της εξάρτησης, της εκμετάλλευσης και της καταπίεσης και η κυβέρνηση που τα εκπροσωπεί. Εργοδοσίες και Διοικήσεις εκμεταλλεύονται το αντιδραστικό και φασίζον θεσμικό πλαίσιο που έχει ψηφιστεί τα προηγούμενα χρόνια για να βγάλουν στην παρανομία κάθε προοπτική αγώνα. Οι νόμοι Γεωργιάδη, Χατζηδάκη, Αχτσιόγλου, Χρυσοχοΐδη, ο νέος Ποινικός Κώδικας, αλλά και πλήθος Υπουργικών Αποφάσεων και Εγκυκλίων έχουν υφάνει ένα πλαίσιο, όπου, ουσιαστικά, κάθε διαδήλωση, απεργία, διαμαρτυρία είναι εκτός νόμου.

Οι απεργίες και οι διαδηλώσεις, για να είναι νόμιμες, έχουν να αντιμετωπίσουν ένα απίστευτο πλέγμα εμποδίων, ενώ μετά την κήρυξή τους βγαίνουν παράνομες, με fast track δικαστικές διαδικασίες. Οι «φωνασκίες» (δηλαδή τα συνθήματα!) σε νοσοκομεία και εκπαίδευση αποτελούν ποινικό αδίκημα και οι εργαζόμενοι, είναι παράνομο να απεργούν ενάντια σε ψηφισμένο νόμο. Τα πανό και τα συνθήματα αντιμετωπίζονται ως «τεκμήριο εγκλήματος». Πάνω σε αυτό το πλαίσιο έχουν πατήσει οι απολύσεις και οι διώξεις συνδικαλιστών εργατών και εργαζομένων, οι δεκάδες διώξεις εκπαιδευτικών, οι διώξεις φοιτητών.

Η κατάσταση αυτή αποκαλύπτει τα πραγματικά χαρακτηριστικά της λεγόμενης αστικής δημοκρατίας. Μιας «δημοκρατίας» που απαιτεί «σεβασμό στο Σύνταγμα» και στην «εκλεγμένη κυβέρνηση» και την ίδια στιγμή παρακάμπτει όποτε θέλει το άρθρο 16 και αναιρεί στοιχειώδεις ελευθερίες και δημοκρατικά πολιτικά και συνδικαλιστικά δικαιώματα. Αυτή η κατεύθυνση του συστήματος έχει ένα όνομα: φασιστικοποίηση της δημόσιας και πολιτικής ζωής.

Είμαστε σε μια νέα εποχή. Που η κρίση και η βαρβαρότητα του συστήματος χάνει κάθε φύλο συκής, απαιτεί την πλήρη υποδούλωση και την πλήρη μετατροπή των σωματείων σε γλάστρες, που, ως «κοινωνικοί εταίροι» θα αποτελούν το διακοσμητικό ντεκόρ της ταξικής υποταγής της εργατικής τάξης και των εργαζομένων. Και που δεν θα διανοούνται καν να οργανώσουν έναν αγώνα κόντρα στον εφιάλτη.

Η αποσυγκρότηση της εργατικής τάξης και του κινήματος, που ήδη μετράει κάποιες δεκαετίες, συντελέστηκε κάτω από την ήττα του επαναστατικού κομμουνιστικού κινήματος και τη συνακόλουθη κυριαρχία της σοσιαλδημοκρατίας και του ρεφορμισμού. Οι όροι αυτοί δεν έχουν, βέβαια, ανατραπεί.

Όμως, κάθε μέρα, θα συναντάμε όλο και περισσότερο τους αγώνες από το μέλλον. Τους αγώνες που διεκδικούν την εκ νέου συγκρότηση της εργατικής τάξης και του λαϊκού κινήματος.

Αυτή η νέα συγκρότηση είναι αναγκασμένη να γίνει με τα υλικά της ταξικής αντιπαράθεσης και όχι της ταξικής συνεργασίας-υποταγής, να συντελεστεί με την ποιότητα της κόντρας στην αστική νομιμότητα, η οποία, στη φάση που είμαστε, βγάζει εκτός νόμου κάθε αγώνα.

Η πάλη για την ανατροπή του συνόλου των συνδικαλιστικών διώξεων έρχεται ως μια σοβαρή αναγκαιότητα παράλληλη με τους στόχους ανατροπής όλου του αντιδραστικού αντι-συνδικαλιστικού θεσμικού πλαισίου.

  • Κάτω τα χέρια, από τα σωματεία, τους αγώνες, τους αγωνιστές και τις αγωνίστριες! Κάτω οι αντεργατικοί - αντισυνδικαλιστικοί νόμοι!
  • Οι αγώνες θα συγκροτηθούν στην καθημερινή πάλη, θα δυναμώσουν δια πυρός και σιδήρου, ΘΑ ΝΙΚΗΣΟΥΝ!

Απρίλης 2024


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København: Solidariteten med det palæstinensiske folk har aldrig været større (Socialistisk Revolution)


Med mere end 6 måneders vedvarende og intensiverende bombardementer og massakrer mod det palæstinensiske folk i Gaza, fortsætter det palæstinensiske folk deres Heltemodige Væbnede Modstandskamp. Israels besættelse af Gaza trækker ud, og de kan ikke bevare kontrollen eller opnå den hurtige sejr de havde håbet på. Deres eneste »resultater« har været deres blodige folkedrab og udsultning af det palæstinensiske folk i Gaza. Men blodet der spildes har kun vandet modstanden, som er voksende, og det samme gør den internationale solidaritet med det palæstinensiske folk.

Rådhuspladsen i København, lørdag den 30. marts.

Den stærke og stadig voksende internationale solidaritet med det palæstinensiske folk kom i København til udtryk lørdag den 30. marts under den internationale demonstration med titlen »Hele Norden på gaden for Palæstina!«. Her deltog palæstinensiske støtteorganisationer fra de nordlige lande Norge og Sverige i en stor og kraftfuld demonstration i København, der gik fra den Røde Plads til Københavns Rådhusplads.

Aktivister fra Antiimperialistisk Kollektiv deltog også med et banner med parolerne »Leve den Heltemodige Palæstinensiske Modstandskamp!« og »Det er rigtigt at gøre oprør!« på dansk og arabisk.

Tusindvis deltog og det blev gjort tydeligt at så længe at Israel, med den danske imperialismes støtte, fortsætter sit folkedrab og besættelse, giver masserne den ikke noget roligt bagland i Danmark.

Kraftfulde paroler blev råbt under hele demonstrationen mens aktioner blev udført under demonstrationen. Hver gang demonstrationen gik forbi en virksomhed, der er kendt for at støtte Israel, blev den malet til med graffiti og klistermærker. Flere enorme palæstinensiske flag blev hængt ned fra stilladser og ved Dronning Louises Bro blev den danske imperialismes fane sænket og erstattet med fanen for den palæstinensiske modstand.

Da demonstrationen kom til Rådhuspladsen blev den hurtigt fyldt helt op. Da pladsen blev fyldt helt op stod 1/3 af demonstrationen stadig og ventede på at kunne komme ind og der måtte rykkes tættere sammen. Mange stærke taler blev holdt og manifestationer blev holdt indenfor demonstrationen med romerlys.

Demonstrationens størrelse og kæmpende energi og had mod imperialismen og zionismen er et stort moralsk og politisk nederlag for den danske imperialisme og Israel. Den borgerlige presse forsøger altid at underpræsentere demonstrationer i solidaritet med Palæstina og underrapporterer antallet af deltagere. De forsøger at tie bevægelsen ihjel, men demonstrationen i lørdags gjorde det klart at solidariteten aldrig har været mere højlydt.

Søndagen efter blev der også holdt en kæmpende demonstration i Malmø i solidaritet med det Palæstinensiske folks kamp. Kampråb blev råbt gennem gaderne og sange for Palæstina blev sunget. Den internationale solidaritet kan aldrig standses!


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pc 31 marzo - Gaza, l’abisso genocida di un certo Occidente (proletari comunisti)


Guardando i video provenienti da Gaza si rimane colpiti dalla ferocia dell’esercito israeliano; è percepibile in ogni gesto, persino nell’irrisione gratuita dei bambini. Non c’è alcuna giustizia in essa, alcuna coscienza etica o azione giustificata; c’è soltanto una gigantesca volontà di annichilire i palestinesi.

Ferocia, crudeltà, terrore. Qualsiasi termine si usi per descrivere il comportamento dell’esercito israeliano, anche il più preciso, non sarà mai in grado di rappresentare compiutamente quello che sta accadendo realmente a Gaza. Che è qualcosa di eccezionale; stra-ordinario, proprio.

Diventa sempre più chiaro che quello che sta accadendo in quella striscia di terra è, insieme, una ferocia

già vista, che si riallaccia ad altre pulsioni genocidarie, e una ferocia di tipo nuovo, che si distingue per l’alta capacità tecnologica utilizzata contro un popolo sostanzialmente inerme. Una ferocia penosa e vigliacca.

È evidente che il fine dell’esercito israeliano non è “la distruzione di Hamas”, bensì l’allontanamento dei palestinesi dalla Striscia di Gaza, prima tappa per una nuova colonizzazione. Non esiste – ne è possibile, vista la storia di quel conflitto – nessun obiettivo diverso.

Se non si tratterà di un allontanamento totale, lo si dovrà agli equilibri – fragili – di quella zona di mondo, più che al risveglio etico degli occidentali o dei paesi arabi. Per l’impatto fortemente simbolico che ha sempre avuto nelle popolazioni arabe, la “questione palestinese” non è risolvibile con una semplice eliminazione fisica dei palestinesi; qualcuno dovrà restare in vita, magari confinato in qualche deserto, così che gli equilibri si mantengano a un livello di guardia. Bisogna che il genocidio non sia completo affinché l’obiettivo di Israele venga raggiunto.

Dunque, no; per quanto possa essere accolta positivamente la risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza dell’Onu, non c’è niente da applaudire. Il fuoco cesserà sempre troppo tardi.

A Gaza non è soltanto naufragata l’etica dei paesi occidentali, ormai palesemente privata del suo intrinseco “senso umanistico e liberatorio”, ma si è confermata l’incapacità delle liberal-democrazie di fermare un genocidio in corso. Tutte le superstizioni derivanti dall’eccesso di confidenza con la “democrazia” israeliana, dalla propensione a tollerarne gli eccessi e i crimini, hanno consegnato i palestinesi all’eccidio.

Negli ultimi due anni ci siamo ubriacati di retorica, demonizzando le autocrazie e glorificando il sistema liberal-democratico; ma lo spettacolo penoso offerto dall’Occidente di fronte al genocidio dei palestinesi dimostra – ancora una volta e inequivocabilmente – che ciò che contano non sono i “valori”, i diritti “universali” o il diritto internazionale, ma solo e solamente le alleanze strategiche.

Lo “spirito” profondo delle liberal-democrazie non è molto diverso da quello delle autocrazie: YOU MAKE HISTORY WHEN YOU DO BUSINESS. Di conseguenza, ogni posizionamento diverso da quello che porta un vantaggio strategico è nefasto e deve essere accuratamente evitato. Fino a quando Israele contribuirà a difendere le ambizioni occidentali di egemonia, fino a quando sarà degno di questo ruolo nello scacchiere medio-orientale, non si screditerà il suo valore.

Non è certo un caso che la mistificazione maggiore si sia palesata proprio nei più squallidi rappresentanti del liberalismo militarizzato, i fanatici dell’atlantismo che non hanno esitato ad accusare di antisemitismo chiunque abbia criticato Israele. Coloro i quali, per intenderci, non mancano di affiancare la bandiera ucraina con quella di Israele, incuranti del cortocircuito logico e di ogni decenza intellettuale.

Questi liberali da operetta sono l’avanguardia cialtrona dell’egemonia occidentale; si pongono al di là di ogni valore realmente universale, perorando la causa di una forma odiosa di suprematismo. La difesa di Israele rientra in questa gabbia ideologica. Hanno eluso la loro stessa retorica, combinando calcolo cinico e istinto di conservazione di un’egemonia che è già persa; mistificazione e senso di superiorità: il peggio, davvero.

Questi non sono che la rappresentazione più grottesca di uno “spirito” che è costitutivo delle liberal-democrazie, i cui interessi vitali non coincidono con quelli dei popoli, bensì con l’esclusivismo di classe. L’aggettivo “liberale” domina sul sostantivo “democrazia”.

L’essenza, ecco; della democrazia. C’è la democrazia del privilegio, e c’è quella dell’equità. Nella prima, ciò che ha più valore è il mercato, il profitto, il business, tutte dimensioni che producono diseguaglianze e povertà; nella seconda, il superamento delle iniquità è il fulcro di ogni azione, sua unica finalità.

La prima, quella dei privilegi, è la democrazia della borsa, del colonialismo, dell’accentramento della ricchezza in poche mani, del connubio tra politica e industria militare; la seconda è la democrazia dei “senza proprietà”, dei popoli, della pace.

Per la prima, il furto di risorse serve al mantenimento dei privilegi; è la democrazia che vuole esportare se stessa, non esitando a bombardare altre nazioni, invadere terre non sue, violare il diritto internazionale. Per la seconda, solo l’uguaglianza dei popoli ha valore positivo, qualsiasi parte della terra abitino.

C’è la democrazia degli interessi imperiali, e c’è quella dei popoli. Se la prima rende il mondo un posto meno libero e sicuro, la seconda ha un’unica ragione di esistere: liberarsi delle forze che promuovono la prima, facendo diventare la democrazia lo spazio dell’uguaglianza e della pace.

In fondo, anche nella “questione palestinese” è in gioco una diversa idea di democrazia. L’idea di una democrazia che non può coincidere con il colonialismo, l’occupazione militare o la pulizia etnica. Proprio per questo, oggi, la democrazia si difende contrastando l’attitudine genocidaria di Israele.

Ogni discorso che difende le istanze di Israele e che ne giustifica i comportamenti non è solo complicità con il genocidio, ma è anche – e forse soprattutto – un modo di svuotare dal di dentro l’idea stessa di democrazia.

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Turkey: The polls open in the local elections – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


Featured image: “The ruling classes are backed by a huge press army, advertising posters and an election campaign that lasts several months. What happens next is the continuation of the exploitation system. The people have never had the right to free choice in elections. People who are brought before the public with the mentality of ‘vote for us or for us’ are imprisoned in a compulsory thought. It is necessary for the people to understand the facts and unite the oppressed masses for their own benefit.” Source: Yeni Demokrasi

The local elections in Turkey are held today. Since the opening of the polls, grave violations of the bourgeois ideals of ”free” elections have been reported – electoral observes have been forced away from the booths, people vote with ballots they have brought with them and in large groups, and in Kurdish provinces soldiers and police have been brought to the booths in uniform and carrying weapons, which is a violation of the electoral laws.

Some days before the election Yeni Demokrasi wrote that the electoral path is “a path that serves the ruling classes, far from the interests of the people” and that this path has been seen multiple times in the past. They note that huge budgets have been allocated to the electoral propaganda, in the midst of a deep crisis. “Elections are much more visible, especially on the streets. We see the candidates of the parties on almost every corner, street, bridge and billboard. …The public’s expectation of ‘changes through elections’ has weakened considerably from yesterday to today1”, they write.

The particularities of the local elections is that many local and social problems are discussed, and all the candidates promise to fix all the local problems. Yeni Demokrasi denounces that the municipalities cannot take a different approach than the central government, and they too follow the line of the administration which protects the interests of the ruling classes. “The candidates presented to the public are people who can sustain the central government and the economy. Those people have to be elected, the system organizes itself with them, they organize and appear before the masses as ‘those to be elected’.” Yeni Demokrasi also denounces that the local politics are plagued by corruption and semi-feudality especially in smaller regions, giving an example of the district of Trabzon where the same family has been elected for 150 years. Finally, they point out that often after the elections, superficial “improvements” are made, but no real local issues are fixed. “In a government designed for exploitation, there is no room for the interests of the people”, they write. They conclude that the elections are an illusion of choice and a mask to cover the reality of exploitation.

We have earlier published an unofficial translation of the position of Partizan in the local elections in Dersim.

1All quotes are our unofficial translations.


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Clashes among the State forces and the armed groups skyrocketed in the DR of Congo – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


Feature image: Displaced in a camp in Goma. Source: The Associated Press

The confrontations between the State forces (FARDC) and the National Liberation Group March23 (M23) continue to increase in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country rich in resources dominated by the imperialists.

We have previously reported about the clashes between both State and foreign repression forces that act in the country with the national liberation groups, such as M23. Once again, the “security” in Congo has concern the imperialists due to the advance of the M23 group towards the regional capital, Goma. This is an important city in the D.R. of Congo, where two million people live and another half a million are displaced in the city seeking for refuge. It is believed that M23 group could be close to seizing the city, which would mean a big blow to the Congolese government, who would lose control over the region. Already in 2012 the M23 group took the power in Goma “with nearly any resistance”, as reported by other media. The response was a large military intervention of a special force of the so-called “peacekeepers” of UN, which took back the control of the city just a year later.

The “peacekeepers” completely armed. Goma, 2013. Source: Reuters

At the moment, the UN armed forces are beginning to retire from Goma due to the progress of M23 towards the city and by the arrival of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people to the city. On the other hand, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo demands that 13,500 soldiers and 2,000 police retire to the border of Rwanda and Burundi, despite international concerns. The militarization and repression of the country increase by the State, it that is unable to keep in line the violence of the people. After 20 years, the DRC has decided to establish the capital punishment again, which, as the State itself says “it will be reserved for offenders involved in criminal conspiracies, armed gangs, insurrection — and also those who commit treason and war crimes. It will also be applied to the military, including those who rebel or desert and join enemy ranks. ”

Since 1996, when the conflict sharped, more than six million people have died in the conflict. Only this year almost one million have been forced to flee their homes. There is also a lack of access to basic resources such as water, food, hygiene or sanitary access for those civilians who are in the middle of the crossfire between the armed groups and State and foreign repression forces. However, when the people raise up against the blue helmets for their clear pro-imperialist interest and against the people, the Congolese suffer a strong repression that leaves tens of dead in their path.

After 25 years since the beginning of MONUSCO, the UN military mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to “keep the peace”, it has been shown that it has not served more than to ensure the interests of imperialists, mainly on mining resources, while there is still deepening in the misery of the people.


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Israelsk fotballag antenner opptøyer i Skien (Tjen Folket)


Av en kommentator for Tjen Folket Media.


Forrige tirsdag brøt det ut opptøyer i Skien i forbindelse med at Israels U19-fotballag spilte kamp mot det norske U19-laget på Skagerak Arena i Skien.

Ifølge borgerlige medier deltok flere hundre i protestene. NRK skriver at det ble ropt slagord fra mer enn 200 demonstranter. Ifølge flere kilder skal det ha blitt kastet stein og skutt fyrverkeri mot politiet.


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PRWC » Ang Bayan Ngayon Compilation (Philippine Revolution Web Central)


Ang pahayagang Ang Bayan ang upisyal na pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. Ang AB ay inililimbag ng Komite Sentral ng PKP kada dalawang linggo at lumalabas sa ika-7 at ika-21 ng bawat buwan. Inilalathala ang AB sa orihinal na edisyong Pilipino at may mga salin na edisyon sa English, Bisaya, Hiligaynon, Waray, at Ilocano.

Sa harap ng mabilis na nagbabagong sitwasyong pampulitika at pang-ekonomya sa Pilipinas, gayundin sa buong mundo, naglalabas ang pahayagang Ang Bayan ng arawan na mga balita at pagsusuri sa mga susing usapin na kinakaharap ng proletaryo at sambayanang Pilipino, gayundin ng aping mamamayan sa iba’t ibang sulok ng mundo. Makikita dito ang pinakahuling mga balita at artikulo ng Ang Bayan Ngayon.

 

2024

January 2024 February 2024 March 2024

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2023

January 2023 February 2023  March 2023 April 2023 May 2023 June 2023 July 2023 August 2023 September 2023 October 2023 November 2023 December 2023

PDF Content:


Ang Bayan Ngayon Compilation Ang Bayan January 2024 Ang pahayagang Ang Bayan ang upisyal na pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. Ang AB ay inililimbag ng Komite Sentral ng PKP kada dalawang linggo at lumalabas sa ika-7 at ika-21 ng bawat buwan. Inilalathala ang AB sa orihinal na edisyong Pilipino at may mga salin na edisyon sa English, Bisaya, Hiligaynon, Waray, at Ilocano. Sa harap ng mabilis na nagbabagong sitwasyong pampulitika at pang-ekonomya sa Pilipinas, gayundin sa buong mundo, naglalabas ang pahayagang Ang Bayan ng arawan na mga balita at pagsusuri sa mga susing usapin na kinakaharap ng proletaryo at sambayanang Pilipino, gayundin ng aping mamamayan sa iba’t ibang sulok ng mundo. Makikita dito ang pinakahuling mga balita at artikulo ng Ang Bayan Ngayon . - 1 -
Table of Contents Internasyunal na mga partido at organisasyon, nagpaabot ng pagbati sa ika-55 anibersaryo ng PKP..................................................................... 8 Pagpapanibagong-lakas ng BHB, atas ng Komite Sentral.............................................................. 11 200 pamilya, pinalalayas ng Authority of the Freeport Area of Bataan ................................... 13 Tuluy-tuloy na protesta kontra masaker sa kabuhayan ng tsuper at opereytor, ikakasa .....16 Daan-daang kabataan ng Southern Tagalog, ipinagdiwang ang ika-55 anibersaryo ng PKP .18 Hindi lumiliit, bagkus ay lumaki, ang bilang ng naghihirap sa Pilipinas ..................................... 20 Ika-3 anibersaryo ng Tumandok masaker, ginunita............................................................ 22 Paglakas ng National Democratic Front sa rehiyong Ilocos, tagumpay ng PKP ..................24 Iilang bagong klasrum ng DepEd, kinastigo ng mga guro.......................................................... 25 Mga mersenaryong imbwelto sa pagmasaker sa Sagay 9, pinarusahan ng BHB-Northern Negros .......................................................................... 27 Pagtatanggal ng programang SHS sa mga SUC at LUC, binatikos .............................................. 28 Bigas, pinakabilis tumaas ang presyo noong Disyembre........................................................ 30 - 2 -
Unyon ng manggagawa sa PhilFoods, papasok na sa negosasyon para sa CBA ......................... 31 Mga kaso laban sa mga organisador ng KMU, ibinasura ng korte ............................................ 32 Pagpapalaya sa migranteng Pilipino na si Mary Jane Veloso, muling iginiit ............................... 33 6-buwang sanggol, pinaslang ng mga pwersa ng estado sa India ................................................. 35 Charter change, muling pinabubwelo ng pangkating Marcos ........................................... 37 Imbestigasyon ng ICC kay Duterte, maaring tapos na............................................................ 39 Oplan sabit, inilunsad sa Antipolo para sa anibersaryo ng Partido ..................................... 40 Pagbaba ng tantos ng implasyon, walang epekto sa mahihirap..................................................... 42 Kampanya para sa charter change, mariing kinundena ng mga grupong pambansa- demokratiko..................................................... 43 Dagdag-singil ng PhilHealth, pinababasura ng mga OFW.......................................................... 45 Mga estudyante at guro sa India, nagprotesta laban sa kontra-insurhensyang operasyon SAMADHAN-Prahar ......................................... 46 Yunit ng 96th IB, binulabog ng BHB-Masbate .48 - 3 -
Kaanak ng bilanggong pulitikal sa Quezon, umapela sa korte .............................................. 50 Magsasaka sa Negros Occidental, nakaligtas sa pamamaril ng 62nd IB ...................................... 52 Mga magsasaka ng Lupang Ramos sa Cavite, sinisindak ng militar ......................................... 54 Paglabag sa internasyunal na makataong batas ng AFP sa kampanyang aerial bombing, binatikos........................................................... 55 Aerial strikes ng US at UK sa Yemen, kinundena ng ILPS-US....................................................... 58 BHB-Sorsogon, naglinaw sa serye ng mga engkwentro noong Enero 14 ............................ 60 Mga biktima ng pamamaril ng 2nd IB, kinasuhan at ikinulong ..................................... 61 Mga manggagawang Pilipino na nawalan ng trabaho sa New Zealand, naggiit ng karampatang tulong ......................................... 62 Pagtatambak ng armas at matagalang presensya ng militar ng Canada at UK sa Pilipinas, tusong inilulusot ............................... 64 Papel ng ADB sa huwad na modernisasyon ng transportasyon, binatikos ................................. 65 Piston: Walang kinalaman sa “climate commitment” ng bansa ang pwersahang konsolidasyon ng prangkisa ng mga dyip ........68 - 4 -
2 magsasaka, pinaslang ng 62nd IB sa modus na pekeng engkwentro .......................................... 71 Mga grupong relihiyoso at kabataan, muling nagrali kontra pagmimina sa Eastern Samar . .73 Pamilya ng martir, binantaan at hinaras ng AFP .......................................................................... 75 Pinunong obispo ng CBCP, nagsagawa ng misa para sa mga bilanggong pulitikal sa Taguig City .......................................................................... 76 3 magsasaka sa Himamaylan City, dinakip at ikinulong ng 94th IB ......................................... 79 Lider-magsasaka sa Cebu, inaresto .................80 Pinakamatandang bilanggong pulitikal, hindi isinali ng rehimen sa mga pinalaya noong kapaskuhan...................................................... 81 Ika-37 anibersaryo ng Mendiola Massacre, ginunita ng mga grupong magsasaka ..............83 Rali kontra chacha, inilunsad ng mga grupong pambansa-demokratiko .................................... 86 Separation pay, giit ng mga manggagawa ng Chun Chiang Enterprises sa Bataan ................88 Estilong “Tokhang” na profiling sa La Union, kinundena......................................................... 89 Grupo sa karapatang-tao, nanawagan sa rehimeng Marcos na itigil ang panloloko sa mga rapporteur ng UN ............................................. 91 - 5 -
Nakatakdang porum ng US Air Force sa UP Diliman, ipinaaatras ......................................... 92 Pagmimina at pagkalbo sa gubat ang sanhi ng pagbaha at mga landslide sa Davao at Caraga 94 Planong pagpapalayas sa mga residente sa isang barangay sa Bataan, nilalabanan ............96 Dedlayn sa sapilitang konsolidasyon ng PUV, muling napaatras .............................................. 98 Ikinulong na mamamahayag na sinampahan ng kaso kaugnay sa “terorismo,” muling iginiit na palayain.......................................................... 100 Iligal na pagkukwari sa Zambales, inirereklamo ........................................................................ 102 Paggunita sa anibersaryo ng Partido, inilunsad sa Rizal........................................................... 103 Reporma sa pensyon ng mga sundalo at pulis, tuluyan nang binitawan ng rehimeng Marcos ........................................................................ 105 Grupo sa karapatang-tao, nababahala sa mungkahing pagbabalik sa barangay intelligence network ....................................... 107 Mga manggagawa ng CNN Philippines, dapat protektahan sa harap ng posibleng pagsasara ........................................................................ 109 Pagdinig ng petisyon kontra “teroristang” designasyon, sinuspinde ng korte sa Baguio City ........................................................................ 111 - 6 -
Paglulustay ni Marcos para sa raling “Bagong Pilipinas,” binatikos ........................................ 113 Rali kontra chacha, inilunsad ng mga magsasaka sa Bacolod City ............................ 114 Tatlong Adivasi, pinaslang ng estado ng India sa pekeng engkwentro ........................................ 116 80 manggagawa, tatanggalin sa pagbebenta ng SkyCable sa PLDT .......................................... 118 Mamamahayag na bilanggong pulitikal sa Tacloban City, binisita ng UN Special Rapporteur..................................................... 120 Mamamahayag na bilanggong pulitikal sa Tacloban City, binista ng UN Special Rapporteur..................................................... 122 Unyon ng manggagawa sa Nexperia, makikipagnegosasyon para sa CBA ...............124 35 berdugong pulis ng India, napaslang sa pag- atake ng PLGA ................................................ 126 Mga grupong pambansa-demokratiko, magrarali sa embahada ng US sa anibersaryo ng gerang Pilipino-Amerikano ......................................... 128 Nagpapatuloy na pag-block ng rehimeng Marcos sa mga progresibong website, binatikos ........................................................................ 129 Giriang Marcos-Duterte, kinamuhian ng sambayanan.................................................... 131 - 7 -
Kita ng US sa mga imperyalistang gera at agresyon, lomobo nang 16% noong 2023 ......135 Presyo ng langis, apat na beses nang tumaas sa 2024................................................................ 137 5-araw na piket sa Maynila, inilulunsad ng mga empleyadong tinanggal sa BACIWA ...............137 Pagpapapirma para sa chacha, sinuspinde sa gitna ng mga anomalya .................................. 139 Pagsisimula ng klase sa UP Manila at UP Visayas, sinalubong ng protesta .....................142 Rekomendasyon ng DoJ na kasuhan ang 2 dinukot na aktibista, kinundena .....................143 Tanggalan sa sektor ng teknolohiya, nagpapatuloy sa gitna ng pagsirit ng tubo ng mga kumpanya ............................................... 145 ₱2 trilyon para sa “modernisasyon” ng AFP, inaprubahan ni Marcos Jr ............................... 147 Internasyunal na mga partido at organisasyon, nagpaabot ng pagbati sa ika-55 anibersaryo ng PKP Enero 1, 2024 Ipinabot ng iba’t ibang kaibigang partido at organisasyon mula sa ibang bansa ang kanilang pagbati at pagpupugay sa Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) sa pagdiriwang ng ika-55 anibersaryo nito noong Disyembre 26, 2023. Naglabas ng pahayag ng pakikiisa ang mga - 8 -
organisasyong mula sa India, Turkey, United States, at Ireland. Sa bidyo-pahayag ng Komite Sentral ng Communist Party of India (Maoist), pinagpugayan nito ang PKP sa higit limang dekadang pamumuno sa pambansa-demokratikong pakikibaka ng mamamayang Pilipino. “Simula higit limang dekada na ang nakararaan, sumusulong ang pambansa-demokratikong pakikibaka ng Pilipinas sa gabay ng Komite Sentral ng PKP sa harap ng hindi mabilang na mga pagsubok at pangingibabaw sa mga kamalian at kahinaan at mga liko’t ikot,” ayon sa CPI (Maoist). Pinarangalan nila ang mga namartir na lider ng Partido kabilang si Kasamang Jose Maria Sison, tagapangulong tagapagtatag ng Komite Sentral ng PKP, na pumanaw noong Disyembre 16, 2022. Pinagpugayan nila ang dakilang mga ambag ng mga lider ng Partido sa pagtatagumpay ng rebolusyong Pilipino at pagsulong ng pandaigdigang kilusang proletaryo. Ipinahayag naman ng Anti-Imperialist Action Ireland (AIAI) ang paghanga nito sa PKP sa pamumuno sa anti-imperyalistang pakikibaka ng sambayanang Pilipino. “Sa makasaysayang okasyon na ito, kaming mga Irish Republican ay sumasaludo sa PKP sa makasaysayang tatag, kapasyahan at inisyatiba nito,” ayon pa sa grupo. Kinilala rin ng AIA-Ireland ang “matapang na bagong hakbang” ng Partido tungo sa hinaharap - 9 -
sa paglulunsad ng kilusang pagwawasto. Anang grupo, “magbubunga ito ng bagong henerasyon ng mga magbabandila ng rebolusyon at rebolusyonaryo mula sa hanay ng sambayanang Pilipino.” Dagdag pa nila, buo ang kanilang tiwala sa Partido at maipagmamalaking nasasaksikhan nila ang isang panibagong mahalagang yugto sa rebolusyong Pilipino. Samantala, hinikayat naman ng Socialist Unity Party (SUP) ng US ang mga Amerikano na pag- aralan at suportahan ang kilusang rebolusyonaryo sa Pilipinas. “Alam namin maraming matututunan sa rebolusyonaryong kasasayan nito at sa paglalapat nito ng Marxismo sa partikular na kundisyon [ng Pilipinas],” ayon sa SUP. Sa minimum, dapat umanong unawain ng mga anti-imperyalista sa US ang ginagampanan ng gubyerno ng US sa pagsasamantala sa mamamayang Pilipino at yaman ng Pilipinas. “Nananawagan kami sa mga anti-imperyalista sa US na tunay na pag-aralan ang Pilipinas at rebolusyon nito para lumikha ng positibong ugnayan sa mga pambansa-demokratikong organisasyon tungo sa isang nagkakaisang prente laban sa imperyalismo,” ayon pa sa SUP. Nagpahayag din ng pakikiisa at pagbati ang Communist Party of Turkey-Marxist Leninist (TKP- ML) at Friends of the Filipino People in Struggle (FFPS) sa Partido. Sa pahayag ng Komite Sentral sa ika-55 anibersaryo ng Partido, ipinanawagan nito ang pagpapalakas sa internasyunal na - 10 -
rebolusyonaryong gawain. Kabilang sa mahahalagang mga tungkuling inilatag nito ang pagkawing ng rebolusyong Pilipino sa pandaigdigang kilusang anti-imperyalista at sa proletaryong rebolusyon sa buong mundo. Gayundin, ipinanawagan nito ang pagtataas ng antas ng kampanya para kabigin ang suportang internasyunal para sa rebolusyonaryong kilusan sa Pilipinas, habang nagbibigay ng lahat ng anyo ng suporta sa mga maka-uring pakikibaka ng mga manggagawa, at pakikibakang demokratiko at anti-imperyalista sa iba’t ibang panig ng mundo. “Dapat patuloy na palakasin ang relasyon ng pakikipagkapatiran sa mga partido at organisasyong Marxista-Leninista-Maoista, palakasin ang diyalogo at tulungang komunista,” pahayag pa ng Komite Sentral. Dapat din umanong isagawa ang aktibong pakikipagtunggali sa ideolohiya upang ilantad at iwaksi ang modernong rebisyunismo, Trotskyismo, Gonzaloismo at iba pang rebisyunistang agos na bumabaluktot sa Marxismo, Leninismo at Maoismo. Pagpapanibagong-lakas ng BHB, atas ng Komite Sentral Enero 1, 2024 Inatas ng Komite Sentral (KS) ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) sa Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB) ang pagpapanibagong-lakas sa harap ng tinukoy nitong mga kabiguan, kamalian at mga kakulangan sa nagdaang ilang taon sa - 11 -
pagsusulong ng armadong pakikibaka. Nilaman ito pahayag ng KS sa okasyon ng ika-55 anibersaryo ng Partido. Ayon sa naturang pahayag, masaklaw na mga problema sa larangan ng rebolusyonaryong armadong pakikibaka ang ibinunga ng suhetibismo sa ideolohiya. “Sa kabiguang gagapin ang landas ng pag-unlad ng digmang bayan, partikular mula sa unang bahagi tungo sa panggitnang bahagi, at mula sa panggitna tungo sa susunod na bahagi, hindi iilang larangang gerilya ng BHB ang naging tigil at nabahura sa matagal na panahon sa lumang antas,” ayon dito. Sinabi ng pamunuan ng Partido na ang mga pagkakamali at pagkukulang na ito ay nagresulta sa kabiguan ng maraming yunit ng BHB na matatag na paalun-along palawakin ang mga larangang gerilya alinsunod sa linya ng masaklaw at maigting na pakikidigmang gerilya sa batayan ng papalawak at papalalim na baseng masa. Panawagan ng KS, na bumawi mula sa mga kabiguan at muling itatag ang baseng masa. Para makapangibabaw sa mga nagdaang pagkakamali at pagkukulang, itinakda ng KS ang sumusunod na mga tungkulin: • Dapat palakasin ng Partido ang pamumuno nito sa BHB • Dapat mahusay na pagkumbinahin ang pagsusulong ng armadong pakikibaka, rebolusyong agraryo, at paglulunsad ng mga kampanyang masang anti-pyudal bilang paraan ng pagbubuo ng baseng masa • Dapat ilunsad ang mga pagsasanay sa mga Pulang kumander at - 12 -
mandirigma • Buuin ang laking-kumpanyang mga larangang gerilya • Maglunsad ng batayan o anihilatibong taktikal na mga opensiba na kayang ipanalo • Patuloy na palakasin ang platun bilang batayang yunit ng BHB, at itayo ang istruktura ng kumand sa lahat ng antas • Palakasin ang mga sangay at komite ng Partido sa hukbong bayan at ang pampulitikang organo sa loob ng BHB sa lahat ng antas • Ibayong palakasin, sanayin at paganahin ang mga yunit ng milisyang bayan, kakumbina ang mga yunit pananggol-sa-sarili ng rebolusyonaryong mga organisasyong masa Ang pagpapalakas ng BHB at armadong pakikibaka ay kaakibat ng isinusulong ng Partido na kilusang pagwawasto upang ituwid ang mga pagkakamali, kahinaan at pagkukulang sa ideolohiya, pulitika at organisasyon. “Sa susunod na isa o dalawang taon, dapat itong puspusang isulong at lubusin sa lahat ng antas mula sa Komite Sentral ng Partido hanggang sa lahat ng mga sangay ng Partido,” ayon sa Komite Sentral. 200 pamilya, pinalalayas ng Authority of the Freeport Area of Bataan Enero 2, 2024 Hanggang Enero 6 na lamang ang taning ng Authority of the Freeport Area of Bataan (AFAB) sa may 200 pamilyang residente ng Narra Dormitory sa Barangay Maligaya, Mariveles, Bataan para umalis. Pinalalayas ang mga residente dahil sasaklawin ng pagpapalawak ng FAB ang naturang lugar. - 13 -
Ayon sa pahayag ng Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng FAB (NMFAB), sinugod ng hindi bababa sa 90 pinagsamang pulis, upisyal ng barangay at AFAB Police ang Narra Dormitory noong Disyembre 21 at sinabihan silang lumayas. Sapilitan din umanong pinapirma ng mga “notarized waiver” ang mga residente na nagsasaad na “wala ni anumang pananagutan” ang AFAB sa mga apektadong residente. Pinagbayad pa umano sila ng ₱200 bawat waiver. “Walang konsiderasyon ang AFAB sa mamamayan ng Mariveles. Ginagamit nila ang kapangyarihang lampas sa kakayahan ng lokal na gubyerno at tahasang nilalabag ang karapatan ng bawat isang Mariveleño,” ayon sa NMFAB. Babala pa ng grupo ng mga manggagawa, hindi lamang Narra Dormitory ang maaapektuhan ng mga demolisyon at pagpapalayas dahil mayroon pang mga sasaklawin ng pagpapalawak ng FAB alinsunod sa FAB Expansion Act. Ayon kay Jaime Azores, dating bise-presidente ng Narra Lodgers Association, “Sapilitan kaming pinapirma sa isang waiver na nagsasabing sumasang-ayon na kami at aalis na sa lugar. Nagbanta rin [ang AFAB] na kapag kami ay hindi pipirma sa waiver na kanilang pinanotaryohan ay puputulan kami ng kuryente at papalayasin na kaagad.” “Sa takot namin, pumirma na ang karamihan kahit pa labag ito sa aming kalooban. Ikaw ba naman ang kuyugin ng AFAB Police? Anong mararamdaman mo?” dagdag pa ni Azores. - 14 -
Deka-dekada nang naninirahan ang mga residente ng Narra Dormitory sa naturang lugar. Nagbabayad sila ng ₱320 kada kuwarto kada buwan bilang renta. Itinayo ito noong panahon pa ng diktadurang Marcos para sa pabahay ng mga manggagawa sa Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) na ngayon ay kilalang FAB. “44 years na akong nakatira rito at karamihan sa amin ay dito na nagkaroon ng pamilya at mga apo. Tapos papalayasin kami? Dadalhin kami dun sa Alas-asin, pababayaran sa amin ng ₱1,000 sa pinakamababa ang renta, malayo pa sa aming trabaho,” pagdidiin ni Azores. Nanawagan ang NMFAB sa kapwa manggagawa at sa demokratikong mga sektor na suportahan ang laban ng Narra Lodgers Association at mga kasapi nito. Anang grupo, “Hindi makatarungan ang ginagawang sapilitang pagpapalayas sa humigit-kumulang 200 pamilya ng Narra Dormitory. Ang pangyayaring ito ay isang paglabag sa kanilang karapatang mamuhay ng disente at payapa.” Giit nila na maraming maaapektuhan sa pangyayaring ito hindi lang ang mga manggagawa na nagtitiis sa kakarampot na kita maging ang mga kabataan na nag-aaral sa eskwelahan. Dapat umanong umaksyon ang lokal na gubyerno ng Mariveles at ng Bataan para sa kagalingan ng mga manggagawa at maralita. Ang FAB ay tinaguriang isang special economic zone sa hawak ng gubyerno na nagbibigay sa mga kumpanya ng mga insentibo para sa - 15 -
pamumuhunan, na kadalasan ay sa kapinsalaan ng mga manggagawa at maralita. Binibigyan ng FAB ang mga kumpanyang pumapasok dito ng insentibong hindi pagbabayad ng buwis at ibang pabor sa ngalan ng “ease of doing business.” Mayroong kasalukuyang 18 “expansion areas” sa buong prubinsya ang FAB labas sa orihinal na lokasyon nito sa timog na bahagi ng Bataan. Mayroon itong hindi bababa sa 40,600 deklaradong manggagawa. Tuluy-tuloy na protesta kontra masaker sa kabuhayan ng tsuper at opereytor, ikakasa Enero 2, 2024 Magtutuluy-tuloy ang protesta at sama-samang pagkilos ng mga tsuper at opereytor ng dyip kontra sa sapilitang konsolidasyon ng prangkisa at pagpapatupad ng huwad na Public Utility Vehicle Modernization Program (PUVMP) sa pagbubukas ng taong 2024. Ito ang kanilang tugon sa pagkikibit-balikat ni Ferdinand Marcos Jr sa hinaing ng mga tsuper at opereytor. Ayon sa Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahan ng Tsuper at Operator Nationwide (Piston), patunay ang kawalang-aksyon na “palpak, pahirap, at tuta” ang kanyang rehimen. Noong huling kwarto ng 2023, ipinamalas ng Piston at Samahang Manibela Mananakay at Nagka-Isang Terminal ng Transportasyon (Manibela) ang kanilang pagtutol sa PUVMP sa sunud-sunod na tigil-pasada at malawakang - 16 -
protesta sa bansa, pangunahin sa Metro Manila. Tinatayang humigit-kumulang 4,000 ang lumahok sa protesta ng dalawang grupo sa Mendiola sa Maynila noong Disyembre 29. Naniniwala ang Piston na tanging sa kanilang papalakas na pwersa at tuluy-tuloy na sama- samang pagkilos ngayong 2024 malalabanan ang pakanang PUVMP ng rehimen na magdudulot ng “transport disaster.” Sa kasalukuyan, tuluy-tuloy na pumapasada ang mga tsuper at opereytor sa kabila ng kanselasyon ng kani-kanilang prangkisa dulot ng sapilitang konsolidasyon. Giit ng Piston, ang pagpasada nila sa kabila ng kautusan ng Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) ay pagpapakita ito ngayon ng protesta at pagtatanggol sa kabuhayan ng mga tsuper at opereytor. “Huwag natin hayaang pwersahan tayong tanggalan ng kabuhayan,” ayon sa Piston. Bukod umano sa tatanggalan ng kabuhayan ang libu- libong manggagawa sa transportasyon, pagkakakitaan lamang ng mga dayuhan at malalaking negosyo ang kanilang mga prangkisa at ruta na lalong magreresulta sa mataas na pamasahe at pagkabawas ng kakarampot na ngang kita ng Pilipinong komyuter. Tinatayang nasa 30,862 ng mga yunit ng dyip at 4,852 yunit ng UV Express ang pinagbabawalang makapasada sa National Capital Region (NCR) dahil hindi nagkonsolida ng mga prangkisa. Nawalan ng kabuhayan ang halos 64,000 na mga - 17 -
tsuper at 25,000 na mga opereytor sa NCR dulot nito. Sa buong bansa, nasa 64,639 yunit ng PUV ang hindi nagkonsolida at nawalan ng trabaho ang may 140,000 tsuper at 60,000 opereytor. Apektado nito ang 28.5 milyong pasahero. Samantala, inatasan noong Disyembre 28 ng Korte Suprema ang Department of Transportation (DOTr) at ang LTFRB na magkomento sa petisyong inihain ng Piston kontra sa pagpapatupad ng sapilitang konsolidasyon ng prangkisa at PUVMP. Binigyan ang dalawang ahensya nang hanggang 10 araw para magkomento. Daan-daang kabataan ng Southern Tagalog, ipinagdiwang ang ika-55 anibersaryo ng PKP Enero 3, 2024 Daan-daang kabataan mula sa iba’t ibang panig ng Southern Tagalog ang nagdiwang sa ika-55 anibersaryo ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) sa nagdaang linggo ayon sa balangay ng Kabataang Makabayan (KM) sa rehiyon. Ang ilan sa kanila ay nagdiwang sa loob ng larangang gerilya, kasama ang Bagong Hukbong Bayan. Sa balita ng dyaryo ng KM-Southern Tagalog na Kalayaan-TK, sinabi nitong hindi nagpatinag sa kaliwa’t kanang operasyon ng mga berdugong militar ang mga kasapi ng KM, mga Pulang mandirigma, at mga masang katutubo’t - 18 -
magsasaka para magdiwang sa loob ng isang sonang gerilya sa rehiyon.   Tinalakay sa mga programa ang mga pahayag ng Komite Sentral ng PKP at Komiteng Rehiyon ng Southern Tagalog. Ito rin umano ang ginamit na balangkas para sa tema ng selebrasyon na “Puspusin ang kilusang pagwawasto! Palakasin ang partido! Likhain ang pinakamahigpit na ugnay sa masa at pamunuan silang dalhin sa bago at mas mataas na antas ang rebolusyong pambansa-demokratiko!” Sa pahayag ng Komite Sentral noong Disyembre 26, 2023, nanawagan ito ng paglulunsad ng kilusang pagwawasto upang ituwid ang mga pagkakamali at kahinaan ng Partido at humakbang nang mas malaki pa ngayong panibagong taon. Ayon sa Kalayaan-TK, tinanggap at ipinaabot ng KM-Southern Tagalog ang panawagan ng Komite Sentral sa hanay ng mga rebolusyonaryong kabataan at estudyante. Ayon kay Karina Mabini, tagapagsalita ng panrehiyong balangay ng KM, marapat lamang na balik-aralan kapwa ang mga tagumpay at kahinaan upang patuloy na dumaluyong kasama ang sambayanan.   “Gagap ng mga kabataang makabayan ang kahalagahan ng determinadong pakikibaka upang tuldukan ang mga kundisyon at kronikong krisis na ito [imperyalismo, pyudalismo at burukratang kapitalismo],” ayon kay Karina Mabini sa kanyang pahayag sa anibersaryo ng PKP.   Ayon pa sa KM- Southern Tagalog, naniniwala at itinataguyod nito ang makauring pamumuno ng proletaryado sa rebolusyong Pilipino sa pamamagitan ng PKP - 19 -
simula noong Disyembre 26, 1968 nang muli itong itatag upang magsilbing Partido at abanteng destakamento ng mga proletaryado. Kinilala at binati ng Komite Sentral sa pahayag nito ang “libu-libong nakababatang kadre na sumanib sa Partido nitong nagdaang mga taon, at ngayo’y nag-aambag ng napakalaking enerhiya sa ating matagalang pakikibaka.” Anang pamunuan ng Partido, “marami sa inyo ngayo’y bumabalikat ng mga tungkulin ng pamumuno bilang mga kagawad ng mga sentral na organo ng Partido, bilang mga kumand at upisyal sa pulitika ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan, at mga lider ng rebolusyonaryong kilusang masa kapwa sa kalunsuran at kanayunan.” Ang hanay ng nakababatang mga kadre ng Partido sa lahat ng antas ay nagpuspos sa iba’t ibang larangan ng rebolusyonaryong gawain ng sigasig at sigla, ayon sa Komite Sentral. “Ang bagong henerasyon ng mga komunistang Pilipino, na malalim na nakaugat sa malawak na masa ng mga manggagawa at magsasaka, ay nagpapakita ng walang-kaubusang determinasyong dalhin ang rebolusyong Pilipino sa pagsulong sa hinaharap.” Hindi lumiliit, bagkus ay lumaki, ang bilang ng naghihirap sa Pilipinas Enero 3, 2024 Taliwas sa ipinagmayabang ng rehimeng Marcos kamakailan na lumiit ang bilang ng mga Pilipinong naghihirap noong unang hati ng 2023, dumami sa - 20 -
aktwal ang mga pamilyang nabubuhay sa ilalim ng pamantayan ng kahirapan. “Nagmumukha lamang na mas mababa ang tantos ng kahirapan dahil ikinumpara ito sa tantos noong nakapailalim ang Pilipinas sa lockdown,” pahayag ng Ibon Foundation noong Disyembre 23. “Kung ikukumpara ito sa unang kwarto ng 2018, nadagdagan ng 3 milyong Pilipino o 472,000 pamilya ang bilang ng mga naghihirap—kahit pa nakabatay ito sa napakababa nang pamantayan na ₱91 kada araw.” Sa estadistika ng Philippine Statistics Authority na inilabas noong Disyembre 22, lumiit tungong 22.4% ang bilang ng mga naghihirap na pamilya noong unang kwarto ng 2023, mula sa 23.7% sa unang kwarto ng 2021. Anito, nangangahulugan ito ng pag-ahon ng 250,000 Pilipino mula sa kahirapan. Ang itinuturing lamang nitong naghihirap na pamilya ay yaong nabubuhay sa ₱13,797 kada buwan o ₱460 kada araw. Samantala, ang tantos ng kahirapan noong 2018 ay 21%. “Ang pagbubukas ng ekonomya ang mayor na salik sa iniulat na pagbaba sa pagitan ng unang semestre ng 2021 at parehong panahon sa 2023,” ayon sa grupo. “Kailangang idiin na hindi ito isang aktibong hakbang para ibaba ang kahirapan kundi nagmula sa pasibong pagluluwag sa napakahaba at napakahigpit na mga restriksyon sa aktibidad sa ekonomya.” Ayon sa grupo, dapat pa ngang kwestyunin kung bakit di pa nakababalik sa antas bago - 21 -
magpandemya ang tantos ng kahirapan, gayong mahigit isang taon nang ipinangangalandakan na bumubwelo na ang ekonomya. Dapat ding tingnan ang mga estadistika ng pagbaba ng tantos ng kawalang trabaho. Hindi umano tugma ang paglaki ng bilang at paglawak ng kahirapan sa pagitan ng 2018 at 2023 sa ipinagmamalaki ng estado na pagbaba ng disempleyo mula 5.4% tungong 4.6% sa parehong panahon. Alinsunod sa kalkulasyon ng nakabubuhay na sahod na ₱1,160 kada araw o ₱25,226 kada buwan sa isang 5-kataong pamilya, kailangan ng isang indibidwal ng abereyds na ₱232 para tugunan ang batayan niyang mga pangangailangan kada araw. Ika-3 anibersaryo ng Tumandok masaker, ginunita Enero 3, 2024 Ginunita ng Katribu o Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas at iba pang demokratikong grupo ang ikatlong anibersaryo ng Tumandok masaker noong Disyembre 30. Sa araw na ito noong 2020, koordinadong pinaslang sa mga operasyon ng pulis at sundalo ang siyam na katutubong Tumandok sa mga baryo ng Tapaz, Capiz at Calinog sa Iloilo. Kasabay sa mga pagpaslang ang maramihang pang-aaresto. Hanggang ngayon, wala pa ni isa sa mga salarin ang napaparusahan o nakakasuhan man lamang. - 22 -
“Magpupunyagi kami sa paghahanap ng hustisya mula sa (noo’y pangulong) Rodrigo Duterte sa masaker sa Tumandok at sa napakarami pang ibang mga inhustisya na idinulot niya sa katutubong mamamayan,” pahayag ng grupo. “Gayundin, pinanagot ng Katribu ang administrasyon ni Marcos Jr sa pagpapatindi ng mga atake sa mamamayang Pilipino, at tuluy-tuloy na mga operasyong nakatuon sa mga katutubong komunidad na lumalaban sa mga programa sa kunwa’y kapayapaan at mga proyektong pangkaunlaran nito.” Anito, hindi dapat kalimutan ang papel ng SEMPO (Synchronized Enhanced Management of Police Operations) ng pulis sa masaker sa Tumandok, at sa iba pang katulad na mga masaker at pang- aaresto sa katabing isla ng Negros. Humarap sa matinding panggigipit at pasismo ang mga komunidad ng Tumandok dahil sa kanilang buong-tapang na pagtutol sa Jalaur Mega Dam project na nakatakdang itayo sa kanilang lupang ninuno. Sisirain ng proyektong ito hindi lamang ang kanilang mga komunidad, kundi ang katubigan at kagubatang matagal nang bumubuhay sa mga Tumandok. Pinuna ng grupo ang presensya ng mga sundalo sa mga katutubong komunidad sa ilalim ng Retooled Community Support Program (RCSP) ng AFP. Lantarang pambabanta, panggigipit at pang- aabuso ang isinasagawa ng mga ito habang nakakampo sa mga kabahayan o sa mga pampublikong istruktura sa baryo. - 23 -
Paglakas ng National Democratic Front sa rehiyong Ilocos, tagumpay ng PKP Enero 3, 2024 Kinilala ng National Democratic Front (NDF)- Ilocos ang susing tungkulin ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) sa pagbubuo at pagpapalakas ng NDF sa buong rehiyong Ilocos. Ipinahayag ito ni Ka Rosa Guidon, tagapagsalita ng NDF-Ilocos, sa pagbati ng organisasyon sa Partido sa ika-55 anibersaryo nito. Ayon kay Ka Rosa, “mahalagang tagumpay ng Partido ang pagkakabuo ng NDF sa Ilocos…at sa pamamagitan nito ay nabibigkis ang lakas ng masang magsasaka, manggagawa, panggitnang mga uri at lahat ng demokratikong sektor sa rehiyon para ipaglaban ang kanilang demokratikong interes.” Aniya, ang wastong linya ng Partido ang naging armas ng NDF-Ilocos upang tukuyin ang mga anyo ng malapyudal at malakolonyal na kalagayan sa rehiyon upang umusbong at yumabong ang rebolusyonaryong pakikibaka dito. “Patuloy na gumagabay at aktwal na nakikibahagi ang Partido sa pagsusulong ng armadong pakikibaka at agraryong rebolusyon at pakikibaka ng lahat ng maralita’t pinagsasamantalahan sa rehiyon,” pahayag ni Ka Rosa. Inarmasan ng Partido ang mga rebolusyonaryong pwersa at masa ng Marxismo-Leninismo-Maoismo, kung kaya’t napanday ang kanilang kapasyahan sa buhay at kamatayang pakikibaka, ani Ka Rosa. - 24 -
Dagdag pa niya , “pinagkaisa sila sa mga lagom na aral at pinamumunuan ang pagtutuwid sa mga kamalian at kahinaan kung kayat natatahak ang wastong linya ng pagsulong.” Pinagpugayan ng NDF-Ilocos ang Komite ng Partido sa Ilocos sa pananatili nitong solido at nagkakaisa sa kabila ng pagsisikap ng kaaway na tugisin at durugin ito sa pamamagitan ng panggigipit sa mga kadre at kasapi nito. “Tiwala ang buong NDF-Ilocos, sa pamumuno ng Partido, na maitataguyod, mapapalakas at mapapalawak ang nagkakaisang prente ng lahat ng mga pinagsasamantalahang uri sa rehiyon,” ayon pa kay Ka Rosa. Sa pahayag ng Komite Sentral ng Partido noong ika-55 anibersaryo nito, inatas nito ang pagpapatatag sa pinakamalapad na antipasista, anti-imperyalista at antipyudal na nagkakaisang prente laban sa rehimeng US-Marcos. Kabilang dito ang patuloy na pagpapalakas at pagpapalawak sa NDFP at lahat ng mga alyadong organisasyon nito. “Tipunin ang pinakamalapad na pampulitika at materyal na suporta ng bayan para sa rebolusyonaryong armadong pakikibaka,” ayon sa Komite Sentral. Iilang bagong klasrum ng DepEd, kinastigo ng mga guro Enero 4, 2024 Kinastigo ng mga guro at ni House Deputy Minority leader at ACT Teachers party-list - 25 -
Rep. France Castro ang Department of Education (DepEd) sa pagmamalaki nito sa karampot na 2,201 klasrum na naitayo ng kagawaran noong 2023. Malayong-malayo ito sa 165,000 kulang na klasrum sa buong bansa. “Ang DepEd mismo ang nagtarget na 5,000-6,000 ang mga silid-aralan na maipapagawa noong 2023…ni wala sa kalahati ng sarili nilang target tapos may gana pang ipagmalaki na magandang accomplishment daw ito,” batikos ni Rep. Castro. Lubhang kabaligtaran umano ang kupad sa paggawa ng mga klasrum sa bilis ni Sara Duterte, kalihim ng DepEd, na gastusin ang ₱125 milyon na iligal na confidential funds sa loob lamang ng 11 araw noong 2022. Ayon pa kay Rep. Castro, ipinamalas nito ang kawalang sinseridad ni Marcos at Duterte na pababain ang kakulangan ng mga klasrum. “(A)ng malaking usapin ng krisis sa mga klasrum ay nangangailangan ng mas ambisyoso at pangmatagalang plano,” pahayag ni Rep.  Castro. Sa pamamagitan lamang umano ng pagtatayo ng 50,000 mga klasrum kada taon mapauunlad ang kundisyon sa pagkatuto, at mababawasan ang mayor na mga balakid sa pagbawi sa edukasyon. Binatikos din ng kinatawan ang walang batayang pahayag ng DepEd na imposible ang pagtatayo ng 50,000 mga klasrum kada taon dahil nakapagtayo ang ahensya ng 100,936 na klasrum sa loob ng tatlong taon noong 2014-2016. - 26 -
Mga mersenaryong imbwelto sa pagmasaker sa Sagay 9, pinarusahan ng BHB-Northern Negros Enero 4, 2024 Magkakasabay na armadong aksyon ang inilunsad ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB) -Northern Negros laban sa mersenaryong Sarona Group noong Enero 2 sa bayan ng Purok Kawayan, Barangay Bug-ang, Toboso, Negros Occidental. Imbwelto ang Sarona Group sa pagmasaker sa tinaguriang Sagay 9 (o ng siyam na magtutubo) noong Oktubre 20, 2018 sa Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City. Ang grupo ay bayaran at suportado ng Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) at malalaking kumprador-panginoong maylupa at asendero sa isla. Inambus at napatay ng BHB ang lider ng grupo na si Juvie Sarona. Pinaralisa at sinunog din ang traktorang pag-aari ng ama niya. Nakumpiska naman sa bahay ng mga Sarona ang isang M2 Carbine, isang .45 Colt, isang .357 revolver, isang shotgun, samu’t saring mga magasin at bala. Kinumpiska rin ang kanilang gadyet na may laman na mahahalagang impormasyon. Sangkot din ang grupo sa pangangamkam ng lupa gamit ang sistemang aryendo. Hindi makapaggiit ang mga magsasaka laban sa mga Sarona dahil sa takot sa mga maton nito. Mayroong mga kaso ng sapilitang pagputol sa mga puno sa sakahan, at pagbubunot ng mga tanim na saging. Naitala rin ang kaso ng pamamaril ng grupo sa kalabaw ng isang magsasaka. Malupit din ang mga Sarona sa - 27 -
kanilang manggagawa at bantog na hindi nagpapasahod nang maayos. Labis ang takot ng mga komunidad na naninirahan sa palibot ng lupaing kontrol ng Sarona Group dahil ipinaiilalim sila sa mga pagbabanta at panggigipit. Ipinagdiwang ng masa ng Northern Negros ang pagpaparusa sa mga Sarona dahil nabigyang hustisya ang pang-aapi at pagsasamantalang kanilang sinapit sa kamay ng mga ito. “Nang may panibagong lakas at determinasyon sa pagbubukas ng bagong taon ng ating pakikibaka laban sa pang-aapi at pagsasamanala, inilunsad ng BHB-Northern Negros ang pamamarusa,” ayon kay Ka Cecil Estrella, tagapagsalita ng yunit. Pinasalamatan din ni Ka Cecil ang mga magsasaka at masang tumulong sa armadong aksyon at patuloy na pagsuporta nito sa hukbong bayan. Pagtatanggal ng programang SHS sa mga SUC at LUC, binatikos Enero 5, 2024 Binatikos ng mga guro at kabataang estudyante ang inilabas na memorandum ng Commission on Higher Education (CHEd) na nagsasabing ihihinto na ang mga programang Senior High School (SHS) o Grade 11 at 12 sa mga state universities and colleges (SUCs) at local universities and colleges (LUCs) sa darating na taong pampaaralan 2024-2025. Bahagi umano ito ng pagbitaw ng ahensya sa tinawag na transisyon sa ilalim ng K- - 28 -
12, at pagpapaubaya nito sa Department of Education. Ayon sa Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), labis ang kanilang pag-aalala at pagkadismaya sa direktibang ito na anila ay magdudulot ng matitinding epekto sa akses ng mga estudyante sa libreng edukasyon, at gayundin sa kalagayan sa trabaho ng mga guro sa pampublikong eskwelahan. “May siginipikanteng epekto ito sa mga estudyante, partikular ang mga posibleng mawalan ng akses sa libreng edukasyon dahil sa kahirapan sa pinansya,” ayon pa sa ACT. Matutulak umano ng sitwasyon ang mga estudyante na pumasok na lamang sa pribadong mga eskwelahan, na dagdag pabigat sa kanilang pamilya. Higit na pararamihin umano nito ang dati nang maraming bilang ng mga estudyanteng nagda-drop out mula sa eskwela. Dagdag ng mga guro, patitindihin nito ang dati nang kakulangan ng mga pampublikong eskwelahan na may programang SHS. “Hahantong ito sa labis-labis na trabaho at overload ng mga guro na tatanggap sa mga lilipat na estudyante,” ayon sa ACT. Para naman sa League of Filipino Students (LFS), marami na nga ang nahihirapan sa bulok na programa ng SHS at K-12 ay palulubhain pa ito ng basta-bastang pagtatanggal ng programang SHS sa mga SUC at LUC. - 29 -
Giit ni House Deputy Minority Leader at ACT Teachers Rep. France Castro, “dapat suspindehin ang implementasyon ng mga memo na ito habang walang masinsing konsultasyon sa lahat ng mga stakeholder at kanilang kagalingan laluna ang mga estudyante at guro.” “Sa sinasabi ng DepEd at CHed na dapat na limang taon lamang ang programang ito ay dapat na lalo nilang napaghandaan ang konsultasyon para dito hindi yung bigla na lang na maglalabas na lamg agad ng memo na libu-libo ang apektado,” pahayag pa niya. Bigas, pinakabilis tumaas ang presyo noong Disyembre Enero 6, 2024 Sa gitna ng ipinagmamalaki ng rehimeng Marcos na “bumagal” ang pagtaas ng presyo ng mga bilihin noong Disyembre 2023, lalupang sumirit ang presyo ng bigas. Ayon sa Philippine Statistics Authority, tumaas tungong 19.6% ang tantos ng implasyon ng bigas (rice inflation) sa katapusan ng 2023, pinakamataas mula 2009. Mas mataas ito nang 3.7% kumpara sa Nobyembre 2023. Sa 2023, umabot sa ₱9 ang abereyds na itinaas ng presyo ng lahat ng klaseng bigas, o 39.63% sa buong taon. Pinakamataas ang pagtaas ng presyo ng well-milled rice sa 22.4% o ₱10 kada kilo. Ayon sa mga upisyal ng estado, tinatayang tuluy- tuloy na tataas ang presyo ng bigas sa 2024. - 30 -
Unyon ng manggagawa sa PhilFoods, papasok na sa negosasyon para sa CBA Enero 7, 2024 Naigiit ng Unyon ng mga Panadero sa PhilFoods Fresh Baked Product Inc. (UPPFBPI-OLALIA- KMU) sa kapitalistang kumpanya na pagkasunduan na ang “bargaining ground rules” na gagamiting gabay sa negosasyon para sa Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) ng unyon at maneydsment. Kasunod ito ng kilos-protesta ng mga manggagawa at ng unyon sa harap ng National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Region IV-A noong Enero 4. Ayon sa Alyansa ng Manggagawa sa Probinsya ng Laguna, naigiit ng unyon sa NCMB na aksyunan ang sadyang pag-antala sa pag-usad ng negosasyon para sa CBA. Bago nito, apat na pag- uusap na ang naganap sa pagitan ng unyon at maneydsment. Haharap na ang unyon sa maneydsment para sa negosasyon sa kanilang CBA simula Enero 9. Noong Setyembre 2023, nanalo ang UPPFBPI- OLALIA-KMU sa eleksyon sa sertipikasyon para katawanin ang mga manggagawa ng pagawaan. Nakakuha ng 295 na boto ang unyon sa kabuuang 341 bumoto sa eleksyon, habang 25 boto ang nakuha ng katunggaling unyon. Ang PhilFoods Fresh Baked Product Inc ay kapatid na pagawaan ng Gardenia Bakeries na gumagawa - 31 -
ng tinapay para sa Gardenia, isang kumpanyang multinasyunal. Ang pagawaan ng PhilFoods ay matatagupuan sa LIIP Avenue, Barangay Mamplasan, Biñan, Laguna. Mga kaso laban sa mga organisador ng KMU, ibinasura ng korte Enero 9, 2024 Isinapubliko kahapon, Enero 8, ng Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) ang desisyon ng korte sa Quezon City na ibasura ang mga kasong Direct Assault at Grave Coercion laban sa mga lider at organisador nito. Itinuring ito ng KMU bilang “mabuting balita” laluna sa pagbubukas ng taong 2024. Ang kaso ay isinampa ni Pcpl Mark Anthony Soliven ng Quezon City Police District laban kina KMU Secretary General Jerome Adonis, organisador ng Association of Democratic Labor Organizations, pederasyon sa ilalim ng KMU, na si Nadja de Vera, isang nagngangalang Aia Pendatun, at anim na alyas noong Hunyo 26, 2023. Kaugnay ang kaso ng pagkumpronta ni Adonis kay Pcpl Soliven noong Hunyo 9, 2023 habang umuuwi ang istap at upisyal ng KMU mula sa isang protesta sa Mendiola, Manila. Kinumpronta si Pcpl Soliven nang mamataan ng KMU na sumusunod ito sakay ang isang motor at kumukuha ng litrato ng mga nasa sasakyan. Binatikos noon ng KMU ang paniniktik ng pulis sa KMU. Sa isang pahayag noong araw na iyon, anila, - 32 -
“walang mali sa gawain ng mga aktibista na ikampanya ang makabuluhang mga pagbabago para sa benepisyo ng mga manggagawa, magsasaka at mamamayan” kung kaya’t hindi dapat sila tinitiktikan at hinaharas ng mga pwersa ng estado. Ayon pa sa grupo, “patunay ang insidente na garapal, walang sinisinong batas at karapatan at wala sa anumang katwiran ang taktikang intimidasyon ng mga kapulisan. Dapat matapang na harapin at labanan ito ng mamamayan.” Kaugnay ng mga kaso, inirekomenda ng korte na ibasura ito dahil sa sinasabi nitong kakulangan ng sapat na ebidensya laban sa mga aktibista. Ayon sa KMU, dapat nang itigil ang ganitong ‘modus’ ng pagsampa ng mga kaso laban sa mga organisador ng kilusang paggawa. Ang desisyon ay inilabas ng korte noong Nobyembre 20, 2023. Pagpapalaya sa migranteng Pilipino na si Mary Jane Veloso, muling iginiit Enero 9, 2024 Muling ipinanagawan ng Migrante International ang kagyat na pagpapalaya kay Mary Jane Veloso, migranteng Pilipinong biktima ng human at drug trafficking, na nakakulong sa Indonesia simula pa 2010. Iginiit ito ng grupo kasabay ng pagbisita ni Indonesian president Joko Widodo sa bansa mula Enero 9 hanggang Enero 11 para makipagpulong kay Ferdinand Marcos Jr. - 33 -
Nailigtas sa parusang pagbitay si Veloso noong 2015 dulot ng paggigiit ng mamamayang Pilipino. Nananatili siyang nakapiit sa Jakarta, Indonesia sa kabila ng pag-usig sa mga iligal na rekruter niya at matagal nang panawagang palayain siya. “Dapat siyang bigyan ng clemency at kalayaan at dapat nang pauwiin ngayon, makapamuhay at makatulong sa kanyang dalawang anak at tumatanda nang mga magulang,” ayon sa Migrante International. Suportado ng grupo ang nakatakdang paghahatid ng sulat-apela ng magulang ni Veloso kay Marcos at Widodo. Ipagdiriwang ni Mary Jane ang kanyang ika-39 kaarawan sa Enero 10. Nanawagan din ang Migrante International na harapin ng dalawang pangulo ang pamilya Veloso. Kung mapagbibigyan at mapalalaya si Veloso, isa umano itong malaking regalo at magdudulot ng labis na ligaya sa mga migranteng Pilipino at sa sambayanan. “Umaalingawngaw ang kwento ni Mary Jane sa mga migrante at mamamayang Pilipino,” pahayag ng Migrante International. Idiniin ng grupo na ang kaso ni Mary Jane, sampu ng iba pang mga migrante, ay dulot ng kawalan ng trabaho sa Pilipinas. Pumapatong pa umano dito ang pagsasamantala ng mga indibidwal na rekruter na nambibiktima sa mahihirap at desperadong makapagtrabaho na mga Pilipino. - 34 -
6-buwang sanggol, pinaslang ng mga pwersa ng estado sa India Enero 10, 2024 Kinundena ng Forum Against Corporatization and Militarization (Facam), grupo sa India, ang pagpaslang ng mga pwersa ng reaksyunaryong estado ng India sa isang 6-buwang sanggol sa Mutvendi, distrito ng Bijapur, estado ng Chhattisgarh noong Enero 1. Ayon sa ulat, pinalalabas ng mga pwersa ng estado na nagkaroon ng “engkwentro” sa mga gerilyang Maoista nang mapaslang ang bata, bagay na pinasinungalingan ng mga residente. Ayon sa pahayag ng Facam, nagpapasuso si Massi Vadde sa kanyang 6-buwang sanggol nang biglang mamaril ang mga pwersang panseguridad ng India sa magubat na bahagi ng Mutvendi. Tumagos sa kamay ni Massi Vadde ang bala na tumama at pumatay sa kanyang sanggol. Giit ng ama ng sanggol, walang katotohanan ang sinasabi ng mga pulis na nagkaroon ng engkwentro sa kanilang komunidad. Ito rin ang pare-parehong pahayag ng mga residente ng komunidad, ayon sa Facam. Sinabi rin ng Communist Party of India (Maoist) West Bastar Division sa isang pahayag sa midya sa India na wala itong nakaengkwentrong yunit sa naturang komunidad. Ayon sa kalihim ng dibisyon ng CPI (Maoist) na si Mohan, inatake ang komunidad dahil sa kanilang pagtutol sa - 35 -
militarisasyon at pagpasok ng mga korporasyon sa kanilang lugar. Kasuklam-suklam na tatlong araw pa lamang ang bagong-tayong kampo ng mga pulis sa Kavadgaon (malapit sa Mutvandi) ay pumatay na sila ng isang sanggol, ani Mohan. Isa ang kampo ng mga pulis dito sa tatlong kampong itinayo sa distrito ng Bijapur noong Disyembre 2023. Nagtayo rin ng mga kampo sa Palnar at Dumriparalnar. Ang pagtatayo ng mga kampo ay sabwatan sa pagitan ng mga korporasyon at ng Brahmanical Hindutva na pasistang gubyerno para gawing isang malaking kampo ng pulis ang distrito ng Bijapur at palayasin ang mga lokal na residente. Kasalukuyang nagtatayo ng daan sa pagitan ng Kavadgoan at Mutvandi na sasagasa sa mga sakahan, kagubatan at lupaing pag-aari at pinagkukunan ng kabuhayan ng mga residente. “Itinatayo ang mga kampo ng pulis, tulay at daanan sa lupa ng mga katutubo nang walang pahintulot ng mga residente o pagsasagawa ng mga gram sabha (asembleya ng mga lokal),” ayon pa kay Mohan. Walang-tigil na panggigipit naman ang kinahaharap ng grupong Moolwasi Bachao Manch, namumuno sa 35 kilusan laban sa pagtatayo ng mga kampo, malalaking daan, pekeng engkwentro at iba pa, mula sa mga pwersa ng estado ng India. Ayon sa Facam, “marami sa mga lider ng mga kilusang ito ang inaaresto sa pagdadahilan na sila ay mga Naxalite (katawagan sa mga Maoista sa - 36 -
India) para supilin ang kanilang demokratikong kilusan laban sa pangangamkam ng lupa at pagwasak sa Jal-Jungle-Jameen (Tubig-Gubat- Lupa).” Samantala, ibinalita ng Facam na inilibing na ng kaanak ang 6-buwang sanggol noong Enero 6. Charter change, muling pinabubwelo ng pangkating Marcos Enero 10, 2024 Tusong inilulusot ng mga kongresistang alyado ng rehimeng Marcos Jr ang pakanang charter change o pagbabago sa konstitusyon sa pamamagitan ng “people’s initiative” o pagkalap ng mga pirma para rito. Ibinunyag ng mga progresibong kongresista ng blokeng Makabayan ang paglipana ng gayong pakana sa iba’t ibang bahagi ng bansa. Pangunahing laman ng petisyon ang pagsingit ng probisyon kung saan maaaring ipasa ang anumang amyenda sa konstitusyon sa pamamagitan ng pagboto ng 3/4 ng pinagsanib na Mataas at Mababang Kapulungan ng Kongreso. Ibig sabihin, boboto bilang isang kapulungan ang lahat ng mga senador at kongresista, at bawat senador at kongresista ay may tig-iisang boto. Ayon sa dating kinatawan ng Bayan Muna na si Neri Colmenares, epektibong tatanggalin ng probisyong ito ang “checks and balance” sa pagitan ng mga institusyon ng estado na nakasaad sa konstitusyon. Labag din ito sa bicameral na katangian ng gubyerno ng Pilipinas. Gagawin - 37 -
nitong “tagamasid” lamang ang Senado sa proseso ng pagbabago ng konstitusyon dahil mas marami ang mga myembro ng Mababang Kapulungan. Pantay ang awtoridad ng Kongreso at Senado sa pagpasa ng mga batas, kahit malayong mas maliit ang bilang ng mga senador. Ilang dekada nang nagtatangka ang bawat naghaharing pangkatin na nakaupo sa poder na baguhin ang konstitusyon para palawigin ang sarili sa pwesto (term extension), palabnawin ang mga probisyong nangangalaga sa karapatang-tao at lubusang tanggalin ang natitirang probisyong nagpuprotekta sa lokal na ekonomya laban sa dayuhang pandarambong. Matagal nang itinutulak ng American Chamber of Commerce ang pagbabago sa konstitusyon. Hindi kaiba ang rehimeng Marcos Jr na una nang nagtangkang maglusot ng charter change noong nakaraang taon. Hindi bumwelo ang panukala dahil sa oposisyon dito ng mga senador. Unang ibinunyag ni Rep.  Lagman ang tusong pakana ng mga kongresistang kaalyado ni Marcos noong Enero 7. Napag-alaman niya na nagpatawag ng pulong ang League of Mayors sa Albay noong Enero 5. Dito binigyan ng pondo ang mga meyor para mangalap ng pirma ng di bababa 3% rehistradong botante sa kani-kanilang mga distrito. Bibigyan ang sinumang pipirma ng ₱100. Bago nito, inianunsyo ni House Speaker Martin Romualdez ang “intensyon” ng Kongreso na baguhin ang konstitusyon sa pamamagitan ng people’s initiative. Kinwestyon ni Lagman, gayundin ng blokeng Makabayan ang pagsingit ni - 38 -
Romualdez at kanyang mga kasapakat ng dagdag na ₱12 bilyon sa dating ₱2 bilyong badyet ng Commission on Elections (Comelec) na aniya’y may kaugnayan sa planong pagratsada sa charter change ngayong taon. Imbestigasyon ng ICC kay Duterte, maaring tapos na Enero 10, 2024 Pinaniniwalaang tapos na ang imbestigasyon ng International Criminal Court (ICC) sa mga kasong krimen laban sa sangkatauhan ng dating pangulong Rodrigo Duterte. Ibig sabihin, maaari na itong maglabas ng mandamyento de aresto anumang oras sa hinaharap. Ito ang paniniwala ni dating Rep.  Neri Colmenares, sang-ayon sa ibinunyag ng kapwa niya abugado na si Atty. Kristi Conti at ng dating senador na si Antonio Trillanes. Bago pa nito, umugong na ang balitang tahimik na pumasok sa Pilipinas noong nakaraang taon ang mga imbestigador ng korte para kapanayamin ang susing mga saksi sa kaso. Hindi ipinaalam ang kanilang presensya sa gubyerno ni Ferdinand Marcos Jr dahil dati na itong nagpahayag na hindi ito makikipagtulungan sa ICC. Ayon kay Trillanes, halos tapos na rin ang imbestigasyon sa sekundaryong mga personalidad na pinangalanan ng korte. Kabilang sa mga ito ang bise presidente na si Sara Duterte. Nagpahayag ng kawalang-alam ang Department of Justice sa presensya ng mga imbestigador. - 39 -
Gayunpaman, nagbukas ang kagawaran noong nakaraang taon para “makinig” sa resolusyong inihapag sa Kongreso para imbestigahan ang hurisdiksyon ng ICC sa bansa. Lubos itong ikinagalit ng dating presidente at kanyang mga kasapakat. “Sang-ayon ako (kay Trillanes) dahil malakas ang ebidensya at ilang taon na ring gumugulong ang imbestigasyon,” ani Colmenares ngayong araw, Enero 10. “Naniniwala kaming malakas ang kaso at malinaw na kailangang mayroong mananagot.” Sina Colmenares at Conti ay parehong mga abugado ng mga pamilyang nagsampa ng kaso sa ICC. Oplan sabit, inilunsad sa Antipolo para sa anibersaryo ng Partido Enero 10, 2024 Matagumpay na naglunsad ng oplan sabit ang Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) -Rizal upang magbigay-pugay sa ika-55 na anibersaryo ng pagkakatatag ng Partido at unang anibersaryo ng pagkamatay ng dakilang guro na si Jose Maria Sison sa Antipolo City noong Enero 9. Sa pangunguna ng rebolusyonaryong kabataan, magsasaka, at maralita, masigasig na inaral ng mga lumahok sa aktibidad ang moda at padron ng mga rumorondang pulis at militar sa paligid upang masinsin na maisabit ang kanilang mga balatengga. - 40 -
Matagumpay na naisagawa ang mabilisang pagsasabit ang mga balatengga sa isang tulay sa Lumang Palengke, Antipolo City sa tabi ng Robinsons. Pinili ito ng mga kasama dahil maraming sasakayan ang dumadaan dito. Kitang- kita dito ang tingkad ng guhit ng mukha ni Ka Joma at mensaheng parangal sa Partido na makasining na nilikha ng mga rebolusyonaryo ng Rizal. Samantala, sa tabing ng kawayanan ay naglunsad ng pagtitipon ang Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB)- Rizal noong huling linggo ng Disyembre 2023 para ipagdiwang ang anibersaryo ng Partido. Kasama nilang nagdiwang ang ilang mga kasapi ng mga rebolusyonaryong organisasyon. Naglunsad ng parangal, mga talumpati at pangkulturang pagtatanghal sa naturang pagtitipon. Nagsindi rin ng sulo ang mga mandirigma bilang simbolo ng tanglaw ng mga aral ni Ka Joma at mga nabuwal na martir ng Partido at hukbong bayan sa nagdaang mga taon. Ang mga pagkilos na ito ay patuloy na pagpapalakas ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan sa prubinsya sa pamumuno ng PKP-Rizal. “Sa mas mahigpit na pagtangan sa prinsipyong Marxismo- Leninismo-Maoismo at pagyakap sa digmang bayan, patuloy na pamumunuan ng komite ng Partido sa prubinsya ang pambansa- demokratikong pakikibaka sa lalawigan hanggang sa tagumpay,” ayon sa PKP-Rizal. - 41 -
Pagbaba ng tantos ng implasyon, walang epekto sa mahihirap Enero 12, 2024 Walang epekto sa pinakamahihirap na pamilyang Pilipino ang sinasabing pagbaba ng tantos ng implasyon o pagbagal ng pagtaas ng presyo ng mga bilihin. Ayon sa Philippine Statistics Authority, bumaba mula 4.1% noong Nobyembre tungong 3.9% ang tantos ng implasyon noong Disyembre. Gayunpaman, tumaas ang implasyon para sa 30% pinakamahihirap na pamilya, mula 4.9% noong Nobyembre tungong 5% noong Disyembre. Ayon sa paghihimay ng grupong Ibon Foundation, bagamat bumaba ang pangkahalang tantos ng implasyon sa pagkain (food inflation) mula 5.7% tungong 5.4%, umabot naman sa napakataas na 19.6% ang implasyon sa bigas (rice inflation)— walang kapantay sa nakaraang 14 taon. Para sa pinakamahihirap na pamilya, nasa 21.4% ang implasyon sa bigas. Patunay ito na walang epekto para sa mahihirap na Pilipino ang mga patakaran ng gubyerno laban sa mataas na tantos ng implasyon, pagsusuri ng Ibon. Ang seksyong ito ng populasyon ang pinakaapektado sa pagtaas ng presyo ng mga bilihin. “Halimbawa, limang taon matapos ipasa ang Rice Liberalization Act, hindi nanatiling mababa ang presyo ng pinakabatayang pagkain ng bansa, taliwas sa pangako ng gubyerno na (ito) ang - 42 -
pangunahing benepisyo ng liberalisasyon,” ayon sa grupo. Pinuna nito na tumaas pa ang presyo ng bigas na nasa ₱48-₱54 kada kilo sa ngayon, kumpara sa ₱43.86 abereyds na presyo nito noong Agosto 2018. “Sampal sa milyong Pilipino na hirap makakain na ipinagmamalaki at itinutulak pa rin ng gubyerno ang importasyon sa kabila ng kabiguan nitong kontrolin ang implasyon,” anito. Kampanya para sa charter change, mariing kinundena ng mga grupong pambansa-demokratiko Enero 13, 2024 Mariing kinundena ng Bagong Alyansang Makabayan o Bayan ang tangkang baluktutin ang kasaysayan sa isang patalastas na ipinalalabas ngayon sa mayor na mga network ng telebisyon. Sa patalastas na ito, minaliit at siniraan ang Pag- aalsang Edsa noong 1986 at isinisi sa Konstitusyong 1987 ang mga kinakaharap na problema ng Pilipinas sa ngayon. “Ang mga usaping kinakaharap ng bansa matapos ang 1986 ay walang kinalaman sa Konstitusyon kundi mas sa tipo ng sistemang pinaghaharian ng mayayaman at mga dayuhan na namamayani hanggang sa ngayon,” pahayag ng Bayan sa noong Enero 10. Tinukoy ng grupo bilang mga problema ang paghahari pa rin ng malalaking panginoong maylupa, kurakot na burukrata, mga dinastiya sa pulitika at dayuhang panghihimasok. - 43 -
Dagdag ng grupo, ang nais itulak na pagbabago sa Konstitusyong 1987 ay walang pakay na lutasin ang mga problemang ito, kundi dahil pa sa pagpapalakas sa interes ng naghaharing uri na matagal nang nagpapanatili sa Pilipinas na mahirap at di maunlad. “Ang mga nagtutulak ng charter change ay yaong nakabenepisyo na sa mga patakarang neoliberal sa ekonomya, na balak palawakin pa sa pamamagitan ng charter change,” ayon sa grupo. “Magbebenepisyo dito ang malalaking negosyo at burukrata-kapitalistang nandarambong sa ating mga rekurso.” Kasabay ng pag-ere ng patalastas ang paglaganap ng isang petisyon para sa charter change na pinapipirmahan ng mga meyor sa iba’t ibang bahagi ng Pilipinas. Layunin nitong mangalap ng mga pirma sa balangkas ng “people’s initiative” para magsingit ng isang probisyon para maging mas madali ang pagbabago sa konstitusyon. Alinsunod sa batas, kailangang makakalap ng mga pirma ng 3% ng mga botante sa kada distrito para magkaroon ng bisa ang petisyon. Ayon sa mga balita, binabayaran ng tig-₱100 ang sinumang pipirma sa petisyon. Sa Visayas, nakatanggap ang Bayan-Negros ng mga ulat na pinapipirma ang mga botante kapalit ng pondo ng programang TUPAD o AICS. Anito, pinopondohan ng meyor ng Bacolod na si Albee Benitez ang kampanya sa pagpapapirma, gamit ang mga upisyal ng barangay at purok. Inoobliga umano ang mga ito para abutin ang “kota.” - 44 -
Pinangangakuan ang mga pipirma ng mga “benepisyo” ng kampanya at hindi malinaw na ipinaliliwanag ang layunin ng petisyon. Ayon sa grupo, mayorya ng mga pumirma ay hindi nakaaalam na charter change na ang kanilang sinang-ayunan. Dagdag-singil ng PhilHealth, pinababasura ng mga OFW Enero 15, 2024 Nanawagan kahapon ang Migrante International para sa kagyat na pagbabasura ng dagdag-singil ng Philippine Health Insurance Corp.  (PhilHealth) ngayong taon. Nakatakdang itaas mula 4% tungong 5% ang sisingilin ng ahensya sa sahod ng mga overseas Filipino workers at migranteng Pilipino, na nangangahulugan ng pagtaas mula ₱500 hanggang ₱5,000 na kaltas sa mga sumasahod ng ₱10,000 hanggang ₱99,999.00 kada buwan. Tinawag ito ng Migrante bilang “dagdag na namang pahirap sa mga OFW.” “Dapat alam ng rehimeng Marcos Jr na habang itinataas nito ang singil (ng PhilHealth), tigil ang sahod ng karamihan ng mga OFW at nahaharap sila sa tumataas na cost of living at upa,” ayon sa grupo sa pahayag nito noong Enero 14. Hindi rin sila sang-ayon sa pahayag ng presidente ng ahensya na “maliit na halaga” lamang ito sa kanila, lalupa’t “ramdam na ramdan” naman diumano ng mga OFW ang mga “benepisyo” ng PhilHealth. - 45 -
“Ang totoo, walang pakinabang ang mga OFW sa PhilHealth dahil saklaw lamang nito ang Pilipinas. Kung nagkasakit o nangangailangan ng atensyong medikal ang mga OFW sa ibang bansa, kinakaharap nila ang matataas na bayarin at gastos at nagagawa nilang makaalpas dahil sa mga seguro na pinagbabayaran nila,” ayon sa grupo. Sa Pilipinas naman, kadalasan mayroon lamang silang isa o dalawang benepisyaryo. “Simpleng pangingikil ng gubyerno ang paniningil ng PhilHealth,” anito. Patunay umano ito na ginagawa lamang ng gubyerno na palabigasan ang mga OFW, lalupa’t pinagkakaitan sila ng mga serbisyo ng estado. Idiniin ng grupo na batayang karapatan ang serbisyong pangkalusugan, at na dapat bahagi ito ng mga serbisyo ng gubyerno. Itinakwil nito ang pagdadahilan ng gubyerno na wala na itong pondo para sa mga serbisyong panlipunan lalupa’t naglipana ang mga kaso ng korapsyon at pandarambong sa pondo ng bayan, kabilang sa PhilHealth. Mga estudyante at guro sa India, nagprotesta laban sa kontra- insurhensyang operasyon SAMADHAN- Prahar Enero 15, 2024 Nagtipun-tipon ang mga estudyante at guro ng Delhi University sa kampus nito sa Delhi, India noong Enero 10 sa pangunguna ng Forum Against Corporatization and Militarization (Facam) para magprotesta laban sa kontra-insurhensyang - 46 -
operasyong SAMADHAN-Prahar. Tinuligsa nila ang ang kampanyang ito ng rehimen ni Naendra Modi, na pangunahing tumatarget sa mga sibilyan at hindi armadong rebolusyonaryo ng Communist Party of India (Maoist). Ayon sa Facam, pinatindi ng operasyon SAMADHAN-Prahar ang militarisasyon sa mga komunidad ng mga Adivasi (katutubo) sa India para bigyan-daan ang pandarambong sa likas na yaman ng mga kagubatan at lupa ng mga Adivasi. Ayon sa grupo, sunud-sunod ang plano ng reaksyunaryong estado para papasukin ang mga operasyong mina, at mga proyekto ng mga korporasyon sa mga rehiyong ito. “Ipinaiilalim sa militar ang mga komunidad sa pamamagitan ng pagtatayo ng maramihang mga kampong paramilitar at pagpapakat ng libu-libong mga pwersang paramilitar…sa ngalan ng kontra- Maoistang mga operasyon,” ayon pa sa Facam. Sa datos ng grupo, mayroong hindi bababa sa 195 kampong paramilitar ang itinayo sa limang taon ng pagpapatupad ng estado sa operasyong SAMADHAN-Prahar. Nagbigay ng talumpati sa naturang protesta ang mga propesor ng Delhi University na sina Dr. Jitendra Meena, Dr.  Saroj Giri at Dr.  Nandita Narain. Kinundena nila ang pang-aagaw ng lupa ng mga Adivasi sa Kaimur, Chhattisgarh na planong gamitin ng estado para sa pangangalaga ng mga tigre. Nanawagan din sila ng hustisya para sa 6-buwang sanggol na pinaslang ng mga pwersa ng estado sa Bijapur, Chhattisgarh noong Enero 1. - 47 -
“Saan pupunta ang mga magsasakang Adivasi, anong mangyayari sa kanilang buhay? Walang may alam.” pahayag ni Dr.  Meena sa harap ng napakaraming kaso ng pagpapalayas sa mga katutubo mula sa kanilang lupain. Ikinumpara naman ni Dr.  Giri ang nararanasan ng mga Adivasi sa ginagawang maramihang pagpapalayas at henodisyo sa mamamayang Palestino ng estado ng Israel na suportado ng US. Tulad sa Palestine, aniya, “ang pakikibaka ng mamamayan [ng India] laban sa militarisasyon at pandarambong ng mga korporasyon ay pakikibaka para sa kanilang buhay na nakatali sa kanilang mga lupa.” Nagbigay din ng talumpati ang iba pang mga grupong dumalo sa protesta. Nagtanghal din ng awit ang mga estudyante at aktibista na tumalakay sa paglaban sa pagpapalayas sa mga Adivasi. Yunit ng 96th IB, binulabog ng BHB- Masbate Enero 15, 2024 Pinatamaan ng isang yunit ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB)-Masbate ang nag-ooperasyong tropa ng 96th sa Sityo Lantawan, Barangay Gangao,Baleno, Masbate noong Enero 13. Nabulabog ang naturang yunit militar at kagyat na itinago ang kanilang kaswalti upang pagtakpan ang kahihiyan. - 48 -
Ayon kay Ka Luz del Mar, tagapagsalita ng BHB- Mabaste, ang armadong opensiba ay bahagi ng kanilang pagsisikap na kamtin ang hustisya para sa mga biktima ng abusong militar at ipagtanggol ang mamamayan laban sa nagpapatuloy na paghaharing militar sa prubinsya. Kabilang sa tinutukoy ni Ka Luz ang 24 na biktima ng pampulitikang pamamaslang sa Masbate sa ilalim ng rehimeng US-Marcos. Labis din ang galit ng mga residente sa pamalagiang pagkakampo ng mga kontra-insurhensyang yunit ng Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) at Philippine National Police (PNP) sa mga eskwelahan sa prubinsya. Inireklamo maging ng ilang mga tauhan ng Department of Education (DepEd) -Masbate ang patuloy na panghihimasok ng militar sa mga eskwelahan para mangrekrut at pwersahin ang mga estudyanteng ipinagpapalagay nilang naninirahan sa mga erya ng hukbong bayan na magbigay ng impormasyon. Ayon pa sa mga ulat, ilang mga estudyante na ang hindi makapasok sa eskwela dulot ng takot sa presensya ng militar. Isang residente rin ng Barangay Gangao ang nagpabatid ng kanyang reklamo at pagkadismaya sa armadong pwersa ng estado sa pamamagitan ng post sa social media noong nakaraang linggo. Aniya, “nilagay po kayo [yunit ng militar] dito para magpasimula ng katahimikan, kaayusan at kapayapaan…hindi po para kayo ang magsimula ng pangamba at takot ng mamamayan.” Pagsisiwalat niya, ang yunit militar na nakatalaga sa kanilang barangay ay nagpasimuno ng mga - 49 -
inuman sa loob at labas ng kampo at kung malalasing ay nagpapaputok ng baril at nanggugulo sa mga residente. Inireklamo rin niya ang prostitusyon sa loob ng mismong kampo ng militar. “Tapos palalabasin ninyo na may nakita kayong kalaban ninyo?” aniya. Kinwestyon niya ang isang pangyayari kung saan hindi lumalabas sa kampo ang mga sundalo at bastang nagpapasabog at nagpapaputok ng baril nang hindi tiyak kung sino ang matatamaan. “Obligasyon ninyong protektahan ang taumbayan, hindi magpapakawala kayo ng pasabog at putok ng baril na mula sa kampo niyo,” himutok niya. Kinundena niya rin ang pambababae, kahit na mga dalagita, ng mga sundalo. “At nagdadala pa kayo sa kampo ninyo ng mga bayarang babae, tama po ba iyan?” aniya. Pahayag ni Ka Luz, ang kanilang armadong aksyon ay nagpapakita ng determinasyon ng hukbong bayan na ipagtanggol ang masa mula sa kamay ng mga berdugo. Nagpaabot din siya ng pasasalamat sa mamamayang Masbatenyo sa kanilang patuloy na pagsuporta sa kanilang tunay na hukbo at papel sa naging operasyong haras laban sa 96th IB. Kaanak ng bilanggong pulitikal sa Quezon, umapela sa korte Enero 16, 2024 - 50 -
Naghain ng apela ang National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL) at ama ng bilanggong pulitikal na tagapagtanggol ng karapatang-tao na si Alex Pacalda sa Court of Appeals sa Maynila noong Enero 10. Layunin ng apela na muling buksan ang kaso at baligtarin ang hatol na maysala sa kasong illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Iginiit ni Pacalda na gawa-gawa ang mga kasong ito. Inilabas ng Lucena City Regional Trial Court Branch 56 ang naturang hatol noong Marso 15, 2023. Pinatawan si Pacalda ng 10 taon na pagkakakulong para sa illegal possession of firearms, habang reclusion perpetua o habambuhay na pagkapiit sa diumanong paglabag niya sa batas sa mga eksplosibo. Ang desisyon ay inilabas ni Judge Salvador Villarosa Jr, na itinalaga ng dating pangulong Rodrigo Duterte. Inaresto si Pacalda noong Setyembre 14, 2019 sa Barangay Magsaysay, Gen.  Luna, Quezon ng mga pwersa ng 201st IBde. Nasa konsultasyon si Pacalda sa masang magsasakang biktima ng militarisasyon nang dakpin siya. Matapos ang iliga na pag-aresto, ipinailalim si Pacalda sa mental at pisikal na tortyur. Hindi siya pinakain at pinatulog nang halos 30 oras para pwersahin siyang “umamin” na myembro siya ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan. Pinilit siyang papirmahin sa isang “dokumento ng pagsuko.” Ginipit din ng militar ang kanyang pamilya at pinapirma ng kung anu-anong dokumento bilang “patunay.” - 51 -
Kasamang ng ama ni Pacalada sa paghain ng petisyon ang mga kaibigan at tagasuporta ni Alex at ang grupong Free Alex Pacalda Network. Ayon sa grupo, ang paghahain ng apela ay hindi lamang paghamon sa desisyon ng korte sa Lucena City kundi pagharap nila sa mas malaking sistemang paulit-ulit na nagsasantabi sa maliliit na mamamayan at ginagamit na instrumento para sa pampulitikang panunupil. “Naniniwala kaming ang laban para sa kalayaan ni Alex Pacalda ay hindi mahihiwalay sa mas malaking pakikibaka para sa karapatang-tao, dignidad ng mga inaapi,” ayon pa sa kanila. Hinimok nila ang lahat ng mga tagapamandila ng hustisya at nagtataguyod sa karapatang-tao na makiisa sa mahalagang laban na ito. Magsasaka sa Negros Occidental, nakaligtas sa pamamaril ng 62nd IB Enero 16, 2024 Pinagbabaril ng mga sundalo ng 62nd IB ang magsasakang si Cerilo Bagnoran Jr habang nagmamaneho ng kanyang motorsiklo at bumabyahe sa Crossing Cordova, Barangay Manghanoy, La Castellana, Negros Occidental. Pinara siya ng tatlong elemento ng 62nd IB Charlie Company sa Crossing Cordova bago pinaulanan ng bala. Pauwi sana si Bagnoran sa kanyang bahay galing sa trabaho nang pagbabarilin ng mga sundalo. Siya ay trabahante sa isang tubuhan. Bagaman nakaligtas sa pamamaril, labis na takot at troma - 52 -
ang idinulot sa kanya at kanyang pamilya ng naturang insidente. Bago pa ang bigong pagpatay, hinanap na si Bagnoran ng mga nagpakilalang elemento ng Philippine National Police (PNP) noong Enero 7 sa kanyang komunidad. Noong Enero 8, pinaghahahanap siya ng 24 sundalo ng 62nd IB na noo’y nag-ooperasyon sa Sityo Mandayao-4, Barangay Kamandag, La Castellana. Samantala, hindi rin nakaligtas sa brutalidad at terorismo ng estado ang pamilyang Carreon sa Sityo Bonbon, Barangay Hinakpan, Guihulngan City. Sapilitang pinasok at niransak ng may 40 tropa ng 62nd IB ang bahay ng pamilya noong Enero 14 ng umaga. Labag sa batas na pinaghahalungkat ng mga sundalo ang kagamitan ng pamilya at hinanap si Bimbo Carreon, ang may- ari ng bahay. Nagdulot ng takot sa pamilya, laluna sa mga bata, ang atakeng militar. Ang taktikang ito ng 62nd IB ay nakabalangkas sa kampanyang kontra-insurhensyang ipinatutupad ng rehimeng US-Marcos. Imbes na makipagsagupaan sa mga yunit ng hukbong bayan, tahasang tinatarget ng militar ang mga magsasakang sibilyan, na lubhang labag sa internasyunal na makataong batas at mga alituntunin ng digma. Ipinahayag ng 3rd ID noong Disyembre 2023 na plano nitong “durugin” at ideklarang “insurgency- free” ang buong isla ng Negros sa unang kwarto ng 2024, dedlayn na ilang beses na nitong inusog. Kaugnay nito, nauna nang nagbabala ang Bagong - 53 -
Hukbong Bayan (BHB)-Negros na mangangahulugan ito ng pagpapalawig ng militarisasyon sa mga komunidad sa buong isla. Mga magsasaka ng Lupang Ramos sa Cavite, sinisindak ng militar Enero 16, 2024 Pinasok ng limang elemento ng Philippine Army Scout Ranger lulan ng isang trak ng militar ang komunidad ng Lupang Ramos sa Dasmariñas, Cavite noong Enero 15. Binatikos ng Katipunan ng mga Lehitimong Magsasaka at Mamamayan sa Lupang Ramos (Kasama-LR) ang pagpasok ng mga sundalong may dalang matataas na kalibre ng armas sa kanilang komunidad. Anila, paninindak at panggigipit sa mga residente at magsasaka ang pakay ng mga ito. Ayon sa ulat ng Kasama-LR, hindi awtorisadong pumasok ang mga sundalo at nang komprontahin ay nagkasa ng baril ang isa sa kanila para takuhin ang mga magsasaka. “Ito ay isa lamang sa serye ng mga pagtatangkang pagpasok ng militar at kapulisan sa komunidad ng Lupang Ramos at ang serye ng red-tagging sa mamayan at magsasaka ng aming komunidad,” ayon pa sa grupo. Sa pamumuno ng Kasama-LR, nakikibaka ang mga magsasaka ng Lupang Ramos para sa kanilang karapatan sa 372 ektaryang lupain na pag-aari ng mga lehitimong magsasaka at mamamayan sa komunidad. Inaagaw ang lupa ng Na tional Grid Corporaton of the Philippines’ (NGCP) na nais - 54 -
magtayo ng mga poste ng kuryente sa lupa simula pa 2014. Mag-iisang dekada na ang pakikibaka ng mga magsasaka ng Lupang Ramos para ipaglaban ang kanilang karapatan sa lupa. Hanggang sa kasalukuyan ay nilalabanan nila ang pang-aagaw sa pamamagitan ng mga kampanyang barikada at sama-samang bungkalan. Giit ng Kasama-LR, patuloy silang lalaban para sa kanilang karapatan sa lupa. Dapat umanong patuloy na biguin ng mga magsasaka ang panggigipit at panghaharas ng mga sundalo dahil lantaran itong paglabag sa kanilang mga karapatan at nagsasapanganib sa kanilang buhay at kaligtasan. Paglabag sa internasyunal na makataong batas ng AFP sa kampanyang aerial bombing, binatikos Enero 16, 2024 Binatikos ng grupong International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (ICHRP) ang lansakang paglabag ng Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) sa internasyunal na makataong batas (IHL) sa paglulunsad nito ng labis-labis at superyor na lakas na mga pag-atake at kampanyang aerial bombing laban sa maliit at mahihinang istruktura ng mga kampo ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB). “Mahigpit na kinukundena ng ICHRP ang disproportionate na paggamit ng armas ng 403rd - 55 -
IBde, 4th ID ng AFP sa aerial bombing nito noong Disyembre 25 hanggang Disyembre 26, 2023 sa Malaybalay City, Bukidnon,” ayon kay Peter Murphy, chairperson ng koalisyon. Giit niya, ipinakikita nito ang lantarang kawalang respeto ng AFP sa karapatang-tao at internasyunal na makataong batas. Ayon sa paunang ulat ng yunit ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB) sa Bukidnon, naghulog ng apat na bomba ang Tactical Air Wing ng 4th ID sa isang temporaryong kampo ng hukbo sa Barangay Can-ayan, Malaybalay City. Dalawang araw matapos nito, muli itong nambomba sa Sityo Bagong Lipunan, Barangay Linabo sa bayan ng Quezon. Labis-labis at walang patumangga ang paghuhulog ng ilang 250-libras na bomba, na naghasik ng teror sa mamamayan ng Bukidnon. Napaslang sa pambobomba sa Malaybalay City ang 10 indibidwal na nasa kampo noon ng BHB. Sa ulat, nagkalasug-lasog ang katawan ng mga tinamaan dahil sa labis-labis na lakas ng mga bombang ginamit ng AFP. Gumamit din ang AFP ng mga kanyong ATMOS 2000 na binili pa nito sa Israel. Ang paggamit ng malalakas na bomba ay “likas na indiscriminate” o walang pinipili, nagsasapanganib sa buhay at kabuhayan ng mga sibilyan at nagdudulot ng malawak na pagkawasak sa kapaligiran. Sa katotohanan, lagpas sa ground zero ang epekto ng pambobomba ng AFP mula sa ere. Winasak nito ang kapayapaan, nagdulot ng malawak na takot, panic at troma sa mga residente sa kalapit na mga komunidad at - 56 -
winawasak ang kagubatan na pinagkukunan nila ng pagkain at kabuhayan. Liban dito, binatikos ng ICHRP ang naganap ang pag-atake at walang habas na pamamaril ng 59th IB sa yunit ng hukbong bayan sa Barangay Malalay, Balayan, Batangas noong Disyembre 17, 2023. Napatay dito ang limang Pulang mandirigma at dalawang sibilyan na sina Pretty Sheine Anacta (19) at si Rose Jane Agda (30). Dumadalaw ang dalawa sa kanilang kaanak na Pulang mandirigma ng BHB nang paslangin. Ayon sa nakalap na ulat ng BHB, hinimatay si Pretty Sheine sa unang bugso ng pamumutok ng mga pasistang tropa, bago siya tuluyang pinatay ng militar. Kasuklam-suklam naman ang sitwasyon ni Rose Jane nang makita ang bangkay niya sa punerarya kung saan nakababa ang pantalon nito, palatandaang pinagsamantalahan siya. Samantala, dinakip at hanggang ngayon ay hindi pa inililitaw ng militar ang sugatang mandirigma na si Baby Jane Orbe (Ka Binhi). Sang-ayon sa mga panuntunan ng internasyunal na makataong batas, dapat kilalanin ang kanyang mga karapatan ng katunggaling armadong pwersa. “Sa paggamit nito ng labis-labis na lakas at paghahasik ng lagim sa lokal na mga magsasaka sa mga opensibang ito, nilabag ng AFP ang IHL at nagpamalas ng lantarang pagbalewala sa kagalingan ng mamamayan,” ayon pa kay Murphy. Dagdag pa niya, higit na nakagugulantang ang mga paglabag na ito sa alituntunin ng digma - 57 -
kasunod ang kamakailang indikasyon ng Gubyerno ng Republika ng Pilipinas (GRP) na muling makipagnegosasyon sa National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), na kumakatawan sa 18 rebolusyonaryong mga organisasyon kabilang ang BHB. Binigyang diin ni Murphy na ang brutal na mga pag-atakeng ito sa kanayunan ay bahagi ng kontra-insurhensyang estratehiya ng rehimeng US-Marcos na gumagamit ng sapilitang pagbabakwit, pag-hamlet at rekonsentrasyon ng mga komunidad, peke at sapilitang pagpapasuko sa mga sibilyan, arbitraryong pag-aresto, mga pagdukot at desaparesido, tortyur at ekstra- hudisyal na mga pagpatay. “Sa harap ng brutalidad na ito ng AFP sa gera nito laban sa BHB, pinagtitibay ng ICHRP ang suporta sa panawagan ng mamamayang Pilipino para sa tunay na solusyon sa armadong tungglian sa pagtugon sa mga ugat nito kabilang ang malawakang kahirapan, kawalan ng trabaho at mga industriya, at ang hindi patas na pamamahagi ng lupa,” pahayag pa ni Murphy. Aerial strikes ng US at UK sa Yemen, kinundena ng ILPS-US Enero 17, 2024 Mariing kinundena ng International League of Peoples’ Strugles-US ang pag-atake ng imperyalismong US at kasapakat nitong United Kingdom sa bansa at mamamayang Yemen. - 58 -
“Naninindigan kami para sa karapatan ng mamamayang Yemeni, hindi lamang para depensahan ang kanilang lupa, kundi pati sa kanilang karapatan na tulungan ang mamamayang Palestino, na pareho nilang nagtatanggol sa kanilang lupa,” ayon sa pahayag ng ILPS-US noong Enero 13. Gamit ang mga eroplanong pandigma at kanyon na nakalagay sa mga warship, binomba ng US ang 60 target sa 16 lugar noong Enero 11. Ayon sa ILPS, nagsimula ang pag-atake ng US nang paputukan nito ang mga barkong Yemeni sa Red Sea na inakusahan nitong “nangho-hostage” ng mga komersyal na barko sa Bab al-Mandab Strait na matatagpuan sa hilagang bahagi ng naturang karagatan. Pinabulaanan ito ng gubyernong Yemeni, sa pagsabing tinatarget lamang nito ang mga barkong papunta sa Zionistang Israel bilang ambag sa pagpinsala sa war machine nito at ambag sa pakikibakang Palestino. “Walang pinsalang dala ang mga hakbang ng Yemen sa mamamayan o ari-arian, habang ang mga pambobomba ng US ay pumatay na ng 15 katao at nangwasak ng imprastruktura,” ayon sa grupo. Gayundin, nagdulot ang mga pambobombang ito ng malawakang pagkaalarma sa buong bansa na malaon nang lugmok sa pinakamalalang makataong krisis sa buong mundo dulot ng walang awat na pambobomba rito ng US, Saudi Arabia at United Arab Emirates mula pa 2014. Ayon sa United Nations, umaabot sa 21 milyong Yemeni o - 59 -
2 /3 ng populasyon ang nakaasa sa makataong ayuda para mabuhay. BHB-Sorsogon, naglinaw sa serye ng mga engkwentro noong Enero 14 Enero 17, 2024 Pinasinungalingan ng Bagong Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB)-Sorsogon ang ilan sa mga pahayag ng 31st IB kaugnay ng pinalalabas nitong naganap na serye ng engkwentro sa prubinsya noong Enero 14. Ayon sa yunit, ang ilan sa mga engkwentro at pinalalabas na nasamsam na kagamitang militar ay pawang kasinungalingan. Giit ng Pulang hukbo, walang katotohanan ang inianunsyong bakbakan ng 31st IB at yunit nito sa Barangay De Vera, Donsol noong Enero 14 ng alas-6 ng umaga. Walang yunit ng BHB-Sorsogon sa naturang lugar kaya imposible ang sinasabing engkwentro. Pawang itinanim na mga ebidensya ang sinasabing nasamsam na mga armas, magasin at iba pang kagamitang militar sa lugar, ayon pa sa yunit. Samantala, iginiit ng yunit na walang nakumpiska o nasamsam na kahit anong armas sa engkwentrong naganap sa Barangay Sangat, Gubat sa Sorsogon mga dakong alas-2:45 ng hapon sa araw na iyon. Hindi rin umano totoo ang pagsuko ng dalawang Pulang mandirigma ng hukbong bayan sa Barangay San Isidro, Bulusan sa 22nd IB. Ang - 60 -
pinangalanan na “Johnny” at “Ganda” ay mga sibilyang pinilit ng mga sundalo na “sumuko.” Pinarangalan naman ng yunit ang Pulang kumander na si Baltazar Hapa (Ka Patrick) na napaslang sa pag-atake ng 31st IB sa Barangay Togawe, Gubat, Sorsogon noong Enero 14 ng alas- 6 ng gabi. Mga biktima ng pamamaril ng 2nd IB, kinasuhan at ikinulong Enero 17, 2024 Inaresto ng mga pwersa ng estado ang limang sibilyan sa Masbate noong nakaraang linggo. Ang lima na sina Jamara Tumangan, Rowel Hagnaya, Alden Tumangan, Rico Cuyos at Senen Dollete ay inaakusahan na mga Pulang mandirigma na naka- engkwentro ng 2nd IB sa Barangay Balantay, Dimasalang noong Hunyo 16, 2023. Itinanggi ito ng mga biktima at iginiit na, katunayan, sila ay mga sibilyang biktima ng pamamaril ng mga sundalo. Ang pamamaril na ito ay nagresulta pa sa pagkamatay ng noo’y kasama nilang 17-anyos na si Rey Belan. Nangangaso ang mga biktima sa gubat nang makasalubong at pinaulanan sila ng bala ng nag- ooperasyong tropa ng 2nd IB bandang alas-3:35 ng hapon. Nauna nang pinasinungalingan ng mga residente at kaanak ng mga biktima ang palabas ng militar na isang “engkwentro” ang naganap noong Hunyo 2023. - 61 -
Wala na ngang hustisya para kay Belan at kanyang mga kasamahan, ngayon ay inaresto pa ang mga biktima, pahayag ng BHB-Masbate. “Sa ilalim ng batas militar sa Masbate, ang biktima ang nagiging kriminal, at ang kriminal ang nagiging biktima,” ayon kay Ka Luz del Mar, tagapagsalita ng BHB-Masbate. Ayon pa kay Ka Luz, ginawa ito ng 2nd IB para pagtakpan ang kanilnag karumal-dumal na krimen at baluktutin ang katotohanan. “Nangangamba ang rebolusyonaryong kilusan na hindi lamang sina Belan, Tumangan at mga kasamahan ang makaranas ng ganitong paglapastangan kundi maging ang iba pang biktima at kanilang kaanak,” pahayag pa niya. Ipinabatid ng yunit ng BHB sa prubinsya na magsisikap ito para mabigyan ng hustisya ang mga biktima ng pasistang paghahari ng militar. Mga manggagawang Pilipino na nawalan ng trabaho sa New Zealand, naggiit ng karampatang tulong Enero 17, 2024 Nagkaisang iginiit ng mga manggagawang nawalan ng trabaho sa New Zealand ang hindi pa naibibigay sa kanila na sahod nang biglang magsara ang kumpanyang nagkontrata sa kanila. Kasabay nito, itinulak nila ang embahada ng Pilipinas na kagyat na ilabas ang tulong at ayudang nararapat sa kanila. - 62 -
Nawalan ng trabaho ang mahigit 1,000 manggagawa, kabilang ang 495 manggagawang Pilipino, nang nagdeklara ng bankcrupty (pagkabangkarote) ang ELE Holdings Ltd sa New Zealand, apat na araw bago magpasko noong Disyembre 2023. Ang ELE Holdings ay grupo ng limang kumpanya kung saan kabilang ang malaking ahensya sa paggawa (manpower agency) na nag-eempleyo ng mga temporaryong migranteng manggagawa. Marami sa mga ito ay pinahintulutang magtrabaho sa bansa sa bisa ng mga temporary visa, at sa gayon ay nanganganib na mapauwi kung hindi agad makakuha ng bagong visa at trabaho. Ayon sa Migrante Aotearoa, 46 pa lamang sa mga Pilipinong humingi ng tulong sa embahada ng Pilipinas ang nakatanggap ng ayudang pinansyal noong Enero 13. Hirap ang mga manggagawa sa kanilang kalagayan, at hirap din ang mga pamilyang nakaasa sa kanila na nasa Pilipinas. Sa ngayon, tinutulungan sila ng FIRST Union at Union Network of Migrants (Unemig) para sa kanilang pinakabatayang pangangailangan tulad ng pagkain at iba pa. Wala pa ring natatanggap na tulong ang mga manggagawa ng ELE na nagkataong nasa Pilipinas nang ito ay magsara. “Karamihan sa mga manggagawa ng ELE (ay nagpahayag) ng ayaw nilang bumalik sa Pilipinas dahil alam nilang walang available na trabaho para sa kanila doon,” ayon sa Migrante-Aoteroa. “Malaking wake-up call (panggulantang) ito sa gubyernong Pilipino na dapat tinitiyak nitong may - 63 -
disenteng trabaho sa bansa, at itigil ang patakarang labor export laluna’t hindi naman ito handang magbigay ng kagyat na tulong sa mga OFW at kanilang mga pamilya sa mga panahong kailangan nila ang proteksyon at serbisyo ng gubyerno.” Sa Enero 19, magtitipon ang mga manggagawa ng ELE sa tatlong lugar sa New Zealnad (Auckland, Wellington at Christchurch) para kalampagin ang ELE at ang gubyerno ng Pilipinas na kagyat na ibigay ang sahod at ayudang nararapat sa kanila. Pagtatambak ng armas at matagalang presensya ng militar ng Canada at UK sa Pilipinas, tusong inilulusot Enero 18, 2024 Di na lamang US ang papayagan ng rehimeng Marcos Jr na magtambak ng tropa, mga sandata at gamit-militar sa Pilipinas, pati Canada at United Kingdom ay pahihintulutan na rin nito sa ilalim ng nilulutong mga kasunduang militar sa pagitan nito at nabanggit na mga bansa. Isang kasunduan sa “enhanced defense cooperation” o EDCA ang sinasabing “inaayos” na sa pagitan ng Pilipinas at Canada, ayon kay Gilbert Teodoro Jr, kalihim ng Department of National Defense noong Enero 16. Pipirmahan ito sa loob ng unang kwarto ng taon. Katulad sa EDCA ng bansa sa US, iniikutan nito ang pagbabawal sa pagtatayo ng mga base militar, pagtatambak ng mga armas pandigma, at pagpasok ng mga armas nukleyar. Naghahabol din - 64 -
ang Canada ng sariling Visiting Forces Agreement na tiyak na magbibigay ng parehong mga pribilehiyo sa mga tropang Amerikano ngayon sa bansa. Katulad ng EDCA at VFA ng US sa Pilipinas, tiyak ring pahihintulutan ng papet na rehimeng Marcos Jr ang matagalang presensya ng mga dayuhang tropang Canadian. Nangangailangan ng pagsang-ayon ng mayorya ng Senado ang isang tratadong militar. Nilusaw ng Senado ang huling gayong tratado, ang US- Philippine Military Bases Agreement noong 1991, na sumipa sa mga pwersa ng US sa malalaking base militar nito sa Subic at Clark. Sa VFA, walang awtoridad ang Pilipinas sa mga sundalong Amerikanong pumapasok sa Pilipinas, kahit pa nakagawa ng mga krimen. May mga ekstra- teritoryal din silang karapatan sa inako nilang mga “EDCA site” na walang iba kundi mga base militar. Magkakaroon din ng “kasunduan” ang Pilipinas at UK para pahintulutan ang presensya ng mga tropa ng huli sa mga isinasagawang wargames ng US sa kalupaan at soberanong karagatan ng bansa sa susunod na limang taon. Papel ng ADB sa huwad na modernisasyon ng transportasyon, binatikos Enero 20, 2024 - 65 -
Nagprotesta sa harap ng upisina ng Asian Development Bank (ADB) sa Ortigas Center sa Mandaluyong City ang kabataan, sa pangunguna ng League of Filipino Students, para batikusin ang papel nito sa huwad na modernisasyon sa transportasyon at pag-phase-out sa tradisyunal na mga dyip. Pasimuno ang ADB sa paninisi sa tradisyunal na mga dyip bilang pollutant, dahilan ng trapik, di episyente at nakasasama sa kalusugan ng mga komyuter. Itinutulak ng ADB ang pagpapatakbo ng “ligtas,” “malinis” at diumano’y abot-kaya na mga bus na buu-buong iaangkat mula sa Japan, US, Korea at kahit sa China. Pinakamatingkad ang pakanang ito sa programang Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) na itinutulak ng ADB sa Davao. Tumataginting na $1 bilyon ang ipinautang nito sa lokal na gubyerno para palitan ang mga bus, dyip at traysikel na pumapasada sa syudad ng mahigit 1,000 bus na Euro-5 compliant at pinatatakbo ng elektrisidad na gawang-Japan at Korea. Sisimulan na ang “transpormasyon” ng buong sistema ng transportasyon ng Davao ngayong 2024. Ipinangangalandakan ng ADB at Japan ang BRT bilang programang magpapababa sa emisyong greenhouse gas (GHG) ng Pilipinas at pagpupwesto ng transportasyong “low carbon.” Ito rin ang pagdadahilang isinumite ng Office of the Solicitor General bilang sagot sa petisyon ng grupong Piston para ipatigil ang PUVMP sa buong bansa. Ayon sa OSG, ang pag-phase-out ng mga dyip ay bahagi ng “climate commitment” ng Pilipinas na pababain ang emisyong GHG nito. - 66 -
Sa National Capital Region at iba pang bahagi ng bansa, kasunod ng pwersahang konsolidasyon ng mga prangkisa ang pwersahang pagpapabili sa mga drayber at opereytor ng napakamahal na mga minibus na gawang-Japan o Korea, o di kaya’y mga makinang pinatatakbo ng elektrisidad na gawang-US. Dahil walang sariling industriya ang Pilipinas sa paggawa ng buong mga sasakyan, o kahit ng mga makina at pyesa, kakailanganin nitong iangkat ang mahahalagang bahagi, kung hindi man ang buu-buong mga sasakyan. “Gagawing negosyo at pagkakakitaan lamang ang mga driver at operator sa pagpapautang o official assistance ng ADB sa tabing ng PUVMP sa paglalako nito ng mga imported modern jeep na tuluyang magpe-phaseout sa tradisyunal na jeep at tatanggalan ng kabuhayan ang libu-libong tsuper at operators,” pahayag ni Elle Buntag, pangkalahatang kalihim ng grupo. Sa ngayon, mayorya ng pumapasadang bus sa bansa ay imported mula sa Japan. Noong 2021, nag-import ang bansa ng mga bus na nagkakahalaga ng $206 milyon mula sa Japan, China ($21.7M), South Korea ($2.7M), Vietnam ($526,000), at United Arab Emirates ($45,300). Minanupaktura rin sa Japan ang mga makina ng mga tradisyunal na dyip (kalakhan gawang-Isuzu, Mitsubishi at Toyota) na nais ngayong palitan ng naturang mga kumpanya ng “mas malinis” na minibus. - 67 -
Malaking tambakan rin ng used vehicle o segunda mano at lumang modelong mga sasakyang Japanese ang Pilipinas. “Sa pamamagitan ng ADB, naghanap ito ng atrasadong bayan na pwede nilang pagtambakan at pagbentahan ng mga nabanggit [uniform vehicles]. Dahil sa kawalan ng makamasa at aksesibol na pampublikong transportasyon, Pilipinas ang nahanap nilang malaking potential market para sa mga sobrang produkto nila,” dagdag pa niya. Ang ADB ay multilateral na bangkong dominado ng estado at mga kapitalistang Japanese. Nagsisilbi itong katuwang ng World Bank sa rehiyon ng Asia sa pagtutulak ng mga imperyalistang patakaran. Piston: Walang kinalaman sa “climate commitment” ng bansa ang pwersahang konsolidasyon ng prangkisa ng mga dyip Enero 20, 2024 Pinuna ng Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahan ng Tsuper at Operator Nationwide (Piston) ang sagot ng Office of the Solicitor General sa petisyon ng mga drayber at opereytor ng dyip na nakasampa sa Korte Suprema laban sa pwersahang konsolidasyon ng mga prangkisa na labag sa prinsipyo ng malayang pag-organisa. Sa sagot ng OSG, na siyang kumakatawan sa DOTr at LTFRB sa kaso, layunin diumano ng PUV modernization program (PUVMP) ang pagtupad sa mga pangako - 68 -
ng bansa na bawasan ang mga greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions o maduming usok na ibinubuga ng bansa. Tanong ng Piston, ano naman ang kinalaman ng mandatory franchise consolidation ng PUVMP sa dedlayn sa pag-abot ng “climate commitment” ng Pilipinas o mga hakbangin pinangako ng bansa? “Ang pagpupumilit ng DOTr at LTFRB sa franchise consolidation, na kalaunan ay magreresulta sa pagkamkam ng malalaking negosyanteng kooperatiba at korporasyon na may kakayahang bumili ng hindi bababa sa 15 minibus bawat ruta, ay walang kinalaman sa anumang mga pagtugon sa klima,” pahayag ng grupo ng mga tsuper at opereytor. “Magreresulta lamang ito sa matinding pagkawala ng hanapbuhay ng mga tsuper at maliliit na operator at sa tahasang pang-aagaw ng mga malalaking korporasyon sa kontrol ng ating pampublikong transportasyon.” Binanggit ng Piston na inirekomenda mismo ng UN special rapporteur for climate change na si Ian Fry na bumuo ang estado ng patakaran para sa makatarungang transisyon sa transportasyon para maprotektahan ang karapatan ng mga manggagawa sa disenteng trabaho. Paulit-ulit nang idinidiin ng Piston at ng grupong MANIBELA na papatayin ng PUVMP at pwersahang konsolidasyon ang hanapbuhay ng maliliit na tsuper at opereytor. - 69 -
“Hindi kailangan ang franchise consolidation para mapabuti ang public transportation system,” giit ng Piston. “Maaari nating ayusin at paunlarin ang kalunos-lunos na lagay ng public transport sa bansa nang hindi nilalabag ang karapatan ng mga tsuper at maliliit na operator sa disenteng trabaho.” “Ang tugon ng OSG at ang pagtatangka ng mga maka-PUVMP na harangan ang ating petisyon sa Korte Suprema ay nagbubunyag lang ng tunay na layunin ng rehimeng Marcos sa pagtulak nito sa PUVMP,” ayon sa Piston. Liban sa pagbibigay-daan sa pang-aagaw ng malalaking burgesya sa kanilang kabuhayan, batid rin ng mga tsuper at opereytor na bibigyan-daan ng PUVMP ang pagtatambak ng sarplas na mga sasakyang minibus, makina, pyesa at iba pang produkto mula sa US, Japan, Korea at maging sa China. Tulad ng OSG, bukambibig rin ng mga bansang ito, partikular ng Japan, ang pag-apula sa climate change sa pamamagitan ng paglalatag ng transportasyong “low carbon.” Kung usapin lamang ng “climate commitments,” malayong-malayo ang usapin ng ibinubugang greenhouse gas ng mga tradisyunal na dyip sa pangunahing mga salarin nito sa bansa. Sa ulat ng Climate Action Tracker noong Hunyo 2023, ang pangunahing nagpapataas ng emisyong GHG sa Pilipinas ay ang sektor ng enerhiya, na nakaasa pangunahin sa plantang pinatatakbo ng karbon (coal). - 70 -
Gayundin, imbes na bawasan ng estado ang pangkalahatang pagsalalay ng bansa sa fossil gas, pinayagan pa nito ang malalaking burgesya na magtayo ng dagdag na pitong LNG (liquid natural gas) terminal para imbakan ng imported na LNG mula sa US, na numero unong nagluluwas ng LNG sa buong mundo. Tatlo rito ay gumana simula 2023. Nag-aambag ang Pilipinas ng 0.48% sa emisyong GHG sa buong mundo. Sa kabilang panig, 2.6% ng pandaigdigang GHG ang nanggagaling sa Japan at 14% sa US. 2 magsasaka, pinaslang ng 62nd IB sa modus na pekeng engkwentro Enero 21, 2024 Dinampot at tinortyur, bago pinaslang ng mga sundalo ng 62nd IB ang dalawang magsasaka sa Barangay Sag-ang, La Castellana, Negros Occidental noong Enero 17 ng umaga. Para pagtakpan ang kanilang karumal-dumal na krimen, pinalalabas ng mga sundalo na napatay sina Boy Baloy, 60 anyos, at Bernard Torres, 50, sa modus nito na pekeng engkwentro. Sa impormasyon ng mga saksi, sina Baloy at Torres ay dinampot sa kanilang tinutuluyang bahay ng alas-6:45 ng umaga, inilayo sa komunidad, ipinailalim sa matinding interogasyon, binugbog at tinortyur, bago binaril ng mga berdugo. Si Baloy ay kasapi ng Kaisahan sa Gamay’ng Mag-uuma sa Oriental Negros (KAUGMAON-Guihulngan Chapter), habang si - 71 -
Torres ay isang drayber ng habal-habal at kasapi ng Undoc-Piston-Guihulngan Chapter. Mula pa 2017, paulit-ulit nang nakararanas ng panggigipit at panghaharas ang dalawa mula sa mga pwersa at ahente ng estado. Nakaligtas si Torres at kanyang pamilya sa madugong Oplan Sauron na inilunsad ng rehimeng US-Duterte laban sa mamamayang Negrosanon noong Disyembre 2018. Naglinaw rin si Ka JB Regalado, tagapagsalita ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB) -Central, na hindi mga kasapi ng hukbong bayan ang dalawa. “Hindi armado ang mga biktima at pinalalabas lamang na nakumpiskahan ng dalawang shotgun, kalibre .45 pistola at iba pang sinasabing subersibong dokumento. “Walang engkwentro,” giit niya. “Ang ganitong kasinungalingan ng 62nd IB laban sa mga inosenteng sibilyan ay hindi na bago, bagkus isang pasistang tatak ng reaksyunaryo at mersenaryong Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),” pahayag ni Ka JB. Binatikos din ng panrehiyong kumand ng BHB sa Negros Island ang modus na pekeng engkwentro ng 62nd IB. Isiniwalat din ni Ka Maoche Legislador, tagapagsalita ng BHB-Negros Island, na mayroong isa pang pinalabas na pekeng engkwentro sa Barangay Cambayobo, Calatrava, Negros Occidental noong Enero 15. “Ang sinasabing nareyd na kampo ng 79th IB ay drama lamang at ang sinasabing engkwentro ay - 72 -
gamit na gamit nang iskrip ng AFP,” ayon pa kay Ka Maoche. Aniya, nagsasagawa ng “fake news spree” ang 3rd ID at ang lahat ng anim na batalyon sa ilalim nito sa isla ng Negros. Hinahabol nito ang hibang na pahayag na “nabuwag” na ang mga yunit ng hukbong bayan sa isla, pinababagsik nito ang kanilang kampanyang kontra-insurhensya na nagsasapahamak at tumatarget sa mga sibilyan at lumalabag sa kanilang karapatang-tao. Mga grupong relihiyoso at kabataan, muling nagrali kontra pagmimina sa Eastern Samar Enero 21, 2024 Mahigit isanlibong mamamayan ang nagsama- sama noong Enero 20 sa Immaculate Conception Parish Church sa bayan ng Guiuan para ipamalas ang kanilang pagtutol sa mapanirang pagmimina sa buong isla ng Samar. Ang aktibidad na tinawag bilang “Island Wide Jericho Prayer Assembly” ay pinangunahan ng Save Homonhon Movement, at mga grupo at diyosesis ng simbahang Katoliko sa buong isla. Panawagan ng mga nakiisa sa pagkilos na itigil ang mapanirang pagmimina sa mga isla ng Homonhon at Manicani sa Guiuan, at maging sa iba pang bahagi ng isla. Kasalukuyang nag- ooperasyon ang apat na kumpanyang mina para kumuha ng nickel at chromite sa isla ng Homonhon. - 73 -
Nag-umpisang magmina ang mga kumpanyang Techiron Resources Inc, Emir Mineral Resources Corp, King Resources Mining Corp, at Global Min- met Resources Inc noong maagang bahagi ng 2015. Ang kumpanyang Techiron, na nagmimina sa 1,500-ektaryang kalupaan sa isla, ay isa sa mga kumpanyang ipinasara ni dating Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Gina Lopez noong 2017. Muli itong nagbukas noong 2020 matapos bawiin ang suspensyon. Sa tala ng gubyerno, ang apat na kumpanyang ito ay nakapagmina ng 605,176 metriko tonelada (MT) ng nickel ore at 19,105 MT ng chromite sa isla noong 2021 lamang. Sa ulat mismo ng Department of Environment and Natural Resources Forestry Management Bureau, halos 1,000 ektaryang kagubatan mula 1990 hanggang 2021 ang kinalbo dahil sa mga operasyong pagmimina sa isla. Dumalo at nakiisa sa pagkilos ang ilang mga kinatawan ng Diocese of Borongan (Eastern Samar), Diocese of Calbayog (Western Samar) at Diocese of Catarman (Northern Samar.) Ito na ang ikalawang pagkilos na inilunsad ng mga grupo para ipahinto ang mapanirang pagmimina sa buong isla. Unang nagsama-sama at nagmartsa ang humigit- kumulang 2,000 residente mula sa iba’t ibang prubinsya ng Samar noong Agosto 7, 2023 sa sentro ng Borongan City, Eastern Samar. - 74 -
Nagmartsa sila noon mula sa kapitolyo ng syudad tungo sa simbahan. Pamilya ng martir, binantaan at hinaras ng AFP Enero 21, 2024 Kinundena ng BHB-Sorsogon (Celso Minguez Command) ang panggigipit ng 31st IB at mga ahenteng paniktik sa pamilya ni Baltazar Hapa (Ka Patrick) noong Enero 20. Sinugod ng 10 elemento, sa pangunguna ni Jordan Enconado, ahente ng 96th MICO, ang burol ni Ka Patrick sa isang punenarya sa sentro ng Gubat, Sorsogon. Ayon sa pamilya, nagbanta ang mga ahenteng militar na papatayin nila ang kapatid ni Baltazar na matagal nang namuhay bilang sibilyan, kung hindi daw ito susuko. Nananawagan ang pamilyang Hapa na respetuhin sila at tigilan na ang panghaharas sa kanila. Matagal nang gawi ng AFP na sundan at gipitin ang naiwang pamilya ng mga martir ng BHB. Si Ka Patrick ay napaslang ng mga elemento ng 31st IB nitong Enero 14, sa Barangay Togawe, Gubat, Sorsogon. Ayon kay Ka Samuel Guerrero, tagapagsalita ng NPA Sorsogon “Ang pananakot at panghaharas sa walang kalaban-labang mga sibilyan ay isang kaduwagan at paglabag sa internasyunal na makataong batas at sa Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) hinggil sa - 75 -
wastong pagtrato sa mga sibilyan sa gitna ng umiiral na gera sibil sa bansa.” “Ipinapakita lamang ng insidenteng ito ang kaduwagan at kawalang respeto ng mga reaksyunaryong armadong pwersa sa mga batas ng digma,” aniya. (Ulat mula sa Radyo Bulusan) Pinunong obispo ng CBCP, nagsagawa ng misa para sa mga bilanggong pulitikal sa Taguig City Enero 21, 2024 Nagdaos ng isang misang Katoliko ang pinunong obispo ng Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) na si Kalookan Bishop Pablo Virgilio David para sa mga bilanggong pulitikal at mga nakapiit sa Metro Manila District Jail Annex 4 (MMDJ-4) sa Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig City noong Enero 16. Naisagawa ito sa imbitasyon at pag-aasikaso ng Kapatid, grupo ng mga kaanak at kaibigan ng mga bilanggong pulitikal. Si Bishop David ay kilala sa walang puknat na pagtatanggol sa karapatan ng mga biktima ng gera kontra droga ng dating rehimeng Duterte. Ang misa sa naturang piitan ay kauna-unahan sa kasaysayan na pinangunahan ng isang obispo. “Labis ang saya namin na tinanggap niya ang aming imbitasyon para magbigay ng misa para sa aming intensyon na mabigyang atensyon ang - 76 -
kalagayan ng mga bilanggong pulitikal at ang aming apela na palayain ang matatanda at maysakit na mga bilanggo,” ayon kay Fides Lim, asawa ng bilanggong pulitikal na si Vicente Ladlad at tagapagsalita ng Kapatid. Pahayag ni Bishop David, hinihintay lamang umano niya na siya ay maimbitahan para makapagbigay ng misa. Nakatuwang ni Bishop David sa pagdiriwang ng misa sina CBCP-Episcopal Commission on Prison Pastoral Care Executive Secretary Rev. Fr. Nezelle O. Lirio at Rev.  Fr. John Albert V. Absalon mula sa prison ministry ng CBCP at Diocese of Pasig. Pagkatapos ng misa, nagkaroon ng maiksing programa kung saan nagsalita ang ilang bilanggong pulitikal. Ibinahagi ng konsultant sa kapayapaan ng National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) na si Adelberto Silva ang kasalukuyang mahirap na kundisyon na kanilang dinaranas sa loob ng piitan. Aniya, iniiinda nila ang masikip na mga kulungan, kakulangan sa pagkain at sapat na nutrisyon, kulang na atendsyong medikal, delikadong pag- padlock sa mga selda, at hindi pagdadala sa ospital sa may malulubhang sakit na nagdulot sa pagkamatay ng kapwa bilanggong pulitikal na si Eduardo Serrano sa parehong piitan noong 2016. Ibinahagi naman ng konsultant ng NDFP na si Vicente Ladlad ang ilan sa dahilan ng kanilang hindi makatarungang pagkakapiit. Kabilang sa mga ito ang tinawag niyang gawa-gawang mga kasong isinasampa laban sa katulad nila, - 77 -
kriminalisasyon ng pampulitikang paninindigan, kakulangan ng mga abugado, at ang Anti- Terrorism Act na aniya ay kinakasangkapan ng gubyerno para arbitraryong i-freeze ang kanilang mga akawnt sa bangko at ari-arian. “Isa itong pagkatuto sa akin na mayroong mga bilanggong pulitikal, at na marami ang katulad niyo sa kasalukuyan,” tugon ni Bishop David. Aniya, alam niya ang pakiramdam ng masampahan ng patung-patong na mga kaso dahil sa kanyang karanasan sa ilalim ng administrasyong Duterte. Sinampahan si Bishop David, kasama ang apat pang obispo at si dating bise presidente Leni Robredo, noon ng mga kasong sedisyon, estafa at libel dahil sa pagtatanggol at pagpanig sa mga biktima ng gera kontra droga. Hinimok ng obispo ang Kapatid na ipagpatuloy ang pakikipag-ugnayan at tulungan nito sa Episcopal Commission ng CBCP sa Prison Pastoral Care. Bilang pasasalamat, nagbigay ang grupo at ang mga bilanggong pulitikal kay Bishop David ng isang wood burned artwork ng Madonna and Child na likha ng bilanggong pulitikal na si Sherniel Ascarragas. Nakaukit sa likha ang mga salitang “Magtanim ng pagmamahal sa Inang Bayan at magbunga ng kapayapaan.” Nagsama-sama sa misa at programa ang mga bilanggong pulitikal, mga kaibigan at kaanak nila, ilang mga opisyal ng piitan, gayundin ang mga kinatawan mula sa prison ministry ng CBCP, ilang - 78 -
mga tagasuporta kabilang sina Princess Nemenzo, Teresita Ang See, Wilson Flores, Barbara Mae Dacanay, at mga madre ng Good Shepherd sa pangunguna ni Sr.  Aida Casambre, nakatatandang kapatid ng bilanggong pulitikal na si Rey Casambre. Ang MMDJ-4 ay itinuturing na “showcase” prison for “high-profile” male detainees kung saan aabot sa 348 ang mga nakapiit na Persons Deprived of Liberty dito kabilang na ang 26 mga bilanggong pulitikal. 3 magsasaka sa Himamaylan City, dinakip at ikinulong ng 94th IB Enero 22, 2024 Inaresto ng mga sundalo ng 94th IB ang tatlong magsasaka sa Sityo Cantupa-Pisok, Barangay Buenavista, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental noong Enero 21. Ikinulong sila sa hindi malinaw na mga kaso at akusasyon. Ayon sa ulat, isinakay ang mag-amang magsasakang sina Deloy at Vincies de Leon, at Remy Villacanao sa sasakyan ng 94th IB na nakaparada sa Sityo Alolong sa barangay na iyon. Ang tatlo ay pawang mga kasapi ng Kauswagan sang mga Mangunguma sa Buenvista (KMB). Lider-simbahan din si Deloy de Leon. Kaugnay nito, inianunsyo ng 94th IB ngayong araw lamang ang kanilang operasyon at pag- aresto kay Vincies de Leon. Pinararatangan siya ng paglabag sa kasong bigong pagpaslang at - 79 -
pinalalabas na kabilang sa “nalalabing” mga kasapi ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB) sa naturang erya. Pekeng ipinahayag pa ng mga ito na kasama nila sa naturang operasyon ang mga elemento ng lokal na pulis. Si De Leon ay kasalukuyang nasa kustodiya ng Himamaylan City Police Station, habang wala pang karagdagang ulat sa kalagayan ng dalawang iba pang magsasakang inaresto ng 94th IB. Hindi na bago sa 94th IB ang modus nitong pagdakip at pagkukulong sa mga sibilyang magsasaka at residente para palabasing nananalo ito laban sa BHB. Tinarget ng 3rd ID, kung saan nakapailalim ang 94th IB, na ideklarang “insurgency-free” ang buong isla ng Negros ngayong unang kwarto ng 2024. Lider-magsasaka sa Cebu, inaresto Enero 22, 2024 Iniulat ng Karapatan-Central Visayas ang pag- aresto sa lider-magsasaka ng Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP)-Cebu na si Allan Flores noong Enero 21 sa kanyang sakahan sa Sibagay 2, Barangay Cantabaco, Minglanilla, Cebu. Anang grupo, dinampot si Flores ng nakasibilyang mga ahente ng estado na umano’y naghain sa kanya ng mandamyento de aresto. Mayroong mga nakasampang kasong pagpatay at tangkang pagpatay sa Bohol laban kay Flores. Tinawag ng Karapatan-Central Visayas ang mga kasong ito na “gawa-gawa.” Kasalukuyan siyang - 80 -
nakapiit sa Lutopan Police Station sa Toledo City, Cebu. Samantala, iniulat ng pambansang pamunuan ng KMP ang lantarang panggigipit ng hinihinalang mga ahenteng paniktik ng gubyerno laban kay Danilo Ramos (Ka Daning), tagapangulo ng KMP. Naitala ng grupo ang paghahanap ng mga lalaking sakay ng motorsiklo kay Ka Daning noong Enero 3 at 15 sa Malolos City, Bulacan, kung saan siya nakatira. Sa isang insidente, itinanong pa ng mga lalaki kung “Tagasaan ba si Danilo Ramos? Matagal na namin siyang hinahanap kasi terorista siya.” Kinundena ito ng KMP at sinabing isa itong mapanganib at lantarang kaso ng “teroristang pagbabansag” na may direktang banta sa buhay ni Ka Daning, kanyang pamilya at maging sa iba pang kasapi at lider ng KMP. Ayon pa sa KMP at grupong Tanggol Magsasaka, tumindi ang pagmamatyag at paniniktik laban kay Ka Daning simula noong nagdaang taon. Isinadokumento ito ng KMP at Tanggol Magsasaka at isinumite sa Commission on Human Rights noong Agosto 2023 para isiwalat ang mga paglabag sa karapatang-tao ng mga pwersa ng estado. Pinakamatandang bilanggong pulitikal, hindi isinali ng rehimen sa mga pinalaya noong kapaskuhan Enero 22, 2024 - 81 -
Dismayado ang Kapatid, grupo ng mga kaanak at kaibigan ng mga bilanggong pulitikal, sa hindi pagsasali sa 84-taong gulang na bilanggong pulitikal na si Gerardo Dela Peña sa listahan ng mga pinalaya noong kapaskuhan sa kabila ng kanyang katandaan at pagkakaroon ng sakit. Kaugnay ito ng ipinatupad na resolusyon ng Bureau of Pardons and Parole (BPP) na nagbibigay ng konsiderasyon para sa “executive clemency” para sa mga bilanggo na edad 70 pataas at nakulong na ng higit 10 taon. Inilabas noong Disyembre 2023 ang BPP Resolution No.  08-02-2023 para umagapay sa pagpapaluwag ng mga piitan at magpapalaya sa matatandang bilanggo laluna ang mga maysakit at seryosong kapansanan. Ayon sa Kapatid, pasok sa kwalipikasyon ang 84-taong gulang na si Dela Peña na 11 taon na sa kulungan. Giit ni Fides Lim, tagapagsalita ng Kapatid, dapat tiyakin ang patas na implementasyon ng naturang resolusyon. “Wala sa panig ng isang 84-taong gulang ang panahon sa napakasisikip na kundisyon sa New Bilibid Prison,” ayon pa kay Lim. Binatikos din ni Lim ang sinabi niyang magkakasalungat na pahayag ng mga upisyal ng guberyno. Aniya, ibinalita ng isang upisyal ng Department of Justice na nakinabang ang dalawang matanda sa naturang resolusyon, kabilang si Dela Peña. Ngunit nang bisitahin ng Kapatid noong Enero 15 sa piitan, ipinakita ni Dela Peña ang listahan ng BPP na tumangging bigyan siya ng executive clemency. - 82 -
“Bakit siya hindi naisali sa higit 1,000 bilanggo na pinalaya noong Disyembre? Dahil ba isa siyang bilanggong pulitikal? O dahil isang numero lamang sa estadistika sa mabagal na usad ng burukrasya?” pagtatanong ni Lim. Giit niya na dapat ibigay sa lahat ng mga bilanggo ang ingklusibo at patas na hustisya anuman ang kanilang pampulitikang istatus. Si Dela Peña ang pinakamatanda sa aabot 800 bilanggong pulitikal na nakakulong ngayon sa iba’t ibang piitan ng bansa. Simula pa 2019 itinutulak ng Kapatid ang pagpapalaya kay Dela Peña ngunit paulit-ulit itong isinantabi at binaliwala ng estado. Si dela Peña, na may altapresyon at iba pang karamdaman, ay magsasakang tubong Vinzons, Camarines Norte na hinatulan ng reclusion perpetua sa gawa-gawang kasong pagpatay. Siya ay dating lider ng Samahan ng Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at Aresto (Selda) at kasapi ng Karapatan. Unang iniapela ng Kapatid ang pagpapalaya sa kanya sa makataong mga batayan noong 2019 ngunit tinanggihan ito ng Korte Suprema at pinagtibay ang hatol sa kanya. Ika-37 anibersaryo ng Mendiola Massacre, ginunita ng mga grupong magsasaka Enero 23, 2024 - 83 -
Ginunita ng mga grupo ng mga magsasaka, kabataan at iba pang demokratikong sektor ang ika-37 anibersaryo ng Mendiola Massacre noong Enero 22. Higit 250 katao ang dumalo sa porum na pinangunahan ng Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) at NNARA Youth UP Diliman sa University of the Philippines (UP)-Diliman, na sinundan ng isang martsa-protesta sa kampus. “Tatlumput-pitong taon matapos ang malagim na Mendiola Massacre, walang pa ring hustisya sa mga pinaslang ng estado sa masaker, nanatiling walang tunay na repormang agraryo sa Pilipinas,” pahayag ng KMP. Nasawi sa naturang masaker ang 13 magsasaka noong Enero 22, 1987 sa Mendiola, Manila. Ang 13 magsasaka ay kabilang sa libu-libong nagtungo noon sa Mendiola upang ipanawagan sa dating Pangulong Cory Aquino na ipatupad ang tunay na reporma sa lupa. Anang grupo, nanatiling pundamental na problema sa ilalim ng kasalukuyang rehimeng US- Marcos ng kawalan ng lupa ng mayorya ng mga magsasakang Pilipino. “Malinaw na wala itong patakaran at programa sa reporma sa lupa,” dagdag pa ng mga magsasaka. Ito umano ang mahigpit na batayan kung bakit dapat walang pagod na isulong ang pakikibaka para sa tunay na reporma sa lupa, katulad ng ipinaglaban ng mga magsasaka 37 taon na ang nakalilipas. “Sa saligan, ang laban para sa tunay na reporma sa lupa—na ang sentral na layunin at batayang prinsipyo ay libreng pamamahagi ng - 84 -
lupa—ay laban ng buong mamamayang Pilipino,” ayon pa sa KMP. Sa porum na may temang “Kamtin ang Kapayapaan! Tunay Na Reporma Sa Lupa, Ipaglaban,” nagbigay ng talumpati ang interim chairperson ng negotiating panel ng National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) na si Ka Julie de Lima. Tinalakay ni de Lima ang Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms (CASER) na nagbalangkas sa kahingian ng masang magsasaka para sa tunay na reporma sa lupa at pagtataguyod ng pambansang industriyalisasyon. Pagkatapos ng talakayan, nagmartsa ang mga grupo sa Palma Hall sa UP Diliman para sa isang kilos protesta. Liban sa panawagang hustisya para sa mga biktima ng Mendiola Massacre, siningil nila ang rehimeng Marcos sa tuluy-tuloy na pagpaslang sa masang magsasaka sa kanayunan. Sa talaan ng Ang Bayan, mayroong 79 magsasakang biktima ng pagpaslang ang rehimeng Marcos mula nang maupo sa poder. Marami sa kanila ay pawang pinalalabas na napatay sa modus na pekeng engkwentro ng Armed Forces of the Philippines. Binatikos din ng KMP ang isinusulong na charter change ng rehimeng Marcos na magbibigay-daan sa pagpapahintulot sa mga dayuhan na magmay- ari ng lupa sa Pilipinas, liban pa sa likas na yaman at mga susing bahagi ng ekonomya. - 85 -
Rali kontra chacha, inilunsad ng mga grupong pambansa-demokratiko Enero 23, 2024 Nagprotesta ang mga grupong pambansa- demokratiko sa House of Representatives sa Quezon City noong Enero 22 para batikusin ang isinusulong ng rehimeng Marcos na charter change o “chacha.” Sa pangunguna ng Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), inilunsad ang protesta kasabay ng unang araw ng sesyon ng Kongreso. Sa pangalawang pagkakataon, tinatangka ng pangkating Marcos ang pagratsada ng charter change. Nagbuhos ito ng malaking pondo para itulak ang isang “people’s initiative” sa layunin na ibigay sa Mababang Kapulungan ang kapangyarihan para madaling baguhin ang konstitusyon. Sinundan ito ng paghahain ng liderato ng Senado sa Resolution of Both Houses No. 6 na naglalayong luwagan ang mga ekonomikong probisyon ng konstitusyong 1987 para bigyang daan ang dayuhang pag-aari o kontrol sa lupa, serbisyong pampubliko, edukasyon, masmidya at pagpapatalastas (advertising). Ayon sa mga grupo, ang “chacha” na ito ay para sa kapakinabangan ni Marcos, ng kaniyang mga kroni, at ng dayuhan nilang mga amo. “Malakas na lalabanan hindi lamang ng mga magsasaka kundi ng buong bayan ang tangkang pagpayag sa 100% dayuhang pagmamay-ari ng - 86 -
lupa na posibleng ilusot sa chacha,” pahayag ng Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Anila, malawakan na nga ang pagpapalayas sa lupa at kawalan ng lupang masasaka ng mga magbubukid, gusto pang ibigay ng rehimen sa dayuhan ang mga kalupaan at likas na yaman ng bansa. Magdudulot din umano ito ng lalo pang pagbaha ng mga imported na produktong agrikultural na magpapabagsak sa pambansang agrikultura at lalong wawasak sa seguridad sa pagkain na dapat sana’y nakabatay sa sariling kakayahan at kasapatan. “Ang sigaw ng mamamayan ay…dagdag sahod, libreng pamamahagi ng lupa, pagkontrol sa presyo ng langis at mga batayang bilihin tulad ng bigas, libreng serbisyong pangkalusugan at edukasyon, sapat na ayuda, abot-kayang pabahay at tunay na kalayaan,” pahayag ng Bayan. Samantala, binuo noong Enero 13 ng 15 iba’t ibang organisasyon sa Quezon City ang isang alyansang lalaban sa pakanang “chacha” ng rehimeng Marcos. Nagtipon sila sa University of the Philippines-Diliman para sa unang asembleya ng Quezon City Movement Against Charter Change (QC March). Inilunsad nila ito matapos ang paglaganap ng “People’s Initiative” na pinasimulan at pinopondohan ng House of Representatives para sa “chacha.” Nangalap ang naturang “inisyatiba” ng mga pirma sa komunidad, na unang naobserbahan at iniulat ng mga maralitang - 87 -
komunidad sa Quezon City. Pinapipirma umano sila sa petisyon para makatanggap ng ayuda at suporta mula sa gubyerno. Separation pay, giit ng mga manggagawa ng Chun Chiang Enterprises sa Bataan Enero 23, 2024 Muling ipinanawagan ng mga manggagwa ng kumpanyang Chun Chiang Enterprises Manufacturing Incorporated (CCEMI) na ibigay na sa kanila ang kanilang separation pay. Labis na itong naantala mula nang magsarado ang kumpanya dahil sa umano’y pagkalugi noong 2022 sa kasagsagan ng pandemya. Nagpoprodyus ang kumpanya ng mga trousers at slacks para sa lalaki. Pag-aari ang pagawaan ng kumpanyang German na Bültel Group. Sa impormasyon ng kumpanya sa website nito, itinayo ang pagawaan ng kumpanya sa Pilipinas noong 1976. Mayroon umano itong 650 manggagawa. Sa bukas na liham ng mga manggagawa ng CCEMI, iginiit nila sa Philippine Trade & General Workers Organization (PTGWO), kasapi ng Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) at IndustriALL, na kagyat nang ibigay ang napirmahang liham sa pandaigdigang upisina ng IndustrialALL. Ayon sa kanila, kinakailangan ang pirma ng pangulo ng PTGWO para maiproseso na ang paghahabol nila sa kanilang employer at separation pay. - 88 -
Nagpahayag ng pakikiisa at suporta ang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Freeport Area of Bataan (NMFAB) sa nasabing laban ng mga manggagawa. Anang grupo, “Hinihikayat namin ang PTGWO na tugunan ang kahilingan ng mga manggagawa upang sa gayon ay makamit na nila ang karampatang bayad na kanilang pinaghirapan sa loob ng CCEMI.” Liban dito, idiniin ng NMFAB na dapat mapanagot ang CCEMI sa sinapit ng mga manggagawa. Ibinahagi ng grupo na liban pa sa pagkakait sa separation pay ng mga manggagawa ay pinagbawalan ng kumpanya ang mga kasapi ng unyon ng CCEMI na makapagtrabaho sa loob ng Freeport Area of Bataan. Dapat din umano itong magsilbing paalala sa iba pang mga manggagawa sa loob ng Freeport Area of Bataan. “Nagpapatunay [ito] na kailangang maging mapagbantay sa lahat ng kumpanya na nagsasabing sila ay nalulugi at magsasara,” ayon sa grupo. Mahalaga umanong pahigpitin ng mga manggagawa ang kanilang pagkakaisa at itayo ang mga unyon na siyang nagsusulong ng karapatan sa sahod, trabaho at benepsiyo. Estilong “Tokhang” na profiling sa La Union, kinundena Enero 24, 2024 Kinundena ng grupo ng maliliit na mangingisda na Timek ken Namnama dagiti Babassit a Mangngalap ti La Union (TIMEK) ang tangkang profiling ng pulis ng Agoo, La Union laban sa - 89 -
pangulo nitong si George “King” Cacayuran at tatlo pa nitong myembro. Ibinahagi ng grupo na “binisita” ng PNP-Agoo si Cacayuran at mga kasama nito sa barangay hall ng San Manuel Norte. Wala noon sina Cacayuran dahil pumalaot ang mga ito. Nag-iwan ang naturang mga pulis ng isang blangkong dokumento na ibinilin nilang dapat sagutan ni Cacayuran. Nakasaad sa naturang dokumento na ang pino-profile ng naturang dokumento ay “sangkot sa paggamit ng shabu.” “Lubhang nakababahala ang ginagawang ito ng PNP Agoo,” ayon sa TIMEK. Sa panahon ni Duterte, aabot sa mahigit 30,000 ang kabuuang bilang ng biktima ng extrajudicial killings sa ngalan ng “gera kontra-droga kung saan nabantog ang salitang “tokhang” bilang katumbas ng pamamaslang ng mga pulis. Sa ilalim ng Oplan Tokhang ng huwad na “gera kontra-droga,” pangkaraniwang maririnig na katwiran ng gubyerno ang “nanlaban” sa mga pag-aresto at kadalasang nauuwi sa pagkakapaslang sa mga pinaghihinalaan pa lamang, ayon sa grupo. “Si King at ang TIMEK La Union ay matagal nang binibiktima ng gubyerno at pinararatangang kaaway ng estado,” ayon sa grupo. Nagpatuloy ito sa ilalim ng rehimeng Marcos, kung saan tampok ang pwersahang pagpapasuko sa apat na maralitang mangingisda noong 2022. Panawagan ng grupo, kagyat na itigil ang lahat ng porma ng harassment at paglabag sa karapatang- - 90 -
tao sa mga komunidad ng maralitang mangingisda. Grupo sa karapatang-tao, nanawagan sa rehimeng Marcos na itigil ang panloloko sa mga rapporteur ng UN Enero 24, 2024 Binweltahan ng grupong Karapatan ang rehimeng Marcos sa pagkukunwari nito kaugnay sa kalagayan ng karapatang-tao sa bansa sa harap ng pagbisita ng Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion ng United Nations (UN.) “Itigil na ang panloloko,” ayon sa grupo laban sa pahayag ng rehimen na ang “malugod na pagsalubong” nito sa naturang rapporteur ay nagpapaktia ng “bukas, sustinido at sinserong kooperasyon” ng gubyerno ni Ferdinand Marcos Jr sa mga UN at iba pang internasyunal na institusyon. Dumating sa bansa noong Enero 23 ang special rapporteur nitong si Irene Khan para siyasatin ang sitwasyon ng pamamahayag at pagpapahayag sa Pilipinas. Tatagal siya dito hanggang Pebrero 2. Balak niyang makipag-ugnayan sa iba’t ibang grupong demokratiko. “Binalewala, isinaisantabi at itinakwil ng gubyerno ng Pilipinas ang mga rekomendasyon ng mga UN special rapporteur na bumisita sa bansa sa nakaraan,” ayon sa grupo. “Pinepeke nila ang lahat ng ito, laluna sa harap ng pagpapatindi ng gubyernong Marcos sa patakaran nitong walang - 91 -
pakundangang panggigipit sa mamamayan, paglabag sa mga karapatan at batayang kalayaan, kabilang ang freedom of expression. Ayon kay Cristina Palabay, pangkalahatang kalihim ng grupo, ginagamit lamang ng gubyernong Marcos ang pakikipag-ugnayang panlabas para “makipagplastikan” at oportunidad para ibangon ang pangit na imahe nito sa internasyunal na komunidad. Kabilang sa mga binabalewala ng estado ang dati nang mga rekomendasyon ng UN, tulad ng inihapag ng noo’y UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions na si Phillip Alston noong 2007; at ni Dr.  Ian Fry, UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human rights in the Context of Climate Change na nagsagawa ng pagsisiyasat sa Pilipinas noong Nobyembre 2023. Nakatakdang porum ng US Air Force sa UP Diliman, ipinaaatras Enero 24, 2024 Nangangalap ng pirma para sa isang petisyon ang University of the Philippines Diliman (UPD) College of Science Student Council (CSSC) sa mga estudyante at organisasyon sa kampus nito para pigilan ang nakatakdang porum ng US Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) sa UP Diliman sa darating na Enero 1. Ayon ito sa ulat ng Philippine Collegian, pahayagang pangmag- aaral ng UP Diliman. - 92 -
Binatikos ng UPD CSSC ang nakatakdang porum ng US Air Force sa College of Science Administration Building na mabibigay ng impormason kaugnay ng “US Air Force Office of Scientific Research Grant Opportunities.” Tatalakayin dito kung papaanong makakukuha ng pondo mula sa AFOSR para sa mga pananaliksik na mapakikinabangan ng US Air Force. Layunin ng AFOSR na pondohan ang siyentipikong pananaliksik na maaari nitong isanib sa pagpapaunlad ng mga armas at teknolohiya na kapaki-pakinabang sa mga gera at opensiba ng imperyalistang US. “[Ang porum] ay tahasang kabaligtaran ng paninindigan ng kolehiyo na “Ipaglinkgod sa sambayanan ang Siyensya,” ayon sa petisyon ng konseho. Naniniwala ang konseho na dapat gamitin ang teknolohiya sa higit na nakabubuti, para sa isang makatarungan at mapayapang lipunan. Anila, malinaw na ginagamit ang mga pananaliksik na ito para sa mga krimen sa digma tulad ng ginagawang pagsuporta at pagpopondo ng imperyalistang US sa henosidyo ng Zionistang Israel laban sa mamamayang Palestino. Sa nagdaang tatlong buwan simula Oktubre 7, 2023, naghulog ang Israel ng 65,000 tonelada ng bomba sa Gaza City at pumatay ng 25,000 Palestino. Sa ulat noong huling kwarto ng 2023, nakatakdang bigyan ng US ang Israel ng dagdag na $14.3 bilyon para itaguyod ang gera nito laban sa mamamayang Palestino. Sa kabuuan, simula - 93 -
1946 hanggang 2023, tinatayang $263 bilyon na ang ibinigay nito sa Israel para sa pag-atake sa mga Palestino. Higit 80% ng mga armas ng Israel mula 1950 hanggang 2020 ay mula sa US. Dahil dito, umapela ang konseho sa dekano ng kolehiyo na si Dean Giovanni Tapang na huwag pahintulutang maisagawa ang aktibidad sa nasasakupan nitong mga gusali at iginiit nilang tuluyan nang ipaatras ang porum. Ayon sa Philippine Collegian, sinimulang ipaikot at mangalap ng pirma ng konseho noong Enero 22. Pagmimina at pagkalbo sa gubat ang sanhi ng pagbaha at mga landslide sa Davao at Caraga Enero 24, 2024 Isinisi ng Bagong Alyansang Makabasa-Southern Mindanao Region (Bayan-SMR) ang pinsala at trahedyang dala ng walang tigil na pag-ulan sa rehiyon sa nagpapatuloy na mga operasyon ng mapangwasak na mina, at pagkalbo sa kagubatan sa Mindanao. Tinatayang nasa ₱78 milyon ang pinsala sa agrikultura dulot ng mga pagbaha at pagguho ng lupa sa mga rehiyon ng Davao at Caraga nitong nagdaang mga linggo. Sa kasalukuyan, siyam na bayan ang ipinailalim sa state of calamity dahil dito. Sa datos ng National Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) noong Enero 23, pinakamalaki ang pinsalang naitala sa rehiyon ng - 94 -
Davao sa halagang ₱64,069,839. Samantala, ₱14,040,579.6 naman ang tinatayang halaga ng pinsala sa CARAGA. Ayon din sa ahensya, umaabot sa 768,387 indibidwal ang apektado ng mga pagbaha at pag-ulan mula pa Enero 14. Sa Davao de Oro, umabot sa 15 ang nasawi dulot sa pagguho ng lupa sa Purok 19, Pag-asa sa Barangay Mt. Diwata, Monkayo noong Enero 18. Sa Davao City, lumubog sa baha ang ilang mga baryo at daan, kabilang sa Bankerohan at Jade Valley, dahil sa walang tigil na pag-ulan. “Habang may mga pagsisikap ang ilang lokal na gubyerno, mga grupong maka-kalikasan at mga relief worker, kailangang kilalanin ang papel ng pandarambong sa kalikasan at pagpapabaya ng estado sa kasalukuyang mga pangyayari,” pahayag ng grupo noong Enero 20. Inihalimbawa nito ang tuluy-tuloy na pandarambong na nagaganap sa Pantaron mountain range, ang pinamalawak na mountain range sa Mindanao na tumatawid sa mga prubinsya ng Misamis Oriental, Bukidnon, Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Davao del Norte, at Davao del Sur. “(N)akikipagsabwatan ang mga ahensya ng gubyerno, tulad ng DENR, sa pamiminsala sa kanayunan sa pamamagitan ng pagbigay ng mga clearance sa multinasyunal na mga kumpanya (sa pagmimina), katulong ang mga pwersang panseguridad ng estado, para pasukin ang ating mga kabundukan at dambungin ang ating mga natural na rekurso,” ayon sa grupo. - 95 -
Kabilang sa pinangalanan ng grupo ang tatlong kumpanya sa pagmimina sa protektadong Mt. Hamigitan (Sinophil Mining & Trading Corporation, Hallmark Mining Corporation, Austral-Asia Link Mining Corporation); Kingking Mining Corporation at mga lugar ng pagmimina sa Pantukan at magkanugnog na mga bayan ng Compostela Valley/Davao de Oro; at tatlo ring kumpanya sa pagmimina sa Talaingod, Davao del Norte (One Compostela Valley Minerals, Inc, Phil. Meng Di Mining & Development Corporation, Metalores Consolidated, Inc. Sa mga pinangalanan, pinakamalaki ang sasaklawin ng Metalores Consolidated Inc, na binigyan ng lisensya na dambungin ang mahigit 15,000 ektaryang kagubatan sa Talaingod. Planong pagpapalayas sa mga residente sa isang barangay sa Bataan, nilalabanan Enero 24, 2024 Tutol ang mga residente ng Barangay Sisiman, Mariveles, Bataan sa nakatakdang pagpapalayas ng Bataan Baseco Joint Venture Inc.  (BBJVI) sa kanila mula sa komunidad sa darating na 2025. Itinutulak ito ng BBJVI para sa planong pagtatayo ng commercial-industrial zone sa naturang komunidad. Sa ulat ng Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Freeport Area of Bataan (NMFAB), nakipag-usap na noong unang linggo ng Enero ang BBJVI sa Sangguniang Barangay na pinamumunuan ni - 96 -
Kapitan Mario Magadan kung saan inihapag ang “master plan” nito para sa itatayong sona. Dagdag pa, nabili na umano ng BBJVI ang hindi bababa sa 271 ektarya lupain ng Barangay Sisiman at nakatakdang sakupin ang erya na ito. Pangunahing maapektuhan nito ang mga residente na naninirahan sa sentrong barangay. Alinsunod sa nasabing plano, ililipat ang mga taga-Sisiman sa 7.1 ektaryang lupain na nasa paligid lamang din ng barangay. Magtatayo umano ng 6,000 yunit ng pabahay na “ready-to- own” sa loob ng 30 taon para sa mga residente. Labis ang pangamba ng mga apektadong residente sa naturang plano ng BBJVI. Giit nila, pawang matagal na silang naninirahan sa lugar at hindi pwedeng basta lamang palayasin sa kanilang barangay. Nagtataka rin ang mga residente, sa biglang pagsulpot ng isang kumpanyang umaangkin ng lupa. Karamihan sa kanila, na manggagawa at mangingisda, ay matagal nang naninirahan sa lugar. Ipinabatid ng NMFAB ang kanilang pakikiisa sa laban at panawagan ng mga residente ng Barangay Sisiman. “Ipinaabot ng aming samahan ang aming lubos na pagsuporta sa pagtutol ng taumbaryo sa naturang proyekto ng BBJVI. Hindi tayo mga hayop na kayang itaboy sa sarili nating tahanan. Ang Sisiman ang inyong tahanan, ang Sisiman ang inyong kinabukasan.” Anila, dapat na magkaisa ang lahat ng mamamayan para igiit ang kanilang karapatan sa paninirahan. Hindi dapat umano pahintulutan na - 97 -
sa ngalan ng “negosyo” at “kapital” ay gagambalain ang kanilang buhay at kinabukasan. Idiniin ng grupo na ang kaso ng Sisiman ay hindi nahihiwalay sa laban ng mamamayan ng Mariveles sa laban nito sa isang ligtas, disente at libreng paninirahan na kapwa biktima ng mga pagpapalayas dahil sa pagtatayo ng mga negosyo at makadayuhang proyekto ng pamahalaan. Nakatira sa Barangay Sisiman ang 2,700 pamilya o 6,000 katao. Isa ito sa mga barangay na apektado ng tuluy-tuloy na pagpapalayas at demolisyon sa bayan ng Mariveles dulot ng pribatisasyon at FAB Expansion Law. Marami sa kanila ang pinagbawalan nang makapagkumpuni ng mga bahay at pinagkakaitan ng maayos na serbisyo ng tubig at kuryente bilang taktika ng pagtataboy. Dedlayn sa sapilitang konsolidasyon ng PUV, muling napaatras Enero 25, 2024 Natulak ng sama-samang pagkilos ng mga tsuper at opereytor, sa pamumuno ng Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahan ng Tsuper at Operator Nationwide (Piston), Samahang Manibela Mananakay at Nagka-Isang Terminal ng Transportasyon (Manibela), at Tanggol Pasada Network ang rehimeng US-Marcos na muling iatras ang dedlayn ng sapilitang konsolidasyon ng prangkisa ng mga public utility vehicle (PUV) na bahagi ng bogus na PUV Modernization Program ng gubyerno. Iniusod ng rehimen ang dedlayn - 98 -
tungong Abril 30 mula sa dating Disyembre 31, 2023 na naunang napalawig tungong Enero 31. “Habang hindi nito ginagarantiya ang agarang pagbabasura ng makadayuhan at negosyong PUV modernization program, magsilbi dapat itong pampagising sa inutil na rehimeng Marcos,” pahayag ng Piston. Ganito rin ang sentimyento ng grupong Manibela. Anila, “Hindi nito agarang mapababasura ang palpak, pahirap at makadayuhan na PUV modernization program, ngunit ito ay magsisilbi natin na pang buwelo para sa pagpapaingay pa ng kampanya hanggang tuluyan ito na mabasura.” Para sa kanila, mahalagang tuluy-tuloy na kumilos ang mga tsuper at opereytor para ipagtanggol ang kanilang mga kabuhayan, ibasura ang PUVMP, at isulong ang progresibo, makabayan, at makamasang pampublikong transportasyon kung saan walang tsuper, operator, at komyuter ang maiiwan. Naganap ang anunsyo ng pag-usod ng dedlayn matapos ang ikalawang pagdinig ng komite sa transportasyon sa House of Representatives kahapong, Enero 24, na tumalakay sa kainutilan at kapalpakan ng PUVMP. Nauna nang naisiwalat noong Enero 10, unang pagdinig ng komite, na malaking bilang pa ng mga dyipni ang hindi nagkonsolida, taliwas sa pahayag ng ahensya. Marami ring mga ruta ang di pa naayos, na rekisito sa konsolidasyon. - 99 -
Sa parehong pagdinig, naging katuwang ng Piston at Manibela ang mga kinatawan ng Makabayan Bloc sa pagtatanggol ng kanilang prangkisa at kabuhayan. Inilunsad din ng mga tsuper at opereytor ang piket kasabay ng mga pagdinig. Samantala, nagprotesta rin ang dalawang grupo sa Korte Suprema sa Maynila noong Enero 23 para ipanawagan ang pagkatig sa kanila ng korte kaugnay ng kanilang inihaing petisyon para ipahinto ang sapilitang konsolidasyon ng prangkisa at ang PUVMP. Itinaon nila ang protesta sa en banc session ng korte. “Nagpapasalamat kami sa lahat ng mga kasama na tinatatagan ang loob at naniwalang kapag tayo ay magkakasamang lumaban, mapagtatagumpayan natin ito!” pahayag ng Manibela. Ikinulong na mamamahayag na sinampahan ng kaso kaugnay sa “terorismo,” muling iginiit na palayain Enero 25, 2024 Muling ipinanawagan ng mga grupo ng mamamahayag at mga tagapagtanggol ng karapatang-tao na palayain ang pinakabatang mamamahayag na nakakulong sa buong mundo, si Frenchie Mae Cumpio, noong Enero 23. Nagprotesta sila, sa pangunguna ng Altermidya Network, sa Department of Justice sa Maynila. Itinaon ang protesta sa ika-25 kaarawan ni Cumpio at sa pagbisita ng Special Rapporteur ng - 100 -
United Nations para sa kalayaan sa opiniyon at pagpapahayag na si Irene Khan sa Pilipinas. Si Cumpio ay mamamahayag ng Eastern Vista, alternatibong midya sa rehiyon ng Eastern Visayas. Inaresto siya kasama sina Marielle “Maye” Domequil ng Rural Missionaries of the Philippines, Alexander Philip Abinguna, Mira Legion at Marissa Cabaljao sa isang iligal na reyd ng mga pulis noong Pebrero 7, 2020 sa isang upisina sa Tacloban City. Sinampahan sila ng mga kasong illegal possession of firearms. Noong Hulyo 2021, sinampahan ng estado ng dagdag na kasong “financing terrorism” sina Cumpio at Domequil. Pinalalabas ng estado na ang pondong nasamsam mula sa kanila ay para umano sa mga operasyon ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan na pilit nitong binabansagan bilang “teroristang organisasyon.” Nagpatunog ng maliliit na kampana ang mga nagprotesta na ginamit nilang simbolo kaugnay ng programa ni Cumpio sa radyo na ‘Lingganay Han Kamatuoran’ o ‘Bells of Truth.’ Umaasa ang mga nagprotesta na maririnig ni UNSR Irene Khan ang kanilang mga panawagan at iimbestigahan ang mga pag-atake ng mga pwersa ng estado laban sa mga mamamahayag pangkomunidad at alternatibong midya. Dapat umanong may mapanagot sa patung-patong nang mga kaso ng panggigipit, red-tagging, at paggamit sa mga batas gaya ng Anti-Terror Law at cyberlibel laban sa mga mamamahayag. Anila, - 101 -
nilalabag nito ang batayang karapatan ninuman sa malayang pagpapahayag. Iligal na pagkukwari sa Zambales, inirereklamo Enero 25, 2024 Inireklamo ng grupo ng mga tagapagtanggol ng kalikasan na Zambales Ecological Network (ZEN) ang iligal na pagkukwari sa dagat ng mga bayan ng San Narciso at San Felipe na kanilang napansin kahapon, Enero 24. Anila, dalawang aggregate carrier at isang dredger ang nasa dagat at nagkukwari ng buhangin na gagamitin sa reklamasyon sa Manila Bay. Napag-alaman ng ZEN na ang nagsasagawa ng pagkukwari ay ang mga barkong Ly 7, Yong Xin 1, at isang cargo, na pawang nakarehistro sa Sierra Leonne, bansa sa Africa. Anila, walang nakarehistrong Ore Transport Permits (OTP) at iba pang kinakailangang mga dokumento sa naturang mga barko. “Ito ay purong kasakiman ng ating mga lokal na upisyal. Ang hindi awtorisadong pagkukwari ay lubhang hindi kaugnay sa tinatawag ng gubernador at Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) na rehabilitasyon sa ilog,” ayon sa ZEN. Sa katunayan, anila, walang ilog ang isinasaayos sa mga operasyong ito. “Ang ating mga seabed, ang marine environment at ang ating mga sagradong fishing ground ay nawawasak at - 102 -
nasisira ngayon para lamang magtayo ng mga pook aliwan para sa mga mayayaman,” ayon sa grupo. Ang kinukwari na buhangin na gagamitin sa reklamasyon sa Manila Bay ay para sa itatayong malalaki at grandyosong casino at iba pang malalaki at nagtatayugang mga gusali at establisyementong negosyo. Isinulong at sinimulan ito sa panahon ng dating rehimeng Duterte. “Tutol sa iligal na pagkukwari ang mga may-ari ng resort, mga trabahante dito, mga nag-aari ng lupa at mga mangingisda,” ayon pa sa ZEN. Paggunita sa anibersaryo ng Partido, inilunsad sa Rizal Enero 25, 2024 Nagtipon ang mga kinatawan ng National Democratic Front of the Philippines upang sama- samang gunitain noong Enero 12 ang ika-55 anibersaryo ng pagkakatatag ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. Kasabay nito, pinagpugayan at inalala ng PKP-Rizal ang isang taong anibersaryo ng pagpanaw ni Prof.  Jose Maria Sison (Ka Joma) at ng iba pang mga rebolusyonaryong martir ng Rizal at Baong Hukbong Bayan (BHB)-Rizal. Nag-alay ng mensahe ng pakikiisa at mga pangkulturang pagtatanghal ang mga kinatawan ng rebolusyonaryong mga organisasyon bilang pagdiriwang ng anibersaryo ng Partido. Inilahad - 103 -
ng bawat isa ang pagtanggap ng hamon na patuloy na magwasto at magpanibagong lakas para sa pagpapatuloy ng rebolusyon. Ibinahagi ng National Democratic Front-Rizal ang mahabang kasaysayan ng pakikiisa sa malawak na bilang ng mamamayan sa pagtataguyod ng demokratikong rebolusyong bayan. “Hinding-hindi magagapi ang rebolusyonaryong kilusan dahil patuloy na umiigting ang krisis panlipunan na syang nag-uudyok sa mamamayan na maghimagsik,” bigkas ng kinatawan nito. Kasunod nitong nagbigay ng mensahe ang representante ng Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (Maibaka)-Rizal upang ilahad ang mahigpit na pakikiisa ng kababaihan sa pambansa-demokratikong pakikibaka ng mamamayan. Anang tagapagsalita ng Makibaka- Rizal, “Lubos ang pagtanggap ng rebolusyunaryong kababaihan ng Rizal sa hamon ng Partido na iwasto ang mga pagkukulang at kahinaan nito. Makakatiyak ang hanay ng kababaihan na iigpaw pasulong ang rebolusyon hanggang sa ganap na tagumpay.” Kasunod nitong nagbigay mensahe ang Katipunan ng mga Samahang Manggagawa (Kasama-Rizal) upang ilahad ang mahalagang papel at gampanin ng mga maralita at mala-manggagawa sa pagsusulong ng rebolusyon. “Tulad ng kababaihan, lubos ding tinatanganan ng mga mala-mangagagawa ang hamon ng Partido sa pagpapanibagong lakas ng pambansa- demokratikong pakikibaka sa ating lalawigan.” - 104 -
Huling nagbigay ng mensahe ng pakikiisa ang Kabataang Makabayan (KM)-Rizal at ibinahagi ang pagiging determinado nito na tatanganan ang malaking papel at tungkulin sa pagpapanibagong sigla at pagsulong ng buong rebolusyonaryong kilusan. Banggit ng KM-Rizal, “Pinatunayan ng kasaysayan mula pa noong rebolusyon ng 1896 hanggang sa pagpapatuloy nito sa pambasa- demokratikong rebolusyon ng bagong tipo na ang kilusang kabataan ay hindi masasaid na balon ng salinlahi ng rebolusyon. Kaya mahigpit ang pagtanggap ng KM-Rizal na bakahin at iwaksi ang empirisismo, konserbatismo, indibidwalismo at iba pang mga kahinaan at kalulangan nito.” Sa huling bahagi ng programa, sama-samang nanumpa muli ang mga kasapi ng Partido upang balikan ang rebolusyonaryong mga tungkulin at prinsipyo nito para sa pagpapatuloy ng demokratikong rebolusyong bayan. Ito ay isang panata na mahigpit na tanganan ang mga prinsipyo ng Partido buhay man ang ialay upang maampat ang mga pinsala at pagpapanibagong-lakas ng pambansa- demokratikong pakikibaka tungo sa mas mataas na antas. Reporma sa pensyon ng mga sundalo at pulis, tuluyan nang binitawan ng rehimeng Marcos Enero 25, 2024 Tuluyan nang binitawan ng rehimeng Marcos Jr ang tangkang pagreporma sa sistema ng mga - 105 -
pensyon ng Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police at iba pang unipormadong tauhan ng estado. Sa huling mga pahayag ng kalihim ng Department of Defense na si Gilbert Teodoro at katatalagang kalihim ng Department of Finance na si Ralph Recto, malinaw na tuluy-tuloy ipababalikat sa mamamayang Pilipino at pagbubundat sa burukrasyang militar. Kinumpirma ni Recto noong Enero 25 na hindi na itutulak ng Department of Finance (DoF) ang pagsingil ng kontribusyon para sa pensyon sa mga retirado at aktibong uniformed personnel. Taliwas ito sa pusisyon ng nauna sa kanya na kalihim ng DoF na si Benjamin Diokno. Diin noon ni Diokno, kailangang kunin sa sweldo ng mga aktibong sundalo at pulis ang kanilang pensyon at kung hindi ay magkakaroon ng “fiscal collapse” o mababangkrap ang Pilipinas. Sa General Appropriations Act o pambansang badyet sa 2024, naglaan ang rehimeng Marcos ng P129.82 bilyon para sa pensyon, pinakamalaking aytem kasunod ng pondong pambayad sa interes ng utang na awtomatikong nakalaan. Sa taya ng DoF, aabot sa $1 trilyon ang kailangang ilaan ng estado para sa pensyon ng unipormadong tauhan pagsapit 2035. Sa kabila ng bantang ito, nagpahayag ang rehimeng Marcos na ang sisingilin na lamang nito ng pensyon ay yaong papasok pa lamang sa serbisyo. Pero ayon pa rin kay Diokno, kung ang mga bagong entrants lamang ang sisingilin, aabot sa anim na dekada bago maging “sustenable” ang pensyon ng militar at pulis. - 106 -
Hindi nagtagal ay sinibak sa pwesto si Diokno. Ang pag-atras sa panukala na unang itinulak ng DoF at ipinasa sa Mababang Kapulungan ay kabilang sa mga hakbang ni Ferdinand Marcos Jr na ligawan ang mga aktibo at retiradong mga upisyal ng AFP laban sa mga maniobra ng pangkating Duterte na yanigin ang kanyang paghahari o di kaya’y tuluyan siyang patalsikin sa pamamagitan ng kudeta. Grupo sa karapatang-tao, nababahala sa mungkahing pagbabalik sa barangay intelligence network Enero 26, 2024 Nagpahayag ng labis na pagkabahala ang grupong Karapatan sa mungkahi ng upisyal ng Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) na muling buhayin ang barangay intelligence network (BIN) para umano sawatahin ang iligal na droga. Nangangamba ang grupo na magdudulot ito ng pagtindi ng ekstra-hudisyal na mga pagpatay at iba pang malulubhang paglabag sa karapatang-tao sa mga barangay. Ayon sa grupo, ang mungkahing buhayin ang BIN ay karugtong ng inilabas na Executive Order No. 54 (EO 54) ng Malacañang noong Enero 19 na nag-utos ng reorganisasyon ng National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). Ayon sa EO 54, isinasaayos ang NICA para umangkop sa “nagbabagong mga banta sa pambansang seguridad at tiyakin ang masiglang pangangalap ng intelidyens.” - 107 -
Sa bisa nito, binuo ng rehimeng Marcos sa ilalim ng NICA ang isang upisina para magpokus sa tinawag nitong “cyber and emerging” na mga banta na may layuning balangkasin ang kilos ng rehimen laban sa banta sa cybersecurity, mga armas para sa malawakang pagwasak, at iba pang lumilitaw na banta. Giit ng Karapatan, hindi malabong ipailalim nito ang banta ng iligal na droga sa bansa sa kategoryang “lumilitaw” o “hindi tradisyunal na banta.” Anila, gagamitin itong salalayan sa pagbuhay sa BIN. Sa kasaysayan, ang BIN ay itinatag ng estado bilang instrumento sa kontra-insurhensyang kampanya laban sa rebolusyonaryong kilusan. Ayon sa Karapatan, sa ganitong balangkas ginamit ng estado ang BIN para tukuyin ang sinasabing mga lider at kasapi ng mga aktibistang organisasyon na itinuturing ng estado na sumusuporta sa Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas at Bagong Hukbong Bayan. “Hindi iilang mga lider masa at aktibista ang iligal na inaresto, hindi makatarungang ikinulong sa patung-patong na mga kaso at pakanang pekeng ebidensya, dinukot, dinesaparesido o naging biktima ng ekstra-hudisyal na pagpaslang dahil sa buktot na trabaho ng mga operatiba ng BIN,” ayon sa grupo. Sa ilalim ng nireorganisang NICA, ang bubuhayin na BIN ay maaaring lantarang gamitin laban sa iligal na droga, pero hindi malabong gamitin din para sa kontra-insurhensyang kampanya at - 108 -
ipaloob sa tinagurian ng gubyerno na “whole of nation approach,” paliwanag ng Karapatan. “Para bigyang katwiran ito, maaari nang tusong magbuo ng pekeng kwento ang NICA na nag- uugnay sa palitan ng iligal na droga sa insurhensya o sa progresibong kilusan, katulad nang ginawa na sa ilang mga rehiyon sa bansa,” dagdag pa nila. Binatikos din nila ang sinasabing pokus ng NICA sa “cybersecurity” na mangangahulugan ng pinatinding paniniktik sa cyberspace at pagbabantay sa mga email at social media ng target na mga indibidwal. Mga manggagawa ng CNN Philippines, dapat protektahan sa harap ng posibleng pagsasara Enero 26, 2024 Dismayado ang National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) dahil hindi ipinaalam o inilinaw ng pamunuan ng istasyon sa telebisyon na CNN Philippines sa mga manggagawa nito ang usapin kaugnay ng posibleng pagsasara ng kumpanya. Naiulat noong Enero 25 na nagdesisyon umano ang Nine Media Corp.  at CNN na ihinto na ang kanilang kasunduan sa pagpapatakbo nito dahil diumano sa malaking pagkalugi. Anang NUJP, “katulad ng karaniwang nangyayari sa ganitong mga sitwasyon, ang mga lumilikha ng content at kung sino pa ang pinakaapektado ng - 109 -
mga desisyon ng korporasyon ay silang huli pang nakaaalam [ng balita].” Pinatutungkulan ng NUJP ang mga manggagawa sa midya na walang kaalam-alam sa katotohanan ng pangyayari. Ayon sa ulat, ang kasunduan sa pagitan ng dalawang kumpanya ay magtatapos pa sana sa katapusan ng taon ngunit nahihirapan na umano ang Nine Media na bayaran ang lisensya, gayundin ang iba pang mga gastusin sa operasyon nito. Sa Enero 29 pa malalaman ng mga empleyado ng CNN Philippines kung ano ang mangyayari sa kumpanya matapos ang ibinalitang pulong ng pamunuan noong Enero 25. “Sa mga balita ng posibleng pagsasara, nabanggit ang severance package (o kabayaran sa mga matatanggal) para sa mga apektadong empleyado, at umaasa kaming ganito nga ang mangyayari kapag inianunsyo na ang tanggalan,” ayon pa sa NUJP. Ayon pa sa kanila, pinatitingkad ng kawalan ng paliwanag at komunikasyon sa pagitan ng pamunuan at empleyado nito kaugnay ng napipintong mga pagbabago ang pangangailangang mag-organisa sa lugar ng paggawa. “Sa minimun, titiyakin nito na nakababalita ang mga empleyado sa mga pagbabago sa loob ng korporasyon na makaapekto sa kanila,” paliwanag ng unyon. Anila, kinakailangan ng mga manggagawa sa midya ng malinaw na komunikasyon sa mga pamunuan ng newsroom at pati na rin - 110 -
representasyon sa mga usaping makaaapekto sa kanilang karera at arawang buhay. Ang CNN Philippines ay may tinatayang 200-500 empleyado. Kabilang sa mga programang ipinalalabas nito sa telebisyon at iba pang plataporma ang mga lokal at inernasyunal na balita, mga talakayan sa pulitika, balitang isports, kalusugan at iba pa. Umeere ito sa maraming prubinsya sa bansa sa libreng telebisyon. Samantala, ang CNN International na kadikit nito ay napapanood sa may 200 bansa at teritoryo. Pagdinig ng petisyon kontra “teroristang” designasyon, sinuspinde ng korte sa Baguio City Enero 26, 2024 Sinuspinde ng Baguio Regional Trial Court ngayong araw, Enero 26, ang pagdinig sa petisyon ng apat na lider ng Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) na kumukwestyon sa arbitraryong “teroristang” designasyon sa kanila ng Anti- Terrorism Council sa ilalim ng Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020. Ayon sa korte, nagpaabot ito ng upisyal na katanungan sa Korte Suprema kung dapat ba nitong ituloy ang pagdinig o ipasa ang petisyon sa Court of Appeals o sa nakatakdang korte ng ATA sa Pangasinan, kaugnay ng mga alituntuning inilabas para sa terror law. Kaugnay ng pagdinig, nagpiket sa harap ng Baguio Justice Hall, Baguio City ang mga kaanak, kaibigan at kasama ng apat na aktibista at lider ng CPA na sina Windel Bolinget, Sarah Abellon- - 111 -
Alikes, Jennifer Awingan-Taggaoa, at Stephen Tauli. Muli nilang iginiit na tanggalin ang designasyon at tuluyang ibasura ang terror law. Inihain nila ang naturang kaso noon pang Nobyembre 23, 2023, na kauna-unahang ligal na aksyon laban sa gayong designasyon. Samantala, nakipagpulong din ang apat, kasama ang iba pang mga lider ng mga demokratikong organisasyon sa hilagang Pilipinas kay United Nations Special Rapporteur Irene Khan. Bumisita si Khan sa Baguio City ngayong araw para alamin ang kalagayan ng karapatan sa malayang pagpapahayag at opinyon sa Northern at Central Luzon. Sa naturang pulong, ipinabatid nila kay Khan kung paanong kinakasangkapan ng estado ang mga mapanupil na batas sa bansa para patahimikin ang mga kritiko. Inihayag din nila ang pagkundena sa National Task Force-Elcac na nangunguna sa kampanyang intimidasyon at red-tagging laban sa mga progresibo at demokratikong kilusan. Isinalaysay din ng mga lider-katutubo kung paanong nilalapastangan ng National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), mga lokal na upisyal at pwersang panseguridad ng estado, ang prosesong Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) para sa kanilang karapatan sa lupang ninuno. Layon umano nitong patahimikin sila sa kanilang paglaban sa mapanirang mga proyektong dam, at malalaking mapangwasak na proyekto. - 112 -
Paglulustay ni Marcos para sa raling “Bagong Pilipinas,” binatikos Enero 27, 2024 Binatikos ng grupong Bayan Muna ang nakatakdang rali ng rehimeng Marcos para sa upisyal na paglulunsad sa kampanya nitong “Bagong Pilipinas” sa Enero 28. Ilulunsad nito ang isang malaking pagtitipon sa Qurino Grandstand sa Maynila, na pinondohan ng buwis ng taumbayan. Ayon kay Bayan Muna chairman Neri Colmenares, may balita silang gagamitin din ang rali bilang plataporma para isulong ng rehimen ang charter change o “chacha.” Aniya, “Sayang lang ang pera ng taumbayan dito at ginagawa pang halos mandatory ang pagdalo samantalang napakadaming dapat asikasuhin ng mga kawani ng gobyerno at maging ng mga opisyal ng baranggay.” Giit niya, sayang na sayang ang pondo para sa isang rali na wala namang katuturan. “Ayon sa ilang nakausap nating baranggay at Sangguniang Kabataan officials ay gagamitin din daw ang raling ito ng administrasyong Marcos Jr. para itulak uli ang Cha-cha at palabasin na ang mga pumunta dun ay suportado ito,” dagdag ni Colmenares. Mahalaga umanong ipabatid ng taumbayan ang pagbatikos sa naturang rali ng rehimen bilang pagrehistro rin sa pagtutol sa “chacha.” Hinimok - 113 -
niya ang kapwa Pilipino na huwag nang pumunta sa naturang rali. Unang inianunsyo ng rehimeng Marcos ang kampanyang Bagong Pilipinas noong Enero 2023. Dati na itong binatikos ng grupong Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) at sinabing mula pa man sa ama nitong diktador na si Marcos Sr hanggang kay Marcos Jr ay “walang makabuluhang nagbago sa lipunang pinaghaharian ng dayuhan at iilan – mga burukrata kapitalista, malaking panginoong maylupa at komprador burgesya.” Anang grupo, walang saligang pagkakaiba ang pekeng slogan na Bagong Lipunan noon sa pekeng slogan na Bagong Pilipinas ngayon. Pagtatangka lamang umano itong tabunan ang malawak na kagutuman, kawalang trabaho, mababang sahod at kahirapan ng malawak na sambayanan. Rali kontra chacha, inilunsad ng mga magsasaka sa Bacolod City Enero 27, 2024 Inilunsad ng mga magsasaka ng Negros Island ang isang martsa-protesta sa Bacolod city noong Enero 24 para kundenahin ang isinusulong na charter change o “chacha” ng rehimeng Marcos. Ang aktibidad ay bahagi ng 2-araw na kampanya ng Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP)- Negros at National Federation of Sugar Workers Negros (NFSW) para sa karapatan sa lupa at hustisya sa mga magsasakang pinaslang at biktima ng paglabag sa karapatang-tao ng estado. - 114 -
Nagmartsa ang mga grupo tungo sa Fountain of Justice sa Bacolod City kung saan sila naglunsad ng programa. Ayon sa mga magsasaka, tinututulan nila ang “chacha” dahil ibubuyangyang nito ang Pilipinas sa buu-buong dayuhang pag-aari sa mahahalagang aspeto ng ekonomya ng bansa kabilang na ang lupa. “Ang pagbukas ng ating ekonomya sa dayuhang negosyante ay magreresulta sa pangangamkam ng lupa sa mga magsasaka at patuloy na pagsalalay sa importasyon ng produktong agrikultural tulad ng bigas, asukal at iba pa,” ayon sa KMP-Negros. Ibubukas din ng “chacha” ang sandaang porsyentong pag-aari sa mga mahahalagang aspeto ng lipunan kabilang ang edukasyon, masmidya, at mga yutilidad tulad ng tubig, kuryente at telekomunikasyon. Binatikos din nila ang plano ng rehimeng Marcos na pahabain ang pampulitikang termino sa poder sa pamamagitan ng “chacha.” Iginiit din nilang dapat ibasura ang programa ng reklasipikasyon ng kanilang mga lupang sakahan at ang pagpapatupad ng Support to Parcelization to Land Individula Titling (SPLIT) na anila ay ginagamit para agawin ang kanilang mga lupa. Ipinanawagan din nila ang hustisya para kay Alexander Ceballos, lider-magsasaka na pinaslang ng rehimeng Duterte noong Enero 20, 2017. Kasabay na ginunita ng KMP-Negros at NFSW ang ika-37 anibersaryo ng Mendiola Massacre. Nasawi sa naturang masaker ang 13 magsasaka noong Enero 22, 1987 sa Mendiola, Manila. Ang 13 - 115 -
magsasaka ay kabilang sa libu-libong nagtungo noon sa Mendiola upang ipanawagan dating Pangulong Cory Aquino na ipatupad ang tunay na reporma sa lupa. Samantala noong Enero 23, inilunsad nila ang piket-dayalogo sa Provincial Agrarian Reform Office I sa Bacolod City kaugnay ng 37 mga asyenda sa Negros Island. Tatlong Adivasi, pinaslang ng estado ng India sa pekeng engkwentro Enero 27, 2024 Dinampot bago pinaslang ng mga pwersa ng estado ng India ang tatlong Adivasi (katutubo sa India) sa Nendra, distrito ng Bijapur, estado ng Chhattisgarh noong Enero 19. Ang mga biktimang sina Madkam Soni, Punem Nangi, at Karam Kosa ay papunta sana sa isang kilos-protesta nang sila ay damputin ng mga pwersa ng estado sa mabundok na bahagi ng kanilang komunidad. Kinundena ng grupong Forum Against Corporatization and Militarization (FACAM) ang pagmasaker sa mga sibilyang Adivasi. Para pagtakpan ang kanilang krimen, pinalalabas ng mga pwersa ng estado na ang tatlo ay napaslang sa isang engkwentro laban sa People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) ng Communist Party of India o CPI (Maoist). Hindi pa nakunento, tinangka pang sunugin ng mga pulis ang katawan ng mga biktima para walang ebidensya sa kanilang krimen. Bago pa - 116 -
man mangyari ito ay naigiit ng kanilang mga kaanak at kapwa residente at Adivasi na mabawi ang mga bangkay. Nanawagan rin ang FACAM ng isang kagyat na imbestigasyon sa naturang masaker para mabigyan ng hustisya ang mga biktima at kanilang pamilya, at sa dumaraming bilang pa ng mga kaso ng paglabag sa karapatang-tao sa naturang rehiyon. Ayon sa grupo, tumindi ang paninibasib ng militar sa rehiyon nang sinimulang ipatupad noong Enero ang tinatawag nitong Operation Kagar sa Abujmarh, isang mabundok at magubat na lugar sa timog ng estado ng Chhattisgarh. Bahagi ito at pinalawak na pagpapatupad sa kontra- insurhensyang kampanya na Operation SAMADHAN-Prahar (OSP). Iniulat na kasalukuyang pinakikilos sa ilalim ng Operation Kagar ang may 3,000 pwersang paramilitar galing pa sa ibang estado ng India para ipakat sa anim na kampong paramilitar sa Abujmarh. Dagdag ito sa halos 10,000 pwersang paramilitar na nakapakat na sa lugar. Sa taya ng grupo, mayroong tantos na tatlong paramilitar sa kada pitong lokal na residente sa lugar. Sa kumpas din ng naturang operasyon isinagawa ng mga pulis at pwersa ng estado ang pagpaslang sa isang 6-buwang sanggol noong Enero 1 sa distrito ng Bijapur. “Ang pagtindi ng presensya ng mga paramilitar sa hitik sa likas na yamang mga rehiyon ng India sa tabing ng paglaban sa mga Maoista, ay nagsisilbi - 117 -
sa pagtindi ng pandarambong ng mga korporasyon sa likas na yaman ng bansa sa interes ng imperyalista at malalaking dayuhan,” ayon pa sa FACAM. Dagdag pa nito, sa nagdaang 20 araw lamang ay naitala nila ang 65 pag-aresto laban sa mga tinagurian ng estado na “simpatisador at sumusuporta sa mga Maoista sa buong Bastar.” 80 manggagawa, tatanggalin sa pagbebenta ng SkyCable sa PLDT Enero 28, 2024 Hindi bababa sa 80 manggagawa ng SkyCable Corporation ang tatanggalin sa trabaho sa darating na Pebrero 26 matapos maisapinal ng pamunuan ng kumpanya ang pagbebenta nito sa kumpanyang PLDT ni Manny V. Pangilinan. Ang SkyCable ay pag-aari ng mga Lopez. Tatanggalin ang mga manggagawa sa pagdadahilang “redundancy.” Binatikos ng SkyCable Supervisors, Profesional/Technical Employees Union (SSPTEU) ang tinawag nitong iligal na tanggalan sa mga manggagawa. Sa ulat ng unyon, mahigit 20 sa hanay ng mga superbisor, kabilang ang apat na upisyal ng unyon ang tatanggalin. Anang unyon, “walang pagsangguning ginawa ang maneydsment sa unyon sa tanggalang ito.” Binatikos ng unyon ang kumpanya dahil sa tinawag nitong malinaw na pagbalewala sa patakarang nakasaad sa pinirmahan nitong - 118 -
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) ukol sa pagbabawas ng tao sa ganitong mga pagkakataon. Giit nila, tuwiran itong pagsasaisantabi sa mga karapatan ng unyon at empleyado sa katiyakan sa trabaho. “Inuna nila ang pansariling interes sa kapital kaysa sa kapakanan ng mga apektadong empleyado at mga pamilya nito,” pahayag pa nito. Liban dito, kinundena nila ang taktikang ito ng “union busting” o pagbuwag sa unyon dahil sa maramihang pagtatanggal sa mga unyonisadong manggagawa. Nauna nang ipinabatid ng kumpanya ang posibleng pagbebenta nito sa PLDT noong pang Marso 2023. Kaugnay nito, nagpulong ang 10 unyon mula sa mga sangay ng SkyCable sa Metro Manila, ibang parte ng Luzon, at Mindanao noong parehong buwan. Nagpaabot ng pakikiisa ang Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) sa laban ng unyon at mga manggagawa ng SkyCable. Giit ng grupo, dapat kunin ng PLDT ang mga manggagawa at kilalanin ang karapatan nila sa katiyakan sa trabaho. Ayon sa mga ulat, nabili ng PLDT ang SkyCable sa halagang ₱6.75 bilyon. Nagsimula ang operasyon ng kumpanay noong 1991. Inaprubahan ang bilihan ng Philippine Competition Commission (PCC). - 119 -
Mamamahayag na bilanggong pulitikal sa Tacloban City, binisita ng UN Special Rapporteur Enero 28, 2024 Nagpasalamat ang mga grupo ng mamamahayag at alternatibong midya sa pagbisita ni Irene Khan, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Free Expression and Opinion, sa nakakulong na mamamahayag na si Frenchie Mae Cumpio, at mga tagapagtanggol ng karapatang-tao na sina Marielle Domequil at Alexander Abinguna sa Tacloban City Jail noong Enero 27. Ang tatlo ay nakakulong sa itinuturing ng mga grupo na gawa- gawang mga kaso kabilang ang pagdadawit sa kanila sa “terorismo.” Ayon kay Khan, “kami pa lamang ang internasyunal na mga bisita na pinahintulutan makita sila!” Binatikos ng special rapporteur ang napakabagal na pag-usap ng kaso ng tatlo. Pagtatanong niya, “gaano pa sila katagal maghihintay bago makalaya?” Ipinahayag ng National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) at Altermidya Network ang kanilang pasasalamat sa ginawa ni Khan na pagbisita sa mga bilanggong pulitikal. Ayon sa NUJP, “hindi na dapat maghintay pa ng kahit ilang minuto bago sila palayain.” Si Cumpio ay mamamahayag ng Eastern Vista, alternatibong midya sa rehiyon ng Eastern Visayas. Inaresto siya kasama sina Domequil ng Rural Missionaries of the Philippines, Abinguna, - 120 -
Mira Legion at Marissa Cabaljao sa isang iligal na reyd ng mga pulis noong Pebrero 7, 2020 sa isang upisina sa Tacloban City. Sinampahan sila ng mga kasong illegal possession of firearms. Noong Hulyo 2021, sinampahan ng estado ng dagdag na kasong “financing terrorism” sina Cumpio at Domequil. Pinalalabas ng estado na ang pondong nasamsam mula sa kanila ay para umano sa mga operasyon ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan na pilit nitong binabansagang “teroristang organisasyon.” Naniniwala ang NUJP na dapat nang ibasura ang mga gawa-gawang mga kaso laban kila Cumpio. Anila, ang ebidensya laban sa kanila ay itinanim, at ang mga testimonya ay pawang pineke. Dagdag ng grupo, ang ginawang panggigipit sa mamamahayag na si Cumpio ay katulad din ng ginawa kina Lady Ann Salem at Anne Krueger na pawang sinampahan din ng mga gawa-gawang kaso. Samantala, katulad ng inaasahan at ginawa na dati, minasama at siniraan ng National Task Force-Elcac sa pamamagitan ng pahayag ni Prosecutor Flosemer Chris Gonzales, tagapagsalita ng Regional Task Force-Elcac Region 6, ang naging pahayag ni Khan at sinabing iyon ay “direktang insulto” sa kanila. Si Gonzales ay kilalang kadikit ng mga Duterte. Sa harap ng patung-patong na pag-atake sa kalayaan sa pagpapahayag at opinyon, ipinahayag ng NUJP ang kanilang pag-asa na “magsusulong - 121 -
ang special rapporteur ng mga rekomendasyon para mawakasan ang ganitong mga paglabag.” Mamamahayag na bilanggong pulitikal sa Tacloban City, binista ng UN Special Rapporteur Enero 28, 2024 Nagpasalamat ang mga grupo ng mamamahayag at alternatibong midya sa pagbisita ni Irene Khan, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Free Expression and Opinion, sa nakakulong na mamamahayag na si Frenchie Mae Cumpio, at mga tagapagtanggol ng karapatang-tao na sina Marielle Domequil at Alexander Abinguna sa Tacloban City Jail noong Enero 27. Ang tatlo ay nakakulong sa itinuturing ng mga grupo na gawa- gawang mga kaso kabilang ang pagdadawit sa kanila sa “terorismo.” Ayon kay Khan, “kami pa lamang ang internasyunal na mga bisita na pinahintulutan makita sila!” Binatikos ng special rapporteur ang napakabagal na pag-usap ng kaso ng tatlo. Pagtatanong niya, “gaano pa sila katagal maghihintay bago makalaya?” Ipinahayag ng National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) at Altermidya Network ang kanilang pasasalamat sa ginawa ni Khan na pagbisita sa mga bilanggong pulitikal. Ayon sa NUJP, “hindi na dapat maghintay pa ng kahit ilang minuto bago sila palayain.” - 122 -
Si Cumpio ay mamamahayag ng Eastern Vista, alternatibong midya sa rehiyon ng Eastern Visayas. Inaresto siya kasama sina Domequil ng Rural Missionaries of the Philippines, Abinguna, Mira Legion at Marissa Cabaljao sa isang iligal na reyd ng mga pulis noong Pebrero 7, 2020 sa isang upisina sa Tacloban City. Sinampahan sila ng mga kasong illegal possession of firearms. Noong Hulyo 2021, sinampahan ng estado ng dagdag na kasong “financing terrorism” sina Cumpio at Domequil. Pinalalabas ng estado na ang pondong nasamsam mula sa kanila ay para umano sa mga operasyon ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan na pilit nitong binabansagang “teroristang organisasyon.” Naniniwala ang NUJP na dapat nang ibasura ang mga gawa-gawang mga kaso laban kila Cumpio. Anila, ang ebidensya laban sa kanila ay itinanim, at ang mga testimonya ay pawang pineke. Dagdag ng grupo, ang ginawang panggigipit sa mamamahayag na si Cumpio ay katulad din ng ginawa kina Lady Ann Salem at Anne Krueger na pawang sinampahan din ng mga gawa-gawang kaso. Samantala, katulad ng inaasahan at ginawa na dati, minasama at siniraan ng National Task Force-Elcac sa pamamagitan ng pahayag ni Prosecutor Flosemer Chris Gonzales, tagapagsalita ng Regional Task Force-Elcac Region 6, ang naging pahayag ni Khan at sinabing iyon ay “direktang insulto” sa kanila. Si Gonzales ay kilalang kadikit ng mga Duterte. - 123 -
Sa harap ng patung-patong na pag-atake sa kalayaan sa pagpapahayag at opinyon, ipinahayag ng NUJP ang kanilang pag-asa na “magsusulong ang special rapporteur ng mga rekomendasyon para mawakasan ang ganitong mga paglabag.” Unyon ng manggagawa sa Nexperia, makikipagnegosasyon para sa CBA Enero 28, 2024 Nagsimula na ang panibagong negosasyon ng Nexperia Phils. Inc.  Workers Union (NPIWU) at pamunuan ng Nexperia Philippines para sa Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) para sa 2024 hanggang 2026. Inianunsyo ito ng unyon noong Enero 25. Magaganap ang panibagong negosasyon kasunod ng tanggalan sa mga manggagawa at ilang upisyal ng unyon noong Setyembre 2023. Dumalo sa pulong para sa CBA Ground rules ang Executive Board, Shopstewards Council at pederasyon mula sa panig ng unyon at mga upisyal ng pamunuan ng kumpanya. Inihayag ng unyon ang kanilang determinasyong ipaglaban ang interes ng mga manggagawa sa muling pagbubukas ng negosasyon para sa CBA. Ibinahagi nito ang mga naranasan sa nakaraang negosasyon para sa CBA kung saan inabutan ng pandemya noong 2020. Samantala, sa pambungad na talumpati ng pangkalahatang manedyer ng kumpanya, inilatag niya ang kalagayan ng ekonomya sa buong mundo - 124 -
na nakakaranas ng pagbagsak. Pero ipinabatid din niya ang pag-asang magkakaroon ng magandang resulta ang CBA. Para sa unyon, mahalagang magkaroon ng bagong CBA upang makakaagapay ang mga manggagawa sa patuloy na pagtaas ng presyo ng mga pangunahing bilihin at ang pagbaba ng halaga ng sahod ng manggagawa bunga na rin ng mataas na implasyon noong mga nakaraang buwan. Matatandaang inilunsad ng mga manggagawa ng Nexperia Philippines, sa pamumuno ng unyon, ang sunud-sunod na mga pagkilos para labanan ang tanggalan at mga atake ng maneydsment sa unyon, at ipagtanggol ang kanilang karapatan sa trabaho noong huling kwarto ng 2023. Binatikos ng unyon sa panahong ito ang paglabag ng kumpanya sa mga napagkasunduan sa CBA. Tinanggal nito ang walong manggagawa, kabilang ang tatlong upisyal ng unyon. Sa gitna ito ng “internal hiring” na nangangahulugan na may mga bakante pang pusisyon sa kumpanya. Batid ng mga manggagawa na nais lamang ng Nexperia na tanggalin ang regular na mga manggagawa para makatipid at pahinain ang kanilang unyon. Ang Nexperia Philippines ay subsidyaryo ng kumpanyang Nexperia na nakabase sa The Netherlands. Nagmamanupaktura ito ng mga semiconductor sa mga pabrika nito sa Europe, Asia at US. Noong 2022, nagtala ito ng $2.36 bilyong kabuuang rebenyu, na mas mataas nang 10.7% - 125 -
kumpara sa naunang taon. Lumaki rin nang 12% ang benta nitong mga produkto. Malaki ang inaasahan nitong paglago sa susunod na mga taon, lalupa’t nagsisilbi ang mga produkto nito sa paglawak ng pangangailangan para sa teknolohiya sa buong mundo. 35 berdugong pulis ng India, napaslang sa pag-atake ng PLGA Enero 29, 2024 Hindi bababa sa 35 elemento ng Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) ng reaksyunaryong estado ng India ang napaslang sa pag-atake ng People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) sa kampo nito sa Darmavaram sa erya ng Pamed, distrito ng Bijapur, estado ng Chhattisgarh noong Enero 16. Liban dito, 40 iba pang pulis ang malubhang nasugatan. Ang yunit ng pulis at kampo ay kilala sa mga paglabag sa karapatang-tao ng mga Adivasi at pagprotekta sa mga malalaking korporasyon na nandarambong sa mga kagubatan at lupa ng mga Adivasi. Pinagpugayan ng Central Regional Bureau ng Communist Party of India (Maoist) ang naturang reyd at pagtatanggol sa mamamayang Adivasi. Ayon dito, nakapagbigay ng hustisya ang reyd dahil sa mga kaso ng panunupil ng mga pulis laban sa rebolusyonaryong mamamayan. Ang yunit ay bahagi din ng tinawag nitong “carpet security” sa erya. Tugon din ang armadong aksyon sa bagong lunsad na kampanyang Operation Kagar sa rehiyon na - 126 -
bahagi ng pagpapatupad sa kontra-insurhensyang kampanya na Operation SAMADHAN-Prahar (OSP). Pinakikilos sa ilalim ng Operation Kagar ang may 3,000 pwersang paramilitar galing sa ibang estado ng India para ipakat sa anim na kampong paramilitar sa Abujmarh, kabundukan sa Chhattisgarh. Dagdag ito sa halos 10,000 pwersang paramilitar na nakapakat na sa lugar. Sa ulat, nagsimula ang pag-atake ng alas-7:05 ng gabi. Gumamit ang PLGA ng mahigit 600 granada gamit ang grenade launcher at iba pang sariling likhang mga pampasabog. Bago ang mismong pag- atake sa kampo, kinontrol na ng mga gerilya ng PLGA ang palibot na lugar nito. Binarikadahan nila ang mga susing daanan gamit ang malalaking troso at pinakilos ang milisya para pasabugan ang rerespondeng mga yunit ng pulis. “Determinado ang kaaway na itago ang kanilang pagkatalo para panatilihing mataas ang moral ng kanilang mga pwersa,” ayon kay Kasamang Pratap, tagapagsalita ng Central Regional Bureau ng CPI (Maoist). Ikinural na umano ang buu-buong mga komunidad at hindi pinahihintulutan na makapasok kahit ang mga mamamahayag para mag-alam at mag-imbestiga para sa kanilang pagbabalita. “Ang reyd ng mga pwersa ng PLGA ay isang militanteng paglaban sa korporatisasyon- militarisasyon ng mga kagubatan na nagdudulot ng malawakang pagpapalayas sa mamamayang Adivasi mula sa kanilang lupa at malubhang pagkawasak sa kalikasan,” ayon kay Kasamang Pratap. Hindi umano ito pahihintulutan ng - 127 -
rebolusyonaryong kilusan ng India at pamalagiang gagawa ng paraan para bigyan sila ng hustisya at dinggin ang kanilang makatarungang panawagan. Samanatala, pinarangalan ng Central Regional Bureau ng CPI (Maoist) ang tatlong namartir na mga mandirigma ng PLGA sa naturang armadong aksyon. Mga grupong pambansa-demokratiko, magrarali sa embahada ng US sa anibersaryo ng gerang Pilipino- Amerikano Enero 29, 2024 Inianunsyo ng Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) ang plano nitong magsagawa ng isang rali sa embahada ng US sa Maynila sa darating na Pebrero 4 bilang paggunita sa ika-125 anibersaryo ng gerang Pilipino-Amerikano. Ayon sa grupo, ang digmaan ay isang “brutal na gera para sakupin ang Pilipinas sa ngalan ng mga interes ng imperyalistang US.” Tinatayang 20,000 sundalong Pilipino ang napatay, at higit 200,000 sibilyang Pilipino ang pinaslang ng mga kolonyal na sundalong Amerikano, habang mahigit isang milyon ang nasawi dahil sa gutom at sakit na idinulot ng gera. “Ang gerang Pilipino-Amerikano ay pagsusubok noon ng US sa doktrinang kontra-insurhensya nito na patuloy pa ring ginagamit hanggang sa kasalukuyan laban sa mga kilusang pambansang - 128 -
pagpapalaya sa buong daigdig, kabilang na ang Pilipinas,” ayon sa pahayag ng Bayan. Anang grupo, dapat patuloy na batikusin ang US, hindi lamang sa nagpapatuloy na paghingi ng hustisya, kundi dahil matapos ang higit isang siglo, patuloy ang banta ng panggegera ng US. Sinusuportahan nito sa kasalukuyan ang kampanya ng pagdurog at henosidyo laban sa mamamayang Palestino ng Zionistang Israel sa Gaza, habang nang-uupat ng gera sa East Asia sa pagpapakat ng mga tropang militar sa naturang rehiyon. “Interesado lamang ang US sa walang-tigil na mga gera para isulong ang hegemonya nito,” pagdidiin ng Bayan. Malinaw na malinaw umano na ang imperyalistang US ang pasakit sa buong mundo hanggang sa kasalukuyan. “Hindi ito kaibigan ng mamamayang Pilipino,” giit ng grupo. Dadalhin ng Bayan at mga grupong pambansa- demokratiko sa embahada ng US ang mga panawagan nito para ihinto ang mga gerang pinangungunahan ng US at henosidyo; palayasin ang tropang Amerikano at base militar nito sa Pilipinas; at hustisya para sa mamamayang Palestino. Nagpapatuloy na pag-block ng rehimeng Marcos sa mga progresibong website, binatikos Enero 29, 2024 - 129 -
Nagprotesta ang mga progresibong grupo at mga tagapagtanggol sa kalayaan sa pamamahayag sa harap ng upisina ng National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) sa Quezon City ngayong Enero 29 para batikusin ang nagpapatuloy na pag-“block” o pagharang sa 27 website ng mga alternatibong midya, progresibo at rebolusyonaryong grupo sa bansa. Nagsimula itong i-block noong Hunyo 2022 sa ilalim ng rehimeng Duterte. Ang kautusan ay inilabas ng NTC noong Hunyo 8, 2022 matapos iutos ng hepe ng National Secutiry Council na si Gen.  Hermogenes Esperon. Ginawa ito ni Esperon alinsunod sa walang-batayang designasyon ng Anti-Terror Council sa Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas bilang isang teroristang organisasyon at mga binansagan nitong “tagasuporta” o “may kaugnayan” sa Partido. Kabilang sa mga website na naka-block ang sa pahayagang Bulatlat at Pinoy Weekly, at sa mga grupong Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura, Amihan Women, at PAMALAKAYA-Pilipinas. Muling iginiit ng mga grupo sa rehimeng Marcos na tanggalin ang pagka-block ng mga website bilang pagkilala at pagrespeto sa karapatang magpahayag sa bansa. Itinaon nila ang pagkilos sa isinasagawang pagbisita at imbestigasyon ni Irene Khan, United Nations Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Experession, sa bansa. Kabilang din ang mga kasong ito sa isinumite ng mga grupo na ulat kay Khan. - 130 -
Matapos ang pagkilos sa NTC, tumungo ang mga grupo sa National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) na upisina ng National Task Force- Elcac para magsagawa ng isa pang protesta. Binatikos ng mga grupo ang ginagawang panunupil at kampanya ng malawakang red- tagging ng naturang ahensya. Iginiit nilang buwagin na ang NTF-Elcac. Ayon sa Bayan, inilunsad nila ang magkasunod na pagkilos para “pasinungalingan ang pahayag ng gubyerno sa pagbisita ni Khan na buhay na buhay ang kalayaan sa pagpapahayag sa bansa.” Giriang Marcos-Duterte, kinamuhian ng sambayanan Enero 30, 2024 Kinamuhian ng malawak na masa ng sambayanan ang lantad na lantad nang girian ng naghaharing mga pangkating Marcos at Duterte. Noong Enero 28, direktang sinumbatan ng mag-amang Rodrigo at Sebastian Duterte si Ferdinand Marcos Jr sa isang rali na isinagawa ng kanilang pamilya sa Davao City laban diumano sa charter change. Sa rali na ito, “isiniwalat” ng amang Duterte na sangkot sa droga si Ferdinand Marcos Jr pero hindi niya ito isiniwalat o ikinulong dahil sa kanilang “pagkakaibigan.” Noon pa man, pinasasaringan na ng matandang Duterte si Marcos Jr bilang “adik” na gumagamit ng cocaine. Direkta niya itong isiniwalat matapos “magbukas” si Marcos Jr sa International Criminal Court (ICC) na imbestigahan ang kanyang kasong - 131 -
krimen laban sa sangkatauhan sa ilalim ng “gera kontra-droga.” Natapos na ng ICC ang imbestigasyon nito sa kaso noong nakaraang taon. Siningil naman ng nakababatang Duterte si Marcos Jr na aniya’y walang utang na loob matapos pahintulutan ng kanyang ama na ilibing sa Libingan ng mga Bayani ang kinamuhiang diktador na si Ferdinand Marcos Sr.  Tinawg niyang “tamad” at “walang malasakit” si Marcos Jr, at nanawagan para sa kanyang pagbaba sa pwesto. Sinagot ito ng pangkating Marcos, sa katauhan ni House Speaker Martin Romualdez, bilang “walang paggalang” sa nakaupong presidente. Pinangungunahan ni Romualdez, gamit ang Kongreso, ang pagbawi sa pondo at mga kontratang pampubliko na pinagkakakitaan ng pamilyang Duterte. “Wag na kayong magturuan, parehas lang kayong adik—adik sa kapangyarihan at yaman na dapat ay sa mamamayan!” batikos ng grupong Anakbayan. “Imbis na gumawa ng mga kongkretong hakbang para apulahin ang lumalalang krisis na dinaranas ng mamamayan, mas pinipili ng mga kampo ni Marcos Jr at mga Duterte na magbardagulan para sa sariling interes nila.” Itinapat ng mag-amang Duterte ang rali sa isinagawang “grand rally” ng pangkating Marcos sa Luneta para ilunsad and hungkag na “Bagong Pilipinas.” - 132 -
“Kahihiyan sa taumbayan ang bangayan ng mga pamilya Marcos at Duterte na nailantad nang buo sa publiko kahapon,” pahayag ng Kilusang Mayo Uno noong Enero 29. Batid nito na bahagi ang girian sa pagpppostura ng dalawang pangkatin sa susunod na eleksyon. “Sino ang collateral damage? Ang manggagawa at mamamayan. Ito ang pinagkakaabalahan ng mga naghahari habang tumitindi ang kahirapan, kagutuman at inhustisya,” ayon pa sa grupo. Napakaraming dapat harapin—ang pangangailangan ng nakabubuhay na sahod, regular na trabaho at respeto sa mga unyon ng mga manggagawa, anito. Binatikos rin ng mga grupong demokratiko ang magastos at walang katuturang “grand rally” at pakanang “Bagong Pilipinas” ng pangkating Marcos. “Sayang lang ang pera ng taumbayan dito at gagawin pang halos mandatory ang pagdalo samantalang napakaraming dapat asikasuhin ng mga kawani ng gubyerno at maging ng mga upisyal ng barangay,” ayon kay Atty. Neri Colmenares, dating kinatawan ng Bayan Muna, bago idinaos ang rali. “Sa gitna ng kahirapan at kawalan ng ayuda, gagastos na naman ang gubyerno sa isang rally na walang katuturan. Ang lalo pang masakit ay ayon sa ilang nakausap nating baranggay at Sangguniang Kabataan officials ay gagamitin din daw ang raling ito ng administrasyong Marcos Jr para itulak uli ang chacha (charter change) at - 133 -
palabasin na ang mga pumunta dun ay suportado ito,” aniya. “Dapat ginamit na lamang ang oras at pagod… para iangat ng buhay ng mga Pilipino at hindi para sa isa na namang pagtatangkang rebranding para pabanguhin ang administrasyong Marcos Jr,” pahayag ni Rep.  France Castro ng ACT Teachers Party List. “Mapabababa ba ng Bagong Pilipinas ang sumisirit na presyo ng bilihin? Magkakaroon na ba ng P20 kada kilo ng bigas bukas dahil dyan? Tataas na ba ang sahod ng mga guro at kawani dahil dyan? Malulutas na ba ang batayang problema ng sambayanang Pilipino dahil sa rebranding na ito?” aniya. Ayon naman sa Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), hindi matatabunan ng “Bagong Pilipinas” ni Marcos Jr, na kapareho ng “Bagong Lipunan” ng kanyang amang diktador, ang matatagal nang problema ng Pilipinas. “Mula Marcos Sr tungong Marcos Jr, nananatiling mga usapin ang kahirapan, disempleyo, gutom at matinding korapsyon,” ayon sa grupo. “Mula noon hanggang ngayon, lalupang tumindi ang abang kalagayan ng mamamayang Pilipino. Sa bahagi nito, nagbabala ang grupong Pamalakaya sa pwersahang panunumbalik ng pangkating Duterte sa poder at nanawagan sa kasapian nito na maging mapagbantay sa “desperado at posibleng marahas na pagtatangka” ng pangkatin na bumalik at monopolisahin ang - 134 -
kapangyarihan ng estado. Anito, “hina-hijack” ng pangkating Duterte ang oposisyon sa charter change ng mamamayan para sa sariling interes. “Para sa mga mangingisda, walang naniniwala sa dating Pangulong Duterte na nagmamalasakit ito sa konstitusyon, dahil siya mismo ang lantarang lumabag dito sa ilalim ng kaniyang panunungkulan. Huwag niyang gamitin ang usapin ng niraratsadang cha-cha para mag-astang oposisyon,” ayon sa grupo ng mga mangingisda. Kita ng US sa mga imperyalistang gera at agresyon, lomobo nang 16% noong 2023 Enero 30, 2024 Lumobo nang 16% ang supertubo ng industriyang militar ng US noong 2023 dulot ng inilulunsad nitong imperyalistang gera at agresyon, pangunahin sa gerang proxy nito laban sa Russia sa Ukraine. Tumabo ng $238 bilyon ang mga Amerikanong kumpanyang gumagawa ng armas noong nakaraang taon, ayon mismo sa Department of State ng US sa pahayag nito noong Enero 30. Ang $81 bilyon dito ay direktang benta ng gubyerno ng US sa Ukraine. Liban sa Ukraine, tumaas ang benta ng US sa mga alyado nito sa NATO sa Europe. Pinakamalaki ang benta nito sa Poland, na katabi lamang ng Ukraine. Kabilang sa mga ibinenta nito sa bansa ang mga helikopter ($12 bilyon) at High Mobility Artillery Rocket System o HIMARS ($10 bilyon.) Nagbenta rin ito ng mga helikopter sa Germany - 135 -
($8.5 bilyon) at Norway ($1 bilyon.) Sa panahon ding ito, ang mga bansang ito ay “nagbenta” ng kanilang lumang mga armas sa Ukraine. Ang mga gamit na ito ay regular na idinidisplay ng US sa mga war games nito sa Pilipinas para paglawayan ng tutang AFP, at kabilang sa mga inilalako ng US sa Pilipinas sa mga pulong ng Security Engagement Board sa ilalim ng Mutual Defense Treaty. Pinagtibay kamakailan ni Marcos ang plano ng AFP na gumastos ng ₱1 trilyon sa susunod na sampung taon para sa “modernisasyon.” Liban sa mga nabanggit, bumili ng dagdag na armas ang mga alyado ng US sa Asia tulad ng South Korea ($5 bilyon) at Australia ($6.3 bilyon) bilang bahagi sa kanilang “pakikipag-alyansa” laban sa China. Dagdag sa luma at bagong mga armas, malaki rin ang naibenta ng US na mga pyesa, makina at serbisyo sa mga bansang ito. Pinakamalaki sa mga kumita ang Lockheed Martin na nagsusuplay ng mga Javelin anti-tank missiles, HIMARS at mga rocket nito, at samutsaring misayl; General Dynamics na nagbebenta ng mga tangke at artileri; at Northrop Grumman na tumabo sa pagbebenta mga rocket, bala at ibang gamit militar. Mahigpit na katuwang ang mga kumpanyang ito sa mga krimen sa digma at henosidyo ng US at Israel sa Palestine. - 136 -
Tuluy-tuloy na lolobo ang kita ng mga kumpanyang ito sa harap ng panunulsol ng US ng gera laban sa China, nagpapatuloy na gera sa Ukraine at pinalalawak na imperyalistang agresyon sa Middle East. Presyo ng langis, apat na beses nang tumaas sa 2024 Enero 30, 2024 Naglunsad ng protesta ang mga drayber at opereytor ng dyip sa harap ng Shell Gasoline Station sa Caretta, Cebu City ngayong araw, Enero 30, para kundenahin ang muling pagtaas ng presyo ng langis. Itinaas ng mga kumpanya ng langis ang presyo ng gasolina nang ₱2.80 kada litro, ₱1.30 kada litro ng diesel at ₱0.45 kada litro ng kerosin. Ang naturang pagtaas ay pang-apat na sa unang apat na linggo ng taon. Kumukonsumo ng hanggang 30 litro ang isang dyip sa isang araw na pamamasada. Sa abereyds na presyong ₱61.50/litro ng diesel, gumagastos ng ₱1,845 kada araw para sa langis ang isang drayber ng dyip, mas mataas nang ₱70 kumpara noong Disyembre 2023, kung saan nasa ₱59.15 ang abereyds na presyo ng diesel kada litro. 5-araw na piket sa Maynila, inilulunsad ng mga empleyadong tinanggal sa BACIWA Enero 31, 2024 - 137 -
Nagtungo sa Maynila ang mga tinanggal na empleyado ng Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) upang magpiket-protesta sa pambansang tanggapan ng Civil Service Commission (CSC) sa Quezon City mula Enero 29 hanggang Pebrero 2. Giit nilang ibasura ang joint venture agreement (JVA) sa pagitan ng Prime Water ng mga Villar at BACIWA na dahilan ng pagkawala ng kanilang trabaho at pagpapailalim ng serbisyo ng BACIWA sa kontrol ng pribadong korporasyon. Bumiyahe sa Metro Manila ang mga manggagawa ng BACIWA Employees Union (BEU) mula sa Bacolod City, Negros Occidental para labanan ang apela ng pamunuan ng BACIWA at PrimeWater sa naging hatol ng CSC Region 6 na pabor sa tinanggal na mga manggagawa. Naipagtagumpay ng unyon ang kaso noong 2021 para ibalik sa trabaho ang mga sinisante. Nagtungo noon pang Abril 2023 ang mga manggagawa sa upisina ng CSC para iprotesta ang mabagal na pag-usad ng kaso ng kanilang reinstatement. Muli nilang ipinanawagan na aksyunan na ang apela ng BACIWA. Tinanggal ang 59 empleyado ng BACIWA noong Disyembre 2020 matapos ang pribatisasyon at pagpirma sa JVA sa pagitan ng BACIWA at ng Prime Water Incorporated na pag-aari ng pamilyang Villar noong Nobyembre 16, 2020. Inalis sila sa pwesto dahil sila diumano’y redundant na o may iba nang gumagawa ng kanilang trabaho sa BACIWA. - 138 -
Nagpaabot ng pakikiisa at suporta ang Confederation for Unity Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (Courage) sa piket-protesta ng mga manggagawa ng BACIWA. Giit ng grupo na tugunan na ng CSC ang kaso dahil higit tatlong taon nang walang trabaho ang mga manggagawa. Nakipagdayalogo rin ang mga kinatawan ng BEU at tinanggal na mga manggagawa sa ilang kinatawan ng Kongreso ngayong Enero 31. Idinulog nila ang kanilang panawagan para sa kagyat na pagbalik nila sa trabaho. Pagpapapirma para sa chacha, sinuspinde sa gitna ng mga anomalya Enero 31, 2024 Sinuspinde nang walang taning noong Enero 29 ng Commission on Elections ang pangangalap ng pirma para sa isang “people’s initiative” para sa charter change (chacha) o pagbabago sa konstitusyong 1987. Ayon sa komisyon, kailangang balik-aralan muna ang resolusyong namamahala sa gayong inisyatiba. Bago nito, inianunsyo ng Comelec na “tagatanggap” lamang ito ng mga pirma. Ibinalita nito kamakailan na tinanggap na nito ang pitong milyon lagda mula sa 209 distrito. Kailangan ng di bababa sa 11.4 milyong lagda o 12% sa 91.9 milyong rehistradong botante para maitulak ang isang people’s initiative. - 139 -
Napatigil ang pangangalap sa harap ng malawak na pagtutol dito ng iba’t ibang sektor. Simula pa lamang, nabunyag na ang paggamit ng pampublikong pondo para sa pangangalap ng pirma. Laganap ang balita ng pagpapapirma kapalit ng ₱100 o mas malala, ayuda mula sa iba’t ibang ahensya ng estado. Kinontra rin ng Senado at mga eksperto sa konstitusyon ang inisyatiba. Labag ito diumano sa konstitusyon, ayon sa isang retiradong mahistrado ng Korte Suprema. Aniya, tanging mga amyenda, at di rebisyon ng konstitusyon ang pinapayagang idaan sa pamamagitan ng isang people’s initiative. Sa isang pandinig sa Senado noong Enero 30, nabunyag ang pagsasabwatan ng People’s Initiative for Reform Modernization and Action (Pirma), ang grupong nagbayad ng patalastas para itulak ang chacha, at ni House Speaker Martin Romualdez at iba pang kongresista, para sa pangangalap ng pirma. Liban sa panunuhol kapalit ng mga pirma, nabunyag din ang paggastos ng PIRMA ng ₱55 milyon para i-ere ang patalastas na tumuya sa Pag-aalsang EDSA at nagsisi dito sa mga problema ng bansa sa konstitusyon. Samantala, napilitan na si Ferdinand Marcos Jr na pansamantalang ipatigil ang pangangalap ng mga pirma dahil masyado umano itong “mapanghati.” “Sa ngayon, patuloy pa rin ang people’s initiative, pero di ako tiyak kung opsyon pa ito para sa amin,” pahayag niya noong Enero 30. Aniya, ipinatatanong pa niya sa kanyang mga abugado, kabilang sina presidential legal counsel Juan - 140 -
Ponce Enrile, kung anu-ano pa ang mga opsyon para mabago ang konstitusyon. “Magandang balita ito at hihintayin namin ang pormal at nakasulat na desisyon na ito ng Comelec,” pahayag naman ni Rep.  France Castro ng ACT Teachers Party List noong Enero 30. “Sa totoo lang, it’s a waste of time (pagsasayang lang ito ng panahon). Dapat na mas tutukan ng Comelec ang pagpaarehistro ng mga botante para sa eleksyon sa 2025. Kasi masasayang lang ang tinatanggap nilang mga pirma kung iwiwithdraw (lang din naman).” Sa harap ng suspensyon, magpapatuloy ang kampanyang “bawi-pirma” na sinimulan ng Bayan Muna noong Enero 28. Marami nang pumirma ang nagpahayag ng kagustuhang bawiin ang kanilang pirma nang malaman nilang para pala ito sa charter change. Anila, kung hindi pagpapapirma para sa ayuda, ibang dahilan ang sinabi sa kanila kaya sila pumirma. Ayon kay Atty. Neri Colmenares ng Bayan Muna, patuloy na mangungulekta ang grupo ng “Affidavit and Manifestation of Withdrawal” hanggang di binibitawan ng PIRMA ang pakanang people’s initiative. “Patuloy kaming mangangalap ng mga affidavit na ‘bawi-pirma’ at maglulunsad ng mga porum sa buong bansa,” aniya. “Ayaw naming magulat sakaling biglang bawiin ng Comelec ang suspensyon.” - 141 -
Pagsisimula ng klase sa UP Manila at UP Visayas, sinalubong ng protesta Enero 31, 2024 Nagprotesta ang mga iskolar ng bayan sa University of the Philippines (UP) Manila at UP Visayas sa pagbubukas ng klase nito noong Enero 29. Karaniwang inilulunsad ng mga estudyante ng UP ang tinatawag nitong “First Day Rage” para salubungin ang pagbubukas ng klase at patampukin ang iba’t ibang isyung panlipunan. Sa UP Manila, isinagawa ng mga progresibong organisasyon at ng mga konseho ng mag-aaral sa kampus ang pagkilos sa College of Arts and Sciences (CAS) Gate at sa College of Medicine Gate. Samantala, inilunsad ng mga grupo sa pangunguna ng Sandigan ng Mag-aaral para sa Sambayanan-UPV, ang kanilang pagkilos sa New Administration Building, UP Visayas, Miagao, Iloilo. Itinampok ng mga grupo ang mga usapin at isyu ukol sa kawalan ng mga espasyo para sa estudyante, pagkakaltas ng badyet sa mga state universities and colleges at local universities and colleges, at pagtapak sa karapatang pang- akademiko at militarisasyon sa kampus. Ipinaabot din nila ang suporta sa mga tsuper at opereytor ng dyip para labanan ang public utility vehicle (PUV) phaseout. Nagpahayag din sila ng pagtutol sa charter change ng rehimeng US-Marcos. “Ang protestang ito ay simbolo ng ating patuloy na pakikibaka para sa karapatan, kabuhayan, at - 142 -
kalayaan. Sa harap ng patuloy na paghihirap ng sambayanang Pilipino kinakailangan ang aktibo at militanteng paglaban ng kabataan at buong sambayanan,” pahayag ng SAMASA-UPV. Rekomendasyon ng DoJ na kasuhan ang 2 dinukot na aktibista, kinundena Enero 31, 2024 Kinundena ng mga grupong maka-kalikasan at tagapagtanggol ng karapatang-tao ang rekomendasyon ng Department of Justice na kasuhan sina Jonila Castro at Jhed Tamano ng “oral defamation” dahil sa “pagpapahiya” diumano nila sa mga sundalo sa isang press conference. Matatandaang balak noon ng Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) na iprisenta sa publiko ang dalawa bilang mga “surrenderee” pero sa halip na sumunod sa dikta ng mga sundalo, matapang na ibinunyag nina Castro at Tamayo na sila ay dinukot, pinagbantaan at ipinailalim sa tortyur. Ginawa ng DoJ ang rekomendasyon matapos ibasura nito ang kasong perjury o pagsisingungaling na isinampa ng 70th IB laban sa kanila. “Nakadidismaya” ang reaksyon ni Castro at Tamano sa anila’y malinaw na pagpanig ng DoJ sa tinahi-tahing kwento ng AFP at NTF-ELCAC sa kasong isinampa sa kanila ng militar. “Isinaisantabi ni Prosecutor Arnold Magpantay na kami ay dinukot ng mga (ahenteng) militar, dinala sa mga safehouse, at ipinailalim sa psychological - 143 -
torture para piliting sakyan ang kwentong binuo ng ahente ng NTF-ELCAC,” ayon sa dalawa. “Itinuring niya ang banta sa aming buhay bilang pawang “imahinasyon” lamang. Ang intensyon namin na paglalantad ng katotohanan ay pinalabas na nagmula sa isang ‘malalim na paghahangad’ na siraan at ipahiya ang AFP.” Ayon sa dalawa, pinatutunayan lamang ng desisyon na tama ang kanilang pagkwestyon sa kakayahan ng DOJ na maging patas sa imbestigasyon. “(U)na pa lang ay nagbigay na ng malisyosong pahayag si DOJ Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla na ang aming ginawa ay parte lang ng ‘bagong pakana ng CPP-NPA’.” “Sa halip na kilalanin ang nakagigimbal na kwento nina Jhed at Jonila kaugnay sa pagdukot, detensyon at tortyur sa kanila, pinagmukha pa ng DoJ na biktima ang mga nagdukot,” ayon naman kay Cristina Palabay ng grupong Karapatan. “Nakapanggagalit na nakapaglabas ang DOJ ng isang desisyon na naglehitimisa sa nagpapatuloy na mga pang-aatake laban sa mga tagapagtanggol ng kalikasan na sina Jhed at Jonila,” pahayag ni Jon Bonifacio, national coordinator ng Kalikasan PNE. “Sa halip na bigyan ng kaunting hustisya sina Jhed at Jonila matapos ang kahindik-hindik nilang karanasan, binigyan pa ng bala ang mga dumakip sa kanila na militar.” Ipinanawagan ng mga grupo na kagyat na tugunan ng Korte Suprema ang petisyon ng dalawang aktibista para sa writ of amparo para sa kanilang kaligtasan. - 144 -
“Malinaw para sa amin na ang mga kasong ipinataw ay harassment para siraan ang moral, manakot sa mga gustong lumaban para sa karapatan, at magpatahimik,” pagtutuloy nina Castro at Tamano. “Isa lang ito sa maraming porma ng panunupil at paglabag sa ating karapatan sa pagpapahayag ng pagtutol sa anti- mamamayang mga patakaran.” Tanggalan sa sektor ng teknolohiya, nagpapatuloy sa gitna ng pagsirit ng tubo ng mga kumpanya Enero 31, 2024 Tuluy-tuloy ang tanggalan ng mga manggagawa sa industriya ng teknolohiya sa buong mundo nitong taon. Sa unang apat na linggo pa lamang ng 2024, umabot na sa 24,584 manggagawa mula sa 93 kumpanya ang nawalan ng trabaho. Karugtong ito sa paglusaw ng mga kumpanya sa teknolohiya ng 260,000 trabaho noong 2023. Ayon sa mga pagsusuri, ang pangunahing dahilan ng malawakang tanggalan ay ang paggamit ng mga kumpanya ng artificial intelligence (AI) sa iba’t ibang bahagi at antas ng kani-kanilang mga operasyon. Noong nagdaang taon, kabilang sa mga nagsisante ang malalaking kumpanyang Amerikano tulad ng Alphabet/Google (12,000+), Microsoft (16,000+), Meta/ Facebook (10,000+), Amazon (27,000+) at Tiktok, gayundin ang iba pa tulad ng Discord, Accenture (19,000), Vodafone (11,000) at marami pang iba. Nito lamang - 145 -
nagdaang buwan, hindi bababa sa 100 kumpanya ang nag-anunsyo ng mga tanggalan ng kanilang mga manggagawa. Naganap rin ang malawakang tanggalan ng mga manggagawang sa teknolohiya sa Pilipinas. Ayon sa pinakahuling ulat ng Job Displacement Report ng Department of Labor and Employment, umabot sa 3,089 ang permanenteng nawalan ng trabaho sa sektor ng teknolohiya noong Enero 2023. Mas mataas ito nang 87% kumpara sa nawalan ng trabaho sa sektor noong Enero 2022. Sa kabila nito, buong pagsisinungaling pa rin na ipinalalaganap ng reaksyunaryong estado ang kunwa’y 200,000 “kakulangan” ng mga manggagawang sa teknolohiya sa bansa. Ang mga tanggalan ay naganap na harap ng nagtataasang kita ng nabanggit na mga kumpanya. Tumaas ang kita ng Microsoft nang 18% noong huling kwarto ng taon, dulot pangunahin ng pag-arangkada ng serbisyong AI nito mula sa pamumuhunan nito sa kumpanyang OpenAI, ang gumawa ng ChatGPT. Ang paglobo ng benta nito ay lalupang nagpasirit sa presyo ng sapi nito sa stockmarket. Sa ngayon, 70% na mas mataas ang halaga ng sapi nito kumpara sa nakaraang taon. Inilagay sa $3 trilyon ang presyo ng kumpanya sa merkado. Gayundin, tumabo ang Alphabet/Google nang $20.7 bilyong kita, pangunahin mula sa mga patalastas sa Youtube at kita sa cloud computing (pang serbisyong elektroniko sa internet). Nasa proseso ang kumpanya sa paglalabas ng sarili nitong AI model na kahalintulad sa ChatGPT. Sa - 146 -
ngayon, papalaki na ang paggamit sa AI sa mga produkto nito tulad ng Gmail at ang Google Searches. ₱2 trilyon para sa “modernisasyon” ng AFP, inaprubahan ni Marcos Jr Enero 31, 2024 Sa gitna ng di matapos-tapos na ugong ng kudeta at destabilisasyon, inaprubahan ni Ferdinand Marcos Jr ang ₱2 trilyong badyet para sa “modernisasyon” ng Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Gagamitin ang pondo para sa ipambili ng mga eroplano, barko, armas, pyesa at serbisyo na nakasaad sa “Horizon 3” ng AFP Modernization Act. Layunin ng Rehorizoned Capability Enhancement and Modernization Program o ReHorizoned 3 ang pagbili ng armas mula sa US at mga alyado nito para sa “teritoryal na depensa” ng Pilipinas. Kabilang dito ang pagbili ng pinaglumaan pero mamahalin pa ring F-16 ng US at malalaking barko na gagamitin sa pakikipag-“joint patrol” nito sa South China Sea. Ang pagbili ng naturang mga sasakyan at gamit militar ay alinsunod sa itinakdang papel ng US sa AFP sa pakikipaggirian nito sa karibal na China. Para matiyak ang katapatan ng mga heneral sa kabuuan ng kanyang termino, isinaad ni Marcos na gagastusin ang pondo sa loob ng 10 taon. Una nang inaprubahan ni Marcos noong Disyembre ang pagpalaki ng badyet ng AFP tungong $285 bilyon sa 2024. Ayon sa ilang manunuri, ₱110 - 147 -
bilyon hanggang ₱115 bilyon dito ang maaaring ilalaan para sa pagbili ng bagong mga armas at pagserbisyo sa lumang mga asset na nilaspag o nasira na ng AFP. Malayong mas malaki ito sa taunang ₱25 bilyon-₱30 bilyon na inilaan noon ng rehimeng Duterte para sa programa. Nakabalangkas ang Rehorizoned 3 sa “bagong” konsepto ng depensa na tinawag ng AFP na Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept. Ayon kay Gilbert Teodoro, kalihim ng Department of National Defense, ang plano sa depensa na ito, na inilarawan din bilang “strategic shift,” ay “maggagarantiya sa mga korporasyong Pilipino, at mga dayuhang pahihintulutan ng Pilipinas, na payapang makapagsagawa ng mga eksplorasyon at pagsasamantala sa lahat ng mga likas na yaman sa loob ng exclusive economic zone (ng Pilipinas) at iba pang mga lugar kung saan mayroon tayong hurisdiksyon.” Isang pinaglalawayan ng mga dayuhang kumpanya, laluna ng mga kumpanyang Amerikano, ang mayamang deposito ng natural gas at langis na matatagpuan sa West Philippine Sea at karugtong nitong South China Sea. Ipinamamarali ng rehimeng Marcos at ng AFP na ang Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept ay para sa depensa at interes ng Pilipinas. Pero sa aktwal, bahagi ito ng Archipelagic Defense Strategy na binalangkas ng US para kontrahin ang China sa tinatawag nitong Western Pacific Theater of Operations (WPTO). Gamit ang tuta nitong mga gubyerno at hukbo sa Asia, inilalatag ng US ang “archipelagic defense” na ang ibig sabihin ay ang pagdudugtong ng mga estratehikong isla sa - 148 -
tinawag nitong “first island chain.” Kabilang sa “chain” o tanikala na ito ang Pilipinas. Bahagi ng Archipelagic Defense Strategy ang taktikang anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) laban sa China na may layuning “inyutralisa” ang kakayahan ng “kaaway” (China), at “supilin” (suppress) o “burahin” (eliminate) ang mga abilidad nito na makapaglunsad ng “agresyon” sa rehiyon. Kabilang sa mga aktibidad nito ang walang patlang na paglulunsad ng mga freedom of navigation operations, “joint patrol” kasama ang mga inarmasan at kontrolado nitong hukbo sa rehiyon, wargames sa karagatan at kalupaan at permanenteng presensya ng mga tropa at gamit sa mga base nito sa Pilipinas, South Korea at Japan. - 149 -

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pc 1 aprile - 25a manifestazione a Milano per la palestina il 30 marzo (proletari comunisti)


25a manifestazione sabato pomeriggio in piazza Duca D'Aosta a Milano a sostegno della Palestina. Tra gli striscioni esposti dai manifestanti, anche uno con scritto "Meloni e Salvini servi degli assassini sionisti" e un altro che recita "Meloni complice di repressione e genocidio".












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Socialist Front Of Nepal Will Hold Interaction Program In Kathmandu Tomorrow - Redspark (Redspark)


Kathmandu, April 1, 2024: The Socialist Front of Nepal, a coalition of Socialist and Communist political parties, is organizing an interaction program focused on the development of socialism in Kathmandu tomorrow.

According to leaders of the Front, the program will be held at the Rastriya Sabhagriha, Exhibition Road in Kathmandu at 1 pm, Tuesday.

The Front consists of the CPN (Maoist Centre), CPN (Unified Socialist), Janata Samajwadi Party, and the Biplav-led Communist Party of Nepal.

Source : https://english.khabarhub.com/2024/01/348974/


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pc 1 aprile - La Resistenza non è reato. Il 4 aprile a L'Aquila Presidio per la libertà di Anan, Ali e Mansour (proletari comunisti)


 

LA RESISTENZA NON È REATO

LIBERTÀ PER ANAN, ALI, MANSOUR

Il 4 aprile dalle ore 9,30: Presidio di solidarietà presso il Tribunale di L’Aquila, in occasione del riesame della custodia cautelare in carcere di Anan Yaeesh, Ali Irar e Mansour Doghmosh.

Anan Yaeesh, rifugiato politico palestinese residente all’Aquila, è stato arrestato il 27 gennaio su mandato dello stato coloniale israeliano che ne ha richiesto l’estradizione.

Anan è particolarmente inviso da Israele. Si è unito alla lotta di liberazione da adolescente, quando l’esercito israeliano ha ucciso la sua compagna mentre con lei si recava a scuola. Ha combattuto in Cisgiordania per difendere il campo profughi dove viveva, è stato vittima di un tentato omicidio ad opera di soldati israeliani che lo hanno raggiunto con 11 colpi di arma da fuoco, i suoi amici sono stati uccisi a sangue freddo dall’esercito Israeliano e nonostante gli anni di prigionia, le violenze subite e le pressioni sulla sua famiglia, non ha mai rinnegato la sua appartenenza alla Resistenza palestinese e non ha mai tradito il suo popolo.

Il suo attivismo politico e le vicende che lo hanno coinvolto hanno fatto di Anan una sorta di eroe in Palestina, quindi un elemento pericoloso per gli Israeliani, che hanno trovato nel governo Meloni il complice perfetto per continuare a uccidere il popolo palestinese e a reprimere la sua Resistenza senza fare troppo rumore.

Ma un’operazione di questo genere, alla luce dei crimini sionisti a Gaza e degli oltre 30 mila morti

palestinesi, non poteva passare sotto silenzio: troppo gravi le violazioni dei diritti umani in Israele, troppo praticata la tortura, troppe associazioni per i diritti umani riconosciute e affidabili che lo confermano: il procedimento estradizionale accolto dal governo italiano è illegale.

E di fronte alla crescente solidarietà che la popolazione e la Resistenza palestinese ricevono nelle piazze di tutto il paese, il governo Meloni e la sua magistratura invece di ammettere l’errore e riconoscere la complicità dello Stato italiano con quello genocida di Israele allargano l'operazione repressiva verso altri palestinesi accusandoli di terrorismo, di preparare azioni contro Italia e Israele, di appartenere a una delle organizzazioni della resistenza palestinese, parte integrante dell'azione del 7 ottobre.

Così l’11 marzo, alla vigilia della camera di consiglio che doveva decidere sulla sua scarcerazione, Anan viene raggiunto da un secondo mandato di cattura, questa volta tutto italiano, e con lui vengono arrestati anche Ali Irar e Mansour Doghmosh.

Ma la cosiddetta “Operazione contro il terrorismo internazionale”, tanto sbandierata da esponenti del governo e politici di centrodestra, non è altro che un'operazione repressiva per cui si arrestano persone accusate di niente, perché nessuna azione di carattere militare o indegnamente definita di “terrorismo” che giustifichi quest'operazione è mai avvenuta nel nostro paese.

Ciò che la giustifica invece è il malcelato tentativo di non scontentare Israele, delegittimare la giusta resistenza dei palestinesi contro l’occupante coloniale, reprimere e criminalizzare la crescente solidarietà con il popolo palestinese e la sua Resistenza.

Il diritto a resistere, anche con le armi all’occupante, è un diritto non solo collettivo ma anche soggettivo, ampiamente riconosciuto dal diritto internazionale. La Resistenza non è reato, la Resistenza è un moto di amore. Come ha detto Anan, “La Resistenza non è terrorismo… Se il nostro amore per la Palestina è terrorismo, allora noi palestinesi siamo il Dio del terrorismo. Dal 1948 ad ora siamo sotto l'attacco di Israele che ci uccide ogni giorno, ma ancora oggi rivendichiamo la libertà, che conquisteremo senza mai fermarci. Perché è la nostra terra e i palestinesi meritano di essere liberi e vivere come tutti gli altri popoli del mondo.

Libertà per Anan, Ali e Mansour

La Resistenza non si processa!


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Κ.Κ.Ινδίας ( Μαοϊκό) | Ο ναός του Ράμα και η Ιδέα της Ινδίας (Resistance in the neighbourhood)



Η αποπεράτωση και τα εγκαίνια του  ινδουιστικού ναού του Ράμα στην βόρεια Ινδία, πάνω στα ερείπια ενός μουσουλμανικού τεμένους αναζωπύρωσε αντιπαραθέσεις στο εσωτερικό της χώρας σχετικά με τον ρόλο της θρησκείας στην πολιτική, τον ινδουιστικό εθνικισμό και φασισμό, τις πολιτικές της ακροδεξιάς κυβέρνησης Μόντι και την στάση των προοδευτικών και επαναστατικών δυνάμενων. Αναδημοσιεύουμε την ενδιαφέρουσα ανάλυση του Κ.Κ.Ινδίας (Μαοϊκό) σχετικά με όλα αυτά.


Κ.Κ.Ινδίας ( Μαοϊκό) 

Ο ναός του Ράμα και η Ιδέα της Ινδίας*

18 Φεβρουαρίου 2024


Ο φασισμός έχει τις ιδιαιτερότητές του, ποικίλλει λοιπόν σε μορφές και φέρει συγκεκριμένα χαρακτηριστικά σε διαφορετικές πραγματικές συνθήκες. Στις συγκεκριμένες συνθήκες της Ινδίας, η φύση του φασισμού είναι ο Φασισμός της Βραχμανικής Ινδικότητας (Brahmanical1 Hindutva2 Fascism).

Η άνοδος των δυνάμεων του κινήματος για την Ινδικότητα (Hindutva) στην πολιτική εξουσία είναι ουσιαστικά εναρμονισμένη με την κίβδηλη ινδική κοινοβουλευτική δημοκρατία.

Ακόμη και σε αυτήν την άνευ προηγουμένου στιγμή περίλαμπρης δόξας, οι παραστρατιωτικές μονάδες της Χίντουτβα ντυμένες στα χρώματα του κρόκου δεν δείχνουν τόσο σοβαρή απειλή για το κοινοβουλευτικό σύστημα λόγω του ότι το τελευταίο αποδεικνύεται ότι δεν αποτελεί πραγματική απειλή για το δικό τους βασίλειο, το βασίλειο του μίσους (kingdom of animosity). Κάτι που θέτει σοβαρό ερώτημα για την ίδια τη συγκρότηση της κοινοβουλευτικής δημοκρατίας.

 

Μπιμράο Ράμτζι Αμπεντκάρ (Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar).
Φωτο: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._R._Ambedkar

Ο Αμπεντκάρ3 δικαίως αποφάνθηκε στο «Κράτος και Μειονότητες» (‘State and Minorities’) ότι η πολιτική δημοκρατία ποτέ δεν αποτέλεσε γνώρισμα του ινδικού κράτους, αντίθετα η ινδική δημοκρατία είναι κατά κύριο λόγο πλειοψηφική4 δημοκρατία, της ανώτερης τάξης, που ταυτίζεται/ σχετίζεται με συγκεκριμένες ομάδες/κοινότητες5.

Ο φασισμός της κύριας μορφής του Ινδουιστικού εθνικισμού (Χίντουτβα) στην Ινδία βρίσκει πρόσφορο έδαφος στη δομή της κοινοβουλευτικής δημοκρατίας μια δομή που αποτελεί παρωδία. Θα προσπαθήσουμε να κατανοήσουμε την πολιτική των δυνάμεων Χίντουτβα με φόντο τα εγκαίνια του ναού του Ράμα6 στις 22 Ιανουαρίου.

Ο Ναός του Ράμα

Η κατασκευή του ναού του Ράμα στην Αγιόντυα7 και η καθιέρωσή8 του από τον πρωθυπουργό Μόντι (Modi) έχει οδηγήσει τη διαστρέβλωση του νου μας σε ένα επόμενο ανώτερο επίπεδο. Τα κυρίαρχα μέσα ενημέρωσης που ενισχύονται με φροντίδα της κυβέρνησης του Νάρεντρα Μόντι (Narendra Modi) και της οργάνωσης RSS9 έχουν παίξει ζηλευτό ρόλο στη διαιώνιση μιας τέτοιας διαστρέβλωσης και άρνησης της αλήθειας βαθιά στις φλέβες της κοινωνίας μας. Εμείς αποτύχαμε να επαναφέρουμε στο προσκήνιο την κριτική μας σκέψη και γίναμε σκλάβοι της κοινοτοπίας των υποστηριζόμενων από το κράτος ψεμάτων γύρω από τον ινδικό πολιτισμό, τη θρησκεία, την ιστορία και την ιδέα της Ινδίας.

Η καθιέρωση του ναού του Ράμα, με όλο το κύμα θαυμαστών της και τον αισθησιασμό των μέσων ενημέρωσης, κατάφερε ακούσια να κανονικοποιήσει την αδικία που υπέστη η μουσουλμανική μειονότητα λόγω της κατεδάφισης του υπέροχου ιστορικού τεμένους Μπάμπρι από τα τάγματα εφόδου της Χίντουτβα. Το ότι υπήρξε επιβεβλημένη υποστήριξη της εκδήλωσης στο ναό του Ράμα από τη μουσουλμανική κοινότητα είναι τόσο ατιμωτικό.

Η διαδρομή του L.K. Advani, που ξεκίνησε στο Somnath στις 25 Σεπτεμβρίου 1990 και τελείωσε στην Αγιόντυα στις 30 Οκτωβρίου 1990.
Φωτο: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ram_Rath_Yatra

Η αναφορά του πρωθυπουργού Μόντι, την ημέρα της καθιέρωσης του ναού του Ράμα στις 22 Ιανουαρίου, ότι η γενέτειρα του Ράμα απαλλάχτηκε από εκατοντάδες χρόνια καταστροφής έρχεται σε άμεση αντίθεση με την απόφαση του Ανώτατου Δικαστηρίου της χώρας (Supreme Court) για την Αγιόντυα που εκδόθηκε στις 9 Νοεμβρίου 2019. Στην απόφασή του, το Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο ορθά διατύπωνε την άποψη ότι το τέμενος Μπάμπρι δεν χτίστηκε μετά από κατεδάφιση κάποιου προϋπάρχοντος ναού, και δήλωνε περαιτέρω ότι η κατεδάφισή του στις 6 Δεκεμβρίου 1992 ήταν μια «κατάφωρη παραβίαση του κράτους δικαίου». Ωστόσο, όλοι οι ένοχοι της κατεδάφισης του τεμένους Μπάμπρι έφυγαν με καθαρό μητρώο και επαινέθηκαν από τον πρωθυπουργό Μόντι ως μεγάλοι Πατριώτες και αγωνιστές της ελευθερίας. Βλέπε L.K. Advani που ηγήθηκε του κινήματος Ramjambhoomi Rath Yatra10 που είχε ως αποτέλεσμα τη λεηλασία του τεμένους Μπάμπρι και τη σφαγή χιλιάδων αθώων ζωών. Αυτό είναι το μέγεθος της παρωδίας της Δικαιοσύνης στον Φασισμό της Βραχμανικής Ινδικότητας.

Ενώ οι φασιστικές δυνάμεις ήταν απασχολημένες με τη θλιβερή, μισητή και διχαστική ατζέντα τους, όλοι εμείς οι ευαισθητοποιημένοι πολίτες δεν καταφέραμε να δείξουμε το ηθικό μας σθένος σε έναν κόσμο που καταρρέει. Όλοι μας λίγο πολύ γίναμε θύματα αυτού του μαζικού φασιστικού προγράμματος. Έτσι λοιπόν λειτουργεί ο φασισμός, σιωπηρά και κρυφά, αποκαλέστε το αισθητική των φασιστικών τεχνικών.

Με την άνοδο του ιμπεριαλισμού, δηλαδή, την εποχή του χρηματιστικού κεφαλαίου, το έθνος-κράτος που αναδύθηκε με τον αναπτυσσόμενο καπιταλισμό, έγινε εμπόδιο για την ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία του κεφαλαίου. Ωστόσο, στον φασισμό που εμφανίστηκε τον 20ο αιώνα με τον ιμπεριαλισμό και την κρίση του καπιταλισμού, η έννοια του εθνικισμού έγινε αντιληπτή από τις φασιστικές δυνάμεις μέσα από τους φακούς της αγνότητας της φυλής και του αίματος. Έτσι, προέκυψε ο ρατσιστικός και πολιτιστικός φασιστικός εθνικισμός που κατασκευάζει εσωτερικά σύνορα και αντίθετους πόλους μεταξύ του εγώ και του άλλου μέσα στο έθνος. Σε τέτοια δόγματα πολιτιστικού εθνικισμού ανήκουν το RSS και το BJP11 που προσπαθούν να επιβάλουν ενιαία αποκλειστική ταυτότητα με βάση τη θρησκεία, τη γλώσσα και τον πολιτισμό. Παντού στον κόσμο όπου αυτός ο σοβινιστικός-πατριδοκάπηλος12 εθνικισμός έχει σφετεριστεί την πολιτική εξουσία, έχει προκαλέσει σοβαρή ζημιά στις δημοκρατικές δομές και έχει επιβάλλει έντονη καταπίεση στις εργαζόμενες μάζες με τη χείρα βοηθείας του ιμπεριαλισμού.

Ακολουθώντας τα βήματα του Savarkar, το BJP ταυτίζει τα συμφέροντα του ιμπεριαλισμού και της κύριας μορφής του Ινδουιστικού εθνικισμού (Χίντουτβα). Οι πρωτοπόροι ηγέτες της Χίντουτβα ήταν σε συμπαιγνία με τον βρετανικό ιμπεριαλισμό. Σήμερα, στο όνομα του πολιτιστικού εθνικισμού, το BJP και το RSS παραδίδουν τους πόρους του έθνους στις Ιμπεριαλιστικές Δυνάμεις και παίζουν το άθλιο παιχνίδι τους για να επιβάλουν τη μονοδιάστατη κουλτούρα της Βραχμανικής Ινδικότητας. Ως εκ τούτου, το BJP και το RSS έχουν χρησιμοποιήσει τον εθνικισμό για να δημιουργήσουν ρήγματα στην κοινωνία και υπερκέρδη σε εταιρικούς οίκους. Ο πατριδοκάπηλος (jingoistic) Εθνικισμός στην Ινδία, από το ξεκίνημά του το 1925, ήταν υποπροϊόν των φασιστών Χίντουτβα. Μαζί με τον πρωθυπουργό Μόντι, όλα τα καθεστωτικά μέσα ενημέρωσης πρόβαλαν την κατασκευή του ναού του Ράμα ως εθνική δόξα, απόγειο του «ινδικού πολιτισμού» και ως πράξη εθνικισμού που δεν μπορεί να ακυρωθεί13.

Με στόχο τη διεύρυνση της κοινωνικής του βάσης και την αντιμετώπιση της αυξανόμενης επιρροής του κομμουνισμού, το RSS προέβη σε διάφορες ενέργειες, από τις οποίες η πρωταρχική ήταν ο σχηματισμός πολλών μαζικών οργανώσεων. Το 1948 ίδρυσε το Πανινδικό Φοιτητικό Συμβούλιο (Akhilya Bharatiya Vidyarthi Sangatan, ABVP), ένα φοιτητικό σώμα του οποίου ο πρωταρχικός στόχος ήταν να καταπολεμήσει την κομμουνιστική επιρροή στα ινδικά Πανεπιστήμια. Το 1952 ίδρυσε το Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram με στόχο να αντιμετωπίσει τις χριστιανικές οργανώσεις και τον προσηλυτισμό και την μεταστροφή των φυλών από τους χριστιανούς ιεραπόστολους. Πίσω από αυτό η κύρια ατζέντα τους ήταν να εντάξουν τους Αντιβάσι 14 στον Ινδουισμό. Την ίδια στιγμή, το RSS σχημάτισε ένα πολιτικό κόμμα, το Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), (το οποίο το 1980 άλλαξε και έγινε Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP) για να κατακτήσει την πολιτική εξουσία με την ατζέντα του περί Ινδουιστικού Έθνους (Hindu Rashtra), που αποκάλυπτε τον πολιτιστικό εθνικισμό του. Το 1955, ίδρυσε την Ένωση Ινδών Εργατών (Bharatiya Mazdoor Shang, BMS), ένα συνδικάτο εργαζόμενων για να αποδυναμωθεί η Κομμουνιστική επιρροή στην εργατική τάξη της Ινδίας. Το 1964, σε στενή επαφή με ινδουιστές κληρικούς, το RSS σχημάτισε το Παγκόσμιο Συμβούλιο Ινδουιστών (Vishwa Hindu Parishad, VHP) το οποίο έπαιξε εξέχοντα ρόλο στη σφυρηλάτηση της ενότητας μεταξύ διαφόρων ινδουιστικών αιρέσεων και κληροδότησε μια «κεντρική δομή» σε μια μέχρι τότε αποκεντρωμένη θρησκεία.

Όλες αυτές οι οργανώσεις έδειξαν σθεναρή επιμονή/αποφασιστικότητα στα φασιστικά τους κινήματα που ταυτίζονταν/σχετίζονταν με συγκεκριμένες ομάδες/κοινότητες και έπαιξαν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην καταστροφή του τεμένους Μπάμπρι. Σήμερα αυτές οι οργανώσεις έχουν εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες μέλη και χιλιάδες παραρτήματά τους απλώνουν τα πλοκάμια τους σε όλη τη χώρα. Αυτό είναι ένα σοβαρό ζήτημα που προκαλεί ανησυχία σε όλες τις δημοκρατικές και επαναστατικές δυνάμεις στην παρούσα συγκυρία.

Το RSS δεν δίστασε να εκφράσει την υποστήριξή του στο Κόμμα του Κογκρέσου (Congress Party) στις Γενικές εκλογές του 1984, καθώς το τελευταίο χρησιμοποιούσε την Ινδικότητα και τις πολιτικές που ταυτίζονται/ σχετίζονται με συγκεκριμένες ομάδες/κοινότητες πολύ πιο αποτελεσματικά από κάθε άλλη φορά –ο χαρακτήρας, ο τρόπος ή το ύφος ακολουθούσε τις αρχές του κοσμικισμού15. Σε μια έντονα φορτισμένη πολιτική ατμόσφαιρα, όπου η θρησκεία χρησιμοποιήθηκε με αποκλειστικούς και κομματικούς όρους16το RSS επανάφερε στην επικαιρότητα το ζήτημα του ναού του Ράμα που βρισκόταν σε λήθαργο για πολλές δεκαετίες. Ειδικά για αυτό το σκοπό, ιδρύθηκε η Bajrang Dal, το καλοκαίρι του 1984 στην πολιτεία Ούταρ Πραντές (Uttar Pradesh), ως μαχητική πτέρυγα του VHP. Τα μέλη της στρατολογήθηκαν από τις κατώτερες κάστες και τους άνεργους/ υποαπασχολούμενους νέους, που έγιναν οι πεζικάριοι της Χίντουτβα. Μέσα σε λίγα χρόνια τα εκτιμώμενα μέλη ανήλθαν σε περίπου 100.000 νέους.

Με την κατάρρευση του σοσιαλιμπεριαλισμού της Σοβιετικής Ρωσίας στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1990, η ινδική οικονομία πέρασε σε βαθιά κρίση καθώς οι ινδικές άρχουσες τάξεις εξαρτιόνταν σε μεγάλο βαθμό από το σοβιετικό κεφάλαιο. Υπήρξε σοβαρή κρίση στο ισοζύγιο πληρωμών. Αυτό αποτέλεσε πρόσφορο έδαφος για τη διείσδυση των πολιτικών του ΔΝΤ και της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας στην Ινδία. Σε ολόκληρη την ινδική οικονομία άνοιξε ο δρόμος για το ξένο κεφάλαιο και ξεκίνησε η φάση αυτού που είναι ευρέως γνωστό ως Φιλελευθεροποίηση (Liberation), Ιδιωτικοποίηση και Παγκοσμιοποίηση.

Για να συγκαλύψουν/καμουφλάρουν την επικείμενη κοινωνική και οικονομική κρίση, στη σύγκρουση με τις ιμπεριαλιστικές δυνάμεις, οι οργανώσεις της κύριας μορφής του Ινδουιστικού εθνικισμού (Χίντουτβα) παρέσυραν τις ινδικές μάζες σε πανικόβλητες πολιτικές17. Στις γενικές εκλογές του 1989 το BJP έφτασε στις 85 έδρες στη Βουλή των Λαϊκών Αντιπροσώπων18, από 2 έδρες το 1984. Μετά δε την ολοκλήρωση της πορείας Ram Rath Yatra, στις γενικές εκλογές του 1991, το BJP κατάφερε να συγκεντρώσει 119 έδρες. Κέρδισε την πλειοψηφία των εδρών από όπου πέρασε η πορεία με την άμαξα (rath yatra). Οι εκλογές του 1991 ήταν μία από τις πιο ακριβές εκλογές στην πολιτική ιστορία της Ινδίας, όπου όλα τα πολιτικά κόμματα επιδόθηκαν σε ένα αισχρό παιχνίδι κοκορομαχίας για τον επηρεασμό της ψήφου των διαφόρων κοινοτήτων.

Ο πλειοψηφισμός και η φασιστική χρησιμοποίηση της θρησκείας στην πολιτική με αποκλειστικούς και κομματικούς όρους από το RSS-BJP οδήγησαν στη σφαγή της Γκόντρα19 το 2002. Με την άνοδο του BJP στην εξουσία το 2014, η χρησιμοποίηση της θρησκείας στην πολιτική με αποκλειστικούς και κομματικούς όρους έχει ενταθεί. Ένα πράγμα που ξεκάθαρα έχει συμβεί την τελευταία δεκαετία είναι ο εξινδουισμός20 της πολιτικής στην Ινδία. Κανείς δεν μπορεί να το αρνηθεί αυτό με πλήρη πολιτική συνείδηση!

Η καθιέρωση του ναού του Ράμα έφερε στο προσκήνιο το ζήτημα της δημιουργίας ασπίδας προστασίας για θεμελιώδεις έννοιες όπως εθνικισμός, κοσμικισμός, δημοκρατία και ιθαγένεια από την αχαλίνωτη επίθεση του φασισμού της Βραχμανικής Ινδικότητας. Με το να προετοιμάζουμε όμως απλά τους εαυτούς μας να γίνουν θεματοφύλακες αυτών των ιδεών/αντιλήψεων που ορίζουν σήμερα την ουσία του να είσαι άνθρωπος, παρέχουμε αδύναμη προστασία σε αυτές τις ιδέες/αντιλήψεις. Αυτό που επί του παρόντος απαιτείται μαζί με την προστασία είναι να υποβάλουμε σε κριτική σκέψη και αναδιάρθρωση αυτές τις ιδέες/αντιλήψεις για να τους δοθεί μεγαλύτερη αντοχή.

Οι μηχανισμοί του RSS γνωρίζουν ότι ο πολιτιστικός τομέας κατασκευάζεται και διαμορφώνουν εκείνους τους πολιτικούς στόχους που αποφασιστικά συμβάλλουν ή επιδρούν στη διαμόρφωση της πολιτικής κατάστασης και στην προώθηση της επιτυχίας τους. Προσδίδοντας στον Ινδουισμό στοιχεία από τις προφητικές-μονοθεϊστικές θρησκείες21 και οργανώνοντάς τον σε κάποια βάση έχει κατασκευάσει ο φασισμός Χίντουτβα μια κουλτούρα που υπόσχεται μια ψυχολογική ενότητα στην προικισμένη με μεγάλη ποικιλομορφία Ινδουιστική θρησκεία. 

Σήμερα μπορούμε να δούμε αυτή την προσπάθεια να προχωρά με ταχύ ρυθμό συσκοτίζοντας άλλες κοινωνικές ταυτότητες όπως η τάξη, η κάστα και το φύλο. Αυτές οι κοινωνικές ταυτότητες πρέπει να καταπιεστούν από τις δυνάμεις της Χίντουτβα καθώς δημιουργούν κινήματα που υπερβαίνουν τη θρησκεία και αποτελούν εμπόδιο στην ιδεολογία της Χίντουτβα. Το RSS-BJP ταξινομεί σε κατηγορίες την ιθαγένεια βάσει του αρχέγονου γνωρίσματος της θρησκείας. Αυτό ακριβώς λέει ο Savarkar22, για το ποιοι είναι πολίτες της Ινδίας, όταν διακηρύσσει ότι ως αληθινοί πολίτες αυτής της χώρας λογίζονται μόνο εκείνοι των οποίων η ιερή τους γη και η γη των προγόνων τους είναι η Ινδία.

Δηλώνοντας σε εθνικό μέσο ενημέρωσης «από το Θεό στη Χώρα και από τον Ράμα στο Έθνος»23, ο πρωθυπουργός Μόντι αποκάλυψε ανοιχτά σε ολόκληρο τον κόσμο την ατζέντα του για το Ινδουιστικό έθνος. Περαιτέρω, ο πρωθυπουργός Μόντι δήλωσε ότι «ο Θεός με έκανε μέσο εκπροσώπησης όλου του λαού της Ινδίας κατά την καθιέρωση». Αυτό δεν είναι παρά μια φασιστική θεωρία περί δικαίω Θεού διακυβέρνησης.

Και ο Χίτλερ καλλιέργησε τέτοιο θρησκευτικό πάθος για να διατηρήσει τον έλεγχο του στις μάζες. O Μόντι και ο Χίτλερ, πολιτικοί θεάνθρωποι, μοιάζουν πολύ μεταξύ τους.

Τα καθεστωτικά αριστερά κόμματα καλωσόρισαν τη στάση του Κόμματος του Κογκρέσου για μποϊκοτάρισμα της εκδήλωσης στον ναό του Ράμα ως ιδεολογική στάση που υποδηλώνει χαρακτηριστικά «κοσμικότητας» που πρέσβευε και υποστήριζε ο Νεχρού»24 . Πέρα από τα κενά τις ασάφειες ή τις παραλείψεις του λεγόμενου «Νεχρουβιανού Κοσμικισμού» τα κόμματα της κοινοβουλευτικής αντιπολίτευσης έδωσαν και μια παράδοξη εξήγηση για τη στάση τους να μποϊκοτάρουν το γεγονός της 22ας Ιανουαρίου. Το Κογκρέσο και η αριστερά επικαλέστηκαν τον κοσμικισμό και τους τέσσερις Σανκαραχάρια25 για να εξηγήσουν τη θέση τους. Αυτό, όπως υποστηρίζουν, τους κάνει να ξεχωρίζουν ιδεολογικά από το BJP.

Νεχρού ο πρώτος πρωθυπουργός της ανεξάρτητης Ινδίας από το 1947 έως 1964.

Από τη μια πλευρά το Κογκρέσο και τα αριστερά κόμματα διαφωνούν με την ανάμειξη της θρησκείας με την πολιτική, από την άλλη υπερασπίζονται τον κοσμικισμό δίνοντας εξηγήσεις θρησκευτικού χαρακτήρα.

Το ΚΚ Ινδίας (Μαρξιστικό) [CPI (M)], στην αγγλόφωνη εβδομαδιαία εφημερίδα του Peoples Democracy υποστήριξε ότι «Ο κύριος όμως λόγος για τον οποίο η κατηγορία περί “αντι-Ινδουιστή” δεν ευσταθεί είναι επειδή οι τέσσερις Σανκαραχάρια των κύριων Ινδουιστικών Peeth –Puri Govardhana Peeth, Jyotir Math, Dwarka Sharda Peeth και η Sringeri Sharda Peeth– έχουν κάνει γνωστή την πρόθεσή τους να μην συμμετάσχουν στην τελετή στην Αγιόντυα στις 22 Ιανουαρίου». Αυτοί οι τέσσερις Σανκαραχάρια έχουν υποστηρίξει στο παρελθόν τα περί Ινδουιστικού έθνους στα κύρια μέσα ενημέρωσης.

Αν ισχύει κάτι τέτοιο το κόμμα του κογκρέσου και τα αριστερά κόμματα προσπαθούν να δείξουν ότι δεν είναι λιγότερο Ινδουιστές από το BJP.

Το Κόμμα του Απλού Λαού (Aam Adami Party), το οποίο είναι μέλος της συμμαχίας της Ενωμένης Αντιπολίτευσης (United Opposition) που ονομάζεται INDIA, διεξήγαγε/πήρε μέρος σε θρησκευτικές εκπομπές/προγράμματα σε 70 εκλογικές περιφέρειες στο Δελχί, λίγο πριν την καθιέρωση του ναού του Ράμα. Όλα τα καθεστωτικά πολιτικά κόμματα βυθίστηκαν σε αυτό το «όπιο», όπως μεταφορικά αποκάλεσε τη θρησκεία ο Καρλ Μαρξ.

Δεν είναι πολύ δύσκολο να προβλέψουμε ότι το θέμα των γενικών εκλογών του 2024 θα περιστρέφεται γύρω από τη θρησκεία και τον ναό του Ράμα. Θα υπάρξει τεράστια/έντονη πόλωση της κοινωνίας με φόντο τη θρησκεία από τους πολιτικούς μηχανισμούς των RSS και BJP. Οδεύουμε ολοκληρωτικά προς έναν Μεσαίωνα υπό την διακυβέρνηση του BJP. 

Τα κόμματα της κυρίαρχης τάξης απέτυχαν τελείως να οικοδομήσουν μια κοσμικού χαρακτήρα κοινωνία. Από τη δεκαετία του 1950, οι αντιλήψεις και τα σύμβολα θρησκειών καθορίζουν κατά κύριο λόγο τις πολιτικές κινητοποιήσεις των καθεστωτικών πολιτικών κομμάτων παρά το γεγονός ότι, το άρθρο 123 του Νόμου περί Αντιπροσώπευσης του Λαού (Representation of the People Act) του 1951 απαγορεύει σε οποιοδήποτε πολιτικό κόμμα ή άτομα να χρησιμοποιούν θρησκευτικά σύμβολα ή θρησκευτικά θέματα στη διεξαγωγή των εκλογών. Δεν έχουν υπάρξει εκλογές στην Ινδία που να μην έχουν κυριαρχήσει τα θρησκευτικά θέματα. Για τον Γκάντι, η θρησκεία ήταν πιο σημαντική από την πολιτική και φιλοδοξούσε να δημιουργήσει το βασίλειο του Θεού που για την Ινδία ήταν το Βασίλειο του Ράμα (Ram Rajya). Αυτή η πολιτική κουλτούρα των Ινδουιστών και της ανώτερης κάστας που χαρακτηρίζεται από έλλειψη αντικειμενικότητας συνεχίστηκε από το κόμμα του Κογκρέσου ακόμη και μετά το 1947. Αργότερα, ο κατευνασμός του συντηρητικού μουσουλμανικού κλήρου στην υπόθεση της Σαχ Μπάνο του 1985 από τον Ρατζίβ Γκάντι26 και την ίδια στιγμή η παροχή άδειας για την τέλεση τελετουργιών από τις δυνάμεις της δεξιάς πτέρυγας Χίντουτβα στο αμφισβητούμενο τέμενος Μπάμπρι πυροδότησε το θρησκευτικό ξέσπασμα/κύμα που τελικά κατάπιε/κατέκλυσε ολόκληρο το έθνος.

Με νόμους που σχετίζονται με τον Ενιαίο Αστικό Κώδικα (Uniform Civil Code), CAA και NRC, το ινδικό κράτος υπό το BJP έχει κάνει σαφή την απάθειά/αδιαφορία του ακόμη και όσον αφορά τον τυπικό κοσμικισμό όπως αυτός κατοχυρώνεται μέσω του συντάγματος.

Αυτό το  Χίντουτβα κράτος, αυτή η Βραχμανική κοινωνία, έβαλε σε σιδερένιες αλυσίδες τους αδύναμους και εξαντλημένους μύες των εργαζομένων μαζών. Διατηρεί την κοιλιά τους μισογεμάτη με 5 κιλά σιτηρά και συνεχή ευτέλεια. Ακόμη και μετά το μόχθο τους σαν σκλάβοι κάτω από τον καύσωνα του καλοκαιριού ή το τσουχτερό κρύο του χειμώνα, οι καταπιεσμένες μάζες της χώρας παραμένουν πάντα θύματα υποσιτισμού.

Οι κοινωνικές αρχές της κύριας μορφής του Ινδουιστικού εθνικισμού (Χίντουτβα) δικαιολογούν την αποικιοποίηση της Ινδίας, εξυμνούν τη δουλοπαροικία του Μεσαίωνα και τη σκλαβιά της αρχαιότητας. Επιπλέον, η Χίντουτβα υπερασπίζεται με τεχνάσματα την καταπίεση των εργαζομένων μαζών και την χαρακτηρίζει ως αναπόφευκτη μοίρα τους. Συνεχίζει την εκμετάλλευση της εργασίας και των καταπιεσμένων μαζών με σκληρό ρυθμό. Θεωρεί κάθε δημοκρατική και κοσμική θέση ως αποκήρυξη της ιδεολογίας της. Μάλιστα, τις θεωρεί ειρηνιστικές και ότι δεν ταιριάζουν σε άνδρες, και στη θέση τους υποστηρίζει τον συγκεντρωτισμό της εξουσίας, την υποταγή στην εξουσία και τη βία για την τρομοκράτηση των δυνάμεων της αντιπολίτευσης.

Τι πρέπει να κάνουμε για την καταστροφή του Ινδουιστικού Έθνους; Η απάντηση σε αυτό το αναπόφευκτο ερώτημα δεν είναι τόσο απλή όσο το να σπάσεις ένα γυάλινο κάστρο. Χωρίς να σταθούμε στην πολυπλοκότητα του ζητήματος/ χωρίς να υπεισέλθουμε σε λεπτομέρειες της απάντησης, πρέπει να κάνουμε ό,τι έκανε η Μεγάλη Επανάσταση του 1789 στη Γαλλική Μοναρχία, ό,τι έκανε το Κόμμα των Μπολσεβίκων στον Τσάρο της Ρωσίας και ό,τι έκαναν οι αγωνιστές της Ελευθερίας στη βρετανική αποικιοκρατία.

Srinivas 

Εκπρόσωπος, Γραφείο Δυτικής Ζώνης 

ΚΚΙ (Μαοϊκό)


Σημειώσεις

Το άρθρο δημοσιεύτηκε από την Διεθνή Επιτροπή για την Υποστήριξη του Λαϊκού Πολέμου στην Ινδία (International Committee to Support the People's War in India, icspwi) στις 18/02/2024 στον ιστότοπο Support the People's War in India με τίτλο «CPI (Maoist) analisys – Ram Temple and the Idea of India».  

Βρίσκεται στη διεύθυνση: https://icspwindia.wordpress.com/2024/02/18/cpi-maoist-analisys-ram-temple-and-the-idea-of-india/. Η μετάφραση έγινε από τα αγγλικά για λογαριασμό των Αντιγειτονιών από τον Κ.Καψ. Η δημοσίευση δεν συνιστά απαραίτητα και συμφωνία με όλες τις απόψεις που διατυπώνονται.



1 ΣτΜ. Brahmanical := Βραχμανικός :» Αρκετοί μελετητές απεικονίζουν τον Βραχμανισμό είτε ως ιστορικό στάδιο στην εξέλιξη του Ινδουισμού είτε ως ξεχωριστή θρησκευτική παράδοση. Ωστόσο, μεταξύ των Ινδουιστών, ειδικά εντός της Ινδίας, ο Βραχμανισμός θεωρείται γενικά ως μέρος της παράδοσής τους παρά ως ξεχωριστή θρησκεία. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Brahmanism. 

2 ΣτΜ. Hindutva := Ινδικότητα :» Η Ινδικότητα ή "Χίντουτβα" είναι όρος που επινοήθηκε από τον Vinayak Damodar Savarkar το 1923, και σημαίνει την κύρια μορφή Ινδουιστικού εθνικισμού στην Ινδία. Το Κόμμα Bharatiya Janata (BJP) υιοθέτησε την Iνδικότητα ως επίσημη ιδεολογία το 1989. Εκπροσωπείται, μαζί με την παλαιότερη ιδεολογία του "Ινδουιστικού Έθνους" (Hindu Rashtra) από την εθελοντική εθνικιστική ινδουιστική οργάνωση, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) και άλλες οργανώσεις, ιδίως την Vishva Hindu Parishad. Πολλοί Ινδοί κοινωνικοί επιστήμονες έχουν περιγράψει την κίνηση Hindutva ως φασιστική. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindutva.

3
ΣτΜ. Ο Μπιμράο Ράμτζι Αμπεντκάρ (Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, 14 Απριλίου 1891 - 6 Δεκεμβρίου 1956), γνωστός ως Μπαμπασαχέμπ Αμπεντκάρ, ήταν Ινδός νομικός, οικονομολόγος, πολιτικός και κοινωνικός μεταρρυθμιστής που ενέπνευσε το Βουδιστικό κίνημα των Ντάλιτ και κατηγόρησε την κοινωνική διάκριση έναντι των Άθικτων (Ντάλιτ) υποστηρίζοντας τα δικαιώματα των γυναικών και της εργασίας. Ήταν ο πρώτος υπουργός Δικαιοσύνης της ανεξάρτητης Ινδίας, κύριος αρχιτέκτονας του Συντάγματος της Ινδίας και ιδρυτής της Δημοκρατίας της Ινδίας. https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._R._Ambedkar, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Bhimrao-Ramji-Ambedkar. 

  4 ΣτΜ. majoritarian := πλειοψηφικός :» Η ιδέα ότι η αριθμητική πλειοψηφία ενός πληθυσμού πρέπει να έχει τον τελευταίο λόγο στον καθορισμό των αποφάσεων καλείται πλειοψηφισμός (majoritarianism). Ο πλειοψηφισμός είναι μια πολιτική φιλοσοφία ή ιδεολογία που υποστηρίζει ότι μια πλειοψηφία (μερικές φορές κατηγοριοποιημένη με βάση τη θρησκεία, τη γλώσσα, την κοινωνική τάξη ή κάποιον άλλο προσδιοριστικό παράγοντα), έχει δικαίωμα πρωτοκαθεδρίας στην κοινωνία και δικαίωμα να λαμβάνει αποφάσεις που επηρεάζουν την κοινωνία. Λαμβάνοντας π.χ. την εθνοτική διάσταση ως προσδιοριστικό παράγοντα παρέχει τη δικαιολογία για τις ομάδες εθνοτικής πλειοψηφίας να κυριαρχούν σε μειονοτικές ομάδες χωρίς την ανάγκη εξασφάλισης ίσων δικαιωμάτων και προστασίας. https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/majoritarianism/. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majoritarian_representation 

  5 ΣτΜ. communal :≈ Που ταυτίζεται/σχετίζεται με συγκεκριμένες ομάδες/κοινότητες. 

  6 ΣτΜ. Ram Temple := Ναός του Ράμα :» Ο ναός, αφιερωμένος στο Θεό Ράμα, ευρέως γνωστός ως Ram Mandir, χτίζεται στη γη όπου βρισκόταν ένα τζαμί του 16ου αιώνα. Το 1992 ινδουιστές ακροδεξιοί κατεδάφισαν το τζαμί, προκαλώντας πανεθνικές ταραχές μεταξύ Ινδουιστών και Μουσουλμάνων κατά τις οποίες σκοτώθηκαν περισσότεροι από 2.000 άνθρωποι, οι περισσότεροι εξ αυτών μουσουλμάνοι. 

7 ΣτΜ. Ayodhya := Αγιόντυα :» Πόλη 55.000 κατοίκων που βρίσκεται στις όχθες του ποταμού Sarayu στην ινδική πολιτεία Ούταρ Πραντές (Uttar Pradesh)· θεωρείται γενέτειρα της Ινδουιστικής θεότητας Ράμα. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayodhya. 

8 ΣτΜ. consecration := καθιέρωση :≈ Η τελετή αγιασμού ή εγκαινίων ναού. 

9 ΣτΜ. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) := Δεξιά ινδουιστική εθνικιστική οργάνωση. 

10 ΣτΜ. Ramjambhoomi Rath Yatra ή Ram Rath Yatra := Πορεία με πολιτικές και θρησκευτικές συγκεντρώσεις που διήρκεσε από τον Σεπτέμβριο έως τον Οκτώβριο του 1990. Διοργανώθηκε από το Κόμμα Bharatiya Janata (BJP) και τα ινδουιστικά εθνικιστικά θυγατρικά του με επικεφαλής τον τότε πρόεδρο του BJP, L.K. Advani. Σκοπός της πορείας ήταν να υποστηρίξει/ενισχύσει το πάθος για την ανέγερση ναού για την Ινδουιστική θεότητα Ράμα στην τοποθεσία του τεμένους Babri. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ram_Rath_Yatra. 

11 ΣτΜ. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) := Ινδικό Λαϊκό Κόμμα, Μπαρατίγια Τζανάτα 

12 ΣτΜ. Jingoistic := υπερεθνικόφρονας, πατριδοκάπηλος :» αυτός που τον διακρίνει ακραίος σοβινισμός ή εθνικισμός που χαρακτηρίζεται ιδιαίτερα από μια πολεμική εξωτερική πολιτική. Τζινγκοϊσμός :≈ στάση πολεμικού εθνικισμού ή τυφλή προσήλωση στην ορθότητα ή την αρετή του έθνους, της κοινωνίας ή της ομάδας κάποιου, απλώς και μόνο επειδή είναι δικό/ή του.  

13 ΣτΜ. inalienable act := απαράγραπτη πράξη :» Πράξη που δεν μπορεί να παραγραφεί, να ακυρωθεί, να καταργηθεί, να διαγραφεί. 

14 ΣτΜ. Adivasi := Αντιβάσι :≈ πρωτόγονοι, αρχαίοι κάτοικοι. 

15 ΣτΜ. secularism := κοσμικισμός ή σεκουλαρισμός :≈ Η άποψη πως το κράτος και οποιαδήποτε άλλη κοινωνική οντότητα πρέπει να είναι εντελώς διαχωρισμένη από τη θρησκεία και από διάφορους θρησκευτικούς θεσμούς και δόγματα (η επίτευξη αυτού αποκαλείται κοσμικότητα). Κατά μία έννοια, ο κοσμικισμός διεκδικεί το δικαίωμα του θρησκευτικού αποχρωματισμού κοινωνικών και πολιτικών θεσμών, δηλαδή τον πλήρη διαχωρισμό εκκλησίας-κράτους. https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CF%8C%CF%82 

16 ΣτΜ. communal politics :≈ Η χρησιμοποίηση της θρησκείας στην πολιτική με αποκλειστικούς και κομματικούς όρους. 

17 ΣτΜ. consternated politics := πανικόβλητες πολιτικές :≈ Αγχώδεις πολιτικές που οδηγούν σε απόλυτη σύγχυση, απογοήτευση. 

18 ΣτΜ. Lok Sabha := Λοκ Σάμπχα :≈ Η Βουλή των Λαϊκών Αντιπροσώπων. https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9B%CE%BF%CE%BA_%CE%A3%CE%AC%CE%BC%CF%80%CE%B1 

19 ΣτΜ. carnage of Godhra := σφαγή στην Γκόντρα :≈ Το κάψιμο του τρένου συνέβη το πρωί της 27ης Φεβρουαρίου 2002: 59 Ινδουιστές προσκυνητές που επέστρεφαν από την Αγιόντυα σκοτώθηκαν σε πυρκαγιά μέσα στο Sabarmati Express κοντά στο σιδηροδρομικό σταθμό Godhra στην ινδική πολιτεία Γκουτζαράτ. Λίγο αργότερα σημειώθηκαν ταραχές στο Γκουτζαράτ όπου οι μουσουλμάνοι έγιναν στόχος εκτεταμένης βίας. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godhra_train_burning.  

20 ΣτΜ. hinduisation := εξινδουισμός :» Όρος που χρησιμοποιούν ορισμένοι μελετητές για να αναφερθούν στη διαδικασία με την οποία μη ή προ-ινδουιστικά θρησκευτικά στοιχεία ―όπως οι τοπικοί θεοί― αφομοιώνονται στον Ινδουισμό, ταυτίζοντάς τα με συγκεκριμένα ινδουιστικά στοιχεία. https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095937567 

21 ΣτΜ. semitized Hinduism := Τάση στο ινδουιστικό κίνημα να δανείζεται στοιχεία από τις προφητικές-μονοθεϊστικές θρησκείες. Λέγεται ότι η Hindutva αποτελεί «σημιτισμό» του Ινδουισμού. http://voiceofdharma.org/books/wiah/ch5.htm. 

22 ΣτΜ. Ο Savarkar είπε ότι Ινδουιστής ήταν κάποιος για τον οποίο η Ινδία ήταν η γη των προγόνων του (pitrabhumi) και η ιερή του γη (punya bhumi). Έτσι, με αυτόν τον ορισμό, Ινδουιστές, Σιχ, Βουδιστές και Τζαϊνιστές κάλυπταν και τις δύο κατηγορίες ενώ οι μουσουλμάνοι και οι χριστιανοί όχι. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/savarkar-was-first-to-advocate-two-nation-theory-shashi-tharoor/articleshow/73590565.cms?from=mdr. 

23 ΣτΜ. Dev se Desh and Ram se Rashtra := [διευρύνετε τη συνείδησή σας] «από το Θεό στη Χώρα, από τον Ράμα στο Έθνος» (from Deity to Country, from Ram to Nation). 

24 ΣτΜ. “Nehruvian Secularism” := «Νεχρουβιανός Κοσμικισμός» :» Ο κοσμικισμός ή σεκουλαρισμός που πρέσβευε και υποστήριζε ο Νεχρού ο πρώτος πρωθυπουργός της ανεξάρτητης Ινδίας από το 1947 έως 1964. Η Ινδία του Νεχρού υποτίθεται ότι ήταν αφοσιωμένη στον «κοσμικισμό». Ο κοσμικισμός της Ινδίας δεν διαχωρίζει τελείως τη θρησκεία και το κράτος. Η ιδέα εδώ, στην πιο αδύναμη μορφή της ήταν ότι η κυβέρνηση δεν θα ανακατευόταν σε «προσωπικά» θρησκευτικά ζητήματα και θα δημιουργούσε συνθήκες στις οποίες οι άνθρωποι όλων των θρησκειών θα μπορούσαν να ζήσουν αρμονικά. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secularism_in_India. 

25 ΣτΜ. Shankaracharya := Σανκαραχάρια :» Ο ινδουιστής άγιος Σάνκαρα (Adi Shankara) του 8ου αιώνα, είχε ιδρύσει τέσσερα μοναστήρια σε όλη τη χώρα. Οι τίτλοι που δίνονται στους επικεφαλής αυτών των μοναστηριών είναι γνωστοί ως Σανκαραχάρια, πνευματικοί ηγέτες. Αυτοί έχουν έναν πολύ κρίσιμο ρόλο στη διατήρηση και την ερμηνεία των ιερών ινδουιστικών γραφών. Θεωρούνται η «ανώτατη αρχή» στον Ινδουισμό και για την ερμηνεία των ινδουιστικών γραφών. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shankaracharya. https://www.indiatvnews.com/explainers/who-is-shankaracharya-how-many-are-they-what-is-their-significance-in-hindu-religion-all-you-need-to-know-2024-01-13-911587  

26 ΣτΜ. Shah Bano :» Τον Απρίλιο του 1978, μια 62χρονη μουσουλμάνα, η Shah Bano, υπέβαλε αίτηση στο δικαστήριο ζητώντας διατροφή από τον διαζευγμένο σύζυγό της Mohammed Ahmad Khan. Η υπόθεση θεωρείται ένα από τα νομικά ορόσημα στη μάχη για την προστασία των δικαιωμάτων των μουσουλμάνων γυναικών. Ενώ το Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο της χώρας υποστήριξε το δικαίωμα στη διατροφή, η απόφαση πυροδότησε μια πολιτική μάχη καθώς και μια διαμάχη σχετικά με τον βαθμό στον οποίο τα δικαστήρια μπορούν να παρέμβουν στο μουσουλμανικό προσωπικό δίκαιο. Η υπόθεση έθεσε το έδαφος για τον αγώνα των μουσουλμάνων γυναικών για ίσα δικαιώματα σε θέματα γάμου και διαζυγίου στα τακτικά δικαστήρια. Αργότερα, το 1986, η κυβέρνηση του Ρατζίβ Γκάντι έφερε τον νόμο για τις Μουσουλμάνες κυρίως για να ακυρώσει τον αντίκτυπο της απόφασης του Ανώτατου Δικαστήριου. https://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-shah-bano-case-4809632/

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KKE(μ-λ) | «Βιομηχανία» συνδικαλιστικών-πολιτικών διώξεων! Στις κεντρικές αιχμές του κινήματος η πάλη για την ανατροπή τους! (Resistance in the neighbourhood)


 «Βιομηχανία» συνδικαλιστικών-πολιτικών διώξεων!

Στις κεντρικές αιχμές του κινήματος η πάλη για την ανατροπή τους!


Το ΚΚΕ(μ-λ) καταγγέλλει την ομοβροντία συνδικαλιστικών και πολιτικών διώξεων που έχει ξεσπάσει σε πολλούς χώρους του ιδιωτικού και του δημόσιου τομέα. 

Δεκάδες εργαζόμενοι, σε επιχειρήσεις, στην εκπαίδευση, στα νοσοκομεία και αλλού, έρχονται αντιμέτωποι με πλήθος πειθαρχικών και ποινικών διώξεων για συμμετοχή σε διαδηλώσεις και σε απεργίες, αλλά ακόμα και για δημόσια διατύπωση άποψης μη αρεστής σε εργοδοσίες, σε προϊστάμενες αρχές και στην κυβέρνηση.

Εμπνευστές της πρωτοφανούς αντι-συνδικαλιστικής υστερίας, είναι τα κέντρα εξουσίας του συστήματος της εξάρτησης, της εκμετάλλευσης και της καταπίεσης και η κυβέρνηση που τα εκπροσωπεί. Εργοδοσίες και Διοικήσεις εκμεταλλεύονται το αντιδραστικό και φασίζον θεσμικό πλαίσιο που έχει ψηφιστεί τα προηγούμενα χρόνια για να βγάλουν στην παρανομία κάθε προοπτική αγώνα. Οι νόμοι Γεωργιάδη, Χατζηδάκη, Αχτσιόγλου, Χρυσοχοΐδη, ο νέος Ποινικός Κώδικας, αλλά και πλήθος Υπουργικών Αποφάσεων και Εγκυκλίων έχουν υφάνει ένα πλαίσιο, όπου, ουσιαστικά, κάθε διαδήλωση, απεργία, διαμαρτυρία είναι εκτός νόμου.

Οι απεργίες και οι διαδηλώσεις, για να είναι νόμιμες, έχουν να αντιμετωπίσουν ένα απίστευτο πλέγμα εμποδίων, ενώ μετά την κήρυξή τους βγαίνουν παράνομες, με fast track δικαστικές διαδικασίες. Οι «φωνασκίες» (δηλαδή τα συνθήματα!) σε νοσοκομεία και εκπαίδευση αποτελούν ποινικό αδίκημα και οι εργαζόμενοι, είναι παράνομο να απεργούν ενάντια σε ψηφισμένο νόμο. Τα πανό και τα συνθήματα αντιμετωπίζονται ως «τεκμήριο εγκλήματος». Πάνω σε αυτό το πλαίσιο έχουν πατήσει οι απολύσεις και οι διώξεις συνδικαλιστών εργατών και εργαζομένων, οι δεκάδες διώξεις εκπαιδευτικών, οι διώξεις φοιτητών.

Η κατάσταση αυτή αποκαλύπτει τα πραγματικά χαρακτηριστικά της λεγόμενης αστικής δημοκρατίας. Μιας «δημοκρατίας» που απαιτεί «σεβασμό στο Σύνταγμα» και στην «εκλεγμένη κυβέρνηση» και την ίδια στιγμή παρακάμπτει όποτε θέλει το άρθρο 16 και αναιρεί στοιχειώδεις ελευθερίες και δημοκρατικά πολιτικά και συνδικαλιστικά δικαιώματα.  Αυτή η κατεύθυνση του συστήματος έχει ένα όνομα: φασιστικοποίηση της δημόσιας και πολιτικής ζωής. 

Είμαστε σε μια νέα εποχή. Που η κρίση και η βαρβαρότητα του συστήματος χάνει κάθε φύλο συκής, απαιτεί την πλήρη υποδούλωση και την πλήρη μετατροπή των σωματείων σε γλάστρες, που, ως «κοινωνικοί εταίροι» θα αποτελούν το διακοσμητικό ντεκόρ της ταξικής υποταγής της εργατικής τάξης και των εργαζομένων. Και που δεν θα διανοούνται καν να οργανώσουν έναν αγώνα κόντρα στον εφιάλτη.

Η αποσυγκρότηση της εργατικής τάξης και του κινήματος, που ήδη μετράει κάποιες δεκαετίες, συντελέστηκε κάτω από την ήττα του επαναστατικού κομμουνιστικού κινήματος και τη συνακόλουθη κυριαρχία της σοσιαλδημοκρατίας και του ρεφορμισμού. Οι όροι αυτοί δεν έχουν, βέβαια, ανατραπεί.

Όμως, κάθε μέρα, θα συναντάμε όλο και περισσότερο τους αγώνες από το μέλλον. Τους αγώνες που διεκδικούν την εκ νέου συγκρότηση της εργατικής τάξης και του λαϊκού κινήματος.

Αυτή η νέα συγκρότηση είναι αναγκασμένη να γίνει με τα υλικά της ταξικής αντιπαράθεσης και όχι της ταξικής συνεργασίας-υποταγής, να συντελεστεί με την ποιότητα της κόντρας στην αστική νομιμότητα, η οποία, στη φάση που είμαστε, βγάζει εκτός νόμου κάθε αγώνα.

Η πάλη για την ανατροπή του συνόλου των συνδικαλιστικών διώξεων έρχεται ως μια σοβαρή αναγκαιότητα παράλληλη με τους στόχους ανατροπής όλου του αντιδραστικού αντι-συνδικαλιστικού θεσμικού πλαισίου.

  • Κάτω τα χέρια, από τα σωματεία, τους αγώνες, τους αγωνιστές και τις αγωνίστριες! Κάτω οι αντεργατικοί - αντισυνδικαλιστικοί νόμοι!
  • Οι αγώνες θα συγκροτηθούν στην καθημερινή πάλη, θα δυναμώσουν δια πυρός και σιδήρου, ΘΑ ΝΙΚΗΣΟΥΝ!    

Απρίλης 2024






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From Ang Bayan: Children And Babies Start Dying By Starvation In Gaza Due To US-Israel Genocide - Redspark (Redspark)


Ang Bayan

April 1, 2024

After several months of warning, children in Gaza are starting to die by starvation due to Israel’s relentless bombing, attacks and food aid embargo. On March 21, the Gaza Health Ministry recorded the deaths of 27 children due to malnutrition and dehydration. The United Nations says the actual number is probably higher because many of the malnourished children do not reach the remaining hospitals. The agency is also certain that the number of people who will die through starvation in Gaza will increase if Israel do not stop its brutal attacks and detention on Palestinians. Hunger is most intense in northern Gaza which is now occupied by Israeli forces.

One of those who died was Yazan Al-Kafarna, a 10-year-old boy with cerebral palsy. He died in a hospital on March 4 due to malnutrition and lack of necessary medication for his condition. In the first week of March, the Emirati Hospital in Rafah reported the deaths of 16 premature babies in the past five weeks due to malnutrition. Some of the children who died were babies who were newly born or were only a few days old. This is due to severe malnutrition and dehydration of their mothers. Almost all patients admitted to hospitals are malnourished.

Starvation causes slow death, and it is most brutal to infants, young children and the elderly. Severely malnourished mothers are unable to produce milk, and almost no milk enters Gaza due to the Israeli forces’ embargo on aid. Some babies suck only dates, instead of milk. Some children are fed grass by their parents to survive.

Diarrhea is also widespread due to the scarcity of clean water, resulting in severe dehydration among infants and children. This is because the water system in Gaza was one of first infrastructures destroyed by Israeli forces.

According to the World Heath Organization, 90% of children 5 and below in Gaza have one or two infectious diseases, and 70% of them suffer from diarrhea at least once in two weeks. One out of every two babies is malnourished, and babies who will be born in the coming months are also most likely to be malnourished.

More than 13,000 children have died in Gaza since October 2023. This is the highest number of children killed in all armed conflicts in the world in the last four years.

Source : https://philippinerevolution.nu/angbayan/children-and-babies-start-dying-by-starvation-in-gaza-due-to-us-israel-genocide/


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Vorarlberg: Terrorprozess wegen Palästinasolidarität? (DIE ROTE FAHNE)



Hier ein kleiner Vorgeschmack der Nummer 29 der Roten Fahne:



Im Februar wurde bekannt, dass zwei Aktivisten der (ehemals) SP-nahen Organisation „Der Funke“ mit den Paragraphen §282 (1) und §282a (2) StGB, dem sogenannten „Terrorparagraphen“, bedroht werden. Ihr „Vergehen“? Sie teilten einen Text, der dazu geeignet sei, zur Begehung einer terroristischen Straftat aufzufordern.



Die zwei Vorarlberger Aktivisten Sonja und Alex wurden Ende Februar als Beschuldigte zur Staatsanwaltschaft Feldkirch vorgeladen. Dabei wird ihnen vorgeworfen, durch die Verbreitung des Statements „Nieder mit der Heuchelei! Für die Verteidigung von Gaza! Statement der IMT“ strafrechtlich relevante Handlungen begangen zu haben. Höchststrafe für die ihnen angedrohten Paragraphen sind zwei Jahre Freiheitsentzug. Auch wenn wir viele der Anschauungen und Positionen aus dem genannten Statement nicht teilen, ist es notwendig sich vehement gegen diese Beschuldigungen und die Androhung eines Terrorprozesses zu stellen. Relevant ist hier die Verteidigung der Meinungsfreiheit, die durch die österreichischen Behörden und die Justiz mit Füßen getreten wird. Wenn dieser Fall tatsächlich zu einer Verurteilung durch die oben genannten Paragraphen führt, so würde das Tür und Tor dafür öffnen, den „Terrorparagraphen“ zur Gesinnungsjustiz breitflächig anwenden zu können. Würde dieser Fall zu einer Verurteilung führen, wäre ein großer Teil der palästina-solidarischen Aktivitäten bedroht, so ausgelegt zu werden, dass eine „Terrorunterstützung“ konstruiert werden könnte.

 

Dieser Fall steht sinnbildlich für die antidemokratische Politik der Herrschenden gegenüber jenen, welche den Völkermord an den Palästinensern verurteilen und die Rechte der Palästinenser verteidigen. Zahlreiche Demonstrationen wurden bereits verboten, Hunderte bekamen Anzeigen und in rund 70 Fällen ermittelt die Justiz. Hier geht es darum, dass den Herrschenden unliebsame Meinungen und Protest unterbunden werden soll – und das richtet sich gegen die demokratischen Rechte der Bevölkerung. Alle Anklagepunkte gegen Sonja und Alex müssen sofort fallen gelassen werden!





(1) § 282 StGB Aufforderung zu mit Strafe bedrohten Handlungen und Gutheißung mit Strafe bedrohter Handlungen

(2) § 282a StGB Aufforderung zu terroristischen Straftaten und Gutheißung terroristischer Straftaten




Bildquelle: derfunke.at


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INDIA: Protest against the Anti-Muslim and Hindutva fascist’s Citizenship Amendment Act! CC CPI(MAOIST) (Dazibao Rojo)


 COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MAOIST) 

Central Committee 

Press Release 

14 March, 2024 

Protest against the Anti-Muslim and Hindutva fascist’s Citizenship Amendment Act! 

Ignoring the people’s protest all over the country Brahmanic Hindutva Fascist BJP’s government at the center under the leadership of Narendra Modi has implemented anti-people, especially anti-Muslim Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) through an ordinance. The Central Committe of CPI (Maoist) strongly condemns this decision of the BJP government and appeals to all progressive-democratic intellectuals, students, youth, pro-people journalists, human rights organizations, peasants, workers and Muslims to build militant protest for the abrogation of CAA. 

Instead of tabling the CAA in the Parliament, Modi government’s act of implementing CAA through ordinance is nothing but a conspiracy. Modi government has taken such wrong method to rescue itself from deep discussions on the CAA and mass protest against it. Just one day before the holy month of Ramadan CAA was implemented and on the day of Ramadan, Modi expressed well-wishes to Muslims was nothing but making fun of them. One has to note one more point that in the BJP ruled state of Uttarakhand, on that very day anti-people Uniform Civil Code (UCC) was passed by the State Assembly for implementation. All these depict the anti-Muslim policies of the BJP-RSS and its hatred towards the Muslim community. 

In fact CAA is influenced from Hindu religion and is totally antagonistic towards Muslim. To deny citizenship of a community of a particular religion and to terminate their citizenship is what the inhuman CAA law is designed for. To cover up this, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is propagating that CAA is related to giving citizenship to religious minorities from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan. This apart, CAA will forcefully deport 40 thousand persecuted Rohingya Muslims that turns their life in danger. This law was made and is now being implemented in violation of the Indian Constitution which talks about secularism. Indian fascist rulers are ignoring the present Indian Constitution. Remember that RSS-BJP has brought CAA to fulfil its agenda of Hindu-Rashtr. Modi’s developed “New India” is in reality Hindutva fascist India which is against the exploited and oppressed classes and especially against particular social communities, the Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists. It is also a den for corporate plunder of the country’s resources. 

Today RSS-BJP and its affiliated organizations have become a threat to the nation and people. Our Central Committe appeals to the people of the country, democratic-progressive forces, patriotic people, human rights organizations, Adivasi and Non-Adivasi organizations, people from religious minorities especially, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and people of nationalities of Kashmir and Northeastern regions to gird up for protest and march forward against the Brahmanical Hindutva fascism. 

Abhay 

Spokesperson 

Central Committee


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Communist Party of India (Maoist) expresses its solidarity to the ongoing farmers’ movement (maoistroad)


COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MAOIST)
Central Committee
Press Release
1 March, 2024
Till the demands are fulfilled, continue the struggle and extend it
The Central committee of Communist Party of India (Maoist) expresses its solidarity to the ongoing
farmers’ movement under the leadership of Samyukt Kisan Morcha (Non-Political). It also condemns the
abominable cruelties like the use of drones to fire tear-gas, use of rubber bullets and bullets by the armed forces that injured hundreds of farmers. Many became blind and deaf and two farmers were killed in police repression.
It states that laying down of spikes and nails and barricading the roads on the border of Haryana in order to stop the farmers' march to Delhi are not only undemocratic but also a terrorist act.
The Central Committee appeals to the Samyukt Kisan Morcha to carry on the movement until the just
demands of the farmers and agricultural labourers are fulfilled and also to extend the movement in the other states. The Central government of the BJP under Modi is putting all efforts to divide the mass movements and their leadership and to separate it from the broad masses in order to crush it. In such condition, our CC appeals to the Samyukt Kishan Morcha (SKM) to take steps to form United front of the farmers to build movement in all states by uniting all the existing farmers’ unions.



The success of the 16th February strike of Rural and Manufacturing sectors under the leadership of SKM
and several Trade Unions states that the people of the country are conscious of the issues and demands of the
farmers and workers. In this context our Party brings to the attention of the masses of the country that the
present farmers’ and adivasi movements are not confined to their own issues. These movements are also the
movements for protecting the wealth and natural resources of the country. Hence, our Party appeals to the
people, democrats, students, youth, artists, writers, patriotic forces to stand in support to the ongoing farmers’
movement like they did in 2021.
It is a fact that the Central government of Narendra Modi bowed down before the 2021 farmers’
movement and withdraw the three anti-people and anti-nation farmers’ bill which were brought to destroy the
agriculture of our country. At the same time, assurance was given by the Modi’s government that it will fulfill
all the demands of the farmers. But after the completion of two years, Modi government has not fulfilled its
promises.
Modi’s promise to double the income of farmers proved to be a cheap prattle. On the other hand,
farmer’s suicides are not taking the name to stop. MSP guarantee for all crops, withdrawal of the Electricity
(Amendment) bill-2020, waiving of farmers’ loans, reduction in the prices of agricultural inputs like seeds,
fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural machineries, increase in subsidies in the budget, providing compensation
and government job to the families of those farmers who died in the farmers’ protest, to punish the culprits of
Lakhimpur-Kheri killing, termination of all international agreements made in agricultural sector, minimum
pension of ₹ 5,000 for farmers and agricultural labourers, provision of ₹ 700 per day to MNREGA workers for at
least 200 days and many other demands are kept in cold storage by the BJP government. Whereas for the
construction of Airports, mining and industrial infrastructure projects, land acquisitions are happening in a
rampant manner. This clearly proves that Modi’s government in the center promises only to cheat and divert
the people.
Labour laws achieved by the working class through historic struggles are abolished and instead of that
the central government made 4 pro-capitalist labour codes. Minimum Wages Act is not implemented in any
manufacturing sector. 12 hour working day is forcefully enforced. Workers demanding their rights are attacked
by capitalist goons, lathi charged by the police personnel and are stuffed in jails.
Adivasis obtained 5th Schedule, rights of Gram Sabha through PESA, a constitutional right that is violated
by the Modi’s government. New Forest Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2023 displaces the adivasi from their
lands and so it is anti-adivasi in nature. This apart, the demands of the adivasis struggling for more than 4 years
in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Odisha for right to Land-Forest-
water-resources and survival-self-respect are not fulfilled. In fact, Central and State governments are unleashing
2
repression on those protests. In Dantewada, Bijapur, Sukma, Kanker, Narayanpur districts of Bastar alone, 17
adivasi farmers were brutally killed in fake encounter between 1st of January and 25th February. Atrocities on
women, brutal beatings, illegal arrests, long term punishment, have become normal in Dandakaryana (DK). In
this repressive nation, in the areas of Adivasi struggles, militarization is being carried on with great intensity. In
the last five years around 200 police camps and central reserve police camps have been established.
The promise to provide employment to youth is nothing but a jhumla. Humiliation, attacks and atrocities
on Dalits and Muslims have increased. Ignoring the protests against UCC and CAA all over the country, Modi’s
government is all set to implement it.
The resolution of Narendra Modi to turn India into “New India” and “Developed India” by 2047 is in
reality to transform India into a hub for domestic and foreign corporate development, that is to make India a
base for corporate loot. In addition to this, by crushing all those voices being raised against this corporate loot
and turning India into a Brahmanic Hindu rashtra is also the motive of RSS-BJP.
It has to be remembered here that the ideology of Brahmanic Hindutva fascist RSS-BJP, its politics, work
and its history all are against farmers, workers, Adivasi, Dalit, women and minorities especially Muslims. It is
against the vast nationalities. RSS-BJP are against their economy, culture, religion and social lifestyle. In the
name of “One India-Great India” it is spreading jingoism and implementing foreign corporate policies without
any control.
In the light of the above-mentioned condition, our Party appeals to all farmers, workers organizations
of the country, farmers’ Samyukt Morcha, Adivasi, Dalit, women, religious minorities especially Muslim and
nationalities of Kashmir and North-Eastern region to unite on the basis of issues and demands, and build a broad
movement against the main danger of the country, the Brahmanic Hindutva fascist BJP government.
Abhay
Spokesperson
Central Committee


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INDIA: Till the demands are fulfilled, continue the struggle and extend it! CC CPI(MAOIST) (Dazibao Rojo)


 COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MAOIST)

Central Committee

Press Release

1 March, 2024

Till the demands are fulfilled, continue the struggle and extend it

The Central committee of Communist Party of India (Maoist) expresses its solidarity to the ongoing farmers’ movement under the leadership of Samyukt Kisan Morcha (Non-Political). It also condemns the abominable cruelties like the use of drones to fire tear-gas, use of rubber bullets and bullets by the armed forces that injured hundreds of farmers. Many became blind and deaf and two farmers were killed in police repression. It states that laying down of spikes and nails and barricading the roads on the border of Haryana in order to stop the farmers' march to Delhi are not only undemocratic but also a terrorist act.

The Central Committee appeals to the Samyukt Kisan Morcha to carry on the movement until the justdemands of the farmers and agricultural labourers are fulfilled and also to extend the movement in the other states. The Central government of the BJP under Modi is putting all efforts to divide the mass movements and their leadership and to separate it from the broad masses in order to crush it. In such condition, our CC appeals to the Samyukt Kishan Morcha (SKM) to take steps to form United front of the farmers to build movement in all states by uniting all the existing farmers’ unions.

The success of the 16th February strike of Rural and Manufacturing sectors under the leadership of SKM and several Trade Unions states that the people of the country are conscious of the issues and demands of the farmers and workers. In this context our Party brings to the attention of the masses of the country that the present farmers’ and adivasi movements are not confined to their own issues. These movements are also the movements for protecting the wealth and natural resources of the country. Hence, our Party appeals to the people, democrats, students, youth, artists, writers, patriotic forces to stand in support to the ongoing farmers’ movement like they did in 2021.

It is a fact that the Central government of Narendra Modi bowed down before the 2021 farmers’movement and withdraw the three anti-people and anti-nation farmers’ bill which were brought to destroy the agriculture of our country. At the same time, assurance was given by the Modi’s government that it will fulfill all the demands of the farmers. But after the completion of two years, Modi government has not fulfilled its promises.

Modi’s promise to double the income of farmers proved to be a cheap prattle. On the other hand,farmer’s suicides are not taking the name to stop. MSP guarantee for all crops, withdrawal of the Electricity (Amendment) bill-2020, waiving of farmers’ loans, reduction in the prices of agricultural inputs like seeds,fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural machineries, increase in subsidies in the budget, providing compensation and government job to the families of those farmers who died in the farmers’ protest, to punish the culprits of Lakhimpur-Kheri killing, termination of all international agreements made in agricultural sector, minimum pension of ₹ 5,000 for farmers and agricultural labourers, provision of ₹ 700 per day to MNREGA workers for at least 200 days and many other demands are kept in cold storage by the BJP government. Whereas for the construction of Airports, mining and industrial infrastructure projects, land acquisitions are happening in a rampant manner. This clearly proves that Modi’s government in the center promises only to cheat and divert the people.

Labour laws achieved by the working class through historic struggles are abolished and instead of that the central government made 4 pro-capitalist labour codes. Minimum Wages Act is not implemented in any manufacturing sector. 12 hour working day is forcefully enforced. Workers demanding their rights are attacked by capitalist goons, lathi charged by the police personnel and are stuffed in jails.

Adivasis obtained 5 th Schedule, rights of Gram Sabha through PESA, a constitutional right that is violated by the Modi’s government. New Forest Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2023 displaces the adivasi from their lands and so it is anti-adivasi in nature. This apart, the demands of the adivasis struggling for more than 4 years in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Odisha for right to Land-Forestwater-resources and survival-self-respect are not fulfilled. In fact, Central and State governments are unleashing repression on those protests. In Dantewada, Bijapur, Sukma, Kanker, Narayanpur districts of Bastar alone, 17 adivasi farmers were brutally killed in fake encounter between 1st of January and 25th February. Atrocities on women, brutal beatings, illegal arrests, long term punishment, have become normal in Dandakaryana (DK). In this repressive nation, in the areas of Adivasi struggles, militarization is being carried on with great intensity. In the last five years around 200 police camps and central reserve police camps have been established.

The promise to provide employment to youth is nothing but a jhumla. Humiliation, attacks and atrocities on Dalits and Muslims have increased. Ignoring the protests against UCC and CAA all over the country, Modi’s government is all set to implement it.

The resolution of Narendra Modi to turn India into “New India” and “Developed India” by 2047 is inreality to transform India into a hub for domestic and foreign corporate development, that is to make India a base for corporate loot. In addition to this, by crushing all those voices being raised against this corporate loot and turning India into a Brahmanic Hindu rashtra is also the motive of RSS-BJP.

It has to be remembered here that the ideology of Brahmanic Hindutva fascist RSS-BJP, its politics, work and its history all are against farmers, workers, Adivasi, Dalit, women and minorities especially Muslims. It is against the vast nationalities. RSS-BJP are against their economy, culture, religion and social lifestyle. In the name of “One India-Great India” it is spreading jingoism and implementing foreign corporate policies without any control.

In the light of the above-mentioned condition, our Party appeals to all farmers, workers organizationsof the country, farmers’ Samyukt Morcha, Adivasi, Dalit, women, religious minorities especially Muslim and nationalities of Kashmir and North-Eastern region to unite on the basis of issues and demands, and build a broad movement against the main danger of the country, the Brahmanic Hindutva fascist BJP government.

Abhay

Spokesperson

Central Committee


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pc 1 aprile - 55° anniversario del Nuovo Esercito Popolare - Partito Comunista delle Filippine - 1 - (proletari comunisti)


dichiarazione pervenuta - traduzione ufficiosa - prima parte


1

Intensificare la lotta armata rivoluzionaria per la democrazia nazionale! Portare avanti i compiti critici e urgenti per correggere gli errori e far avanzare la rivoluzione!

Comitato Centrale Partito Comunista delle Filippine

Il Comitato Centrale del Partito Comunista delle Filippine tiene alta la bandiera rossa della rivoluzione democratica nazionale e, a nome di tutti i quadri e membri del Partito, rivoluzionari e attivisti, rivolge il suo più fermo saluto a tutti i comandanti rossi, ai combattenti e alle milizie, mentre celebriamo, in questa occasione molto importante e gioiosa, il 55° anniversario del Nuovo Esercito del Popolo.

Oggi, guardiamo indietro ai nostri successi e alle nostre mancanze durante l'anno passato, traiamo lezioni da questi e formuliamo piani per ottenere risultati più grandi nel condurre la lotta armata rivoluzionaria contro il regime fascista e fantoccio Marcos-Stati Uniti nel prossimo anno.

In questa occasione, ricordiamo e onoriamo tutti gli eroi e i martiri della rivoluzione filippina che hanno sacrificato tutto per la causa del popolo filippino per la liberazione nazionale e sociale. Esaltiamo la loro vita e lasciamoci ispirare dal loro martirio. Quale modo migliore per onorare la loro memoria se non continuando la causa rivoluzionaria che hanno contribuito a far avanzare?

Il Comitato Centrale è lieto di informare tutti che l'appello per un movimento di rettifica che il Partito ha lanciato lo scorso dicembre è stato accolto con tutto il cuore da tutti i comitati regionali del Partito e dai comandi del NEP. Hanno risposto positivamente e stanno attualmente svolgendo conferenze di sintesi e incontri di studio per identificare gli errori e le carenze al fine di correggerli, e portare avanti in modo coerente e completo tutti i compiti rivoluzionari.

Dobbiamo fare tutto il possibile per portare avanti la rivoluzione, al fine di difendere gli interessi delle masse filippine che sono sottoposte a forme sempre più gravi di oppressione e sfruttamento da parte del regime USA-Marcos. Il paese affronta il pericolo reale e crescente di essere trascinato in una guerra inter-imperialista. La necessità di portare avanti la lotta armata rivoluzionaria, in particolare, è di grande urgenza, essendo l'arma più importante del popolo filippino per combattere per la sua causa rivoluzionaria.

Le condizioni di crisi del paese spingono le masse oppresse e sfruttate del popolo filippino a portare avanti le loro lotte. Sotto la guida del Partito, le forze rivoluzionarie sono determinate a risvegliare, organizzare e mobilitare il popolo filippino in gran numero, portare avanti costantemente la rivoluzione democratica nazionale e portarla a livelli senza precedenti in futuro, affrontando tutti i sacrifici e le difficoltà necessarie.

Prendere l'iniziativa per infiammare la lotta armata! Frustrare l'assalto a tutto campo del nemico

La lotta armata rivoluzionaria condotta dal Nuovo Esercito del Popolo (NEP) sotto la guida assoluta del Partito Comunista delle Filippine è in un momento critico. I quadri del partito, i comandanti e i combattenti rossi, le organizzazioni rivoluzionarie di massa e gli attivisti nelle campagne e nelle città, sono chiamati ad assumersi coraggiosamente i nostri compiti urgenti, ad alzare in alto la bandiera rossa della rivoluzione, a infiammare la lotta armata, a sollevarla dal suo attuale stato di avversità e ad emergere più forti che mai.




Da un lato, c'è l'urgente necessità di condurre la lotta armata per sferrare colpi contro il nemico di fronte all'intensificarsi dell'aggressione economica imperialista e dell'intervento militare e all'intensificarsi dell'assalto fascista. L'obiettivo dichiarato del nemico di "porre fine al conflitto armato" cerca di spianare la strada al calpestamento assoluto della sovranità del paese e all'oppressione totale del popolo filippino.

D'altra parte, le nostre forze sono state indebolite in larga misura da errori interni, debolezze e carenze a causa di anni di conservatorismo militare e passività. Guidate dal Partito, le unità del NEP stanno attualmente intraprendendo sforzi cruciali di rettifica e consolidamento con l'obiettivo di superare le battute d'arresto del passato, uscire dalla passività militare, preservare ed espandere le loro forze e rinvigorire la guerriglia.

Per far fronte a questa particolare situazione, dobbiamo afferrare saldamente il rapporto dialettico tra combattere il nemico e rafforzare le nostre forze: dobbiamo rafforzare il NEP per combattere efficacemente il nemico; dobbiamo combattere il nemico per rafforzare efficacemente il NEP. Non possiamo separare l'uno dall'altro. Il primo è abbastanza chiaro da vedere e non ha bisogno di essere elaborato ulteriormente; ma quest'ultimo non è così ovvio, e alcuni potrebbero anche sostenere il contrario.

Soprattutto di fronte alla superiorità strategica e locale del nemico nel dispiegare una forza militare schiacciante, è facile perdere di vista le vulnerabilità e la debolezza politica del nemico che il NEP e l'intera schiera delle forze rivoluzionarie possono e devono sfruttare. Alcuni sono così sopraffatti dalla grande presenza del nemico che si perdono facilmente d'animo e dimenticano che si tratta di una forza marcia fino al midollo e che difende un sistema moribondo e decrepito. Non riescono a riconoscere che è completamente odiato dalle masse contadine che sono molto più numerose e molto più forti quando sono organizzate. Dovrebbero resistere vigorosamente alla passività di coloro che vedono unilateralmente l'inferiorità del NEP nelle armi come uno stato permanente, e che non riescono a cogliere il processo dialettico di acquisizione della forza attraverso la guerra popolare e la guerriglia prolungate. In effetti, la situazione richiede che i quadri del Partito, i comandanti e i combattenti del NEP possiedano una grande perspicacia rivoluzionaria, una fede incrollabile e una fiducia nelle masse, e che non si facciano scoraggiare dalle difficoltà e dai sacrifici per servire la causa rivoluzionaria del popolo.

Quando parliamo di lotta armata e di lotta contro il nemico, intendiamo colpire le forze armate nemiche, impiegando ogni tipo di arma nelle mani della guerriglia e del popolo. Intendiamo principalmente organizzare offensive tattiche di base che siamo in grado di vincere, che indeboliscono il nemico annientando le sue forze armate pezzo per pezzo, e gli tolgono le armi in modo da poter armare più reclute e organizzare offensive tattiche ancora più grandi in futuro. Aumentiamo la capacità del NEP di fare la guerra facendo la guerra.

Di fronte alla spietatezza del nemico e alle campagne di accerchiamento e di repressione a tutto campo, le forze rivoluzionarie hanno il dovere di combattere il nemico e difendere il popolo conducendo la lotta armata. Dobbiamo elevare lo spirito indomito dell'esercito popolare e delle masse per combattere e sconfiggere il nemico. Dobbiamo risolvere e superare i problemi e le difficoltà poste dal grande dispiegamento di truppe nemiche contro le masse e le forze della guerriglia. Dobbiamo costringere il nemico a diluire le sue forze allargando la portata delle nostre iniziative politiche e militari. Per quanto grandi e forti siano le operazioni del nemico, ci saranno sempre opportunità d'oro che possiamo sfruttare e che dovremmo analizzare attentamente per distruggere il suo anello più debole. Dobbiamo essere pronti a riconoscere che più grande è la portata di queste operazioni nemiche, più parti del corpo del nemico diventano esposte e vulnerabili alle offensive tattiche del NEP. Per scoprire, analizzare e sfruttare queste opportunità, il NEP deve essere sempre militante, ed essere veloce e agile nei suoi movimenti, per trasformare il nemico in un gigante ingombrante e consentire al NEP di colpire a piacimento.

Di fronte all'attuale assalto del nemico, i comandi del NEP a livello di fronte e provinciale o subregionale, devono pianificare di condurre una guerra di difesa attiva a livello di campagne e battaglie, anticipare il dispiegamento del nemico e colpire le sue parti più deboli. Devono essere pronti a spostare le loro forze principali o il centro di gravità fuori dall'accerchiamento del nemico, lasciando o inviando squadre o unità composite per condurre vari tipi di azioni di guerriglia e offensive tattiche che sono in grado di vincere e infliggere gravi danni al nemico.

Data la situazione attuale, è fondamentale che le unità del NEP e le milizie popolari a tutti i livelli prendano l'iniziativa di pianificare offensive tattiche che siano in grado di organizzare e vincere. Queste iniziative devono essere portate avanti in coordinamento con il comando superiore e le unità vicine. Le offensive tattiche e le azioni di guerriglia possono variare dalla preparazione di un'imboscata contro le unità di ricognizione del nemico, la difesa perimetrale o le linee di rifornimento, l'attacco ai suoi avamposti isolati, il disarmo, il cecchinaggio, la demolizione, le operazioni partigiane e di arresto, l'imposizione di sanzioni, l'imposizione di giustizia ai controrivoluzionari e agli elementi antisociali criminali, e così via. Queste offensive tattiche devono riuscire a impadronirsi dei fucili e del materiale bellico del nemico, distruggere le loro linee di rifornimento e di comunicazione, immobilizzare le loro risorse terrestri, aeree e marittime, interrompere i piani del nemico o bloccarne l'avanzata e distogliere l'attenzione del nemico dalla direzione principale e dai piani delle forze principali del NEP.

Il compito di organizzare offensive tattiche che siamo in grado di vincere deve essere portato a termine con meticolosa pianificazione e con il massimo vigore, come un modo per galvanizzare il NEP e come il primo passo decisivo per la rettifica.

Lungo la linea per condurre una guerriglia estesa e intensa su una base di massa sempre più ampia e profonda, tutte le unità dell'esercito popolare e delle milizie popolari sono chiamate a prendere piena iniziativa militare e politica e ad esercitare flessibilità nelle loro azioni. Il NEP deve rafforzare ed espandere i suoi legami con le masse. Deve difendere le masse contadine e il popolo contro i loro oppressori e sfruttatori fascisti, e fare propaganda, organizzazione e mobilitazione per portare avanti le loro lotte di massa antifeudali e realizzare la riforma agraria.

La maggior parte dei plotoni del NEP deve essere schierata per aiutare a consolidare ed espandere i fronti di guerriglia e costruire fronti di guerriglia più grandi come le compagnie. I plotoni di guerriglieri devono forgiare un piano chiaro per inviare le loro unità entro un dato raggio che sia limitato in un dato momento per evitare un'eccessiva dispersione, ma abbastanza ampio per manovre difensive e offensive, con un chiaro lasso di tempo per avanzare ondata su ondata, o espandere la base di massa rivoluzionaria sulla base del consolidamento. Espandiamo l'area di operazioni del NEP con metodi di avanzamento a ondate o scavalcando segretamente in aree relativamente favorevoli dove può iniziare a sollevare, organizzare e mobilitare la gente per ottenere un punto d'appoggio. Possiamo sempre inviare unità NEP in missioni pionieristiche per iniziare la guerriglia e aprire nuove zone di guerriglia dove il nemico meno sospetta e si aspetta.

Insieme alle organizzazioni di massa contadine, ai comitati territoriali del partito e alle altre forze rivoluzionarie, il NEP deve condurre campagne di indagine sociale per identificare le questioni e i problemi più urgenti delle masse e accelerare gli sforzi per sollevare, organizzare e mobilitare le masse contadine, portando avanti le loro urgenti rivendicazioni democratiche, collegandole con il loro movimento rivoluzionario agrario e la rivoluzione democratica popolare.

Dobbiamo prestare attenzione alla costruzione o alla ricostruzione degli organi del potere politico nei villaggi e ai livelli più alti sulle fondamenta delle organizzazioni di massa a pieno titolo di contadini, donne, giovani, operatori culturali e altri lavoratori che coprono i quartieri o i gruppi di quartieri o comuni, così come le sezioni locali e i comitati di sezione del partito. Molti di questi organi del potere politico sono stati presi di mira dalla repressione armata del nemico. Dobbiamo riassumere le nostre esperienze e trovare politiche per garantire che gli organi del potere politico, le organizzazioni di massa, i leader di massa locali siano protetti e tenuti fuori dal radar dell'intelligence nemica.

Dobbiamo consolidare e rafforzare la base delle masse e forgiare piani per aumentare la loro militanza per affermare i loro diritti civili, politici, sociali ed economici, e per smascherare e resistere collettivamente e risolutamente alle sporche tattiche del nemico. Dobbiamo frustrare gli spregevoli piani del nemico tesi a spezzare l'unità del popolo, costringerlo ad arrendersi uno per uno, o invogliare i comandanti e i combattenti rossi ad abbandonare le masse con false promesse di un futuro migliore. Nel combattere la campagna di repressione del nemico, le forze locali non devono essere abbandonate a se stesse. La loro lotta deve essere portata a un livello più alto per trarre forza dai numeri e dalla solidarietà delle persone, dai villaggi adiacenti alla comunità internazionale. Soprattutto, il NEP deve fare tutti gli sforzi per dimostrare la sua determinazione a difendere il popolo colpendo i suoi oppressori fascisti.

Dobbiamo intensificare gli sforzi nella costruzione di forze di difesa popolari per dare pieno gioco alla guerriglia delle masse. Queste forze di difesa includono unità di milizia di villaggio e comando di coordinamento della milizia a livello inter-villaggio o municipale, unità di difesa di villaggio e comitati di autodifesa basati su organizzazioni di massa. Queste forze di difesa del popolo dovrebbero essere incoraggiate e guidate a prendere l'iniziativa di condurre tutte le forme di guerriglia o di movimento armato di massa contro il nemico, comprese le operazioni di agaw-armas (strappare le armi al nemico), il lancio di granate, i bombardamenti incendiari, le trappole esplosive, i cecchini e altre operazioni che colpiscono unità nemiche isolate o qualsiasi altra unità che possono molestare, inabilitare, sbaragliare o annientare. Dovrebbero utilizzare e impiegare tutti i tipi di armi disponibili, compresi i metodi indigeni e le trappole contro le forze operative del nemico facendogli pagare un caro prezzo. Al nemico non dovrebbe essere permesso di entrare e devastare le aree rivoluzionarie senza vivere un incubo, incorrere in perdite e subire le conseguenze dei suoi crimini fascisti.

Il NEP deve contribuire a organizzare campagne di massa per mobilitare le masse contadine su problemi e questioni gravi che le riguardano in comune. Questi includono l'accaparramento di terre da parte di grandi aziende coinvolte nell'estrazione mineraria, nelle piantagioni, nel settore immobiliare, nell'ecoturismo, nell'energia e in altri progetti infrastrutturali. Devono anche essere organizzate e mobilitate per affrontare i loro problemi in tempi di inondazioni diffuse, siccità o frane e altri disastri che distruggono i loro mezzi di sussistenza. Le masse contadine, soprattutto i contadini poveri e gli agricoltori, devono essere organizzate e mobilitate per lottare per l'abbassamento della rendita fondiaria, l'eliminazione dell'usura, l'aumento dei salari agricoli, l'equità dei prezzi dei prodotti agricoli e altre rivendicazioni urgenti in linea con la linea antifeudale e la politica agraria del partito. Le masse contadine devono essere organizzate in gran numero per elevare le loro rivendicazioni nei centri urbani o nelle città.

Ovunque vadano, i combattenti rossi e i comandanti del NEP svolgono anche campagne di produzione, educazione, salute e cultura al fine di affrontare i bisogni pratici delle masse. Devono continuare a stringere legami forti e inscindibili con le masse. Devono sempre identificarsi con i mali delle masse contadine e trovare soluzioni alla situazione a cui sono condannati dai loro sfruttatori.

Le unità del NEP devono consolidare, rafforzare ed espandere le proprie forze. È estremamente importante che i combattenti e i comandanti rossi si uniscano con un'unica mente e agiscano come un unico corpo. Per raggiungere questo obiettivo, devono fare il punto sui loro punti di forza e di debolezza e pianificare le misure necessarie per aumentare la determinazione e la capacità dei combattenti rossi e delle masse rivoluzionarie di combattere e frustrare gli attacchi a tutto campo del nemico.

Dobbiamo migliorare la struttura di comando del NEP a tutti i livelli, garantendo la qualità e la composizione dei comandi delle unità delle forze orizzontali e verticali, nonché del comando delle operazioni territoriali regionali e provinciali o subregionali. Il nucleo dirigente ad ogni livello di comando del NEP dovrebbe essere composto da comandanti e combattenti che siano modelli di coraggio di fronte al nemico e modelli di umiltà di fronte alle masse.

Le nostre forze di guerriglia devono essere in grado di condurre addestramenti politico-militari di base, così come addestramenti per ufficiali, al fine di migliorare le capacità e le conoscenze dei nostri combattenti e comandanti rossi nella scienza e nelle tattiche militari, e rafforzare ulteriormente il loro impegno a servire il popolo. Il sistema di addestramento dovrebbe essere migliorato per consentire corsi più brevi o scaglionati al fine di adattarsi alla fluida situazione militare in mezzo alle implacabili operazioni nemiche.

Le unità del NEP dovrebbero continuare a padroneggiare la flessibilità nel cambiare le loro modalità d'azione dalla concentrazione, alla dispersione e allo spostamento, a seconda della situazione e dei loro obiettivi. Concentriamo le nostre forze per attaccare il nemico e consolidarci, disperderci per condurre lavori di massa, scomparire davanti al nemico e creare più punti di iniziativa, e ci spostiamo per perseguire piani di espansione o per uscire dall'accerchiamento nemico.

Tutte le unità del NEP devono evitare battaglie non pianificate e cercare modi per far sì che il nemico prenda a pugni l'aria e si esaurisca. Devono valutare immediatamente e regolarmente la loro situazione, correggere tutte le falle di sicurezza e rimuovere tutte le vulnerabilità. Devono guardarsi diligentemente dalla tattica nemica di contrabbandare localizzatori elettronici o GPS. Devono rafforzare la loro determinazione a mettere in pratica i principi e i metodi della segretezza nei movimenti di guerriglia, durante la marcia o il bivacco. Devono mantenere costantemente un alto livello di disciplina e di rispetto dei regolamenti militari tra i combattenti rossi, e un alto grado di coscienza politica rivoluzionaria per rafforzare la loro volontà di fare i sacrifici necessari per mantenere la sicurezza del NEP. Devono sottoporre a critica e rettifica tutte le violazioni delle politiche e dei regolamenti di sicurezza che compromettono la segretezza della guerriglia.

Il NEP deve smantellare con decisione la rete di intelligence nemica che si nasconde in bella vista tra le masse, restringendo il campo ai capibanda, in particolare a quelli che hanno commesso gravi crimini contro il popolo. Le masse, specialmente quelle che hanno sopportato il peso della campagna di repressione del nemico, esigono che i traditori rinnegati che hanno collaborato attivamente con il nemico come agenti o spie, siano sottoposti a punizioni rivoluzionarie e che i loro misfatti criminali e controrivoluzionari siano completamente smascherati.

Tutte le unità dell'NPA devono valutare il patrimonio di intelligence del nemico (costruito a partire da informazioni contenute in file compromessi, divulgate da traditori o accumulate attraverso lunghi periodi di sorveglianza) e come questo sia collegato alla condotta delle operazioni nemiche. Devono fare piani e aggiustamenti appropriati nei loro piani per rendere le informazioni di intelligence del nemico non praticabili o inutilizzabili.

L'NPA deve continuare a seguire regole rigorose nella sicurezza e nella protezione delle informazioni sensibili, osservando la compartimentazione, utilizzando cifrari e crittografia e prestando attenzione alle politiche permanenti che coprono l'uso regolamentato di computer, smartphone, telefoni cellulari, radio ricetrasmittenti e altri gadget elettronici. Dobbiamo anche sviluppare la padronanza dell'arte della disinformazione e del depistaggio, compresa l'alimentazione della rete di intelligence del nemico o della sorveglianza elettronica con falsi positivi, al fine di confondere il nemico e frustrare i suoi attacchi.

Dobbiamo condurre una campagna di proselitismo tra le file del nemico, molti dei quali sono di origine contadina, operaia, semiproletaria o piccolo-borghese, che sono stati invogliati ad arruolarsi nelle forze armate del nemico a causa dei suoi alti salari. Sono pienamente consapevoli della putrefazione e della corruzione dell'organizzazione militare reazionaria, e nutrono profonde rimostranze per gli abusi perpetrati contro di loro dai loro superiori, così come per i gravi crimini e le violazioni dei diritti umani che sono costretti a perpetrare contro le masse. Dobbiamo distribuire volantini e fare propaganda aperta nei campi, nei distaccamenti o nelle stazioni militari. Possiamo incoraggiare il personale scontento delle forze militari e di polizia nemiche a lasciare il lavoro, ad unirsi alla rivoluzione, a trasmettere informazioni preziose o a vivere una vita produttiva come civili, e a prendere parte ai frutti del lavoro collettivo delle organizzazioni di massa contadine.

Dobbiamo continuare a costruire e rafforzare il Partito all'interno del Nuovo Esercito Popolare per guidarlo in tutti i suoi compiti. Dobbiamo continuare a reclutare gli elementi più avanzati e garantire la loro formazione e il loro sviluppo ideologico, politico e organizzativo. I comitati di partito devono essere costruiti a livello di compagnie; sezioni del partito in plotoni; e gruppi di partito in squadre. Il Partito deve designare tra i suoi ranghi funzionari politici e istruttori in ogni formazione del NEP per garantire che la politica comanda le armi. Dobbiamo anche garantire il dispiegamento di quadri e attivisti delle aree urbane, in particolare delle file dei lavoratori, così come di studenti, insegnanti e altri intellettuali e professionisti piccolo-borghesi, al fine di aumentare la capacità del NEP nello svolgimento dei vari compiti di direzione e amministrazione.

I compiti sopra indicati sono critici e devono essere svolti con un alto grado di urgenza dai quadri del Partito e dai comandanti rossi al centro e alla leadership del Nuovo Esercito Popolare. È particolarmente urgente prendere l'iniziativa militare e politica per riconquistare i punti di guerriglia delle unità del NEP, specialmente quelle che hanno subito battute d'arresto in passato e costrette in una posizione passiva, frustrare l'assalto del nemico e portare avanti la lotta armata rivoluzionaria. Questi compiti devono essere svolti dal Partito e dal NEP mentre portiamo avanti il movimento di rettifica per sradicare le basi ideologiche degli errori e delle debolezze del passato, al fine di creare le condizioni per una rinnovata crescita della lotta armata rivoluzionaria.

Riaffermare i principi fondamentali della guerra popolare nelle Filippine

Ogni unità del NEP deve riassumere le proprie esperienze e correggere gli errori in linea con lo spirito di critica e di autocritica, guidata dall'analisi autocritica globale fornita nel messaggio del Comitato Centrale per il 55° anniversario del Partito e dalla sintesi delle esperienze nell'ambito del loro lavoro e delle circostanze delle loro aree di attività. Le unità che hanno subito battute d'arresto devono prestare particolare attenzione all'analisi delle battaglie difensive al fine di identificare i loro errori e le loro debolezze. Dobbiamo imparare dalle lezioni pagate a caro prezzo con il sangue dei nostri martiri come un modo per onorare i loro sacrifici.

Il 55° anniversario dell'NPA è un'occasione molto propizia per riaffermare i principi di base e la teoria della guerra popolare nelle Filippine. Ciò è particolarmente importante in quanto ci troviamo di fronte a una situazione critica a seguito di gravi battute d'arresto negli ultimi anni, che ci impongono di correggere i nostri errori e le nostre debolezze.

Applicando il marxismo-leninismo-maoismo alle condizioni concrete del paese, il Partito ha sviluppato la teoria della guerra popolare nelle Filippine e guidato il Nuovo Esercito del Popolo nel condurre la lotta armata rivoluzionaria da un livello all'altro. L'articolo del 1974, Caratteristiche specifiche della nostra guerra popolare, esponeva la teoria, i principi, il programma e il piano per condurre una guerra rivoluzionaria nelle Filippine. Ha preso in considerazione il sistema semicoloniale e semifeudale, il carattere arcipelagico del suo terreno geografico e fisico, nonché altre caratteristiche specifiche del paese.

Le nostre conquiste nella pratica rivoluzionaria negli ultimi 55 anni sono la prova concreta della correttezza di queste teorie. Un'ulteriore prova della validità di queste teorie sono le battute d'arresto e le perdite che abbiamo subito a causa della nostra incapacità di attenerci fermamente a queste teorie.

La giustezza della rivoluzione democratica nazionale è stata dimostrata nella pratica conducendo la lotta armata rivoluzionaria nelle campagne come forma principale di lotta, e il movimento rivoluzionario di massa che combina forme legali e illegali di lotta nelle città e nelle campagne, come forma secondaria ma indispensabile di lotta. Sostenendo la linea democratica nazionale, siamo riusciti a costruire una base di massa di diversi milioni di persone, sotto la ferma direzione del proletariato, realizzando l'alleanza di base degli operai e dei contadini principalmente attraverso la direzione del NEP da parte del partito, e costruendo il fronte unico nazionale per combattere l'imperialismo, il feudalesimo e il capitalismo burocratico, con l'obiettivo di rovesciare lo stato reazionario dominante dei grandi borghesi compradores e dei grandi proprietari fondiari.

Conducendo una guerra popolare di lunga durata nelle campagne, principalmente costruendo l'esercito popolare e facendo avanzare la lotta armata, costruendo la base delle masse rurali e gli organi del potere politico, e facendo avanzare la rivoluzione agraria, siamo stati in grado di mobilitare le masse contadine che formano la parte più grande del popolo filippino e che servono come l'alleato più affidabile della classe operaia. Abbiamo portato avanti con fermezza la lotta per la terra in risposta al principale clamore democratico delle masse contadine. In tal modo, siamo stati in grado di costruire e rafforzare il Nuovo Esercito Popolare, attirando reclute principalmente tra i contadini poveri e i contadini senza terra, nonché sostegno materiale e politico. Lo scopo di condurre una lunga guerra popolare nelle campagne è stato quello di sviluppare le nostre forze passo dopo passo, sconfiggere il nemico pezzo per pezzo e circondare le città fino a quando non è possibile impadronirsi delle città e avanzare verso la vittoria nazionale. In tal modo, abbiamo stabilito organi di potere politico nelle campagne, costruiti sulle fondamenta del fronte unico rivoluzionario antifeudale di tutte le classi sfruttate e oppresse nelle campagne filippine.

Negli ultimi 55 anni, abbiamo superato le più grandi difficoltà e ostacoli nel condurre la guerra popolare nelle Filippine come paese arcipelagico. Siamo riusciti a sviluppare autonomamente la guerriglia su scala nazionale, nonostante lo svantaggio di non avere retrovie fisiche. Abbiamo stabilito fronti di guerriglia e consolidato basi rurali con unità abbastanza forti del NEP in tutte le principali isole del paese. Questi fronti di guerriglia sono serviti come teatri per le unità del NEP per condurre la guerriglia. Creano zone e basi di guerriglia prima nei terreni montuosi meno popolati, dove potrebbero consolidarsi, addestrarsi e pianificare l'espansione verso le pianure meglio popolate, i fiumi, le principali linee di trasporto e le aree costiere.

Partendo da soli 60 combattenti rossi armati con solo nove fucili automatici e 26 armi da fuoco di tipo inferiore nel secondo distretto della provincia di Tarlac, siamo riusciti a sviluppare le nostre forze da squadre e plotoni, a forze di guerriglia della forza di compagnia. Abbiamo creato 14 comandi regionali del NEP, ognuno dei quali ha raggiunto una forza massima di poche centinaia o più o meno mille combattenti rossi, e ciascuno ha un certo numero di comandi subregionali o provinciali con diversi fronti di guerriglia.

La rivoluzione democratica nazionale filippina ha avuto la particolarità di essere progredita a grandi passi e di aver condotto la lotta armata nell'attuale epoca di arretramento internazionale del proletariato mondiale. Con la sconfitta della rivoluzione socialista e la restaurazione capitalista in Cina e nell'Unione Sovietica sotto il moderno regime revisionista, il popolo filippino ha dovuto condurre e sviluppare autonomamente la lotta armata rivoluzionaria.

Abbiamo stabilito il potere politico rosso in migliaia di villaggi in tutto il paese. Abbiamo costruito le forme rudimentali del governo democratico popolare a livello di distretto o inter-distrettuale, con funzionari eletti nelle assemblee di villaggio o selezionati dalle organizzazioni di massa rivoluzionarie locali.

Abbiamo condotto la guerriglia in tutto il paese adottando la politica del comando strategico centralizzato e delle operazioni decentralizzate nelle campagne e nelle battaglie. Nel corso degli ultimi decenni, i comitati regionali del Partito e i comandi regionali del NEP hanno sviluppato quadri e comandanti locali di alta qualità, in grado di guidare in modo autonomo l'ampia gamma di compiti rivoluzionari, lungo la linea stabilita dal Comitato Centrale. Molti di loro sono stati promossi al Comitato Centrale del Partito e al Comando Nazionale delle Operazioni del NEP.

Mentre portiamo avanti un movimento di rettifica, è fondamentale che tutti i quadri del Partito, i comandanti e i combattenti del NEP, e tutte le forze rivoluzionarie, riaffermino la nostra analisi di base del sistema semicoloniale e semifeudale nel paese, e i principi e le teorie di base per condurre la rivoluzione democratica popolare nelle Filippine attraverso una guerra popolare prolungata lungo la linea strategica di circondare le città dalla campagna; studiare la storia della lotta rivoluzionaria negli ultimi 55 anni per trarre insegnamenti dai suoi successi e dalle sue battute d'arresto; avere una visione a lungo termine dei compiti che ci attendono per far avanzare quantitativamente e qualitativamente le forze rivoluzionarie, fino a quando non riusciremo a trasformare l'attuale equilibrio di forze nel suo opposto.

Come il Partito ha stabilito, la guerra popolare di lunga durata nelle Filippine attraverserà tre probabili fasi di sviluppo: la difensiva strategica, l’equilibrio strategico e l'offensiva strategica. Questo percorso di avanzamento della guerra popolare nelle Filippine è determinato dalle leggi dialettiche dello sviluppo. Desiderare un'altra strada o non riuscire a spingersi lungo il sentiero è quasi certamente fatale.

Negli anni '80, elementi non trasformati della piccola borghesia, nella direzione del Partito nutrivano l'idea di una scorciatoia per una rapida vittoria. Hanno messo in discussione l'analisi di base del Partito del sistema semicoloniale e semifeudale, hanno promosso l'idea che la dittatura di Marcos abbia industrializzato e trasformato il paese in un paese capitalista, hanno esagerato il processo di l'urbanizzazione del paese e hanno minimizzato l'estensione dell'economia agraria citando false statistiche governative.

Hanno spinto per la speranzosa linea di una "controffensiva strategica" all'interno della fase della difensiva strategica, per giustificare il passaggio alla strategia dell'insurrezionalismo urbano combinato con la prematura regolarizzazione e verticalizzazione delle formazioni del NEP. Promuovevano il concetto di guerra partigiana come una forma distinta e separata di guerra nelle città per creare focolai insurrezionali. A questo si aggiunge la "guerra mobile regolare" che utilizza grandi formazioni dell'esercito popolare (compagnie e battaglioni) per colpire i punti e gli obiettivi nemici (compagnia o battaglione, campi altamente fortificati e quartier generale). Questa linea di avventurismo militare richiedeva la regolarizzazione prematura dell'esercito popolare concentrando e persino liquidando le formazioni orizzontali del NEP per formare compagnie e battaglioni "regolari". Ciò ha creato uno squilibrio nella diffusione, nel dispiegamento e nella crescita sostenuta delle forze verticali e orizzontali del NEP, che ha causato una contrazione significativa della sua base di massa rivoluzionaria e dei fronti di guerriglia. Questa politica errata ha fatto il gioco delle superiori forze nemiche, spingendo il NEP in una situazione puramente militare. Nonostante le vittorie militari iniziali, le forze del NE furono presto ridotte alla passività militare e divennero vulnerabili all'accerchiamento e alla soppressione nemica, portando a una grande riduzione delle forze e a battute d'arresto senza precedenti nel 1990-1991.

Accanto agli opportunisti di "sinistra" c'erano vari filoni di opportunisti di destra che rifiutavano la necessità di condurre una lotta armata rivoluzionaria. Alla fine degli anni '80, alcuni hanno promosso la linea della "democrazia popolare" che alla fine si è consolidata in "organizzazioni non governative" che promuovono il riformismo e la collaborazione di classe. A loro si uniranno in seguito gli opportunisti di "sinistra" che, dopo aver fallito nella loro linea di insurrezionalismo e avventurismo militare, hanno servito come burocrati di ONG nella cosiddetta comunità della "società civile". Altri ancora si sono impegnati in "colloqui di pace" per facilitare la loro resa al regime reazionario, con alcuni autorizzati a mantenere forze paramilitari per combattere il NEP, mentre si impegnavano in vari tipi di attività criminali.

Ci volle il Secondo Grande Movimento di Rettifica per salvare le forze della guerriglia rivoluzionaria dal subire ulteriori gravi perdite. Riaffermando i principi fondamentali del Partito di condurre la rivoluzione democratica popolare attraverso una guerra popolare prolungata, le unità del NEP furono riorganizzate per raggiungere un corretto equilibrio di forze orizzontali e verticali, al fine di svolgere efficacemente sia il lavoro politico che quello militare. Il Partito affermò la linea militare tattica di condurre una guerriglia estesa e intensiva sulla base di una base di massa sempre più ampia e profonda nella fase della difesa strategica.

Il Nuovo Esercito Popolare ha frustrato con successo gli obiettivi annuali dichiarati dal nemico per schiacciare il movimento armato rivoluzionario. Ha superato le successive campagne di accerchiamento e soppressione, tra cui l'Oplan Katatagan, l'Oplan Lambat Bitag I, II e III, l'Oplan Gordian Knot, l'Oplan Makabayan, l'Oplan Bantay Laya I e II, l'Oplan Bayanihan e l'Oplan Kapayapaan e, nel complesso, ne è uscito più forte. La direzione del Partito ha stimato che la guerra popolare ha raggiunto la fase centrale della difesa strategica intorno alla metà degli anni 2000, e ha fatto piani per soddisfare i requisiti per raggiungere la fase avanzata e sulla soglia dell’equilibrio strategico.

Anche allora, tuttavia, eravamo impantanati in problemi di conservatorismo militare che hanno tenuto le cose ferme alla fase intermedia. Anni di conservatorismo in tutti gli aspetti del lavoro rivoluzionario e di compiacimento hanno portato all'autocostrizione dell'esercito popolare e a un lento indebolimento e riduzione della base di massa, rendendola vulnerabile all'accerchiamento e alla repressione nemica, portando a battute d'arresto e perdite. Uno degli effetti dannosi dell'empirismo è stata la nostra incapacità di trarre rapidamente lezioni dall'esperienza al fine di elevare il livello della nostra conoscenza e teoria, dal livello del comando nazionale del NEP fino alle regioni e ai fronti, con il risultato di non adattarci ai cambiamenti nelle tattiche del nemico e di commettere errori ripetutamente.

Sotto la direzione del Comitato Centrale, tutto il Partito, il Nuovo Esercito Popolare e tutte le forze rivoluzionarie stanno attualmente attuando un movimento di rettifica per identificare e sbarazzarsi delle radici ideologiche borghesi e piccolo-borghesi dei nostri errori, debolezze e mancanze passate, riaffermare il nostro punto di vista e i nostri metodi proletari per portare avanti più risolutamente la rivoluzione.

L'attuale movimento di rettifica è fondamentalmente un movimento di studio per rivedere e riaffermare i principi fondamentali del marxismo-leninismo-maoismo contenuti negli scritti classici dei grandi maestri comunisti e in quelli di Ka José Maria Sison; studiare la Costituzione e il Programma del Partito; studiare i documenti del Primo e del Secondo Grande Movimento di Rettifica del Partito; per riassumere le esperienze degli ultimi cinque e 25 anni; condurre una campagna di inchiesta sociale e di analisi di classe; svolgere attività di critica e autocritica; valutare le prestazioni dei quadri del Partito; e di attuare pienamente il Corso di Partito a Tre Livelli.

Tutti i comitati e gli organi regionali del Partito e i comandi del NEP hanno accolto con favore l'appello per un movimento di rettifica da quando il Comitato Centrale lo ha emesso lo scorso 26 dicembre 2023. Sessioni di riassunto e di studio, conferenze di inchiesta sociale e riunioni di pianificazione, sono state tenute o sono programmate per essere condotte da vari comitati del Partito e comandi del NEP a tutti i livelli. Allo stesso tempo, si sta attuando il necessario rischieramento delle forze del NEP per affrontare le varie forme di autocostrizione, espandere la portata delle operazioni del NEP, aprire nuove aree al di fuori dell'accerchiamento del nemico, combattere la repressione fascista nelle vecchie aree, e risvegliare, organizzare e mobilitare vigorosamente le masse contadine.

La dichiarazione del movimento di rettifica a dicembre ha frustrato il regime USA-Marcos e lo stato reazionario che aveva il pio desiderio che il Partito fosse sull'orlo della capitolazione in seguito alla cattura e all'assassinio di alcuni leader chiave del Partito, così come alla scomparsa di Ka Joma, il presidente fondatore del Partito e la sua luce guida. In risposta, il nemico ha versato quantità ancora maggiori di fondi e risorse nella sua guerra controrivoluzionaria e ha ulteriormente intensificato la sua campagna di accerchiamento e repressione. Questo ha ora preso la forma di incessanti e diffuse campagne di repressione armata contro le comunità contadine, bombardamenti aerei e di artiglieria e operazioni di combattimento su larga scala in decine di fronti di guerriglia in tutto il paese.

Usando il metodo di pensiero marxista-leninista-maoista, possiamo analizzare i punti di forza del nemico e sottolineare le sue debolezze. Per esempio, dobbiamo prima capire che l'uso da parte del nemico di mezzi aerei, che gli ha dato il netto vantaggio di un rapido dispiegamento, è prima di tutto una manifestazione della sua incapacità di superare la sua mancanza di sostegno politico a terra tra le masse contadine. Gli elicotteri sono vulnerabili al fuoco dei cecchini del NEP mentre tentano di atterrare o decollare, il che rende le sue truppe di terra in attesa di rifornimenti e rinforzi vulnerabili all'isolamento. I bombardamenti aerei danno al nemico un netto vantaggio, ma sono anche politicamente disastrosi nell'isolare i fascisti dalle masse e rendere le sue truppe di terra dipendenti da una limitata superiorità aerea, che il NEP può facilmente contrastare. Il NEP può sviluppare o acquisire armi antiaeree, ma deve anche adottare metodi per negare agli obiettivi nemici gli attacchi aerei. Attraverso un'attenta osservazione e analisi, possiamo vedere chiaramente i limiti e le vulnerabilità attraverso i suoi punti di forza e vantaggi. I comandanti e i combattenti rossi del NEP, insieme alle masse, devono tenere gli occhi aperti e osservare da vicino il nemico, e escogitare uno stratagemma efficace.

Ispirati dal movimento di rettifica, i leader del Partito e i combattenti del NEP sono diventati più impavidi e determinati, nonostante la grande disparità nell'attuale equilibrio delle forze. Possiamo riconoscere più profondamente che la superiorità del nemico in termini di armamenti forniti dagli Stati Uniti è compensata dal marciume e dallo stato moribondo del sistema che sta difendendo; e che l'inferiorità del NEP in termini di armamenti è compensata dalla sua superiorità in termini di ampio sostegno delle masse filippine. Armati del metodo dialettico del pensiero, riconosciamo anche che questa situazione è temporanea e alla fine passerà attraverso la sua negazione, man mano che la guerra popolare avanza dalla sua fase attuale a quella successiva e il nemico viene ulteriormente coinvolto nella crisi irrisolvibile dell'imperialismo e del sistema semicoloniale e semifeudale dominante.

continua



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pc 1 aprile - L’ignobile propaganda per criminalizzare gli studenti sulla Palestina - parliamo della Leonardo Spa e della Fondazione Culturale Med/or .. (proletari comunisti)


Critiche alla propaganda che tenta di delegittimare il movimento studentesco in solidarietà al popolo palestinese

L’Università di Torino si è ritirata il 7 marzo scorso dall’accordo di cooperazione industriale, scientifica e tecnologica tra Italia e Israele. (Bando Maeci)

In questi giorni anche la Normale di Pisa ha deciso di ritirarsi.

Il Rettore dell’Università di Bari si è ritirato dal consiglio scientifico della fondazione Med-Or (Leonardo). Il Rettore dichiara: l’obiettivo è congelare i progetti di ricerca in collaborazione con Israele “come facemmo con la Russia nel 2022”. “Ho avuto un confronto con gli studenti, non ero circondato dai Sioux”. N.d.r a noi non sarebbero dispiaciuti neanche i Sioux

Proprio in seguito a queste prime significative vittorie del movimento studentesco contro il genocidio in corso, il governo italiano di estrema destra paventa un pericolo “terrorista” e “brigatista” all’interno dell’università. In molte città le manifestazioni studentesche in solidarietà alla Palestina sono state aggredite a bastonate dalla polizia.

Svariate sono anche le prese di posizione di molti intellettuali (anche sedicenti “sinistri”) contro queste lotte. Qualche esempio:

·       Ritorna il “tempo lugubre nel quale dalle università venivano espulsi professori perché ebrei” (Fassino sulla decisione dell’Università di Torino)

·      Tommaso Montanari: “Anche in Israele l’università è luogo del dissenso, è sbagliato interrompere i rapporti

·      “La cooperazione tra atenei si fonda proprio sulla necessità di uno scambio di conoscenze, sulla cultura che unisce al di là della politica” Milena Santerini vicepresidente della Fondazione memoriale della Shoah di Milano.

·      Antonio Padellaro: “I contestatori hanno rinunciato ad articolare frasi di senso compiuto, vittime di una qualche forma di ideologica afasia.  Si potrebbe sospettare che i disturbatori pro Palestina e pro Hamas respingano le offerte di dialogo perché non sanno cosa dire e, soprattutto, non sanno come dirlo.”

Consapevoli di quanto la propaganda culturale sia uno dei bracci armati della repressione proprio per la sua capacità di penetrare il senso comune della gente, cominciamo col rispondere all’ultima tesi che abbiamo riportato, quella di Padellaro.

La parola afasia nel vocabolario d’italiano è così definita: perdita della capacità di comprendere e comporre il linguaggio conseguente a lesione dell’apparato nervoso centrale, impossibilità parziale o totale di ricordare i segni della parola.

A proposito di afasia, ecco alcuni chiarimenti ben argomentati.

Da anni viene segnalato all’interno delle Università l’intensificarsi dello spostamento della centralità della conoscenza come luogo di pace alla conoscenza ai fini di guerra. Quanti di noi sanno che oltre al PNRR esiste un PNRM (Piano nazionale della ricerca militare)?

Il ruolo centrale del sistema universitario per il rafforzamento del comparto militare è enfatizzato anche nel Documento programmatico 2020-2022 dello Stato maggiore della Difesa.

In questo quadro perché mai studenti e docenti denunciano – come è stato fatto anche a Trento un mese fa grazie al generoso impegno dell’Assemblea di Trento di solidarietà alla resistenza palestinese – le collaborazioni dell’università con Leonardo e con le sue fondazioni culturali come Med-Or? Arroganza antidemocratica?

Parliamo di Leonardo Spa, niente a che vedere con l’uomo onnilaterale rinascimentale:

L’azienda italiana, con i suoi 15 miliardi di fatturato (dati 2022), è al tredicesimo posto nella classifica mondiale dei costruttori di armi, prima società dell’Unione Europea.

Nell’ultimo bilancio del 2022 dichiara che realizza l’83% del fatturato nel settore difesa (guerra), avendo quasi solo clienti governativi (88%). La stessa Leonardo che nel luglio 2022 ha acquistato la società israeliana Rada Electronic Industries, specializzata in radar per la difesa a corto raggio e anti -droni.

La stessa Leonardo i cui Cannoni 76 mm Oto Melara montati sulle corvette della Marina militare Israeliana partecipano ai bombardamenti su Gaza.

Leonardo è titolare di 5 accordi quadro con grandi Università italiane (Milano, Torino, Genova, Bologna, Roma) e collaborazioni attive con più di 90 università.

La Fondazione culturale Med-Or è stata fondata da Leonardo nel 2021.

Med-Or esibisce un incredibile consiglio internazionale che spazia a tutto campo: dall’ex capo dell’intelligence Usa, John Negroponte, all’ex capo dell’intelligence saudita Turkey al Faisal, al ministro egiziano Rachid Mohamed Rachid, dal quatarino Khalid Al-Khater all’israeliano David Meidan, agli ex ministri degli Esteri di Spagna e Germania, Ana Palacio e Sigmar Gabriel, fino all’ex capo dell’intelligence britannica Sir Alex Younger.

Il presidente è un certo Minniti, italiano, il realizzatore degli accordi sui lager in Libia per i migranti.

La vocazione militarista della fondazione culturale risulta chiara anche dai “convegni prestigiosi” che organizza. L’ultimo il 13 marzo assieme al Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa dal titolo “Italia, Europa, Nato e il futuro del Mediterraneo“, presenti Marco Peronaci, rappresentante italiano presso la Nato, l’ambasciatore statunitense Jack Markell, il futuro comandante degli Stati maggiori Nato, l’italiano Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, con intervento conclusivo del ministro Crosetto.

Nel giugno 2023 Med-Or consolidava la sua collaborazione con l’Institute for National Security Studies (Inss) di Tel Aviv

Quale mai sarà il senso dell’attività della fondazione culturale della più grande industria militare dell’Ue? Propaganda culturale per formare gli sviluppatori e i venditori dei suoi prodotti (ARMI), che prima o poi devono pur essere utilizzati.

Sono 16 i rettori italiani presenti nel consiglio scientifico, tra i quali anche Deflorian, il rettore della nostra Università di Trento.

Denunciando, criticando queste collaborazioni con precisione e ricchezza di argomentazioni frutto di una ricerca collettiva e dialogica e di una visione del sapere al servizio dell’umanità che soffre e non dei ricchi mercanti d’armi, ci stiamo battendo per un futuro che per i nostri bambini e per il pianeta Terra non preveda la guerra, massacro dei popoli e dell’ambiente e profitti per i milionari.

Altro che “terroristi”, siamo i più sinceri interpreti di una Costituzione che con il suo articolo 11 ripudia la guerra, Costituzione nata dalla Resistenza e dalla lotta all’occupazione nazi-fascista.

Quando i cosiddetti intellettuali parlano di etica della ricerca, della neutralità, dell’autonomia, della libertà democratica (quindi al servizio del popolo) dell’Università, come possono pensare che la cultura di guerra propagandata da queste fondazioni e praticata dagli accordi denunciati non abbia niente a che fare con i massacri di Gaza e con i venti di guerra mondiale?

Come possiamo non pensare ai bambini morti a Gaza, che in soli 5 mesi sono più di tutti quelli morti in tutte le guerre del mondo in 4 anni (dal 2018 al 2022)?

Ricordiamo che l’Italia ha venduto armamenti a Israele tra il 2013 e il 2022 per 120 milioni di euro che ora vengono utilizzati nel genocidio dei palestinesi. Le collaborazioni con le Università, le fondazioni culturali delle grandi industrie d’armi non hanno avuto nessun ruolo nel loro sviluppo?

Nella lettera firmata da quasi 2000 docenti e ricercatori italiani e inviata al Ministro Tajani il 29 febbraio in cui si chiede lo stop alle collaborazioni con Israele si dice che “il finanziamento potrebbe essere utilizzato per sviluppare tecnologia ‘dual use’, ovvero a impiego sia civile che militare, e la terza linea di finanziamento delle tecnologie ottiche potrebbe essere utilizzata per sviluppare device di sorveglianza di ultima generazione, anche a uso bellico. La richiesta della lettera è sospendere gli accordi fino al cessate il fuoco di Israele.

L’appello chiede il congelamento delle relazioni fra università e centri di ricerca dei due Paesi allo scopo di fare pressione su Israele, come venne fatto contro il Sudafrica dell’Apartheid. Questo tipo di lotta è palesemente imparagonabile al fascismo, al “tempo lugubre nel quale dalle università venivano espulsi professori perché ebrei” come dichiarava il noto Fassino.

A proposito delle università Israeliane come “luogo del dissenso”, tenendo conto delle esemplari eccezioni che ci capita spesso di raccontare ed esaltare, ci poniamo alcuni interrogativi sulle strutture generali: le università israeliane sono pienamente libere? Luoghi neutrali di confronto democratico, del pensiero critico?

Un primo esempio: La nota Prof palestinese Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (esperta di femminisimi e violenze di genere) è stata appena sospesa per ordine della Hebrew University e detenuta per ore all’aeroporto Ben Gurion. A ottobre aveva firmato una lettera con 1000 accademici internazionali che chiedeva il cessate il fuoco e la fine del regime di Apartheid.

Approfondiremo questi interrogativi nella prossima puntata.

Intanto nella Striscia è in corso uno “scolasticidio”: sono stati ammazzati oltre 4mila studenti, 231 insegnanti e lavoratori della scuola. Le Università di Gaza sono distrutte.

Il bando Maeci è stato pubblicato il 21 novembre e scade il 10 aprile.

Continuiamo a lottare, a estendere, rendere sempre più partecipi e intrecciate le lotte, con la forza delle nostre ragioni approfondite da un dialogo di ricerca continua e dai nostri grandi sentimenti.

Non lasciamo soli i Palestinesi. Fermiamo il genocidio!

Ringraziamo l’Assemblea di Trento in solidarietà alla resistenza palestinese alla quale partecipiamo per i tanti spunti di approfondimento che abbiamo elaborato assieme in un impegno di lotta comune.

Invitiamo tutte e tutti a partecipare all’assemblea che si ritrova ogni lunedì (non questo che viene) a Sociologia a Trento alle 18.00.


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One Year Red Herald – Heraldo Rojo – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


To our dear readers,

on 15th of March, last year, we launched the English language part of this website, 17 days later we started publishing our materials in Spanish. So this 1st of April marks the 1st anniversary of our project. During one year we have now been running a daily bilingual revolutionary news service. We have published more than one thousand articles in two languages, an average of 2.75 articles per day. Of these articles 60 per cent have been written by us, 40 per cent have been statements or articles we have collected from different sources, and in almost all cases translated. This work is done pro bono, all of us must earn our daily bread with other activities than journalism. We are journalists and activists from different corners of the world, who are united by the wish to provide information to readers from all walks of life about issues we think are very interesting and important. We strongly believe that in a world dominated by media giants belonging to a handful of people, it is more necessary than ever to promote just that type of information, that might hopefully be disturbing to the masters of war and destruction.

The responses we have been receiving from you, our readers, in general have been very positive and this strengthens our determination to improve and develop our journalistic mission. We are happy and proud to contribute with our “small piece of grain” to the development of the revolutionary, anti-imperialist and democratic forces in the world.

We know that we can and must do many things better. We know that we must improve our translations (so you do not notice too much that none of us is professional in this regard either…), we must spread the knowledge about the existence of the site more and raise the numbers of readers, we must improve the layout and design of our articles and the website as a whole, we must do more in-dept analysis, we must broaden the scope and write about the unfolding of the struggle between the exploiters and the exploited in many more countries etc. We are committed to do all of it. You can help us to do so and we would like to give you some hints on how:

– If you have done any activity that you think we would like to publish, if you can translate the information about into English and Spanish then please do so and send it to us by email. The translation of the articles costs us a lot of efforts and forces us to be more selective concerning the numbers of texts that we can publish.

– If you have images that you think we would like to publish, please “work them over” before you send them to us. This not only saves us time, but also is a protection against errors that might occur on our behalf.

– If you have a Statement, or alike, that you think we would like to publish, please send them in “workable formats”, if you send us text within pictures or .PDF please also include it in a text-document.

– Spread the knowledge of the existence of our website to as many people as you can, particularly the Spanish part, and use those means you have at your disposal. Those readers who have websites of their own would do us a great favor if they link to us in their articles, due to the algorithms (of the search-engines). This will make it easier for others to find us by searching the internet. If you have social media channels, that are appropriate for this purpose (do not put your own security or that of others at risk!), then post articles from us regularly.

– Send us your feed-back and criticism on the articles that we publish. Even if we do not often reply in detail, we always read and take into account those emails that we receive. Hence, we like to ask you also to send us the sources you base yourself on.

We know that you all make your contribution in the hard daily struggle. We will continue to do the same. We salute you all.

The Editors of the Red Herald – Heraldo Rojo website


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XANIA | Δε θα περάσει η τρομοκρατία! Καταγγελία για το ρεσάλτο της αστυνομίας στο Λόφο Καστέλι (Resistance in the neighbourhood)


 

Καταγγέλλουμε την αστυνομική επιχείρηση εκκένωσης των καταλήψεων που έγινε το πρωί στις 1/4 στο λόφο Καστέλι. Λίγα χρόνια μετά από την προηγούμενη προσπάθεια εκκένωσης της κατάληψης, τα ΜΑΤ εισέβαλαν ξανά, προχωρώντας σε 8 προσαγωγές. Την προηγούμενη φορά μάλιστα είχαν στείλει σε δίκη τους συλληφθέντες και μένει να φανεί πώς θα εξελιχθούν οι σημερινές προσαγωγές.

Η σημερινή κίνηση της κυβέρνησης δε γίνεται στο κενό. Αθροίζεται και αυτή στη μεγάλη λίστα εκφράσεων της κρατικής τρομοκρατίας και καταστολής ειδικά του τελευταίου διαστήματος.  

Για να αναφερθούμε μόνο στα πιο πρόσφατα, οι  κινητοποιήσεις βγαίνουν παράνομες (πρόσφατο παράδειγμα η καταδικαστική απόφαση της δίκης της ΕΛΜΕ Χανίων), εκπαιδευτικοί διώκονται για τη συνδικαλιστική τους δράση (ΕΛΜΕ Πειραιά), φοιτητές συλλαμβάνονται γιατί κάνουν κατάληψη ενάντια στα ιδιωτικά πανεπιστήμια (49, ΑΠΘ) ή διώκονται πειθαρχικά (Πάτρα), οι διαδηλώσεις χτυπιούνται από τις δυνάμεις καταστολής κλπ.

Σε μια περίοδο που οι μισθοί φτώχειας, το σάρωμα βασικών λαϊκών κατακτήσεων σε υγεία-παιδεία, που η εμπλοκή της χώρας στον πόλεμο των ιμπεριαλιστών σε Παλαιστίνη και Ουκρανία πρέπει να γίνουν αποδεκτά από τον λαό, το ντου στη κατάληψη της Ρόζα Νέρα δε μπορεί να ερμηνευτεί διαφορετικά. Το κύριο ζήτημα δεν είναι η εμπορευματοποίηση ενός μνημείου, ούτε είναι βίτσιο της σημερινής κυβέρνησης να ρίχνει ξύλο.

Θέλουν να στείλουν μήνυμα ότι όποιος αντιστέκεται θα διώκεται!

Συνολικότερα ακονίζεται το νομοθετικό οπλοστάσιο ώστε τα σωματεία να γίνουν ντεκόρ της εργοδοσίας, οι φοιτητικοί σύλλογοι να χάσουν τα αγωνιστικά χαρακτηριστικά τους, οι διαδηλώσεις να γίνονται με την άδεια της αστυνομίας. Να βγει στην παρανομία κάθε φωνή που αντιστέκεται στο δρόμο ενάντια στην ιμπεριαλιστική-καπιταλιστική βαρβαρότητα.

Το σύστημα με την πολιτική του νόμου και της τάξης φασιστικοποιεί τη δημοσιά και πολιτική ζωή. Κάθε μέρα και με κάθε τρόπο βάζει στο στόχαστρο όποια φωνή αμφισβητεί, αντιστέκεται, παλεύει ενάντια στην πολιτική του. 

Οι διαφωνίες μας με τον α/α χώρο για το κίνημα και τις συνολικότερες απαντήσεις που απαιτούνται είναι δεδομένες. Η απάντηση όμως στην κρατική τρομοκρατία δεν αφορά τα στενά όρια ενός πολιτικού χώρου αλλά είναι υπόθεση κάθε δημοκράτη, κάθε λαϊκού ανθρώπου.

Να υπερασπιστούμε τα δημοκρατικά δικαιώματα και τις ελευθερίες!

Να ενισχύσουμε αποφασιστικά τους αγώνες για ζωή και δουλειά με δικαιώματα! Να παλέψουμε ενάντια στην πολιτική που μας μπλέκει στους πολέμους των ιμπεριαλιστών!

ΠΡΩΤΟΒΟΥΛΙΑ ΑΝΤΙΣΤΑΣΗΣ XANΙΩΝ 



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El medio «El Heraldo Rojo» cumple un año de vida (Servir al pueblo)



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ΗΓΟΥΜΕΝΙΤΣΑ | Στα 75 χρόνια της φονικής μηχανής του ΝΑΤΟ: Διαδηλώνουμε κατά του ιμπεριαλισμού και του πολέμου - Πέμπτη 4 Απρίλη (Resistance in the neighbourhood)


Στα  75 χρόνια της φονικής μηχανής του ΝΑΤΟ:

Ø Διαδηλώνουμε κατά του ιμπεριαλισμού και του πολέμου

Ø Λευτεριά στην Παλαιστίνη-Νίκη στην Παλαιστινιακή Αντίσταση

Συγκέντρωση, Πέμπτη 4 Απρίλη 7.30μμ στον Πεζόδρομο

ü Ισραήλ-ΗΠΑ-ΝΑΤΟ-ΕΕ, με την υποστήριξη της Ελληνικής

κυβέρνησης, δολοφονούν μαζικά αμάχους στην Παλαιστίνη

ü Να σταματήσει τώρα η γενοκτονία, οι βομβαρδισμοί

και η πολιορκία του Παλαιστινιακού λαού

ü Καμιά εμπλοκή της Ελλάδας στις επεμβάσεις των ιμπεριαλιστών και στη σφαγή του Παλαιστινιακού λαού

ü  Έξω οι Βάσεις, Έξω από ΝΑΤΟ-ΕΕ

ü ΝΑΤΟ σημαίνει χούντες και πόλεμοι

Η γενοκτονία του ηρωικού Παλαιστινιακού λαού στη Γάζα, οι δολοφονίες στη Δυτική Όχθη και η επικείμενη εισβολή στη Ράφα απ΄ τους σιωνιστές, πυροδοτούν καταστάσεις με απρόβλεπτες συνέπειες σε όλη την ευρύτερη περιοχή της Μέσης Ανατολής, και όχι μόνο.

Παρά τη γενοκτονία και τον πόλεμο που διαρκεί πέντε μήνες, η ένοπλη Παλαιστινιακή Αντίσταση για μια Λεύτερη και Ανεξάρτητη Παλαιστίνη, συνεχίζεται, και φανερώνει την αδυναμία του Ισραήλ να την εξουδετερώσει.

Οι ιμπεριαλιστές των ΗΠΑ, της ΕΕ και του ΝΑΤΟ στηρίζουν το κράτος – δολοφόνο. Οι Αμερικάνοι ιμπεριαλιστές επιδιώκουν να ελέγξουν τις καταστάσεις στην περιοχή, προχωρούν σε νέους τυχοδιωκτισμούς και ανοίγουν νέα πολεμικά μέτωπα, στέλνοντας φρεγάτες στην Ερυθρά Θάλασσα.

Νέοι πόλεμοι ξεσπούν στην περιοχή και διεθνώς, στο πλαίσιο των ιμπεριαλιστικών επιδιώξεων για το ξαναμοίρασμα του πλανήτη, ενώ το μέτωπο της Ουκρανίας εξακολουθεί να παραμένει ανοιχτό, με το ΝΑΤΟ μάλιστα να διεξάγει την μεγαλύτερη στρατιωτική άσκηση με την εμπλοκή και των 31 κρατών μελών, ενώ η συζήτηση για την επίσημη αποστολή στρατευμάτων χωρών μελών του ΝΑΤΟ και της ΕΕ στον πόλεμο έχει ανοίξει.

Η κυβέρνηση της ΝΔ έχει διαλέξει πλευρά, συμμετέχει ανοιχτά στον πόλεμο στο πλευρό του Ισραήλ και βάφει τα χέρια της με το αίμα των παλαιστινίων, εμπλέκει επικίνδυνα τη χώρα στον πόλεμο. Στέλνει όπλα στην Ουκρανία. Ο Μητσοτάκης αγκαλιάζει τον Νετανιάχου και τον Ζελένσκι. Η ελληνική φρεγάτα «ΥΔΡΑ» που προστέθηκε στο στόλο των ΗΠΑ στην Ερυθρά Θάλασσα, η μετατροπή της Λάρισας σε διοικητήριο και της υπόλοιπης χώρας σε πολεμικό ορμητήριο, βοηθούν ακόμα και στρατιωτικά το Ισραήλ, να συνεχίσει τους βομβαρδισμούς και την πολιορκία των Παλαιστινίων και κλιμακώνουν τους κινδύνους για τον ελληνικό λαό!

Σ΄ ολόκληρο τον πλανήτη, οι λαοί διαδηλώνουν μαζικά, καθημερινά, απαιτώντας να σταματήσει η γενοκτονία και για λεύτερη Παλαιστίνη!

Επιτροπή αλληλεγγύης στον Παλαιστινιακό λαό


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¿Quién Arma a Israel? Parte 1 | Revolución Obrera (Revolucion Obrera)


¿Quién Arma a Israel? Parte 1 1
Humo elevándose en la franja de Gaza, visto desde la frontera de Israel con Gaza, en el sur de Israel, 17 de marzo de 2024

La Producción de Armamento para Israel en los EE. UU. – por Trabajadores en Palestina

Tomado de MaoistRoad – Traducción de Revolución Obrera

Los principales países involucrados en el suministro de armas y bienes militares a Israel son los EE. UU., Alemania, Italia y el Reino Unido. Este documento describe los sitios conectados a la producción para el ejército israelí en diferentes países y, cuando sea posible, identifica desde dónde se transportan los bienes militares.

Nuestro objetivo es proporcionar un recurso para acciones que apunten a la producción o transporte de bienes militares, o que interrumpan la actividad de los proveedores militares de Israel, y también para vincular recursos que puedan utilizarse para tomar medidas en países específicos.

Nuestra investigación identifica empresas que producen algunos de los armamentos más fundamentales para el ejército israelí, incluyendo Lockheed Martin (contratista principal para el avión de combate F35), Boeing (fabricante de muchos de los armamentos guiados utilizados por el ejército israelí), BAE Systems (un importante proveedor para el F35), Leonardo (parte de la coalición F35) y Raytheon (fabricante de la bomba guiada Paveway).

La acción es posible en diferentes formas: mientras identificamos sitios de producción directa para el ejército israelí, también es posible dirigirse a empresas multinacionales que producen para Israel incluso si los bienes militares se fabrican en otro lugar. Del mismo modo, es posible apuntar a empresas involucradas en el transporte de bienes militares hacia Israel.

La producción de armas es altamente internacional y muchas de las cadenas de suministro más rastreables son para bienes como aviones de combate fabricados por coaliciones internacionales. Estos aviones son fundamentales para la guerra actual y el bombardeo de Gaza; Israel está utilizando «todos los aviones de combate a su disposición», incluyendo F15, F16, F35 y helicópteros AH-64 Apache. Hay 408 enlaces en la cadena de suministro para el F35, por ejemplo: vea una lista de empresas involucradas aquí.

Inevitablemente, las cadenas de suministro son mucho más complejas de lo que este documento puede abarcar y muchas empresas más pequeñas están involucradas. Si utiliza este documento como punto de partida, es posible que pueda identificar cadenas de suministro más detalladas para interrumpir.

Los Estados Unidos

La producción de armas para Israel en los Estados Unidos

Los Estados Unidos son el mayor proveedor de armas de Israel, suministrando más del 90 por ciento de sus importaciones de armas. Los Estados Unidos otorgan a Israel casi 4 mil millones de dólares en ayuda militar anualmente, «incluidos unos 500 millones de dólares para defensas aéreas y de misiles». Además, Israel gasta considerablemente en armas estadounidenses, habiendo adquirido aproximadamente 53.5 mil millones de dólares en bienes militares de EE. UU. durante las últimas siete décadas según la Agencia de Cooperación de Seguridad de Defensa, incluidos 6.5 mil millones de dólares en los últimos cinco años hasta 2022. Israel ha realizado algunas de estas compras utilizando la ayuda militar recibida de los EE. UU. Para obtener una lista de todas las licencias de exportación de armas acordadas a través del Programa de Ventas Militares Extranjeras de los EE. UU., incluidos los contratistas principales y los sitios, consulte aquí(Nota: No todos estos acuerdos han resultado en exportaciones).

Las mayores compañías de armas de los Estados Unidos son Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman y General Dynamics. Estas empresas son internacionales y tienen subsidiarias en el extranjero.

Algunas de las armas más significativas fabricadas en los Estados Unidos para Israel incluyen:

El F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Israel ha comprado 50 aviones de combate F35 y ha recibido 36 para fines de 2022. Están basados en la Base Aérea de Nevatim, en el sur de Israel. En 2021, las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel (FDI) anunciaron que habían utilizado F35 en combate por primera vez en Gaza. El F-35 es una colaboración internacional; consulte otros perfiles de países para ver ejemplos de dónde se fabrican las piezas del F35. Israel también ha desarrollado sus propias tecnologías para modificar algunos elementos del F-35.

Ubicaciones de fabricación en Estados Unidos (la cadena de suministro del F35 en Estados Unidos es altamente extensa y puede ser rastreada con más detalle aquí):

• Los F-35 se ensamblan en la Planta de la Fuerza Aérea 4, que es propiedad del gobierno de Estados Unidos y operada por Lockheed Martin, en Fort Worth, Texas. 
• Los motores son fabricados por Pratt & Whitney en East Hartford y Middletown, Connecticut. 
• Los sistemas electrónicos son fabricados por BAE Systems en Nashua, New Hampshire y Endicott, Nueva York. 
• Los sistemas de actuación de control que ayudan al F35 a lanzar armas guiadas son fabricados por Woodward Inc en Santa Clarita, California.


Aeronaves de combate F-15 y F-16

Israel actualmente está negociando pedidos del avión de combate F15EX a través del Programa de Ventas Militares Extranjeras de Estados Unidos. Según informes sobre el proceso, la solicitud formal de Israel hace probable la entrega para el año 2028. Los sitios de fabricación en Estados Unidos para el F15 y F16 incluyen los siguientes (aunque las ventas originales de F15 y F16, excepto el modelo F15EX, ya se han realizado, hay un suministro continuo de repuestos especialmente durante la guerra).

• Los F15EX se producen en la planta de Boeing en St. Louis, Missouri. 
• Los F16 son fabricados por Lockheed Martin en Greenville, Carolina del Sur
• En algunas variantes del F16, la aviónica se reemplaza con componentes fabricados en Israel por empresas como Elbit y Israel Aerospace Industries, así como con misiles de Rafael, tres importantes compañías de armamento israelíes.

Helicópteros militares

Los sitios de fabricación en Estados Unidos para helicópteros militares utilizados por las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel (FDI) incluyen:

• Los helicópteros de transporte pesado CH-53K, vistos siendo utilizados en el actual asalto, son fabricados por Lockheed Martin Global, Inc. en Shelton, Connecticut; y General Electric en Lynn, Massachusetts. 
• Los helicópteros Apache son fabricados por Boeing en Mesa, Arizona
• Los helicópteros AW119Kx son fabricados por Leonardo en Filadelfia.

Aviones de reabastecimiento

• Los aviones cisterna de reabastecimiento aéreo KC-46A son fabricados por Boeing en Everett, Washington; el receptor GPS MAGR 2K es fabricado por Raytheon en Waltham, Massachusetts.

Bombas guiadas utilizadas por las Fuerzas de Ocupación Israelíes (IOF):

Las bombas guiadas utilizadas por las Fuerzas de Ocupación Israelíes (IOF) son fabricadas principalmente en Estados Unidos e Israel. Las siguientes bombas son fabricadas por compañías israelíes, a menudo en Israel, pero tienen sitios internacionales que fabrican otros productos. Estas incluyen: la Bomba Guiada Opher (Elbit), la bomba guiada por láser Griffin (Israel Aerospace Industries); Lizard (Elbit); Bombas Spice (Rafael). Elbit tiene una filial en Estados Unidos en Fort Worth, Texas.

Los siguientes son sitios de fabricación en Estados Unidos para las bombas guiadas utilizadas por las Fuerzas de Ocupación Israelíes (IOF):

• Los kits de cola y municiones de Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) son fabricados porBoeing en St. Charles, Missouri; Lockheed-Martin en Archbald, Pensilvania; General Dynamics en Garland, Texas; Elwood National Forge Co en Irvine, Pensilvania; y Raytheon Missile Systems en Tucson, Arizona.
• Los misiles Sidewinder son fabricados por Raytheon Missile Systems Company en Tucson, Arizona.
• Las bombas de pequeño diámetro GBU-39 son fabricadas por Boeing en St. Louis, Missouri.
• Los misiles Hellfire, que generalmente son lanzados desde helicópteros Apache, al menos algunos de ellos son fabricados por Hellfire Systems en Orlando, Florida, una empresa conjunta entre Lockheed Martin y Boeing.
Los interceptores de Iron Dome se llaman Tamir y son co-producidos por RTX (anteriormente Raytheon Technologies) y Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, y ensamblados en Israel.
• Las bombas guiadas Paveway II son fabricadas por Lockheed Martin en Archibald, Pensilvania, y Raytheon en Tucson, Arizona.

Fósforo blanco

Israel ha utilizado fósforo blanco en Gaza y Líbano.

• Israel Chemical Ltd (ICL, ahora ICL Group) suministra fosfatos a Monsanto (ahora Bayer) para la producción del fósforo blanco químico proporcionado al Arsenal de Pine Bluff (PBA) cerca de Little Rock, Arkansas, para su llenado.

Transportes Blindados de Personal

Tres semanas después del inicio del asalto en Gaza, las Fuerzas de Ocupación Israelíes (IOF) iniciaron operaciones terrestres en la Franja de Gaza. Esto implica tanques y transportes blindados de personal, respaldados por helicópteros y drones.

• Los conjuntos de potencia para los Transportes Blindados de Personal Namer, fabricados en Israel, son fabricados por MTU America, Novi, MI. MTU America es la subsidiaria norteamericana de Rolls Royce Power Systems.

Activos navales

La mayor parte del asalto en Gaza se está llevando a cabo desde el aire y por tierra, pero Israel también está utilizando por primera vez sus corbetas Sa’ar 6.

• Los cañones navales de 76 mm son fabricados por DRS North America, una empresa de Leonardo. 
• El casco y las superestructuras de los Sa’ar 6 son fabricados en Kiel, Alemania, por ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS).

Transporte militar y logística desde Estados Unidos a Israel

Si bien muchos productos militares terminados son transportados por el propio ejército, ya sea en buques militares o mediante transporte aéreo, los componentes y algunos bienes son transportados por mar a bordo de buques portacontenedores normales. Los puertos son nodos clave en la cadena de suministro de armas.

El actor clave en el envío desde Estados Unidos, y otros lugares del mundo, hacia Israel es la línea naviera ZIM. ZIM es el principal proveedor de servicios de envío a Israel y una de las diez principales líneas navieras más grandes del mundo. Anteriormente controlada por el gobierno israelí, ZIM ha sido privatizada y cotiza en la Bolsa de Nueva York durante las últimas dos décadas. A pesar de esto, aún mantiene estrechos vínculos con el Estado de Israel y es crucial para garantizar el apoyo logístico para el estado y las FDI.

La mayoría de los componentes militares entran y salen de Estados Unidos a través de los puertos de la costa este, principalmente Nueva York / Newark, Savannah, Charleston y el Puerto de Virginia. Estos puertos suelen estar sindicalizados por la Asociación Internacional de Estibadores (ILA, por sus siglas en inglés). Esto se debe a que la mayoría de las cadenas de suministro militares se centran en Europa y Estados Unidos, con muchos componentes producidos en Europa y el ensamblaje final que tiene lugar en Estados Unidos.

Con acceso a los datos comerciales de Estados Unidos, es posible ver envíos individuales a través de sus «conocimientos de embarque», los documentos utilizados por las líneas navieras para identificar los envíos y rastrear patrones de entregas. En raras ocasiones, esto puede incluir envíos de armas en buques civiles. Por ejemplo, el 4 de marzo de 2023, un envío de «CABEZAS DE GUERRA, COHETE CON CARGA EXPLOSIVA» producido por Raytheon en Tucson, Arizona y valorado en $100,000, salió del Puerto de Virginia con destino a Haifa, Israel, en el buque portacontenedores Zim Yokohama. Otros envíos de Raytheon han salido por la misma ruta en los meses siguientes. En la mayoría de los casos, los datos comerciales pueden identificar las rutas para los componentes. Por ejemplo, Dunlop regularmente envía neumáticos para el F35 y otros aviones militares desde su fábrica en Birmingham, Reino Unido, ya sea a través de Londres al Puerto de Virginia o a través de Liverpool a Charleston.

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Defense Security Cooperation Agency NEWS RELEASE On the web: http://www.dsca.mil Media/Public Contact: pm -cpa@state.gov Transmittal No. 20- 12 Israel – KC-46A Aeria l Refueling Aircraft WASHINGTON, March 3, 2020 - The State Department has made a determination approving a pos sible Foreign Military Sale to Israel of up to eight (8) KC -46 aircraft and related equipment for an estimated cost of $2.4 billion . The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today . The Government of Israel has requested to buy up to eight (8) KC -46 aircraft; up to seventeen (17) PW4062 turbofan engines (16 installed, 1 spare); and up to eighteen (18) MAGR 2K -GPS SAASM receivers (16 installed, 2 spares). Also included are AN/ARC -210 U/VHF radios, APX -119 Identification Friend or Foe transponders, initial spares and repair parts, consumables, support equipment, technical data, engineering change proposals, publications, Field Service Representatives (FSRs), repair and return, depot maintenance, training and training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, U.S. Government and contracto r representative support, Group A and B installation for subsystems, flight test and certification, other related elements of logistics support and training. The total estimated program cost is $2.4 billion. The United States is committed to the security of Israel, and it is vital to U.S. national interests to assist Israel to develop and maintain a strong and ready self -defense capability. This proposed sale is consistent with those objectives. The proposed sale further supports the foreign policy and national security of the United States by allowing Israel to provide a redundant capability to U.S. assets within the region, potentially freeing U.S. assets for use elsewhere during times of war. Aerial refueling and strategic airlift are consistently cited as significant shortfalls for our allies. In addition, the sale improves Israel's national security posture as a key U.S. ally. Israel will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces. The proposed equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. The principal contractors will be Boeing Corporation, Everett, WA, for the aircraft; and Raytheon Company, Waltham, MA, for the MAGR 2K. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of two U.S. field service/contractor representatives to Israel. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. This notice of a potential sale is required by law and does not mean the sale has been concluded.
All questions regarding this proposed Foreign Military Sale should be directed to the State Department's Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Congressional an d Public Affairs, pm -cpa@state.gov. -30-

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Criança mimada, Israel faz birra e desobedece a leis internacionais - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


Exatamente uma semana atrás, no dia 25 de março, o Conselho de Segurança da ONU aprovou a primeira resolução pedindo um cessar fogo imediato em Gaza. Não por falta de tentativa dos USA de sabotarem tal resolução, cujo texto pedia um cessar fogo “permanente”, e a pedido de Washington foi alterado para “duradouro”. Duradouro, na mentalidade dos diplomatas ianques, significa até o fim do Ramadã. Isto é, daqui a uma semana. Este “cessar fogo do Ramadã”, aprovado já na metade final deste sagrado mês, foi proposto pela Argélia, com total concordância dos outros países árabes, e contou com quase unanimidade de votos favoráveis no Conselho de Segurança. Somente os USA, que já vetaram quatro outras resoluções que pediam cessar fogo, se abstiveram – mas com requintes de mais um veto.

Como se não bastasse que o cessar fogo tenha sido aprovado já com uma mentalidade temporária, como uma pausa para um cafezinho em um genocídio em curso, o Estado facínora que perpetra este genocídio tomou para si a decisão de simplesmente não acatar a resolução. O Estado Sionista de Israel não apenas não cessou as hostilidades, como intensificou suas ações criminosas, com bombardeios pesados à cidade de Rafah1 – onde se abrigam mais de 2 milhões de civis palestinos, a maioria já refugiados do norte de Gaza. Este Estado Vilão se dá a esse direito graças à bênção diplomática de seu patrão, padrinho e patrono ianque, que julga que a resolução aprovada “não é vinculativa” (non-binding). Isto é, que os membros das Nações Unidas não teriam a obrigação de acatar, contrariamente ao que a Corte Internacional de Justiça julga. Com esse palavreado juridiquês sofístico, os USA se prestam novamente ao seu papel de proteger o direito de Israel cometer um genocídio.

Mas não somente os USA continuam a providenciar proteção jurídica na Corte Internacional de Justiça e diplomática no Conselho de Segurança da ONU, como também militar. Em seu apoio incondicional ao Estado Sionista de Israel, o governo “Democrata” ianque aprovou na surdina o envio de mais de 2 bilhões de dólares em aviões e bombas para seu aliado genocida. Isto serve para que todos os verdadeiros democratas do globo não esqueçam que as bombas lançadas sobre as mais de 13 mil crianças já assassinadas em Gaza, ainda que lançadas com sádicas inscrições em hebraico, não deixam de ter um forte sotaque do Texas e um certo brilho de Madison Square. A sede de sangue sionista é saciada com bandejas e taças norte americanas. Da Coreia ao Vietnã, do Iraque ao Afeganistão, das ditaduras latino-americanas à Palestina: a assinatura ianque é inconfundível.

Inconfundíveis também tem sido as vozes dos povos árabes. No Marrocos, Iraque, Egito, Jordânia e outros países árabes, civis tem ido às ruas protestar pelo povo palestino. Os silêncios e inações de seus governos vendidos, que abandonam o povo palestino à sua própria sorte, não tem passado despercebidos. Na Jordânia, país da região do Levante que tem as melhores relações com Israel e onde há o maior número de refugiados palestinos no mundo, a polícia de choque jordaniana agrediu manifestantes que se reuniam diante da embaixada israelense em Amã, capital do país. A cidade tem visto manifestações cada vez maiores nos últimos cinco dias, e a repressão do Estado jordaniano aumenta em recíproca. A insatisfação de um povo que sofre com uma economia estagnada e 23% de desemprego é aumentada pela falta de ações concretas diante do genocídio de seus irmãos, primos e vizinhos palestinos.

O povo marroquino também vem tomando as ruas das cidades do país, exigindo que seu governo corte as relações com o Estado sionista de Israel. Não é algo novo, uma vez que o Marrocos é um dos signatários dos Acordos de Abraão, uma traição de alguns governos árabes (Emirados Árabes, Bahrein, Sudão e Marrocos) em busca da “normalização” de relações com Israel em troca de favores do imperialismo ianque. No caso do Marrocos, Israel reconheceu a soberania marroquina sobre o Saara Ocidental. O povo marroquino já tomou as ruas diversas vezes em oposição à participação do governo marroquino em tal traição. Mas traição ainda maior é o uso de armas israelenses pelo governo marroquino para assassinar civis no Saara Ocidental. O governo marroquino, cliente de Israel, inimigo do povo palestino e cúmplice do genocídio, terá de lidar com a rejeição crescente de seu próprio povo.

Sábado passado, no dia 30 de março, palestinos em todo o mundo celebraram o Dia da Terra palestino. É um dia para lembrar com pesar do roubo da terra palestina pelos sionistas em 1948 e até hoje. Marcado no dia em que, em 1976, seis palestinos foram assassinados, centenas foram feridos e ilegalmente presos em manifestações durante uma greve devida à confiscação de terras pertencentes aos palestinos cidadãos de Israel na região da Galileia, como parte de um plano de “judaização” da região do governo sionista. Os protestos em celebração ao Dia da Terra ocorreram também dentro do próprio Estado Sionista de Israel, onde mais de 20% dos cidadãos são palestinos com direitos reduzidos.

A rapinagem do território palestino, entretanto, não se detém no passado. É um ato contínuo, em desenvolvimento e ocorrendo ao lado do genocídio em Gaza. Desde o dia 7 de outubro, Israel confiscou mais de 27 quilômetros quadrados – equivalente a aproximadamente 2700 campos de futebol – e forçou mais de 25 vilarejos palestinos a fugirem, num total de mais de 1200 pessoas. Desde outubro, mais de mil ataques terroristas sionistas foram praticados por milícias coloniais – civis israelenses, geralmente armados e endossados pelo próprio governo e seus funcionários, uma prática costumaz do sionismo desde antes mesmo da fundação do Estado Sionista de Israel. Como uma colônia de assentamento que é, Israel segue seu plano de eliminar qualquer território palestino minimamente autônomo, e já traça seus planos para reocupar a Faixa de Gaza após concluir seu genocídio. Mas para o exército terrorista de Israel, o genocídio nem mesmo precisa ser concluído para começar a demarcar seu roubo de terras, com centenas de bandeiras israelenses sendo colocadas pelo território de Gaza.

O cessar fogo não foi obedecido, e as ações genocidas de Israel só se intensificaram na semana após a aprovação da resolução da ONU. À comunidade diplomática internacional, exige-se que sejam feitas sanções imediatas a Israel. Exige-se que acordos de quaisquer naturezas sejam rompidos, sejam militares, tecnológicos ou meramente formais. Revolucionários e democratas, devemos exigir o fim do genocídio em curso, não somente há 177 dias, mas há 76 anos. Devemos exigir a libertação do povo palestino, por quaisquer meios necessários aos quais o povo palestino estiver disposto, daqueles que os colonizam, sufocam e assassinam. Uma Palestina livre da colonização, com seu povo forte e invencível vitorioso, mandará todo o Estado sionista de Israel para o lugar ao qual pertence: o museu de antiguidades, ao lado do Apartheid Sul-Africano e da Alemanha Nazista.


Esse texto expressa a opinião do autor.

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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATES OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA) NOTWITHSTANDING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 276 (1970) ADVISORY OPINION OF 21 JUNE 1971 COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES CONSÉQUENCES JURIDIQUES POUR LES ÉTATS DE LA PRÉSENCE CONTINUE DE L'AFRIQUE DU SUD EN NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN) NONOBSTANT LA RÉSOLUTION 276 (1970) DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 21 JUIN 1971
Official citation : Legal Consequences for States of the Contitiued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Reso- lution 276 (1970), Adrisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16. Mode officiel de citation : Conséquences juridiques pour les Etars de la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Cotzseil de sécurité, asis consultatiL C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 16. Sales number No de vente: 352 1
1971 21 June General List No. 53 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE YEAR 1971 21 June 1971 LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATES OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN NAMlBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA) NOTWITHSTANDING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 276 (1970) Composition and competence of' the Court-Propriety of the Court's giving the Opinion-Concept of mandates-Characteristics of the League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa-Situation on the dissolution of the League of Nations and the setting-up of the United Nations: survival of the Mandate and transference of supervision and accountability to the United Nations-Develop- ments in the United Nations prior to the termination of the Mandate-Revoca- bilify of the Mandate-Termination of the Mandate by the General Assembly- Action in the Security Council and effect of'security Council resolutions leading to the request for Opinion-Requests by South Africa to supply further factual information and for the holding of a plebiscite-Legal consequences for States ADVISORY OPINION Present: Presiden! Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN ; Vice-President AMMOUN ; Judges Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, PADILLA NERVO, FORSTER, GROS, BENGZON, PETRÉN, LACHS, ONYEAMA, DILLARD, IGNACIO-PINTO, DE CASTRO, MOROZOV, JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA; Registrar AQUARONE. Concerning the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970),
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE ANNÉE 1971 21 juin 1971 1971 21 juin Rôle général no 53 CONSÉQUENCES JURIDIQUES POUR LES ÉTATS DE LA PRÉSENCE CONTINUE DE L'AFRIQUE DU SUD EN NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN) NONOBSTANT LA RÉSOLUTION 276 (1970) DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ Composition et compétence de la Cour - Question de savoir s'il convient que la Cour donne l'avis demandé - Notion de mandat - Caractéristiques du mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain conféré par la Société des Nations - Situation créée par la dissolution de la Société des Nations et la création de l'organisation des Nations Unies: maintien du mandat, la surveillance est transférée aux Nations Unies et l'obligation de rendre compte leur est due - Evénements survenus aux Nations Unies avant la cessation du mandat - Révocabilité du mandat - L'Assemblée générale met fin au mandat - Mesures prises par le Conseil de sécurité et effet des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité ayant abouti à la requête pour avis consultarif - Demandes de 1:Afrique du Sud tendant à fournir des renseignements complémentaires sur les faits et concernant l'organisation d'un plébiscite - Conséquences juridiquespour les Etats AVIS CONSULTATIF Présents: Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN, Président; M. AMMOUN, Vice- Président; sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, MM. PADILLA NERVO, FORSTER, GROS, BENGZON, PETRÉN, LACHS, ONYEAMA, DILLARD, IGNACIO-PINTO, DE CASTRO, MOROZOV, JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, Juges; M. AQUARONE, Greffier. Au sujet des conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain), nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité,
cornposed as above, gives the following Advisory Opinion: 1. The question upon which the advisory opinion of the Court has been asked was laid before the Court by a letter dûted 29 July 1970, filed in the Registry on 10 August, and addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to thePresident of the Court. In his letter the Secretary-General inforrned the Court that, by resolution 284 (1 970) adopted on 29 July 1970, certified true copies of the English and French texts of which were transrnitted with his letter, the Security Council of the United Nations had decided to subrnit to the Court, with the request for an advisory opinion to be transmitted to the Security Council at an early date, the question set out in the resolution, which was in the following terrns: "The Security Council, Reafirming the special responsibility of the United Nations with regard to the territory and the people of Narnibia, Recalling Security Council resolution 276 (1970) on the question of Narnibia, Taking note of the report and recornmendations subrnitted by the Ad Hoc Sub-Cornmittee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 276 (1 970), Taking further note of the recomrnendation of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the possibility of requesting an advisory opinion from the lnternational Court of Justice, Considering that an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice would be useful for the Security Council in its further consideration of the question of Narnibia and in furtherance of the objectives the Council is seeking 1. Decides to subrnit in accordance with Article 96 (1) of the Charter, the following question to the International Court of Justice with the request for an advisory opinion which shall be transmitted to the Security Council at an early date: 'What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Narnibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolu- tion 276 (1970)?' 2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, accompanied by al1 documents likely to throw light upon the question." 2. On 5 August 1970, that is to say, after the despatch of the Secretary- General's letter but before its receipt by the Registry, the English and French texts of resolution 284 (1970) of the Security Council were comrnunicated to the President of the Court by telegram frorn the United Nations Secretariat. The President thereupon decided that the States Mernbers of the United Nations were likely to be able to furnish information on the question, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and by an Order dated 5 August 1970, the President fixed 23 Septernber 1970 as the tirne-limit within which the
LA COUR, ainsi composée, donne l'avis consultatif suivant: 1. La Cour a été saisie de la question sur laquelle l'avis consultatif lui est demandé par une lettre du Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Président de la Cour datée du 29 juillet 1970 et reçue au Greffe le 10 août. Dans cette lettre, le Secrétaire général porte à la connaissance de la Cour que, par la résolution 284(1970)adoptéele29juillet 1970 dont letextecertifié con- formeen anglais et en français est joint à sacommunication, le Conseil de sécu- rité des Nations Unies a décidé de soumettre à la Cour, en demandant qu'un avis consultatif lui soit transmis a une date rapprochée, la question énoncée dans la résolution dont les termes sont les suivants: «Le Conseil de sécurité, Réafirrnanr la responsabilité spéciale de l'organisation des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne le territoire et le peuple de la Namibie, Rappelant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil sur la question de Namibie, Prenant note du rapport et des recommandations présentés par le Sous- Comité ad hoc en application de la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité, Prenant note également de la recommandation du Sous-Comité ad hoc touchant la possibilité de demander un avis consultatif à la Cour inter- nationale de Justice, Considérant qu'un avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de Justice serait utile au Conseil de sécurité.pour continuer à examiner la question de la Namibie et pour la réalisation des objectifs recherchés par le Conseil, 1. Décide de soumettre, conformément au paragraphe 1 de l'article 96 de la Charte, la question suivante à la Cour internationale de Justice en demandant qu'un avis consultatif soit transmis au Conseil de sécurité à une date rapprochée: «Quelles sont les conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l'Afrique dl! Sud en Namibie, nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité?» 2. Prie le Secrétaire général de transmettre la présente résolution à la Cour internationale de Justice, conformément à l'article 65 du Statut de la Cour, en y joignant tout document pouvant servir à élucider la question.)) 2. Le 5 août 1970, après l'envoi de la lettre du Secrétaire général mais avant sa réception au Greffe, les textes anglais et français de la résolution 284 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité ont été communiqués au Président de la Cour télé- graphiquement par le Secrétariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Le Président a décidé alors que les Etats Membres des Nations Unies étaient susceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question, conformément à l'article 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut et, par ordonnance du 5 août 1970 il a fixé au 23 septembre 1970 la date d'expiration du délai dans lequel la Cour
18 NAMIBIA (S.W. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) Court would be prepared to receive written statements from them. The same day, the Registrar sent to the States Men-ibers of the United Nations the special and direct communication provided for in Article 66 of the Statute. 3. The notice of the request for advisory opinion, prescribed by Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Statute, was given by the Registrar to al1 States entitled to appear before the Court by letter of 14 August 1970. 4. On 21 August 1970, the President decided that in addition to the States Members of the United Nations, the non-meinber States entitled to appear before the Court were also likely to be able to furnish information on the question. The same day the Registrar sent to those States the special and direct communication provided for in Article 66 of the Statute. 5. On 24 August 1970, a letter was received by the Registrar from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of South Atrica, whereby the Government of South Africa, for the reasons therein set out, requested the extension to 31 January 1971 of the time-limit for the submission of a written statement. The President of the Court, by an Order dated 28 August 1970, extended the time-limit for the submission of written statements to 19 November 1970. 6. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in two instalments, and the following States submitted to the Court written statements or letters setting forth their views: Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Hungary, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, the United States of Arnerica, Yugoslavia. Copies of these communications were transrnitted to al1 States entitled to appear before the Court, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and, in pursuance of Articles 44, paragraph 3, and 82, para- graph 1, of the Rules of Court, they were made accessible to the public as frorn 5 February 197 1. 7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in pursuance of Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute transrnitted to the Court a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon the question, together with an lntroductory Note; these documents were received in the Registry in instalments between 5 Novem- ber and 29 December 1970. 8. Before holding public sittings to hear oral statements in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Court had first to resolve two questions reIating to its composition for the further proceedings. 9. In its written statement, filed on 19 November 1970, the Government of South Africa had taken objection to the participation of three Members of the Court in the proceedings. Its objections were based on staternents made or other participation by the Members concerned, in their former capacity as representatives of their Governments, in United Nations organs which were dealing with matters concerning South West Africa. The Court gave careful consideration to the objections raised by the Government of South Africa, examiningeachcase separately. In each of them the Court reached the conclusion that the participation of the Member concerned in his former capacity as representative of his Government, to which objection was taken in the South African Government's written statement, did not attract the application of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. In making Order No. 2 of 26 January 1971, the Court found no reason to depart in the present advisory proceedings from the decision adopted by the Court in the Order of 18 March 1965 in the South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) after hearing the same contentions as have now been advanced by the Government of South Africa. In deciding the other two objections, the
serait disposée à recevoir de ces Etats des exposés écrits. Le même jour, le Greffier a envoyé aux Etats Membres des Nations Unies la communication spéciale et directe prévue à I'article 66 du Statut. 3. La notification de la requête pour avis consultatif, prescrite par I'article 66, paragraphe 1, du Statut, a été adressée par le Greffier, dans une lettre du 14 août 1970, à tous les Etats admis à ester devant la Cour. 4. Le 21 août 1970, le Président a décidé que, outre les Etats Membres des Nations Unies, les Etats non membres admis à ester devant la Cour étaient aussi susceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question. Le même jour, le Greffier leur a envoyé la communication spéciale et directe prévue à l'article 66 du Statut. 5. Le 24 août 1970, le Greffier a. reçu du secrétaire aux affaires étrangères de l'Afrique du Sud une lettre par laquelle le Gouvernement sud-africain, pour les raisons par lui indiquées, demandait le report au 31 janvier 1971 de la date d'expiration du délai pour la présentation d'un exposé écrit. Par ordonnance du 28 août 1970, le Président a reporté au 19 novembre 1970 la date d'expiration du délai dans lequel des exposés écrits pouvaient être déposés. 6. Ont soumis à la Cour des exposés écrits ou des lettres exprimant leurs vues le Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies (en deux livraisons) et les Etats ci-après: Afrique du Sud, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Finlande, France, Hongrie, Inde, Nigéria, Pakistan, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie, Yougoslavie. Des copies de ces communications ont été transmises à tous les Etats admis à ester devant la Cour ainsi qu'au Secrétaire général de I'Organi- sation des Nations Unies et, en application des articles 44, paragraphe 3, et 82, paragraphe 1, du Règlement, les exposés écrits présentés en l'affaire ont été rendus accessibles au public à dater du 5 février 1971. 7. Conformément à I'article 65, paragraphe 2, du Statut, le Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies a transmis à la Cour, avec une note d'introduction, un dossier de documents pouvant servir à élucider la question; ces documents sont parvenus au Greffe, sous plusieurs plis, entre le 5 novembre et le 29 décembre 1970. 8. Avant de tenir des audiences publiques pour entendre des exposés oraux conformément à I'article 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut, la Cour avait à trancher deux questions relatives à sa composition pour la suite de la procédure. 9. Dans son exposé écrit, présenté le 19 novembre 1970, le Gouvernement sud-africain avait formulé des objections à la participation de trois membres de la Cour à la procédure. II se fondait sur des déclarations que ces membres avaient faites, à l'époque où ils représentaient leur gouvernement, devant des organes des Nations Unies s'occupant de problèmes relatifs au Sud-Ouest africain ou sur leur participation en la même qualité aux travaux de ces organes. La Cour a examiné avec soin les objections du Gouvernement sud-africain, envisageant chaque cas séparément. Pour chacun d'eux, la Cour est parvenue à la conclusion que la participation du juge en question, comme représentant de son gouvernement, à laquelle le Gouvernement sud-africain avait objecté dans son exposé écrit, n'appelait pas l'application de I'article 17, paragraphe 2, du Statut. En adoptant son ordonnance no 2 du 26 janvier 1971, la Cour n'a vu aucune raison de s'écarter en la présente procédure consultative de la décision qu'elle avait prise dans son ordonnance du 18 mars 1965 dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud; Libéria c. Afrique du Sud) après avoir entendu les mêmes observations que celles que le Gouvernement sud- africain formule aujourd'hui. Pour se prononcer sur les deux autres cas, la
19 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) Court took intoconsideration that the activities in United Nations organs of the Mernbers concerned, prior to their election to the Court. and which are referred to in the written staternent of the Governrnent of South Africa, do not furnish grounds for treating these objections differently froin those raised in the appli- cation to which the Court decided not to accede in 1965, a decision confirmed by its Order No. 2 of 26 January 1971. With reference to Order No. 3 of the same date, the Court also took into consideration a circumstance to which its attention was drawn, although it was not inentioned in the written staternent of the Governrnent of South Africa, narnely the participation of the Mernber concerned, prior to his election to the Court, in the formulation of Security Council resolution 246 (1968), which concerned the trial at Fretoria of thirty- seven South West Africans and which in its prearnble took into account General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXL). The Court considered that this participa- tion of the Mernber concerned in the work of the United Nations, as a represen- tative of his Governrnent, did not justify a conclusion different frorn that already reached with regard to the objections raised by the Governrnent of South Africa. Account rnust also be taken in this respect of precedents established by the present Court and the Permanent Court wherein judges sat in certain cases even though they had taken part in the formulation of texts the Court was asked to interpret. (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, p. 1 I ; P.C.I.J., Series C, No. 84, p. 535; P.C.I.J., Series E, No. 4, p. 270; P.C.I.J., Series E, No. 8, p. 251 .) After deliberation, the Court decided, by three Orders dated 26 January 1971, and made public on that date, not to accede to the objections which had been raised. 10. By a lettei- from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs dated 13 Novernber 1970, the Governrnent of South Africa made an application for the appointment of a judge ad hoc to sit in the proceedings, in ternis of Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. The Court decided, in accordance with the terms of Article 46 of the Statute of the Court, to hear the contentions of South Africa on this point in camera, and a closed hearing, at which representatives of India, the Netherlands, Nigeria and the United States of America were also present, was held for the purpose on 27 January 1971. 1 1. By an Order dated 29 January 1971, the Court decided to reject the application of the Governrnent of South Africa. The Court thereafter decided that the record of the closed hearing should be made accessible to the public. 12. On 29 January 1971, the Court decided, upon the application of the Organization of African Unity, that that Organization was also likely to be able to furnish information on the question before the Court, and that the Court would therefore be prepared to hear an oral staternent on behalf of the Organization. 13. The States entitled to appear before the Court had been inforrned by the Registrar on 27 Novernber 1970 that oral proceedings in the case would be likely to open at the beginning of February 1971. On 4 February 1971, notifica- tion was given to those States which had expressed an intention to rnake oral staternents, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, that 8 February 'had been fixed as the opening date. At 23 public sittings held between 8 February and 17 Mai-ch 1971, oral staternents were made to the Court by the following representatives:
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 19 Cour a tenu compte du fait que l'activité des membres de la Cour en question, dans des organes des Nations Unies, avant leur élection à la Cour, activité à laquelle le Gouvernement sud-africain s'est référé dans son exposé écrit, ne justifiait pas que ces objections soient traitées différemment de celles qu'avait soulevées la requête à laquelle la Cour n'avait pas fait droit en 1965, dans une décision qui a été confirmée par l'ordonnance no 2 du 26 janvier 1971. En ce qui concerne l'ordonnance no 3 de la même date, la Cour a tenu compte aussi d'un élément sur lequel son attention a été appelée bien qu'il n'ait pas été mentionné dans l'exposé écrit du Gouvernement sud-africain: il s'agit du fait que le membre de la Cour en question a participé, avant son élection à la Cour, à l'élaboration de la résolution 246 (1968) du Conseil de sécurité qui concernait le procês de trente-sept ressortissants du Sud-Ouest africain à Pretoria et tenait compte dans son préambule, de la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale. La Cour a estimé que la participation de ce membre aux travaux des Nations Unies, comme représentant de son gouvernement, ne justifiait pas une conclusion différente de celle qui avait déjà été adoptée à l'égard des objections formulées par le Gouvernement sud-africain. On doit prendre aussi en considé- ration à cet égard des précédents établis par la Cour actuelle et la Cour perma- nente et d'après lesquels des juges ont siégé dans certaines affaires bien qu'ils aient pris part à l'élaboration de textes que la Cour était invitée à interpréter (C.P.J.I. série A no I, p. II; C.P.J.I. série Cn084, p. 535; C.P.J.I. sévie En04, p. 262; C.P.J.I. série E no 8, p. 242). Après délibéré en chambre du conseil, la Cour a décidé, par trois ordonnances du 26 janvier 1971 rendues publiques à cette dat:, de ne pas faire droit aux objections soulevées. 10. Par lettre du secrétaire aux affaires étrangères en date du 13 novembre 1970, le Gouvernement sud-africain avait présenté une demande tendant à la désignation d'un juge ad hoc pour siéger en l'affaire aux termes de l'article 31, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour. Conformément à l'article 46 de son Statut, la Cour a décidé d'entendre à huis clos les observations de l'Afrique du Sud sur ce point et elle a tenu à cette fin, le 27 janvier 1971, une audience à huis clos à laquelle ont assisté également des représentants des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, de l'Inde, du Nigéria et des Pays-Bas. 1 1. Par ordonnance du 29 janvier 1971, la Cour a décidé de rejeter la demande du Gouvernement sud-africain. Elle a décidé ensuite de rendre accessible au public le compte rendu de l'audience à huis clos. 12. Le 29 janvier 1971, statuant sur une demande présentée par l'organisation de l'unité africaine, la Cour a décidé que cette organisation était, elle aussi, susceptible de fournir des renseignements sur la question dont la Cour était saisie, et que la Cour serait donc disposée à entendre un exposé oral qui serait fait au nom de cette organisation. 13. Le 27 novembre 1970, le Greffier avait informé les Etats admis à ester devant la Cour que la procédure orale en l'affaire commencerait probablement au début du mois de février 1971. Le 4 février 1971, les Etats qui avaient manifesté l'intention de présenter des exposés oraux, le Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies et l'organisation de l'unité africaine ont été informés que la date d'ouverture de la procédure orale était fixée au 8 février. Au cours de vingt-trois audiences publiques, tenues entre le 8 février et le 17 mars 197 1, la Cour a entendu, en leurs exposés oraux, les représentants ci-après:
for the Secretary-General Mr. C. A. Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary- of the United Nations: General, Legal Counsel of the United Nations, and Mr. D. B. H. Vickers, Senior Legal Officer, Office of Legal Affairs; for Finland: for the Organization of African Unity : for India : for the Netherlands: for Nigeria: for Pakistan: for South Africa: for the Republic of Viet-Nam : for the United States of America : Mr. E. J. S. Castrén, Professor of International Law in the University of Helsinki; Mr. T. O. Elias, Attorney-General and Com- missioner for Justice of Nigeria; Mr. M. C. Chagla, M.P., Former Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of India; Mr. W. Riphagen, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. T. O. Elias, Attorney-General and Com- n,iissioner for Justice; Mr. S. S. Pirzada, S.Pk., Attorney-General of Pakistan; Mr. J. D. Viall, Legal Adviser to the Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs, Mr. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Mr. E. M. Grosskopf, S.C., Member of the South African Bar, Mr. H. J. 0. van Heerden, Member of the South African Bar, Mr. R. F. Botha, Member of the South African Bar, Mr. M. Wiechers, Professor of Law in the University of South Africa; Mr. Le Tai Trien, Attorney-General, Supreme Court of Viet-Nam; Mr. J. R. Stevenson, The Legal Adviser, Department of State. 14. Prior to the opening of the public sittings, the Court decided to examine first of al1 certain observations made by the Government of South Africa in its written statement, and in a letter dated 14 January 1971, in support of its submission that the Court should decline to give an advisory opinion. 15. At the opening of the public sittings on 8 February 1971, the President of the Court announced that the Court had reached a unanimous decision thereon. The substance of the submission of the Governmen: of South Africa and the decision of the Court are dealt with in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Advisory Opinion, below. 16. By a letter of 27 January 1971, the Government of South Africa had submitted a proposal to the Court regarding the holding of a plebiscite in the Territory of Namibia (South West Africa), and this proposal was elaborated in a further letter of 6 February 1971, which explained that the plebiscite was to determine whether it was the wish of the inhabitants "that the Territory should continue to be administered by the South African Government or should henceforth be administered by the United Nations".
NAMIBIE (S.-O. pour le Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies: pour la Finlande: pour l'organisation de l'unité africaine: pour l'Inde: pour les Pays-Bas: pour le Nigéria: pour le Pakistan : M. C. A. Stavropoulos, Secrétaire général adjoint, conseiller juridique de I'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies, et M. D. B. H. Vickers, administrateur hors classe au service juridique de l'organisation; M. E. J. S. Castrén, professeur de droit international à l'université d'Helsinki; M. T. O. Elias attorney-general et commissaire à la Justice du Nigéria; M. M. C. Chagla, membre du Parlement, ancien ministre des affaires étrangères; M. W. Riphagen, jurisconsulte du ministère des affaires étrangères; M. T. O. Elias attorney-general et commissaire à la Justice; M. S. S. Pirzada, S.Pk., attorney-general; pour l'Afrique du Sud: M. J. D. Viall, jurisconsulte du département des affaires étrangères; M. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., avocat à la Cour suprême d'Afrique du Sud ; M. E. M. Grosskopf, S.C., membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud; M. H. J. 0. van Heerden, membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud; M. R. F. Botha, membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud; M. M. Wiechers, professeur de droit à l'Uni- versité d'Afrique du Sud; pour la République du M. Le Tai Trien, procureur général près la Viet-Nam : Cour suprême; pour les Etats-Unis M. .i. R. Stevenson, jurisconsulte du départe- d' Amériq ue : ment d'Etat. 14. Avant I'ouverture des audiences publiques, la Cour avait décidé d'exa- miner en premier lieu certaines observations que le Gouvernement sud-africain avait formulées dans son exposé écrit et dans une lettre du 14 janvier 1971 à l'appui de sa thèse selon laquelle la Cour devrait refuser de donner un avis consultatif. 15. A l'ouverture des audiences publiques, le 8 février 1971, le Président a annoncé que la Cour était parvenue à une décision unanime à cet égard. La thèse du Gouvernement sud-africain et la décision de la Cour sont traitées aux paragraphes 28 et 29 du présent avis consultatif. 16. Dans une lettre du 27 janvier 1971, le Gouvernement sud-africain avait soumis à la Cour une proposition relative à l'organisation d'un plébiscite dans le territoire de la Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain), proposition qu'il avait déve- loppée dans une lettre du 6 février 1971, où il précisait que le plébiscite aurait pour objet de déterminer si les habitants souhaitaient que «le territoire continue à être administré par le Gouvernement sud-africain ou soit désormais administré par les Nations Unies*.
17. At the hearing of 5 March 1971, the representative of South Africa explained further the position of his Government with regard to the proposed plebiscite, and indicated that his Governrnent considered it necessary to adduce considerable evidence on the factual issues which it regarded as under- lying thequestion before the Court. At the close of the hearing, on 17 March 1971, the President made the following statement: "The Court has considered the request submitted by the representative of South Africa in his letter of 6 February 1971 that a plebiscite should be held in the Territory of Narnibia (South West Africa) under the joint supervision of the Court and the Government of the Republic of South Africa. The Court cannot pronounce upon this request at the present stage without anticipating, or appearing to anticipate, its decision on one or more of the main issues now before it. Consequently, the Court must defer its answer to this request until a later date. The Court has also had under consideration the desire of the Govern- ment of the Republic to supply the Court with further factual material concerning the situation in Namibiü (South West Africa). However, until the Court has been able first to examine some of the legal issues which must, in any event, be dealt with, it will not be in a position to determine whether it requires additional material on the facts. The Court rnust accordingly defer its decision on this matter as well. If, at any tirne, the Court should find itself in need of further arguments or information, on these or any other rnatters, it will notify the govern- ments and organizations whose representatives have participated in the oral hearings." 18. On 14 May 1971 the President sent the following letter to the represen- taiives of the Secretary-General, of the Organization of African Unity and of the States which had participated in the oral proceedings: "i have the honour to refer to the staternent which 1 made at the end of the oral hearing on the advisory proceedings relating to the Territory of Narnibia (South West Africa) on 17 March last . . . , to the effect that the Court considered it appropriate to defer until a later date its decision regarding the requests of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (a) for the holding in that Territory of a plebiscite under the joint super- vision of the Court and the Governrnent of the Republic; and (b) to be allowed to supply the Court with further factual rnaterial concerning the situation there. 1 now have the honour to inforrn you that the Court, having examined the rnatter, does not find itself in need of further arguments or information, and has decided to refuse both these requests." 19. Before examining the merits of the question submitted to it the Court must consider the objections that have been raised to its doing so. 20. The Government of South Africa has contended that for several reasons resolution 284 (1970) of the Security Council, which requested
17. A l'audience du 5 mars 1971, le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a donné des explications complémentaires sur l'attitude de son gouvernement à l'égard du plébiscite proposé et il a indiqué que ce gouvernement estimait nécessaire de produire de nombreux éléments de preuve quant aux points de fait qui, selon lui, sont à la base de la question dont la Cour est saisie. A la clôture des audiences publiques, le 17 mars 197 1, le Président a prononcé la déclaration suivante: «La Cour a examiné la demande présentée par le représentant de ['Afrique du Sud dans sa lettre du 6 février 1971 tendant à ce qu'un plébiscite soit organisé sur le territoire de la Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) sous le contrôle conjoint de la Cour et du Gouvernement de la République sud-africaine. La Cour ne peut, à ce stade, se prononcer sur cette demande sans anticiper ou paraître anticiper la décision qu'elle prendra sur une ou plusieurs des questions importantes dont elle est saisie. En conséquence, elle doit remettre à plus tard la réponse à cette demande. La Cour a également pris en considération le désir du Gouvernement de la République sud-africaine de fournir à la Cour une documentation complémentaire sur les faits en ce qui concerne la situation en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain). Mais tant que la Cour n'aura pu d'abord examiner certains des points juridiques qu'elle doit de toute manière traiter, elle ne sera pas en mesure de dire si elle a besoin de renseignements complé- mentaires sur les faits. La Cour doit donc aussi différer sa décision sur cette question. Si, à un moment quelconque, la Cour estime avoir besoin d'explications ou de renseignemefits complémentaires sur ces questions ou sur d'autres, elle le notifiera aux gouvernements et organisations ayant participé à la procédure orale par l'intermédiaire de représentants.» 18. Le 14 mai 1971, le Président a adressé la lettre suivante aux représentants du Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies, de l'organisation de l'unité africaine et des Etats qui avaient participé à la procédure orale: «Dans la déclaration que j'ai faite à la fin de la procédure orale en l'affaire consultative relative au territoire de la Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) le 17 mars dernier ... j'indiquais qu'il avait paru approprié à la Cour de remettre à plus tard sa décision sur les demandes du Gouverne- ment sud-africain tendant à ce que a) un plébiscite soit organisé dans ce territoire sous le contrôle conjoint de la Cour et du Gouvernement de la République; b) l'autorisation lui soit donnée de fournir à la Cour une documentation complémentaire sur les faits en ce qui concerne la situation dans le territoire. J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que, après avoir examiné la question, la Cour n'estime pas avoir besoin d'explications ou de renseigne- ments complémentaires et a décidé de rejeter ces deux demandes.» 19. Avant d'aborder au fond la question qui lui est posée, la Cour doit envisager les objections qui ont été soulevées contre cet examen. 20. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a soutenu que, pour plusieurs motifs, la résolution 284 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité demandant un avis
22 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) the advisory opinion of the Court, is invalid, and that, therefore, the Court is not competent to deliver the opinion. A resolution of a properly constituted organ oftheUnited Nations which is passed in accordance with that organ's rules of procedure, and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presiimed to have been validly adopted. However, since in this instance the objections made concern the competence of the Court, the Court will proceed to examine them. 21. The first objection is that in the voting on the resolution two per- manent members of the Security Council abstained. lt is contended that the resolution was consequently not adopted by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, as required by Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations. 22. However, the proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period supply abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the positions taken by members of the Council, in particular its permanent members, have consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice of voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions. By abstaining, a membcr does not signify its objection to the approval of what is being proposed; in order to prevent the adoption of a resolution requiring unanimity of the permanent mem- bers, a permanent member has only to cast a negative vote. This proce- dure followed by the Security Council, which has continued unchanged after the amendment in 1965 of Article 27 of the Charter, has been gener- ally accepted by Members of the United Nations and evidences a general practice of that Organization. 23. The Government of South Africa has also argued that as the ques- tion relates to a dispute between South Africa and other Members of the United Nations, South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations, nota member of the Security Council and a party to a dispute, should have been invited under Article 32 of the Charter to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to it. It further contended that the proviso at the end of Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter, requiring members of the Security Council which are parties to a dispute to abstain froin voting, should have been complied with. 24. The language of Article 32 of the Charter is mandatory, but the question whether the Security Council must extend an invitation in accordance with that provision depends on whether it has made a deter- mination that the matter under its consideration is in the nature of a dispute. In the absence of such a determination Article 32 of the Charter does not apply. 25. The question of Namibia was placed on the agenda of the Security Council as a "situation" and not as a "dispute". No membrr State made any suggestion or proposal that the matter should be examined as a dispute, although due notice was given of the placing of the question
à la Cour n'zst pas valable et que, par suite, la Cour n'a pas compétence pour rendre un avis. Toute résolution émanant d'un organe des Nations Unies régulièrement constitué, prise conformément à son règlement et déclarée adoptée par son président, doit être présumée valable. Cependant, puisqu'en l'espèce les objections soulevées concernent la compétence de la Cour, la Cour les examinera. 21. La première objection vient de ce que deux membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité se sont abstenus lors du vote sur la résolution. On soutient qu'en conséquence la résolution n'a pas été adoptée par un vote affirmatif de neuf membres, dans lequel seraient comprises les voix de tous les membres permanents, comme l'exige l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Charte des Nations Unies. 22. Mais les débats qui se déroulent au Conseil de sécurité depuis de longues années prouvent abondamment que la pratique de l'abstention volontaire d'un membre permanent a toujours et uniformément été interprétée, à en juger d'après les décisions de la présidence et les positions prises par les membres du Conseil, en particulier par les membres permanents, comme ne faisant pas obstacle à I'adoption de résolutions. L'abstention d'un membre du Conseil ne signifie pas qu'il s'oppose à l'approbation de ce qui est proposé; pour empêcher l'adoption d'une résolution exigeant' l'unanimité des membres permanents, un membre permanent doit émettre un vote négatif. La procédure suivie par le Conseil de séci-rité, qui est demeurée inchangée après l'amendement apporté à l'article 27 de la Charte en 1965, a été généralement acceptée par les Membres des Nations Unies et constitue la preuve d'une pratique générale de l'organisation. 23. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a soutenu aussi que, s'agissant d'un différend entre l'Afrique du Sud et d'autres Membres des Nations Unies, l'Afrique du Sud aurait dû être conviée, comme Etat Membre des Nations Unies non membre du Conseil de sécurité et ~artie à un différend. à participer, sans droit de vote, aux discussions relatives à ce différend en vertu de I'article 32 de la Charte. Il a soutenu en outre qu'il aurait fallu appliquer la clause figurant à la fin du paragraphe 3 de I'article 27 de la Charte, qui oblige les membres du Conseil de sécurité parties à un différend à s'abstenir de voter. 24. Le libellé de I'article 32 de la Charte est impératif mais le Conseil de sécurité n'a l'obligation de convier un Etat conformément à cette disposition que s'il constate que la question dont il est saisi a le caractère d'un différend. En l'absence d'une trlle constatation. I'article 32 de la Charte ne s'applique pas. 25. La question de la Namibie a été inscrite à l'ordre du jour du Conseil de sécurité en tant que situation et non en tant que drfférend. Aucun Etat n'a suggéré ou proposé d'étudier la question en tant que différend, bien que son inscription à l'ordre du jour du Conseil de sécurité
23 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) on the Security Council's agenda under the title "Situation in Namibia". Had the Government of South Africa considered that the question should have been treated in the Security Council as a dispute, it should have drawn the Council's attention to that aspect of the matter. Having failed to raise the question at the appropriate time in the proper forum, it is not open to it to raise it before the Court at this stage. 26. A similar answer must be given to the related objection based on the proviso to paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter. This proviso also requires for its application the prior determination by the Security Council that a dispute exists and that certain members of the Council are involved as parties to such a dispute. 27. In the alternative the Government of South Africa has contended that even if the Court had competence to give the opinion requested, it should nevertheless, as a matter of judicial propriety, refuse to exercise its competence. 28. The first reason invoked in support of this contention is the sup- posed disability of the Court to give the opinion requested by the Security Council, because of political pressure to which the Court, according to the Government of South Africa, has been or might be subjected. 29. It would not be proper for the Court to entertain these observa- tions, bearing as they do on the very nature of the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an organ which, in that capacity, acts only on the basis of the law, independently of al1 outside influence or interventions whatsoever, in the exercise of the judicial function en- trusted to it alone by the Charter and its Statute. A court functioning as a court of law can act in no other way. 30. The second reason advanced on behalf of the Government of South Africa in support of its contention that the Court should refuse to accede to the request of the Security Council is that the relevant legal question relates to an existing dispute between South Africa and other States. In this context it relies on the case of Eastern Carelia and argues that the Permanent Court of International Justice declined to rule upon the question referred to it because it was directly related to the main point of a dispute actually pending between two States. 31. However, that case is not relevant, as it differs from the present one. For instance one of the States concerned in that case was not at the time a Member of the League of Nations and did not appear before the Permanent Court. South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations, is bound by Article 96 of the Charter, which empowers the Security Council to request advisory opinions on any legal question. Tt has ap- peared before the Court, participated in both the written and oral pro-
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 23 sous le titre «La situation en Namibie)) ait été dûment notifiée. Si le Gouvernement sud-africain avait estimé que la question devait être con- sidérée devant le Conseil de sécurité comme un différend, il aurait dû appeler l'attention du Conseil sur ce point. Faute d'avoir soulevé le pro- blème en temps voulu devant l'instance qui convenait, il ne lui est plus loisible de le faire à ce stade devant la Cour. 26. Il faut répondre de la même manière à l'objection connexe tirée de la clause figurant à la fin du paragraphe 3 de l'article 27 de la Charte. Cette clause exige également, pour être applicable, que le Conseil de sécurité ait constaté au préalable qu'il existe un différend auquel certains membres du Conseil sont parties. 27. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a soutenu subsidiairement que, même si la Cour avait compétence pour répondre à la demande d'avis, elle n'en devrait pas moins, pour rester dans son rôle judiciaire, refuser d'exercer sa compétence. 28. La première raison invoquée a l'appui de cette thèse est la prétendue incapacité où serait la Cour de donner l'avis consultatif demandé par le Conseil de sécurité en raison des pressions politiques auxquelles, selon le Gouvernement sud-africain, elle aurait été ou pourrait être soumise. 29. Il n'y a pas lieu pour la Cour de retenir ces observations portant sur la nature même de la Cour, organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies, qui, en cette qualité, ne se prononce que sur la base du droit, indépendamment de toute influence ou de toute intervention de la part de quiconque, dans l'exercice de la fonction juridictionnelle confiée à elle seule par la Charte et par son Statut. Une cour, remplissant une fonction de cour de justice, ne saurait agir d'une autre manière. 30. La deuxième raison avancée Dar le Gouvernement sud-africain pour étayer sa thèse selon laquelle la Cour devrait refuser de donner suite à la requête du Conseil de sécurité est que la question juridique dont il s'agit a trait à un différend existant entre l'Afrique du Sud et d'autres Etats. A ce sujet, le Gouvernement sud-africain invoque l'affaire du Statut de la Carélie orientale et fait valoir que la Cour permanente de Justice internationale a refusé de se prononcer sur la question posée parce qu'elle concernait directement le point essentiel d'un différend actuelle- ment né entre deux Etats. 31. Cette affaire n'est pas pertinente car elle diffère de la présente espèce. C'est ainsi que l'un des Etats intéressés n'était pas à l'époque membre de la Société des Nations et ne s'était pas présenté devant la Cour permanente. Or l'Afrique du Sud est liée, comme Membre des Nations Unies, par l'article 96 de la Charte qui autorise le Conseil de sécurité à demander un avis consultatif sur toute question juridique. De plus elle s'est présentée devant la Cour, a participé tant à la procédure
ceedings and, while raising specific objections against the cornpetence of the Court, has addressed itself to the merits of the question. 32. Nor does the Court find that in this case the Security Council's request relates to a legal dispute actually pending between two or more States. Zt is not the purpose of the request to obtain the assistance of the Court in the exercise of the Security Council's functions relating to the pacific settlement of a dispute pending before it between two or more States. The request is put forward by a United Nations organ with refer- ence to its own decisions and it seeks legal advice from the Court on the consequences and implications of these decisions. This objective is stressed by the preamble to the resolution requesting the opinion, in which the Security Council has stated "that an advisory opinion from the rnternational Court of Justice would be useful for the Security Council in its further consideration of the question of Narnibia and in further- ance of the objectives the Council is seeking". Tt is worth recalling that in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Preven- tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Court stated: "The object of this request for an Opinion is to guide the United Natiors in respect of its own action" (I.C.J. Reports 1951 p. 19). 33. The Court does not find either that in this case the advisory opinion concerns a dispute between South Africa and the United Nations. In the course of the oral proceedings Counsel for the Government of South Africa stated: ". . . our submission is not that the question is a dispute, but that in order to answer the question the Court will have to decide legal and factual issues which are actually in dispute between South Africa and other States" 34. The fact that, in the course of its reasoning, and in order to answer the question submitted to it, the Court may have to pronounce on legal issues upon which radically divergent views exist between South Africa and the United Nations, does not convert the present case into a dispute nor bring it within the coinpass of Articles 82 and 83 of the Rules of Court. A similar position existed in the three previous advisory proceed- ings concerning South West Africa: in none of them did South Africa claim that there was a dispute, nor did the Court feel it necessary to apply the Rules of Court concerning "a legal question actually pending between two or more States". Differences of views among States on legal issues have existed in practicall!r every advisory proceeding; if al1 were agreed, the need to resort to the Court for advice would not arise. 35. ln accordance with Article 83 of the Rules of Court, the question whether the advisory opinion had been requested "upon a legal question actually pending betneer: two or more States" was also of decisive im-
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 24 écrite qu'à la procédure orale et, tout en soulevant certaines objections précises contre la compétence de la Cour, a traité du fond. 32. La Cour n'estime pas non plus qu'en l'espèce la requête du Conseil de sécurité ait trait à un différend juridique actuellement pendant entre deux ou plusieurs Etats. L'objet de la requête n'est pas de faire en sorte que la cour assiste le conseil-de sécurité dans l'exercice de ses fonctions relatives au règlement pacifique d'un différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats dont il serait saisi. II s'agit d'une requête présentée par un organe des Nations Unies, à propos de ses propres décisions, en vue d'obtenir de la Cour un avis juridique sur les conséquences et les incidences de ces décisions. C'est cet objectif que souligne le préambule de la résolution sollicitant I'avis, où le Conseil de sécurité indique ((qu'un avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de Justice serait utile au Conseil de sécurité pour continuer à examiner la question de Namibie et pour la réalisaticn des objectifs recherchés par le Conseil ». Il convient de rappeler que, dans son avis consultatif sur les Réserves à la convention pour la préllention er la répression du crime de génocide, la Cour a dit: <( L'objet de la présente demande d'avis est d'éclairer les Nations Unies dans leur action propre » (C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 19). 33. La Cour ne considère pas non plus qu'en l'espèce l'avis consultatif concerne un différend entre l'Afrique du Sud et les Nations Unies. Au cours de la procédure orale, l'un des conseils du Gouvernement sud- africain s'est exprimé en ces termes: nous affirmons, non pas que la question constitue un différend, mais que, pour y répondre, la Cour devra trancher des points de droit et de fait qui font l'objet d'un différend actuellement né entre l'Afrique du Sud et d'autres Etats )). 34. Le fait que, dans l'énoncé de ses motifs et pour répondre à la question qui lui est sounise, la Cour puisse avoir à se prononcer sur des questions juridiques au sujet desquelles les vues de l'Afrique du Sud et celles des Nations Unies s'opposent radicalement ne suffit pas à trans- former la présente affaire en un différend et n'entraîne pas l'application des articles 82 et 83 du Règlement. La situation était comparable dans les trois procédures consultatives précédentes concernant le Sud-Ouest africain: dans aucune d'elles, l'Afrique du Sud n'a prétendu qu'il y eût un différend, pas plus que la Cour n',jugé nécessaire d'appliquer les articles de son Règlement visant (( une question juridique actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats ». Presque toutes les procédures consultatives ont été marquées par des divergences de vues entre Etats sur des points de droit; si les opinions des Etats concordaient, il serait inutile de demander I'avis de la Cour. 35. Etant donné l'article 83 du Règlement, la question de savoir si I'avis consultatif a été demandé ((au sujet d'une question juridique actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats 1) revêtait aussi une
25 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) portance in the Court's consideration of the request made by the Govern- ment of South Africa for the appointment of a judge ad hoc. As already indicated, the Court heard argument in support of that request and, after due deliberation, decided, by an Order of 29 January 1971, not to accede to it. This decision was based on the conclusion that the terms of the request for advisory opinion, the circumstances in which it had been submitted (which are described in para. 32 above), as well as the con- siderations set forth in paragraphs 33 and 34 above, were such as to preclude the interpretation that an opinion had been "requested upon a legal question actually pending between two or more States". Thus, in the opinion of the Court, South Africa was not entitled under Article 83 of the Rules of Court to the appointment of a judge ad hoc. 36. Tt has been urged that the possible existence of a dispute was a point of substance which was prematurely disposed of by the Order of 29 January 1971. Now the question whether a judge ad hoc should be appointed is of course a matter concerning the composition of the Bench and possesses, as the Government of South Africa recognized, absolute logical priority. It has to be settled prior to the opening of the oral proceedings, and indeed before any further issues, even of procedure, can be decided. Until it is disposed of the Court cannot proceed with the case. Tt is thus a logical necessity that any request for the appointment of a judge ad hoc must be treated as a preliminary matter on the basis of a prima facie appreciation of the facts and the law. This cannot be construed as meaning that the Court's decision thereon may involve the irrevocable disposal of a point of substance or of one related to the Court's compe- tence. Thus, in a contentious case, when preliminary objections have been raised, the appointment of judges ad hoc must be decided before the hearing of those objections. That decision, however, does not prejudge the Court's competence if, for instance, it is claimed that no dispute exists. Conversely, to assert that the question of the judge ad hoc could not be validly settled until the Court had been able to analyse substantive issues is tantamount to suggesting that the composition of the Court could be left in suspense, and thus the validity of its proceedings left in doubt, until an advanced stage in the case. 37. The only question which was in fact settled with finality by the Order of 29 January 1971 was the one relating to the Court's compo- sition for the purpose of the present case. That decision was adopted on the authority of Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and in accordance with Article 55, paragraph 1, of the Statute. Consequently, after the adoption of that decision, while differing views might still be held as to the applicability of Article 83 of the Rules of Court in the present case, the regularity of the composition of the Court for the
importance décisive du point de vue de l'examen par la Cour de la demande introduite par le Gouvernement sud-africain en vue de la désignation d'un juge ad hoc. Comme il a déjà été indiqué, la Cour a entendu des observations à l'appui de cette demande et, après délibéré, a décidé par son ordonnance du 29 janvier 1971 de ne pas y faire droit. Cette décision était fondée sur la conclusion que les termes de la demande d'avis consultatif, les circonstances de sa présentation (qui sont décrites au par. 32 ci-dessus) et les considérations exposées aux paragraphes 33 et 34 étaient de nature à exclure l'interprétation selon laquelle l'avis aurait été ademandé au sujet d'une question juridique actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats ». Ainsi, selon la Cour, l'Afrique du Sud n'était pas fondée en vertu de l'article 83 du Règlement à désigner un juge ad hoc. 36. On a fait valoir que l'existence éventuelle d'un différend constituait une question de fond réglée prématurément par l'ordonnance du 29 janvier 197 1. Or, la question de savoir si un juge ad hoc doit être nommé concerne évidemment la composition de la Cour et présente, comme le Gouver- nement sud-africain l'a reconnu, une priorité logique absolue. Elle doit être tranchée avant l'ouverture de la procédure orale et même avant que toute autre question, fût-elle procédurale, puisse être décidée. Tant qu'elle n'est pas réglée, la Cour ne peut pas poursuivre l'examen de I'affaire. II est donc logiquement indispensable que toute demande tendant à la désignation d'un juge ad hoc soit traitée comme une question préliminaire sur la base d'une première appréciation des faits et du droit. On ne saurait déduire de cela que la décision de la Cour à ce sujet pourrait trancher de façon irrévocable un point de fond ou un point ayant trait à la compétence de la Cour. C'est ainsi que, dans une affaire contentieuse, lorsque des exceptions préliminaires sont soulevées, la question de la désignation de juges ad hoc doit être réglée avant les débats sur ces exceptions. La décision prise ne préjuge cependant pas de la compétence de la Cour, au cas où l'on prétendrait, par exemple, qu'il n'existe pas de différend. Inversement, affirmer que la question du juge ad hoc ne saurait être valablement réglée tant que la Cour n'a pas été en mesure d'analyser des questions de fond revient à dire qu'il faudrait laisser en suspens la question de la composition de la Cour et, partant, laisser planer un doute sur la validité de la procédure, jusqu'à un stade avancé de I'affaire. 37. La seule question que l'ordonnance du 29 janvier 1971 ait en fait définitivement réglée est celle qui concerne la composition de la Cour aux fins de la présente instance. Cette décision a été prise sur la base de l'article 3, paragraphe 1, du Règlement et conformément à l'article 55, paragraphe 1, du Statut. Par conséquent, si les divergences de vues demeurent possibles quant à I'applicabilité de l'article 83 du Règlement en l'espèce, dès lors que la décision est adoptée, il n'est plus loisible de remetGe en cause le caractère régulier de la composition de la Cour pour
26 NAMIBIA (S. W. AFKICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) purposes of delivering the present Advisory Opinion, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Court, is no longer open to question. 38. ln connection with the possible appointment of judges ad hoc, it has further been suggested that the final clause in paragraph 1 of Article 82 of the Rules of Court obliges the Court to determine as a preliminary question whether the request relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more States. The Court cannot accept this reading, which overstrains the literal meaning of the words "avant tout". It is difficult to conceive that an Article providing general guidelines in the relatively unschematic context of advisory proceedings should prescribe a rigid sequence in the action of the Court. This is confirmed by the practice of the Court, which in no previous advisory proceedings has found it neces- sary to make an independent preliminary determination of this question or of its own competence, even when specifically requested to do so. Likewise, the interpretation of the Rules of Court as imposing a procedure in limine litis, which has been suggested, corresponds neither to the text of the Article nor to its purpose, which is to regulate advisory proceedings without impairing the flexibility which Articles 66, paragraph 4, and 68 of the Statute allow the Court so that it may adjust its procedure to the require- ments of each particular case. The phrase in question merely indicates that the test of legal pendency is to be considered "above all" by the Court for the purpose of exercising the latitude granted by Article 68 of the Statute to be guided by the provisions which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which the Court recognizes them to be applicable. From a practical point of view it may be added that the procedure suggested, analogous to that followed in contentious procedure with respect to preliminary objections, would not have dispensed with the need to decide on the request for the appointment of a judge ad hoc as a previous, independent decision, just as in contentious cases the question of judges ad hoc must be settled before any hearings on the preliminary objections may be proceeded with. Finally, it must be observed that such proposed preliminary decision under Article 82 of the Rules of Court would not necessarily have predetermined the decision which it is suggested should have been taken subsequently under Article 83, since the latter provision envisages a more restricted hypothesis: that the advisory opinion is requested upon a legal question actually pending and not that it relates to such a question. 39. The view has also been expressed that even if South Africa is not entitled to a judge ad hoc as a matter of right, the Court should, in the exercise of the discretion granted by Article 68 of the Statute, have allowed such an appointment, in recognition of the fact that South Africa's interests are specially affected in the present case. In this connection the Court wishes to recall a decision taken by the Permanent Court at a time when the Statute did not include any provision concerning advisory opinions, the entire regulation of the procedure in the matter being thus left to the Court (P.C.I.J., Series E, No. 4, p. 76). Confronted with a
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 26 le prononcé du présent avis consultatif, aux termes de son Statut et de son Règlement. - 38. En ce qui concerne la désignation éventuelle de juges ad hoc, on a indiqué en outre que la clause figurant à la fin du paragraphe 1 de I'article 82 du Règlement contraint la Cour à établir, en tant que question préliminaire, si la demande d'avis a trait ou non à une question juridique actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats. La Cour ne peut admettre cette interprétation qui force le sens littéral des mots ((avant tout ». On imagine mal qu'un article donnant des directives générales dans le cadre relativement souple de la procédure consultative prescrive strictement l'ordre dans lequel la Cour doit procéder. C'est du reste ce que confirme la pratique de la Cour qui n'a jugé nécessaire, dans aucune procédure consultative antérieure, de se prononcer à titre préliminaire et indépendant sur cette question ni sur sa compétence, même lorsqu'elle était expressément priée de le faire. De même, interpréter le Règlement comme imposant une procédure in limine litis, ainsi qu'on l'a fait, ne correspond ni au texte de I'article ni à son objet, lequel est de régler la procédure consultative sans nuire à la latitude que I'article 66, paragraphe 4, et I'article 68 du Statut accordent à la Cour de façon qu'elle puisse adapter sa procédure aux nécessités de chaque espèce. Le membre de phrase en question montre simplement que la Cour doit ((avant tout )) chercher à savoir s'il y a une question juridique pendante à l'effet d'exercer la faculté qui lui est donnée par I'article 68 du Statut de s'inspirer des dispositions relatives à la procédure en matière contentieuse dans la mesure où elle les reconnaît applicables. On peut ajouter qu'en pratique la procédure suggérée, analogue à celle qui est suivie en matière con- tentieuse pour les exceptions préliminaires, n'aurait pas supprimé la nécessité d'une décision préliminaire et indépendante sur la demande de désignation d'un juge ad hoc, exactement comme au contentieux la question des juges ad hoc doit être réglée avant tout débat sur les ex- ceptions préliminaires. Enfin il convient de faire observer que la décision préliminaire qu'il était proposé de prendre en vertu de I'article 82 du Règlement n'aurait pas nécessairement prédéterminé la décision qu'il aurait fallu prendre ensuite, selon cette proposition, en vertu de l'article 83, puisque celui-ci envisage une hypothèse plus restreinte: celle où l'avis consultatif est demandé au sujet d'une question juridique actuel- lement pendante et non pas celle où il a trait à pareille question. 39. On a aussi exprimé l'avis que, même si l'Afrique du Sud n'a pas droit à un juge ad hoc, la Cour n'en devrait pas moins, dans l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire que lui confère I'article 68 du Statut, lui per- mettre d'en désigner un, pour tenir compte du fait que ses intérêts sont particulièrement touchés dans la présente instance. A cet égard, la Cour rappellera une décision prise par la Cour permanente à une époque où le Statut ne contenait aucune disposition sur les avis consultatifs, le soin de régler la procédure en la matière étant laissé entièrement à la Cour (C.P.J.I. série E no 4, p. 72). Saisie d'une requête tendant à la désignation
27 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) request for the appointment of a judge ad hoc in a case in which it found there was no dispute, the Court, in rejecting the request, stated that "the decision of the Court must be in accordance with its Statute and with the Rules duly framed by it in pursuance of Article 30 of the Statute" (Order of 31 October 1935, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 65, Annex 1, p. 69 at p. 70). It found further that the "exception cannot be given a wider application than is provided for by the Rules" (ibid., p. 71). In the present case the Court, having regard to the Rules of Court adopted under Article 30 of the Statute, came to the conclusion that it was unable to exercise discretion in this respect. 40. The Government of South Africa has also expressed doubts as to whether the Court is competent to, or should, give an opinion, if, in order to do so, it should have to make findings as to extensive factual issues. Tn the view of the Court, the contingency that there may be factual issues underlying the question posed does not alter its character as a "legal question" as envisaged in Article 96 of the Charter. The reference in this provision to legal questions cannot be interpreted as opposing legal to factual issues. Normally, to enable a court to pronounce on legal questions, it must also be acquainted with, take into account and, if necessary, make findings as to the relevant factual issues. The limitation of the powers of the Court contended for by the Government of South Africa has no basis in the Charter or the Statute. 41. The Court could, of course, acting on its own, exercise the dis- cretion vested in it by Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute and decline to accede to the request for an advisory opinion. In considering this possibility the Court must bear in mind that: "A reply to a request for an Opinion should not, in principle, be refused." (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 19.) The Court has considered whether there are any "compelling reasons", as referred to in the past practice of the Court, which would justify such a refusal. It has found no such reasons. Moreover, it feels that by replying to the request it would not only "remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character" (I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 153), but also discharge its functions as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (Art. 92 of the Charter). 42. Having established that it is properly seised of a request for an advisory opinion, the Court will now proceed to an analysis of the question placed before it: "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithsunding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?" 43. The Government of South Africa in both its written and oral statements has covered a wide field of history, going back to the origin and functioning of the Mandate. The same and similar problems were
d'un juge ad hoc dans une affaire où elle estimait qu'il n'existait pas de différend, la Cour permanente a dit, en rejetant cette requête: « la cour ne peut statuer qu'en conformité de son Statut et de son Règlement, dûment établi en application de l'article 30 du Statut » (ordonnance du 31 octobre 1935, C.P.J.I. série AIB no 65, ann. 1, p. 70). Elle a constaté en outre que l'application [de l'exception ne] saurait être étendue au-delà des limites qui lui ont été réglementairement fixées 1) (ibid., p. 71). Dans la présente affaire, la Cour, tenant compte du Règlement adopté en vertu de l'article 30 du Statut, est arrivée à la conclusion qu'elle n'était pas en mesure d'exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire à cet égard. 40. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a également mis en doute que la Cour soit compétente pour donner un avis ou encore qu'elle doive le faire si, pour cela, il lui faut se prononcer sur des questions de fait d'une portée étendue. Selon la Cour, ce n'est pas parce que la question posée met en jeu des faits qu'elle perd le caractère de ((question juridique )) au sens de l'article 96 de la Charte. On ne saurait considérer aue cette dis~osition oppose les questions de droit aux points de fait. Pour être à même de se prononcer sur des questions juridiques, un tribunal doit normalement avoir connaissance des faits correspondants, les prendre en considération et, le cas échéant, statuer à leur sujet. Les limites que le Gouvernement sud-africain prétend assigner aux pouvoirs de la Cour n'cnt de fondement ni dans la Charte ni dans le Statut. 41. Il est vrai que la Cour pourrait, de sa propre initiative, user du pouvoir discrétionnaire que lui confère l'article 65, paragraphe 1, du Statut et ne pas donner suite à la demande d'avis consultatif. Lorsqu'elle examine cette possibilité, la Cour ne doit pas perdre de vue qu'((En principe la réponse à une demande d'avis ne doit pas être refusée)) (C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 19). La Cour s'est demandé, eu égard à sa pratique passée, si des raisons (( décisives »justifieraient un tel refus. Elle n'a pu en découvrir aucune. Elle estime au surplus qu'en répondant à la requête non seulement elle resterait ((fidèle aux exigences de son caractère judiciaire » (C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 153), mais encore elle s'acquitterait de ses fonctions d'((organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies» (Charte, art. 92). 42. Ayant établi qu'elle était valablement saisie d'une requête pour avis consultatif, la Cour analysera la question qui lui est soumise: ((Quelles sont les conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité? )) 43. Dans son exposé écrit comme dans ses exposés oraux, le Gouverne- ment sud-africain a fait un large historique, remontant à l'origine du mandat, dont il a examiné le fonctionnement. D'autres gouvernements,
dealt with by other governments, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity in their written and oral statements. 44. A series of important issues is involved: the nature of the Mandate, its working under the League of Nations, the consequences of the demise of the League and of the establishment of the United Nations and the impact of further developments within the new organization. While the Court is aware that this is the sixth time it has had to deal with the issues involved in the Mandatc for South West Africa, it has nonetheless reached the conclusion that it is necessary for it to consider and summarize some of the issues underlying the question addressed to it. ln particular, the Court will examine the substance and scope of Article 22 of the League Covenant and the nature of "C" mandates. 45. The Government of South Africa, in its written statement, presented a detailed analysis of the intentions of some of the participants in the Paris Peace Conference, who approved a resolution which, with some alterations and additions, eventually became Article 22 of the Covenant. At the conclusion and in the light of this analysis it suggested that it was quite natural for commentators to refer to " 'C' mandates as being in their practical effect not far removed from annexation". This view, which the Goverqment of South Africa appears to have adopted, would be tantamount to admitting that the relevant provisions of the Covenant were of a purely nominal character and that the rights they enshrined were of their very nature imperfect and unenforceable. Tt puts too much emphasis on the intentions of some of the parties and too little on the instrument which emerged from those negotiations. Tt is thus necessary to refer to the actual text of Article 22 of the Covenant, paragraph 1 of which declares: "1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant." As the Cocrt recalled in its 1950 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South- West Africa, in the setting-up of the mandates system "two principles were considered to be of paramount importance: the principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form 'a sacred trust of civilization'" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 131). 46. It is self-evident that the "trust" had to be exercised for the benefit of the peoples concerned, who were adm.itted to have interests of their
ainsi que le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et l'organisation de l'unité africaine, ont évoqué les mêmes problèmes ou des problèmes analogues dans leurs exposés écrits et oraux. 44. Toute une série de questions importantes sont en jeu: la nature du mandat, son application à l'époque de la Société des Nations, les con- séquences de la disparition de la Société, de l'établissement des Nations Unies et des faits survenus depuis lors au sein de la nouvelle organisation. La Cour n'ignore pas qu'elle est appelée pour la sixième fois à connaitre des problèmes liés au mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, mais elle n'en a pas moins conclu qu'il lui fallait examiner et résumer certains des problèmes mis en jeu par la question qui lui est posée. Elle se propose d'étudier en particulier le contenu et la portée de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et la nature des mandats C. 45. Dans son exposé écrit, le Gouvernement sud-africain a présenté une analyse détaillée des intentions de certains des participants à la conférence de la paix de Paris, où fut approuvée la résolution qui, avec certaines modifications et adjonctions, devait devenir ultérieurement l'article 22 du Pacte. En conclusion, et à la lumière de cette analyse, il a estimé qu'il était très naturel que les commentateurs aient parlé des mandats C a comme très proches, dans leur effet pratique, de l'annexion ». Cette manière de voir, que le Gouvernement sud-africain paraît avoir adoptée, reviendrait à admettre que les dispositions pertinentes du Pacte avaient un caractère de pure forme et que les droits qu'elles consacraient étaient par nature imparfaits et non exécutoires. Elle accorde trop d'importance aux intentions de certaines des parties et pas assez à l'instrument issu des négociations. Il faut donc se reporter au texte même de l'article 22, paragraphe 1, du Pacte: (( 1. Les principes suivants s'appliquent aux colonies et territoires qui, à la suite de la guerre, ont cessé d'être sous la souveraineté des Etats qui les gouvernaient précédemment et qui sont habités par des peuples non encore capables de se diriger eux-mêmes dans les con- ditions particulièrement difficiles du monde moderne. Le bien-être et le développement de ces peuples forment une mission sacrée de civilisation et il convient d'incorporer dans le présent Pacte des garanties pour l'accomplissement de cette mission. 1) La Cour a rappelé dans son avis consultatif de 1950 sur le Statut inter- national du Sud-Ouest africain que, lorsque le système des mandats fut créé, (( deux principes furent considérés comme étant d'importance pri- mordiale: celui de la non-annexion et celui qui proclamait que le bien- être et le développement de ces peuples formaient (( une mission sacrée de civilisation )) (C.I.J. Recueil 19.50, p. 13 1). 46. 11 est évident que la (1 mission 1) dont il s'agit devait être exercée au profit des populations en cause auxquelles on reconnaissait des intérêts
29 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) own and to possess a potentiality for independent existence on the attainment of a certain stage of development: the mandates system was designed to provide peoples "not yet" able to manage their own affairs with the help and guidance necessary to enable them to arrive at the stage where they would be "able to stand by themselves". The requisite means of assistance to that end is dealt with in paragraph 2 of Arti- cle 22: "2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League." This made it clear that those Powers which were to undertake the task envisaged would be acting exclusively as mandatories on behalf of the League. As to the position of the League, the Court found in its 1950 Advisory Opinion that: "The League was not, as alleged by [the South African] Government, a 'mandator' in the sense in which this term is used in the national law of certain States." The Court pointed out that: "The Mandate was created, in the interest of the inhabitants of the terri- tory, aiid of humanity in general, as an international institution with an international object-a sacred trust of civilisation." Therefore, the Court found, the League "had only assumed an international function of supervision and control" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 132). 47. The acceptance of a mandate on these terms connoted the assump- tion of obligations not only of a moral but also of a binding legal character; and, as a corollary of the trust, "securities for [its] performance" were instituted (para. 7 of Art. 22) in the form of legal accountability for its discharge and fulfilment : "7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge." 48. A further security for the performance of the trust was embodied in paragraph 9 of Article 22: "9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on al1 matters relating to the observance of the mandates." Thus the reply to the essential question, quis custodiet ipsos custodes?, was given in terms of the mandatory's accountability to international
propres et la possibilité de vivre indépendantes lorsqu'elles auraient atteint un certain stade de développement: le système des mandats devait fournir aux peuples (( non encore » capables de gérer leurs propres affaires l'aide et les conseils nécessaires pour leur permettre d'arriver au stade où ils seraient ((capables de se diriger eux-mêmes )). Le mode d'assistance nécessaire à cet effet était défini à l'article 22, paragraphe 2: (( 2. La meilleure méthode de réaliser pratiquement ce principe est de confier la tutelle de ces peuples aux nations développées qui, en raison de leurs ressources, de leur expérience ou de leur position géographique, sont le nieux à même d'assumer cette responsabilité et qui consentent à l'accepter: elles exerceraient cette tutelle en qualité de Mandataires et au nom de la Société. )) II ressort clairement de ce texte que les puissances qui allaient se charger de la tâche envisagée agiraient exclusivement en qualité de mandataires et au nom de la société des Nations. Pour ce qui est de la position de la SdN, la Cour a dit, dans son avis de 1950, que cc la Société des Nations n'était pas, comme l'a allégué [le Gouvernement sud-africain], un ((mandant », au sens où ce terme est employé dans la législation interne de certains Etats 11. La Cour faisait observer: (( Le Mandat a été créé, dans l'intérêt des habitants du Territoire et de l'humanité en général, comme une institution internationale à laquelle était assigné un but international: une mission sacrée de civilisation ». Elle estimait donc que la Société des Nations cc avait seulement assumé une fonction internationale de sur- veillance et de contrôle 1) (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 132). 47. Accepter un mandat dans ces conditions supposait que l'on con- tractait des obligations non seulement morales mais aussi juridiquement contraignantes et, comme corollaire de la mission, ((des garanties pour [son] accomplissement 1) étaient prévues (art. 22, par. 7) sous forme d'une obligation juridique de rendre compte de la manière dont on s'en acquit- tait: (( 7. Dans tous les cas le Mandataire doit envoyer au Conseil un rapport annuel concernant les territoires dont il a la charge. )) 48. Une autre garantie de l'accomplissement de la mission était prévue au paragraphe 9 de l'article 22: a9. Une commission permanente sera chargée de recevoir et d'examiner les rapports annuels des mandataires et de donner au Conseil son avis sur toutes questions relatives à l'exécution des mandats. 11 La réponse à la question essentielle quis custodiet ipsos custodes? était donc que les mandataires étaient tenus de rendre compte à des organismes
organs. An additional measure of supervision was introduced by a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, adopted on 31 Jan- uary 1923. Under this resolution the mandatory Governments were to transmit to the League petitions from communities or sections of the populations of mandated territories. 49. Paragraph 8 of Article 22 of the Covenant gave the following directive : "8. The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercjsed by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council." In pursuance of this directive, a Mandate for German South West Africa was drawn up which defined the terms of the Mandatory's administration in seven articles. Of these, Article 6 made explicit the obligation of the Mandatory under paragraph 7 of Article 22 of the Covenant by providing that "The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumea under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5" of the Mandate. As the Court said in 1950: "the Mandatory was to observe a number of obligations, and the Council of the League was to supervise the administration and see to it that these obligations were fulfilled" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 132). In sum the relevant provisions of the Covenant and those of the Mandate itself preclude any doubt as to the establishment of definite legal obligations designed for the attainment of the object and purpose of the Mandate. 50. As indicated in paragraph 45 above, the Government of South Africa has dwelt at some length on the negotiations which preceded the adoption of the final version of Article 22 of the League Covenant, and has suggested that they lead to a different reading of its provisions. It is true that as that Government points out, there had been a strong tendency to annex former enemy colonial territories. Be that as it may, the final outcome of the negotiations, however difficult of achievement, was a rejection of the notion of annexation. It cannot tenably be argued that the clear meaning of the mandate institution could be ignored by placing upon the explicit provisions embodying its principles a construction at variance with its object and purpose. 51. Events subsequent to the adoption of the instruments in question should also be considered. The Allied and Associated Powers, in their Reply to Observations of the German Delegation, referred in 1919 to "the mandatory Powers, which in so far as they rnay be appointed trustees by the League of Nations will derive no benefit from such trusteeship". As to the Mandate for South West Africa, its preamble
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 30 internationaux. Une résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations adoptée le 3 1 janvier 1923 a introduit une mesure de surveillance supplé- mentaire. En vertu de cette résolution, les gouvernements mandataires devaient transmettre à la Société les pétitions de communautés ou d'éléments de la population des territoires sous mandat. 49. L'article 22, paragraphe 8, du Pacte contenait la directive suivante: (18. Si le degré d'autorité, de contrôle ou d'administration à exercer par le Mandataire n'a pas fait l'objet d'une convention antérieure entre les Membres de la Société, il sera expressément statué sur ces points par le Conseil. 1) Conformément à cette directive, il a été établi un mandat pour le Sud- Ouest africain allemand qui définissait en sept articles les conditions de l'administration du territoire par le mandataire. L'article 6 précisait l'obligation qui incombait au mandataire en vertu de l'article 22, para- graphe 7, du Pacte; il stipulait que celui-ci devait (1 envoyer au Conseil dela Société des Nations un rapport annuel satisfaisant le Conseil et contenant toute information intéressant le territoire et indiquant les mesures prises pour assurer les engagements pris suivant les articles 2, 3, 4 et 5 )) du mandat. Ainsi que la Cour l'a dit en 1950: 11 le mandataire était tenu de respecter un certain nombre d'obligations, et le Conseil de la Société des Nations devait surveiller l'administration et veiller à ce que ces obli- gations fussent rspectées » (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 132). En bref, les dispositions pertinentes du Pacte et celles du mandat lui-même ne laissent subsister aucun doute quant à la création d'obligations juridiques précises visant à atteindre le but et l'objet du mandat. 50. Comme il est indiqué au paragraphe 45 ci-dessus, le Gouvernement sud-africain s'est étendu assez longuement sur les négociations qui ont précédé l'adoption de la version définitive de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et a soutenu qu'on pouvait en tirer une interprétation différente de cette disposition. 11 est vrai, comme ce gouvernement le fait observer, qu'il y avait eu une tendance marquée à l'annexion des anciens territoires coloniaux ennemis. Quoi qu'il en soit, le résultat final de ces négociations - même s'il n'a pas été obtenu sans mal - a été le rejet de l'idée d'annexion. Prétendre qu'on peut méconnaître le sens évident de l'institution des mandats, en donnant aux dispositions explicites qui en expriment les principes une interprétation contraire à son but et à son objet, est une thèse insoutenable. 51. Il faut aussi tenir compte des événements qui ont suivi l'adoption des instruments en question. Les Puissances.alliées et associées, dans leur Réponse aux remarques de la délégation allemande sur les conditions de paix, se sont référées en 1919 aux K Puissances mandataires qui, étant constituées fidéicommissaires par la Société des Nations, ne tireront aucun bénéfice de ce fidéicommis )). Le mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain
recited that "His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of the Union of South Africa, has agreed to accept the Mandate in respect of the said territory and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations". 52. Furthermore, the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to al1 of them. The concept of the sacred trust was confirmed and expanded to al1 "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government" (Art. 73). Thus it clearly embraced territories under a colonial régime. Obviously the sacred trust continued to apply to League of Nations mandated territories on which an international status had been conferred earlier. A further important stage in this development was the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), which embraces al1 peoples and territories which "have not yet attained independence". Nor is it possible to leave out of account the political history of mandated territories in general. Al1 those which did not acquire independence, excluding Namibia, were placed under trusteeship. Today, only two out of fifteen, excluding Namibia, remain under United Nations tutelage. This is but a manifestation of the general development which has led to the birth of so many new States. 53. All these considerations are germane to the Court's evaluation of the present case. Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant-"the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and "the well-being and development" of the peoples concerned-were not static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the "sacred trust". The parties to the Covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an inter- national instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the frame- work of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation. In the domain to which the present proceedings relate, the last fifty years, as indicated above, have brought important developments. These developments leave little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples con- cerned. In this domain; as elsewhere, the corpus iuris gentium has been
précisait d'autre part dans son préambule: ((Sa Majesté britannique, agissant pour le Gouvernement de l'Union de l'Afrique du Sud, et en son nom, s'est engagée à accepter le mandat sur ledit territoire et a entrepris de l'exercer au nom de la Société des Nations )). 52. En outre l'évolutjon ultérieure du droit international à l'égard des territoires non autonomes, tel qu'il est consacré par la Charte des Nations Unies, a fait de l'autodétermination un principe applicable à tous ces territoires. La notion de mission sacrée a été confirmée et étendue à tous les ((territoires dont les populations ne s'administrent pas encore com- plètement elles-mêmes 1) (art. 73). JI est clair que ces termes visaient les territoires sous régime colonial. Manifestement la mission sacrée con- tinuait à s'appliquer aux territoires placés sous le mandat de la Société des Nations auxquels un statut international avait été conféré anté- rieurement. Une autre étape importante de cette évolution a été la déclaration sur l'octroi de I'indépendance aux pays et aux peuples colo- niaux (résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale en date du 14 décem- bre 1960) applicable à tous les peuples et à tous les territoires ((qui n'ont pas encore accédé à l'indépendance 11. De même, il est impossible de négliger l'histoire politique des territoires sous mandat en général. Tous ceux qui n'ont pas accédé à I'indépendance, à l'exception de la Namibie, ont été placés sous tutelle. Aujourd'hui sur quinze de ces territoires, non compris la Namibie, deux seulement sont encore sous la tutelle des Nations Unies. Ce n'est là au'une manifestation de l'évolution pénérale u qui a conduit à la naissance de maints nouveaux Etats. 53. Toutes ces considérations se rattachent à la manière dont la Cour envisage la présente affaire. Sans oublier la nécessité primordiale d'in- terpréter un instrument donné conformément aux intentions qu'ont eues les-parties lors de sa conclusion, la Cour doit tenir compte-de ce que les notions consacrées par l'article 22 du Pacte - 11 les conditions parti- culièrement difficiles du monde moderne » et a le bien-être et le dévelou- pement )) des peuples intéressés - n'étaient pas statiques mais par défi- nition évolutives et qu'il en allait de même par suite de la notion de ((mission sacrée de civilisation ». On doit donc admettre que les parties au Pacte les ont acceptées comme telles. C'est pourquoi, quand elle envisage les institutions de 1919, la Cour doit prendre en consiciération les transformations survenues dans le demi-siècle qui a suivi et son inter- prétation ne peut manquer de tenir compte de l'évolution que le droit a ultérieurement connue grâce à la Charte des Nations Unies et à la coutume. De plus, tout instrument international doit être interprété et appliqué dans le cadre de l'ensemble du système juridique en vigueur au moment où l'interprétation a lieu. Dans le domaine auquel se rattache la présente procédure, les cinquante dernières années ont marqué, comme il est dit plus haut, une évolution importante. Du fait de cette évolution il n'y a guère de doute que la ((mission sacrée de civilisation » avait pour objectif ultime l'autodétermination et I'indépendance des peuples en cause. Dans ce domaine comme dans les autres, le corpus juris gentium
considerably enriched, and this the Court, if it is faithfully to discharge its functions, may not ignore. 54. In the light of t5e foregoing, the Court is unable to accept any construction which would attach to "C" mandates an object and purpose different from those of "A" or "B" mandates. The only differences were those appearing from the language of Article 22 of the Covenant, and from the particular mandate instruments, but the objective and safeguards remained the same, with no exceptions such as considerations of geo- graphical contiguity. To hold otherwise would mean that territories under "Cm mandate belonged to the family of mandates only in name, being in fact the objects of disguised cessions, as if the affirmation that they could "be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory" (Art. 22, para. 6) conferred upon the administering Power a special title not vested in States entrusted with "A" or "B" mandates. The Court would recall in this respect what was stated in the 1962 Judgment in the South West Africa cases as applying to al1 categories of mandate: "The rights of the Mandatory in relation to the mandated territory and the inhabitants have their foundation in the obligations of the Mandatory and they are, so to speak, mere tools given to enable it to fulfil its obligations." (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 329.) 55. The Court will now turn to the situation which arose on the demise of the League and with the birth of the United Nations. As already recalled, the League of Nations was the international organization entrusted with the exercise of the supervisory functions of the Mandate. Those functions were an indispensable element of the Mandate. But that does not mean that the mandates institution was to collapse with the disappearance of the original supervisory machinery. To the question whether the continuance of a mandate was inseparably linked with the existence of the League, the answer must be that an institution established for the fulfilment of a sacred trust cannot be presumed to lapse before the achievement of its purpose. The responsibilities of both mandatory and supervisor resulting from the mandates institution were complemen- tary, and the disappearance of one or the other could not affect the survival of the institution. That is why, in 1950, the Court remarked, in connection with the obligations corresponding to the sacred trust: "Their raison d'être and original object remain. Since their fulfilment did not depend on the existence of the League of Nations, they could not be brought to an end merely because this supervisory
s'est beaucoup enrichi et, pour pouvoir s'acquitter fidèlement de ses fonctions, la Cour ne peut l'ignorer. 54. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la Cour ne saurait faire sienne une interprétation qui attribuerait aux mandats C un objet et un but différents de ceux des mandats A ou B. Les seules différences sont celles qui ressortent du libellé de l'article 22 du Pacte et des instruments de mandat pertinents, mais l'objectif et les garanties sont les mêmes, aucune exception n'étant faite notamment pour des raisons de conti- guïté géographique. Soutenir le contraire signifierait que les territoires sous mandat C n'appartenaient que de nom à la famille des mandats et n'étaient en fait que l'objet de cessions déguisées, comme si, en affir- mant qu'ils ne sauraient ((être mieux administrés que sous les lois du Mandataire, comme une partie intégrante de son territoire)) (art. 22, par. 6), on avait conféré à la puissance administrante un titre spécial qui n'était pas accordé aux Etats auxquels des mandats A ou B avaient été confiés. La Cour rappellera à ce sujet une observation qu'elle a faite dans son arrêt de 1962 sur les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain et qui s'applique à toutes les catégories de mandats: (i Les droits du Mandataire concernant le territoire sous Mandat et ses habitants se fondent sur les obligations du Mandataire et ils ne sont, pour ainsi dire, que de simples instruments lui permettant de remplir ses obligations. 1) (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 329.) 55. La Cour en vient maintenant à la situation créée par la disparition de la Société des Nations et la naissance des Nations Unies. On a vu plus haut que la Société des Nations était l'organisation internationale chargée d'exercer les fonctions de surveillance à l'égard des mandats. Ces fonctions étaient un élément essentiel du système des mandats. Cela ne signifie pourtant pas que I'institution des mandats devait nécessaire- ment prendre fin lorsque disparaîtrait le mécanisme originel de surveil- lance. A la question de savoir si le maintien du mandat était inséparable- ment lié à l'existence de la Société des Nations, il faut répondre que l'on ne saurait présumer la caducité d'une institution établie en vue d'accom- plir une mission sacrée tant que son objectif n'a pas été atteint. Les res- ponsabilités du mandataire et de l'autorité de surveillance dans I'insti- tution des mandats étaient complémentaires et la disparition de l'un ou de l'autre ne pouvait affecter la survivance de l'institution. C'est pour cette raison qu'en 1950 la Cour a déclaré, à propos des obligations décou- lant de la mission sacrée: (i A tous égards leur raison d'être et leur objet primitif demeurent. Comme leur exécution ne dépendait pas de I'existence de la Société des Nations, ces obligations ne pouvaient devenir caduques pour
organ ceased to exist. Nor could the right of the population to have the Territory adrninistered in accordance with these rules depend thereon." (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 133.) In the particular case, specific provisions were made and decisions taken for the transfer of functions from the organization which was to be wound up to that which came into being. 56. Within the framework of the United Nations an international trusteeship system was established and it was clearly contemplated that rnandated territories considered as not yet ready for independence would be converted into trust territories under the United Nations international trusteeship system. This system established a wider and more effective international supervision than had been the case under the mandates of the League of Nations. 57. It would have been contrary to the overriding purpose of the mandates system to assume that difficulties in the way of the replacement of one régime by another designed to irnprove international supervision should have been permitted to bring about, on the dissolution of the League, a complete disappearance of international supervision. To accept the contention of the Government of South Africa on this point would have entailed the reversion of mandated territories to colonial status, and the virtual replacement of the mandates régime by annexation, so determinedly excluded in 1920. 58. These compelling considerations brought about the insertion in the Charter of the United Nations of the safeguarding clause contained in Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which reads as follows: ''1. Except as rnay be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79 and 8 1, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any rnanner the rights whatsoever of any States or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations rnay respectively be parties." 59. A striking feature of this provision is the stipulation in favour of the preservation of the rights of "any peoples", thus clearly including the inhabitants of the mandated territories and, in particular, their indigenous populations. These rights were thus confirmed to have an existence independent of that of the League of Nations. The Court, in the 1950 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South- West Africa, relied on this provision to reach the conclusion that "no such rights of the peoples could be effectively safeguarded without inter-
la seule raison que cet organe de surveillance avait cessé d'exister. Le droit de la population de voir le Territoire administré conformé- ment à ces règles ne pouvait pas non plus en dépendre. )) (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 133.) Dans ce cas particulier, des dispositions spéciales ont été élaborées et des décisions ont été prises en vue de transférer les fonctions de l'or- ganisation qui devait être dissoute à celle qui prenait naissance. 56. Lorsqu'on a créé dans le cadre des Nations Unies un régime inter- national de tutelle, on a manifestement envisagé que les territoires sous mandat que l'on ne considérait pas encore mûrs pour l'indépendance seraient placés sous le régime international de tutelle des Nations Unies. Ce régime comportait une surveillance internationale plus large et plus efficace que celle des mandats de la Société des Nations. 57. 11 eût été contraire au but primordial du système des mandats d'admettre que les difficultés dues au rempiacement d'un régime par un autre régime destiné à améliorer la surveillance internationale puissent entraîner, à la dissolution de la Société des Nations, la disparition de toute surveillance internationale. Accepter la thèse du Gouvernement sud-africain sur ce point aurait abouti au retour des territoires sous man- dat au statut colonial et au remplacement virtuel du système des man- dats par l'annexion, solution qui avait été résolument écartée en 1920. 58. Ce sont ces raisons décisives qui ont .déterminé l'introduction dans la Charte des Nations Unies de la clause de sauvegarde que cons- titue l'article 80, paragraphe 1, de la Charte: (( 1. A l'exception de ce qui peut être convenu dans les accords particuliers de tutelle conclus conformément aux articles 77, 79 et 81 et plaçant chaque territoire sous le régime de tutelle, et jusqu'à ce que ces accords aient été conclus, aucune disposition du présent chapitre ne sera interprétée comme modifiant directement ou in- directement en aucune manière les droits quelconques d'aucun Etat ou d'aucun peuple ou les dispositions d'actes internationaux en vigueur auxquels des Membres de l'organisation peuvent être parties. )) 59. L'un des traits notables de cette disposition est la stipulation con- cernant le maintien des droits des peuples, qui s'applique sans conteste aux habitants des territoires sous mandat et en particulier aux populations autochtones. C'est là confirmer que ces droits possèdent une existence indépendante de celle de la Société des Nations. Dans son avis consultatif de 1950 sur le Statut international du Sud-Ouest africain, la Cour s'est fondée sur cette disposition pour conclure que I( ces droits des peuples ne sauraient être efficacement garantis sans contrôle international et sans
34 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) national supervision and a duty to render reports to a supervisory organ" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 137). In 1956 the Court confirmed the conclusion that "the effect of Article 80 (1) of the Charter" was that of "preserving the rights of States and peoples" (I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 27). 60. Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter was thus interpreted by the Court as providing that the system of replacement of mandates by trusteeship agreements, resulting from Chapter XII of the Charter, shall not "be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights what- soever of any States or any peoples". 61. The exception made in the initial words of the provision, "Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79 and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded", established a particular method for changing the status quo of a mandate régime. This could be achieved only by means of a trusteeship agreement, unless the "sacred trust" had come to an end by the implementation of its objective, that is, the attainment of independent existence. In this way, by the use of the expression "until such agreements have been concluded", a legal hiatus between the two systems was obviated. 62. The final words of Article 80, paragraph 1, refer to "the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectiveiy be parties". The records of the San Francisco Conference show that these words were inserted in replacement of the words "any mandate" in an earlier draft in order to preserve "any rights set forth in paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations". 63. In approving this amendment and inserting these words in the report of Cornmittee 1114, the States participating at the San Francisco Conference obviously took into account the fact that the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations would render the disappearance of the League of Nations inevitable. This shows the common understanding and intention at San Francisco that Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter had the purpose and effect of keeping in force al1 rights whatsoever, including those contained in the Covenant itself, against any claim as to their possible lapse with the dissolution of the League. 64. The demise of the League could thus not be considered as an unexpected supervening event entailing a possible termination of those rights, entirely alien to Chapter XII of the Charter and not foreseen by the safeguarding provisions of Article 80, paragraph 1. The Members of the League, upon effecting the dissolution of that organization, did not declare, or accept even by implication, that the mandates v~ould be cancelled or lapse with the dissolution of the League. On the contrary,
l'obligation de soumettre des rapports à un organe de contrôle » (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 137). En 1956, la Cour a confirmé la conclusion d'après laquelle (( l'effet de l'article 80, paragraphe 1, de la Charte ... garantit les droits [des] Etats et [des] peuples )) (C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 27). 60. Ainsi, selon l'interprétation de la Cour, l'article 80, paragraphe 1, de la Charte disposait que l'opération de remplacement des mandats par des accords de tutelle, en vertu du chapitre XII de la Charte, ne devait pas être ((interprétée comme modifiant directement ou indirecte- ment en aucune manière les droits quelconques d'aucun Etat ou d'aucun peuple )). 61. Le début du paragraphe I précisait la méthode par laquelle le statu quo en matière de mandat pouvait être modifié (( A l'exception de ce qui peut être convenu dans les accords particuliers de tutelle conclus conformément aux articles 77, 79 et 81 et plaçant chaque territoire sous le régime de tutelle, et jusqu'à ce que des accords aient été conclus ». La transformation ne pouvait s'effectuer qu'au moyen d'un accord de tutelle, à moins que la (1 mission sacrée )) ne soit arrivée à son terme par suite de la réalisation de l'objectif auquel elle répondait: l'accession à l'indépendance. En employant la formule ajusqu'à ce que ces accords aient été conclus », on évitait toute solution de continuité juridique entre les deux régimes. 62. A la fin de l'article 80, paragraphe 1, il est fait mention des (( dis- positions d'actes internationaux en vigueur auxquels des Membres de l'organisation peuvent être parties 1). Les documents officiels de la con- férence de San Francisco montrent que cette formule a été introduite à la place des mots (( d'un mandat quelconque )), qui figuraient dans un texte antérieur, afin de préserver (t les droits stipulés au paragraphe 4 de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations )). 63. Si les Etats participant à la conférence de San Francisco ont ap- prouvé cet amendement et introduit cette précision dans le rapport du comité 4 de la Commission II, c'est manifestement parce qu'ils consi- déraient que l'adoption de la Charte des Nations Unies rendrait inéluc- table la disparition de la Société des Nations. Cela montre que, selon l'interprétation et l'intention des participants à la conférence de San Francisco, l'article 80, paragraphe 1, de la Charte avait pour but et pour effet de maintenir en vigueur tous les droits, quels qu'ils soient, y compris les droits stipulés dans le Pacte lui-même, pour qu'on ne puisse pas pré- tendre que la dissolution de la Société des Nations les avait rendus caducs. 64. La disparition de la SdN ne saurait donc être considérée comme un événement fortuit entraînant une éventuelle extinction de ces droits, événement entièrement étranger au chapitre XII de la Charte et que n'auraient pas prévu les dispositions de sauvegarde de l'article 80, para- graphe 1. Lorsque les Membres de la Sociétk des Nations ont dissout l'organisation, ils n'ont ni déclaré ni accepté, même implicitement, que cette dissolution entraînerait l'abrogation ou la caducité des mandats. Au
35 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) paragraph 4 of the resolution on mandates of 18 April 1946 clearly assumed their continuation. 65. The Government of South Africa, in asking the Court to reappraise the 1950 Advisory Opinion, has argued that Article 80, paragraph 1, must be interpreted as a mere saving clause having a purely negative effect. 66. If Article 80, paragraph 1, were to be understood as a mere inter- pretative provision preventing the operation of Chapter XII from affecting any rights, then it would be deprived of al1 practical effect. There is nothing in Chapter XII-which, as interpreted by the Court in 1950, constitutes a framework for future agreements-susceptible of affecting existing rights of States or of peoples under the mandates system. Likewise, if paragraph 1 of Article 80 were to be understood as a mere saving clause, paragraph 2 of the same Article would have no purpose. This paragraph provides as follows: "2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and con- clusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77." This provision was obviously intended to prevent a mandatory Power from invoking the preservation of its rights resulting from paragraph 1 as a ground for delaying or postponing what the Court described as "the normal course indicated by the Charter, namely, conclude Trustee- ship Agreements" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 140). No method of inter- pretation would warrant the conclusion that Article 80 as a whole is meaningless. 67. In considering whether negative effects only may be attributed to Article 80, paragraph 1, as contended by South Africa, account must be taken of the words at the end of Article 76 (d) of the Charter, which, as one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system, ensures equal treatment in commercial matters for al1 Members of the United Nations and their nationals. The proviso "subject to the provisions of Article 80" was included at the San Francisco Conference in order to preserve the existing right of preference of the mandatory Powers in "CM mandates. The delegate of the Union of South Africa at the Conference had pointed out earlier that "the 'open door' had not previously applied to the 'C' mandates", adding that "his Government could not contemplate its application to their mandated territory". If Article 80, paragraph 1, had no conservatory and positive effects, and if the rights therein preserved could have been extinguished with the disappearance of the League of Nations, then the proviso in Article 76 (d) infine would be deprived of any practical meaiiing.
contraire, le paragraphe 4 de la résolution du 18 avril 1946 sur les man- dats suppose nettement leur maintien en vigueur. 65. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a demandé à la Cour de reconsi- dérer son avis consultatif de 1950 et soutenu à ce propos que I'article 80, paragraphe 1, devait être interprété comme une simple clause de sauve- garde ayant un effet purement négatif. 66. Si l'on devait voir dans I'article 80, paragraphe 1, une simple dis- position interprétative empêchant que l'application du chapitre XII ne porte atteinte à des droits, ce paragraphe serait dépourvu de toute portée pratique. Rien dans le chapitre XII - qui, selon l'interprétation donnée par la Cour en 1950, est un cadre pour des accords de tutelle à venir - ne peut affecter les droits que des Etats ou des peuples tiennent du système des mandats. De plus, si l'on devait considérer l'article 80, paragraphe 1, comme une simple clause de sauvegarde, le paragraphe 2 de cet article serait sans objet. Ce paragraphe dispose: (( 2. Le paragraphe 1 du présent article ne doit pas être interprété comme motivant un retard ou un ajournement de la négociation et de la conclusion d'accords destinés à placer sous le régime de tutelle des territoires sous mandat ou d'autres territoires ainsi qu'il est prévu à I'article 77. )) Cette disposition visait manifestement à empêcher une puissance man- dataire d'invoquer le maintien de ses droits en vertu du paragraphe 1 pour retarder ou ajourner le moment de prendre ce que la Cour a appelé ((la voie normale tracée par la Charte, c'est-à-dire: conclure des Accords de Tutelle )J (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 140). Aucune méthode d'interprétation n'autorise à conclure que l'article 80 n'ait dans son ensemble aucune signification. 67. Quand on se demande si l'on ne peut attribuer à I'article 80, para- graphe 1, qu'un effet purement négatif, ainsi que le soutient l'Afrique du Sud, il faut tenir compte des derniers mots de I'article 76, alinéa d), de la Charte, qui visent à assurer, comme une des fins essentielles du régime de tutelle, l'égalité de traitement dans le domaine commercial à tous les Membres de l'Organisation et à leurs ressortissants. La clause ((sous réserve des dispositions de I'article 80 )) a été introduite à la con- férence de San Francisco pour préserver le droit de préférence que pos- sédaient les puissances mandataires dans les territoires placés sous man- dat C. Le représentant de l'Union sud-africaine à la conférence avait fait observer que (( la ((porte ouverte )l n'était pas applicable, auparavant, aux mandats CD, ajoutant que ((son gouvernement n'en envisageait pas I'ap- plication au territoire placé sous son mandat ». Si I'article 80, paragraphe 1, n'avait pas eu d'effet conservatoire et positif et si les droits qu'il main- tenait avaient pu s'éteindre à la disparition de la Société des Nations, le dernier membre de phrase de l'article 76, alinéa d), aurait été dépourvu de toute signification pratique.
36 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) 68. The Government of South Africa has invoked as "new facts" not fully before the Court in 1950 a proposa1 introduced by the Chinese delegation at the final Assembly of the League of Nations and another submitted by the Executive Committee to the United Nations Preparatory Commission, both providing in explicit terms for the transfer of super- visory functions over mandates from the League of Nations to United Nations organs. It is argued that, since neither of these two proposals was adopted, no such transfer was envisaged. 69. The Court is unable to accept the argument advanced. The fact that a particular proposa1 is not adopted by an international organ does not necessarily carry with it the inference that a collective pronouncement is made in a sense opposite to that proposed. There can be many rea- sons determining rejection or non-approval. For instance, the Chinese proposal, which was never considered but was ruled out of order, would have subjected mandated territories to a form of supervision which went beyond the scope of the existing supervisory authority in respect of mandates, and could have raised difficulties with respect to Article 82 of the Charter. As to the establishment of a Temporary Trusteeship Com- mittee, it was opposed because it was felt that the setting up of such an organ might delay the negotiation and conclusion of trusteeship agree- ments. Consequently two United States proposals, intended to authorize this Committee to undertake the functions previously performed by the Mandates Commission, could not be acted upon. The non-establishment of a temporary subsidiary body empowered tiassist the General Assembly in the exercise of its supervisory functions over mandates cannot be interpreted as implying that the General Assembly lacked competence or could not itself exercise its functions in that field. On the contrary, the general assumption appeared to be that the supervisory functions over mandates previously performed by the League were to be exercised by the United Nations. Thus, in the discussions concerning the proposed setting-up of the Temporary Trusteeship Committee, no observation was made to the effect that the League's supervisory functions had not been transferred to the United Nations. Tndeed, the South African representative at the United Nations Preparatory Commission declared on 29 November 1945 that "it seemed reasonîble to create an interim body as the Mandates Commission was now in abeyance and countries holding mandates should have a body to which they could report". 70. The Government of South Africa has further contended that the provision in Article 80, paragraph 1, that the terms of "existing inter- national instruments" shall not be construed as altered by anything in Chapter XII of the Charter, cannot justify the conclusion that the duty to report under the Mandate was transferred from the Council of the
68. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a invoqué en tant que ((faits nou- veaux » dont la Cour n'aurait paseupleinement connaissance en 1950 une proposition de la délégation chinoise, présentée à la dernière Assemblée de la Société des Nations, ainsi qu'une autre proposition soumise par le Comité exécutif à la Commission préparatoire des Nations Unies, qui toutes deux prévoyaient expressément le transfert à des organes des Nations Unies des fonctions de surveillance de la SdN relatives aux man- dats. II a fait valoir que, ni l'une ni l'autre de ces propositions n'ayant été adoptée, aucun transfert de ce genre n'a été envisagé. 69. La Cour ne peut accepter cette argumentation. Le fait que telle ou telle proposition n'ait pas été adoptée par un organe international n'implique pas nécessairement qu'une décision collective inverse ait été prise. Le rejet ou la non-approbation d'une proposition peut tenir à de nombreux motifs. Par exemple, la proposition chinoise, qui n'a jamais été examinée et a été considérée comme irrecevable, aurait eu pour effet d'assujettir les territoires sous mandat à un mode de surveillance allant au-delà des pouvoirs de surveillance applicables aux mandats et elle aurait pu soulever des difficultés au sujet de l'article 82 de la Charte. Quant à la proposition tendant à constituer un comité temporaire de tutelle, elle a été repoussée parce qu'on estimait que la création d'un tel organe aurait risqué de retarder la négociation et la conclusion d'accords de tutelle. En conséquence deux propositions des Etats-Unis visant à auto- riser ce comité à assumer les fonctions exercées jusque-là par la Commis- sion permanente des mandats sont restées sans suite. On ne saurait con- sidérer que le fait de ne pas créer un organe subsidiaire temporaire chargé d'aider l'Assemblée générale dans l'exercice de ses fonctions de surveil- lance à l'égard des mandats implique que l'Assemblée générale n'avait pas compétence ou ne pouvait exercer elle-même ses fonctions pro- pres dans ce domaine. On semble avoir supposé au contraire que les fonctions de surveillance sur les mandats, auparavant assumées par la Société des Nations, seraient exercées par l'organisation des Nations Unies. C'est ainsi que, dans les débats sur la proposition concernant la création du comité temporaire de tutelle, personne n'a signalé que les fonctions de surveillance de la Société des Nations n'avaient pas été trans- férées à l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Qui plus est, le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud à la Commission préparatoire des Nations Unies a déclaré le 29 novembre 1945 : (( il semble raisonnable de créer un organis- me provisoire puisque la Commission des mandats est en sommeil et que les pays mandataires devraient avoir un organisme auquel ils puissent soumettre leur rapport ». 70. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a soutenu d'autre part que l'article 80, paragraphe 1, qui prévoit qu'aucune disposition du chapitre XII de la Charte ne sera interprétée comme modifiant les dispositions ((d'actes internationaux en vigueur )), ne saurait autoriser à conclure que, par suite d'un transfert, l'obligation de faire rapport au Conseil de la Société des
League to the United Nations. 71. This objection fails to take into consideration Article 10 in Chapter IV of the Charter, a provision which was relied upon in the 1950 Opinion to justify the transference of supervisory powers from the League Council to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Court then said: "The competence of the General Assembly of the United Nations to exercise such supervision and to receive and examine reports is derived from the provisions of Article 10 of the Charter, which authorizes the General Assembly to discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter and to make recommenda- tions on these questions or matters to the Members of the United Nations." (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 137.) 72. Since a provision of the Charter-Article 80, paragraph 1-had maintained the obligations of the Mandatory, the United Nations had become the appropriate forum for supervising the fulfilment of those obligations. Thus, by virtue of Article 10 of the Charter, South Africa agreed to submit its administration of South West Africa to the scrutiny of the General Assembly, on the basis of the information furnished by the Mandatory or obtained from other sources. The transfer of the obligation to report, from the League Council to the General Assembly, was merely a corollary of the powers granted to the General Assembly. These powers were in fact exercised by it, as found by the Court in the 1950 Advisory Opinion. The Court rightly concluded in 1950 that- ". . . the General Assembly of the United Nations is legally qualified to exercise the supervisory functions previously exercised by the League of Nations with regard to the administration of the Territory, and that the Union of South Africa is under an obligation to submit to supervision and control of the General Assembly and to render annual reports to it" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 137). In its 1955 Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South- West Afiica, after recalling some passages from the 1950 Advisory Opinion, the Court stated : "Thus, the authority of the General Assembly to exercise super- vision over the administration of South-West A.frica as a mandated Territory is based on the provisions of the Charter." (I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 76.) In the 1956 Advisory Opinion on Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, again after referring to certain passages from the 1950 Advisory Opinion, the Court stated :
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 3 7 Nations imposée par le mandat est due désormais à l'organisation des Nations Unies. 71. Cette objection ne tient pas compte de I'article 10, chapitre IV, de la Charte, sur lequel l'avis de 1950 s'est appuyé pour justifier le trans- fert de fonctions de surveillance du Conseil de la Société des Nations à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. La Cour a déclaré alors: I( La compétence de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies pour exercer un tel contrôle et pour recevoir et examiner des rapports se déduit des termes généraux de l'article 10 de la Charte qui autorise l'Assemblée générale à discuter toutes questions ou affaires rentrant dans le cadre de la Charte et à formuler sur ces questions ou affaires des recommandations aux Membres des Nations Unies. » (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 137.) 72. Dès lors qu'une disposition de la Charte - I'article 80, para- graphe 1 - maintenait les obligations du mandataire, c'est à I'Organi- sation des Nations Unies qu'il incombait de veiller au respect de ces obligations. Par conséquent, en vertu de I'article 10 de la Charte, l'Afrique du Sud a consenti à soumettre son administration du Sud-Ouest africain à l'examen de l'Assemblée générale, sur la base des renseignements four- nis par le mandataire ou obtenus d'autres sources. Le transfert à l'As- semblée générale de l'obligation de faire rapport existant envers le Con- seil de la Société des Nations n'a été qu'un corollaire des pouvoirs dévolus l'Assemblée générale. Celle-ci les a en fait exercés, comme la Cour l'a constaté dans son avis consultatif de 1950. Elle a conclu à juste titre: I< l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies est fondée en droit à exer- cer les fonctions de surveillance qu'exerçait précédemment la Société des Nations en ce qui concerne l'administration du Territoire et ... l'Union sud-africaine a l'obligation de se prêter à la surveillance de l'Assemblée générale et de lui soumettre des rapports annuels 1) (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 137). Dans son avis consultatif de 1955 sur la Procédure de rote applicable aux questions toucl~ant les rapports et pétitions relatifs au Territoire du Sud- Ouest africain, la Cour a dit, après avoir rappelé certains passages de l'avis de 1950 : ((Ainsi, la compétence de l'Assemblée générale pour exercer une surveillance sur l'administration du Sud-Ouest africain en tant que territoire sous mandat est fondée sur les dispositions de la Charte. )l (C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p. 76.) Dans son avis consultatif de 1956 sur l'Admissibilité de l'audition de péti- tionnaires par le Comité du Sud-Ouest africain, s'étant de nouveau référée a certains passages de l'avis de 1950, la Cour s'est exprimée en ces termes:
38 NAMIBIA (S. W. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) "Accordingly, the obligations of the Mandatory continue unim- paired with this difference, that the supervisory functions exercised by the Council of the League of Nations are now to be exercised by the United Nations." (I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 27.) In the same Opinion the Court further stated "... the paramount purpose underlying the taking over by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the supervisory functions in respect of the Mandate for South West Africe formerly exercised by the Council of the League of Nations was to safeguard the sacred trust of civilization through the maintenance of effective international supervision of the administration of the Mandated Territory" (ibid., p. 28). 73. With regard to the intention of the League, it is essential to recall that, at its last session, the Assembly of the League, by a resolution adopted on 12 April 1946, attributed to itself the responsibilities of the Council in the following terms: "The Assembly, with the concurrence of al1 the Members of the Council which are represented at its present session: Decides that, so far as required, it will, during the present session, assume the functions falling within the cornpetence of the Council." Thereupon, before finally dissolving the League, the Assembly on 18 April 1946, adopted a resolution providing as follows for the continuation of the mandates and the mandates system : "The Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Recognises that, on the termination of the League's existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will corne to an end, but notes that Chapters XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League; 4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-bei~g and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory Powers."
((Par consGquent, les obligations du Mandataire subsistent dans toute leur force, avec cette différence que les fonctions de contrôle exercées par le Conseil de la Société des Nations doivent maintenant être exercées par les Nations Unies. )) (C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 27.) Dans le même avis, la Cour a dit en outre: ((l'intention principale qui est à la base de la reprise par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies des fonctions de surveillance à l'égard du Mandat sur le Sud-Ouest africain, précédemment exercées par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, est de sauvegarder la mission sacrée de civilisation, grâce au maintien d'une surveillance inter- nationale effective de l'administration du territoire sous mandat » (ibid., p. 28). 73. En ce qui concerne les intentions de la Société des Nations, il est indispensable de noter qu'à sa dernière réunion l'Assemblée de la Société s'est attribué les responsabilités du Conseil par une résolution du 12 avril 1946 ou l'on peut lire: ((L'Assemblée, avec l'assentiment de tous les membres du Conseil représentés à la présente session, Décide que, pour autant qu'il sera nécessaire, elle assumera, durant la présente session, toutes les fonctions rentrant dans la compétence du Conseil. » En suite de quoi, avant de dissoudre définitivement la Société des Nations, l'Assemblée a adopté le 18 avril 1946 une résolution dont les dispositions citées ci-après prévoyaient la continuation des mandats et dii système des mandats : (( L'Assemblée .. 3. Reconnaît que la dissolution de la Société des Nations mettra fin à ses fonctions en ce qui concerne les territoires sous mandat, mais note que des principes correspondant à ceux que déclare I'ar- ticle 22 du Pacte sont incorporés dans les chapitres XI, XII et XII1 de la Charte des Nations Unies; 4. Note que les Membres de la Société administrant actuellement des territoires sous mandat ont exorimé leur intention de continuer à les administrer, en vue du bien-être et du développement des peuples intéressés, conformément aux obligations contenues dans les divers mandats, jusqu'à ce que de nouveaux arrangements soient pris entre les Nations Unies et les diverses Puissances mandataires. »
As stated in the Court's 1962 Judgment : " ... the League of Nations in ending its own existence did not terminate the Mandates but . . . definitely intended to continue them by its resolution of 18 April 1946" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 334). 74. That the Mandate had not lapsed was also admitted by the Govern- ment of South Africa on several occasions during the early period of transition, when the United Nations was being formed and the League dissolved. In particular, on 9 April 1946, the representative of South Africa, after announcing his Government's intention to transform South West Africa into an integral part of the Union, declared before the Assembly of the League : "In the meantime, the Union will continue to administer the territory scrupulously in accordance with the obligations of the Mandate, for the advancement and promotion of the interests of the inhabitants, as she has done during the past six years when meetings of the Mandates Commission could not be held. The disappearance of those organs of the League concerned with the supervision of mandates, primarily the Mandates Commission and the League Council, will necessarily preclude complete com- pliance with the letter of the Mandate. The Union Government will nevertheless regard the dissolution of the League as in no way dirninishing its obligations under the Mandate, which it will continue to discharge with the full and proper appreciation ofits responsibil- ities until such time as other arrangements are agreed upon con- cerning the future status of the territory." The Court referred to this statement in its Judgment of 1962, finding that "there could be no clearer recognition on the part of the Government of South Africa of the continuance of its obligations under the Mandate after the dissolution of the League of Nations" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 340). 75. Sirnilar assurances were given on behalf of South Africa in a rnernorandurn transmitted on 17 October 1946 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and in statements to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 4 November and 13 November 1946. Referring to some of these and other assurances the Court stated in 1950: "These declarations constitute recognition by the Union Government of the continuance of its obligations under the Mandate and not a mere indica- tion of the future conduct of that Government." (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 135.) 76. Even before the dissolution of the League, on 22 January 1946, the Government of the Union of South Africa had announced to the General Assembly of the United Nations its intention to ascertain the
Ainsi que la Cour l'a dit dans son arrêt de 1962 ((en mettant fin à sa propre existence, la Société des Nations n'a pas mis fin aux Mandats mais ... elle a certainement entendu les maintenir par sa résolution du 18 avril 1946 )) (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 334). 74. Au début de la période transitoire, lors de la constitution de l'Or- ganisation des Nations Unies et de la dissolution de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement sud-africain a, lui aussi, admis à plusieurs reprises que le mandat n'était pas devenu caduc. En particulier, le 9 avril 1946, après avoir annoncé l'intention de son gouvernement de faire du Sud-Ouest africain une partie intégrante de l'Union, le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a déclaré devant l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations: (( Dans l'intervalle, l'Union sud-africaine continuera à l'administrer en se conformant scrupuleusement aux obligations du Mandat, afin d'assurer le progrès et de sauvegarder les intérêts de ses habitants, comme elle l'a fait pendant les six dernières années durant lesquelles la Commission des mandats n'a DU se réunir. La disparition des organes de la Société des Nations qui s'occupent du contrôle des mandats, à savoir, en premier lieu la Commission des mandats et le Conseil de la Société, empêchera évidemment de se conformer entièrement à la lettre du Mandat. Le Gouvernement de l'Union se fera, cependant, un devoir de considérer que la disparition de la Société des Nations ne diminue en rien les obligations qui découlent du Mandat; il continuera à s'en acquitter en pleine cons- cience et avec le juste sentiment de ses responsabilités, jusqu'au moment oii d'autres arrangements auront été conclus quant au statut futur de ce territoire. )) La Cour a évoqué cette déclaration dans son arrêt de 1962, où elle a constaté que (( Il ne pouvait y avoir de la part du Gouvernement sud-africain de reconnaissance plus claire de la continuation, après la dissolution de la Société des Nations, de ses obligations en vertu du Mandat pour le Sud- Ouest africain )) (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 340). 75. Des assurances analogues ont été données par l'Afrique du Sud dans un mémorandum transmis le 17 octobre 1946 au Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et dans des déclarations faites devant la Quatrième Commission de l'Assemblée générale les 4 et 13 novembre 1946. Se référant à certaines de ces assurances parmi d'autres, la Cour a dit en 1950: c( Ces déclarations constituent la reconnaissance par le Gou- vernement de l'Union de la continuation de ses obligations en vertu du Mandat et non une simple indication quant à la conduite future de ce Gouvernement n (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 135). 76. Dès le 22 janvier 1946, avant même la dissolution de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement de l'Union sud-africaine a fait part à 1'Assem- blée générale des Nations Unies de son intention de donner à la population
40 NAMIBIA (S. W. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) views of the population of South West Africa, stating that "when that had been done, the decision of the Union would be submitted to the General Assembly for judgment". Thereafter, the representative of the Union of South Africa submitted a proposa1 to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946, requesting the approval of the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. On 14 Decem- ber 1946 the General Assembly adopted resolution 65 (1) noting- ". . . wirh satisfaction that the Union of South Africa, by presenting this matter to the United Nations, recognizes the interest and con- Cern of the United Nations in the matter of the future status of ter- ritories now held under mandate" and declared that it was- ". . . unable to accede to the incorporation of the territory of South West Africa in the Union of South Africa". The General Assembly, the resolution went on, "Recommends that the mandated territory of South West Africa be placed under the international trusteeship system and invites the Government of the Union of South Africa to propose for the con- sideration of the General Assembly a trusteeship agreement for the aforesaid Territory." A year later the General Assembly, by resolution 141 (II) of 1 November 1947, took note of the South African Government's decision not to proceed with its plan for the incorporation of the Territory. As the Court stated in 1950: "By thus submitting the question of the future international status of the Territory to the 'judgment' of the General Assembly as the 'competent international organ', the Union Government recognized the competence of the General Assembly in the matter." (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 142.) 77. In the course of the following years South Africa's acts and de- clarations made in the United Nations in regard to South West Africa were characterized by contradictions. Some of these acts and declarations confirmed the recognition of the supervisory authority of the United Nations and South Africa's obligations towards it, while others clearly signified an intention to withdraw such recognition. It was only on 11 July 1949 that the SouthAfricanGovernment addressed to thesecretary- General a letter in which it stated that it could "no longer see that any
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 40 du Sud-Ouest africain l'occasion d'exprimer sa volonté, indiquant: « Quand cette volonté sera connue, I'Union soumettra sa décision au jugement de l'Assemblée générale 1). Par la suite, le représentant de l'Union sud-afri- caine a présenté à l'Assemblée générale, pendant la deuxième partie de sa première session de 1946, une proposition par laquelle il lui demandait d'approuver I'incorporation du Sud-Ouest africain à I'Union sud-afri- caine. L'Assemblée générale a adopté le 14 décembre 1946 la résolution 65 (1), où elle a constaté ((arec satisfaction que l'Union sud-africaine, en soumettant cette question à l'organisation des Nations Unies, reconnaît l'intérêt et le souci que les Nations Unies témoignent pour la question du statut futur des territoires actuellement sous mandat 1) et a déclar2 qu'elle ((ne saurait admettre I'incorporation du territoire du Sud-Ouest africain à l'Union sud-africaine )). Plus loin l'Assemblée générale (( Recommande que le territoire sous mandat du Sud-Ouest africain soit placé sous le régime international de tutelle et invite le Gouver- nement de l'Union sud-africaine à soumettre à l'examen de l'Assem- blée générale un accord de tutelle pour ledit territoire. )) Un an plus tard, par sa résolution 141 (II) du 1" novembre 1947, l'As- semblée générale a pris acte de la décision du Gouvernement sud-africain de ne pas procéder à I'incorporation du territoire. Comme la Cour l'a dit en 1950: (( En soumettant ainsi la question du futur statut international du Territoire au ((jugement 1) de l'Assemblée générale en tant qu' « organe international compétent 11, Ie Gouvernement de I'Union a reconnu la compétence de l'Assemblée générale en la matière. 1) (C.Z.J. Recueil 1950, p. 142.) 77. Au cours des années suivantes, l'Afrique du Sud s'est contredite dans ses actes et ses déclarations aux Nations Unies en ce qui concerne le Sud-Ouest africain. Certains actes et certaines déclarations ont confirmé que l'Afrique du Sud reconnaissait le pouvoir de surveillance des Nations Unies et les obligations qui lui incombaient à Ieur égard alors que d'autres dénotaient une intention de revenir sur cette reconnaissance. Ce n'est que le 1 1 juillet 1949 que le Gouvernement sud-africain a adressé au Secrétaire général une lettre dans laquelle il déclarait qu'il ne pouvait ((plus croire
real benefit is to be derived from the submission of special reports on South West Africa to the United Nations and [had] regretfully come to the conclusion that in the interests of efficient administration no further reports should be forwarded". 78. In the light of the foregoing review, there can be no doubt that, as consistently recognized by this Court, the Mandate survived the demise of the League, and that South Africa admitted as much for a number of years. Thus the supervisory element, an integral part of the Mandate, was bound to survive. and the Mandatorv continued to be accountable for the performance of the sacred trust. ?O restrict the responsibility of the Mandatory to the sphere of conscience or of moral obligation would amount to conferring upon that Power rights to which it was not entitled, and at the same time to depriving the peoples of the Territory of rights which they had been guaranteed. It would mean that the Mandatory would be unilaterally entitled to decide the destiny of the people of South West Afrjca at its discretion. As the Court, referring to its Advisory Opinion of 1950, stated in 1962: "The findings of the Court on the obligation of the Union Govern- ment to submit to international supervision are thus crystal clear. Indeed, to exclude the obligations connected with the Mandate would be to exclude the very essence of the Mandate." (I.C.J. Re- ports 1962, p. 334.) 79. The cogency of this finding is well illustrated by the views present- ed on behalf of South Africa, which, in its final submissions in the South West Africa cases, presented as an alternative submission, "in the event of it being held that the Mandate as such continued in existence despite the dissolution of the League of Nations", ". . . that the Respondent's former obligations under the Mandate to report and account to, and to submit to the supervision, of the Council of the League of Nations, lapsed upon the dissolution of the League, and have not been replaced by any similar obligations rel- ative to supervision by any organ of the United Nations or any other organization or body" (I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 16). The principal submission, however, had been: "That the whole Mandate for South'West Africa lapsed on the dissolution of the League of Nations and that Respondent is, in consequence thereof, no longer subject to any legal obligations there- under." (Ibid.)
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 4 1 que la présentation aux Nations Unies de rapports spéciaux sur le Sud- Ouest africain puisse présenter un avantage réel quelconque et il est arrivé avec regret à la conclusion que, dans l'intérêt d'une administration efficace, aucun rapport ne doit plus être envoyé ». 78. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, il ne fait pas de doute que, comme la Cour l'a invariablement reconnu, le mandat a survécu à la disparition de la Société des Nations et que l'Afrique du Sud l'a admis pendant plu- sieurs années. De ce fait, l'élément de surveillance, qui est une partie intégrante du mandat, devait forcément survivre et le mandataire restait tenu de rendre compte de l'exécution de la mission sacrée. Faire de la resoonsabilité du mandataire une sim~le affaire de conscience ou d'obli- gation morale serait conférer à cette puissance des droits auxquels elle ne saurait prétendre et, en même temps, priver les populations du territoire de droits qui leur ont été garantis. Ce serait donner au mandataire la faculté de décider unilatéralement et à son gré du destin de la population du Sud-Ouest africain. Comnie la Cour, se référant à son avis consultatif de 1950, l'a déclaré en 1962 : 11 Les conclusions de la Cour au sujet de l'obligation du Gouverne- ment de l'Union de se soumettre à une surveillance internationale sont donc parfaitement claires. En fait, exclure les obligations liées au Mandat reviendrait à exclure l'essence même du Mandat. » (C.I. J. Recueil 1962, p. 334.) 79. Le bien-fondé de cette déclaration apparaît à la lecture des thèses présentées par l'Afrique du Sud qui, dans ses conclusions finales dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain, a soutenu subsidiairement, pour le ([cas où l'on estimerait que le Mandat en tant que tel est demeuré en vigueur malgré la dissolution de la Société des Nations )), (( que les obligations incombant antérieurement au défendeur en vertu du Mandat et consistant à faire rapport et à rendre compte au Conseil de la Société des Nations et à se soumettre à la surveillance de ce Conseil ont pris fin lors de la dissolution de la Société et n'ont pas été remplacées par des obligations similaires concernant une surveillance par un organe quelconque des Nations Unies, par toute autre organisation ou par tout autre organisme)) (C.I.J. Recueil 1966, p. 1 6- 1 7). La conclusion principale du défendeur était la suivante: ((Que le Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain dans son ensemble est devenu caduc lors de la dissolution de la Société des Nations et que le défendeur n'est plus en conséquence soumis à aucune des obligations juridiques découlant du Mandat. )) (Ibid., p. 16.)
80. In the present proceedings, at the public Sitting of 15 March 1971, the representative of South Africa sumrned up his Government's position in the following terms: "Our contentions concerning the falling away of supervisory and accountability provisions are, accordingly, absolute and unqualified. On the other hand, our contentions concerning the possible lapse of the Mandate as a whole are secondary and consequential and depend on Our primary contention that the supervision and the accounta- bility provisions fell away on the dissolution of the League. In the present proceedings we accordingly make tlie formal sub- mission that the Mandate has lapsed as a whole by reason of the falling away of supervision by the League, but for the rest we assume that the Mandate still continued . . . . . . on either hypothesis we contend that after dissolution of the League there no longer was any obligation to report and account under the Mandate." He thus placed the emphasis on the "falling-away" of the "supervisory and accountability provisions" and treated "the possible lapse of the Mandate as a whole" as a "secondary and consequential" consideration. 8 1. Thus, by South Africa's own admission, "supervision and account- ability" were of the essence of the Mandate, as the Court had consis- tently maintained. The theory of the lapse of the Mandate on the demise of the League of Nations is in fact inseparable from the claim that there is no obligation to submit to the supervision of the United Nations, and vice versa. Consequently, both or either of the claims advanced, namely that the Mandate has lapsed and/or that there is no obligation to submit to international supervision by the United Nations, are destructive of the very institution upon which the presence of South Africa in Namibia rests, for: "The authority which the Union Government exercises over the Territory is based on the Mandate. If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Government contends, the latter's authority would equally have lapsed. To retain the rights derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified." (Z.C.J. Re- ports 1950, p. 133; cited in Z.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 333.) 82. Of this South Africa would appear to be aware, as is evidenced by its assertion at various times of other titles to justify its continued presence in Namibia, for example before the General Assembly on 5 October 1966:
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 42 80. Au cours de la présente instance, à l'audience publique du 15 mars 1971, le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a résumé comme suit la position de son gouvernement : « Par conséquent, notre argumentation sur l'extinction des clauses concernant la surveillance et l'obligation de rendre compte est absolue et sans réserves. Mais notre argumentation sur la caducité éventuelle du mandat dans son ensemble est secondaire et accessoire; elle est subordonnée à notre thèse essentielle, à savoir que les dispositions du mandat concernant la surveillance et l'obligation de rendre compte ont disparu à la dissolution de la Société des Na- tions. Nous concluons donc formellement dans la présente procédure que le mandat est devenu caduc dans son ensemble en raison de la disparition de la surveillance de la Société des Nations mais, pour le reste, nous considérons qu'il a subsisté ... Nous soutenons néanmoins que, dans l'un et l'autre cas, il n'exis- tait plus, après la disparition de la Société des Nations, aucune obligation de rendre compte ou de faire rapport en vertu du mandat. )) Le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud mettait ainsi l'accent sur (1 I'extinc- tion », ((la disparition )) des clauses concernant la surveillance et I'obli- gation de rendre compte et estimait 11 secondaire et accessoire )) I'argu- mentation portznt sur la ((caducité éventuelle du mandat dans son ensemble )). 81. Ainsi, de l'aveu même de l'Afrique du Sud, ((la surveillance et l'obligation de rendre compte )) étaient des éléments essentiels du mandat, ce que la Cour a toujours affirmé. La thèse selon laquelle le mandat serait devenu caduc à la dissolution de la Société des Nations est en fait insé- parable de l'assertion qu'il n'y a pas d'obligation de se soumettre à la surveillance des Nations Unies. Il en résulte que, ensemble ou séparément, les deux assertions, à savoir que le mandat est devenu caduc et qu'il n'existe aucune obligation de se soumettre à la surveillance internationale des Nations Unies, sont incompatibles avec l'institution même sur laquelle repose la présence de I'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, car ((L'autorité que le Gouvernement de l'union exerce sur le Terri- toire est fondée sur le Mandat. Si le Mandat avait cessé d'exister, comme le prétend le Gouvernement de l'Union, l'autorité de celle-ci aurait également cessé d'exister. Rien ne permet de conserver les droits dérivés du Mandat tout en répudiant les obligations qui en découlent. 1) (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 133 ; cité dans C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 333.) 82. Il semble que l'Afrique du Sud ait conscience de ce qui précède, comme l'atteste le fait qu'à diverses reprises elle a invoqué d'autres titres pour justifier le maintien de sa présence en Namibie. Ainsi elle a dkclaré devant l'Assemblée générale le 5 octobre 1966:
"South Africa has for a long time contended that the Mandate is no longer legally in force, and that South Africa's right to adminis- ter the Territory is not derived from the Mandate but from military conquest, together with South Africa's openly declared and con- sistent practice of continuing to administer the Territory as a sacred trust towards the inhabitants." In the present proceedings the representative of South Africa maintained on 15 March 1971: ". . . if it is accepted that the Mandate has lapsed, the South African Governrnent would have the right to administer the Territory by reason of a combination of factors, being (a) its original conquest; (6) its long occupation; (c) the continuation of the sacred trust basis agreed upon in 1920; and, finally (d) because its administra- tion is to the benefit of the inhabitants of the Territory and is desired by them. In these circumstances the South African Government can- not accept that any State or organization can have a better title to the Territory." 83. These claims of title, which apart from other considerations are inadmissible in regard to a mandated territory, lead by South Africa's own admission to a situation which vitiates the object and purpose of the Mandate. Their significance in the context of the sacred trust has best been revealed by a statement made by the representative of South Africa in the present proceedings on 15 March 1971 : "it is the view of the South African Government that no legal provision prevents its annexing South West Africa." As the Court pointed out in its Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South- West Africa, "the principle of non-annexa- tion" was "considered to be ofparamount importance" when the future of South West Africa and other territories was the subject of decision after the First World War (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 13 1). What was in consequence excluded by Article 22 of the League Covenant is even less acceptable today. 84. Where the United Nations is concerned, the records show that, throughout a period of twenty years, the General Assembly, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Charter, called upon the South African Government to perform its obligations arisjng out of the Mandate. On 9 February 1946 the General Assembly, by resolution 9 (1), invited al1 States administering territories held under mandate to submit trustee- ship agreements. All, with the exception of South Africa, responded by placing the respective territories under the trusteeship system or offering
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 43 c( l'Afrique du Sud soutient depuis longtemps que le Mandat n'est plus en vigueur juridiquement et que le droit que possède l'Afrique du Sud d'administrer le Territoire ne découle pas du Mandat mais de la conquête militaire ainsi que de sa pratique déclarée et constante consistant à poursuivre l'administration du Territoire comme une mission sacrée à l'égard des habitants )). Dans la présente procédure, le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a dit le 15 mars 1971 : (( Le Gouvernement sud-africain estime qu'étant admise la caducité du mandat, il aurait le droit d'administrer le territoire grâce au jeu d'une série de facteurs qui sont a) la conquête initiale, 6) une occupation prolongée, c) le maintien de la mission sacrée confiée et acceptée en 1920, d) le fait que son administration s'exerce au profit des habitants du territoire et qu'elle est voulue par eux. Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement sud-africain ne saurait considérer qu'un Etat ou une organisation puisse avoir un meilleur titre à administrer le territoire. )) 83. Invoquer ces titres qui, toutes autres considérations mises à part, sont inadmissibles s'agissant d'un territoire sous mandat, aboutit à une situation qui, de l'aveu même de l'Afrique du Sud, est contraire à l'objet et au but du mandat. La déclaration suivante du représentant de l'Afrique du Sud, faite le 15 mars 1971 au cours de la présente procédure permettra d'en apprécier tout le sens par rapport à la mission sacrée: « Le Gouvernement sud-africain est d'avis qu'aucune disposition juridi- que ne l'empêche d'annexer le Sud-Ouest africain 1). Comme la Cour l'a fait observer dans son avis consultatif sur le Statut international du Sud- Ouest africain, le principe de la (( non-annexion » a été considéré « comme étant d'importance primordiale 1) au moment où il a fallu se prononcer sur l'avenir du Sud-Ouest africain et d'autres territoires après la première guerre mondiale (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 13 1). Ce que l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations a exclu en conséquence est encore moins acceptable aujourd'hui. 84. Pour ce qui est des Nations Unies, il ressort des documents que, pendant vingt ans, en vertu des pouvoirs que la Charte lui confère, l'Assemblée générale a prié le Gouvernement sud-africain de s'acquitter des obligations découlant du mandat. Le 9 février 1946, par sa résolution 9 (1), l'Assemblée générale a invité tous les Etats qui administraient des territoires en vertu d'un mandat à soumettre des accords de tutelle. La réaction de tous, à l'exception de l'Afrique du Sud, a été de placer les territoires en question sous le régime de tutelle ou de leur offrir I'indé-
them independence. The General Assembly further made a special re- cornmendation to this effect in resolution 65 (1) of 14 December 1946; on 1 November 1947, in resolution 141 (II), it "urged" the Government of the Union of South Africa to propose a trusteeship agreement; by resolution 227 (III) of 26 November 1948 it maintained its earlier re- commendations. A year later, in resolution 337 (IV) of 6 December 1949, it expressed "regret that the Government of the Union of South Africa has withdrawn its previous undertaking to submit reports on its admin- istration of the Territory of South West Africa for the information of the United Nations", reiterated its previous resolutions and invited South Africa "to resume the submission of such reports to the General Assembly". At the same time, in resolution 338 (IV), it addressed spe- cific questions concerning the international status of South West Africa to this Court. In 1950, by resolution 449 (V) of 13 December, it accepted the resultant Advisory Opinion and urged the Government of the Union of South Africa "to take the necessary steps to give effect to the Opinion of the International Court of Justice". By the same resolution, it established a committee "to confer with the Union of South Africa concerning the procedural measures necessary for implementing the Advisory Opinion . . .". In the course of the ensuing negotiations South Africa continued to maintain that neither the United Nations nor any other international organization had succeeded to the supervisory func- tions of the League. The Cornmittee, for its part, presented a proposal closely following the terms of the Mandate and providing for imple- mentation "through the United Nations by a procedure as nearly as possible analogous to that which existed under the League of Nations, thus Providing terms no more extensive or onerous than those which existed before". This procedure would have involved the submission by South Africa of renorts to a General Assemblv committee. which would further set up a special commission to take over the functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. Thus the United Nations, which undoubtedly conducted the negotiations in good faith, did not insist on the conclusion of a trusteeship agreement; it suggested a system of supervision which "should not exceed that which applied under the Mandates System . . .". These proposais were rejected by South Africa, which refused to accept the principle of the supervision of its administration of the Territory by the United Nations. 85. Further fruitless negotiations were held from 1952 to 1959. In total, negotiations extended over a period of thirteen years, from 1946 to 1959. In practice the actual length of negotiations is no test of whether the possibilities of agreement have been exhausted; it may be sufficient to show that an early deadlock was reached and that one side adamantly refused compromise. In the case of Narnibia (South West Africa) this
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 44 pendance. En outre l'Assemblée générale a formulé une recommandation spéciale à cet égard dans sa résolution 65 (1) du 14 décembre 1946; le 1" novembre 1947, par sa résolution 141 (II), elle a ((prié instamment 1) le Gouvernement de l'Union sud-africaine de soumettre à son examen un accord de tutelle; par sa résolution 227 (111) du 26 novembre 1948, elle a maintenu ses recommandations antérieures. Un an plus tard, par sa résolution 337 (IV) du 6 décembre 1949, elle a regrette que le Gouver- nement de l'Union sud-africaine ait retiré sa promesse antérieure ... de présenter des rapports sur son administration du territoire du Sud-Ouest africain, pour information, à l'organisation des Nations Unies », confirmé ses résolutions précédentes et invité l'Afrique du Sud ((à reprendre la présentation de ... rapports à I'Assemblée générale 11. En même temps, elle soumettait à la Cour, par sa résolution 338 (IV), des questions précises au sujet du statut international du Sud-Ouest africain. En 1950, par sa résolution 449 (V) du 13 décembre, I'Assemblée a accepté l'avis consul- tatif que la Cour lui avait donné à la suite de sa demande et elle a (( invité instamment le Gouvernement de l'Union sud-africaine à orendre les ~ - mesures nécessaires pour donner effet à I'avis de la Cour internationale de Justice)). Par la même résolution, I'Assemblée a créé un comité ((chargé de conférer avec l'Union sud-africaine au sujet des mesures de procedure nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre l'avis consultatif ... )I. Au cours des négociations qui ont suivi, I'Afrique du Sud a persisté à soutenir que ni les Nations Unies ni aucune autre organisation internationale n'avaient hérité les fonctions de surveillance de la Société des Nations. Le comité, pour sa part, a présenté une proposition qui suivait de près les termes du mandat et prévoyait une mise en œuvre (1 qui serait assurée par l'intermédiaire de l'organisation des Nations Unies au moyen d'une procédure se rapprochant le plus possible de celle qui était appliquée par la Société des Nations; ainsi les obligations imposées ne seraient ni plus étendues ni plus lourdes que les obligations antérieures 11. Cette procédure aurait comporté l'envoi de rapports par I'Afrique du Sud à une commission de I'Assemblée générale, qui aurait aussi institué un comité spécial chargé de reprendre les fonctions de la Commission permanente des mandats. Ainsi les Nations Unies, qui ont indubita- blement mené les négociations de bonne foi, n'ont pas insisté sur la conclusion d'un accord de tutelle; elles ont suggéré un système de con- trôle qui ne serait pas (( plus étendu que sous le régime des Mandats ». Ces propositions ont été rejetées par l'Afrique du Sud qui a refusé d'accepter le principe de la surveillance des Nations Unies pour son administration du territoire. 85. D'autres négociations infructueuses ont eu lieu de 1952 à 1959. Ainsi les négociations se sont échelonnées sur treize années au total, de 1946 à 1959. En pratique la durée des négociations ne permet pas de savoir si les possibilités d'accord ont été épuisées; il peut être suffisant de montrer qu'on a abouti rapidement à une impasse et que, d'un côté, on s'est fermement refusé à tout compromis. Dans !e cas de la Namibie
stage had patently been reached long before the United Nations finally abandoned its efforts to reach agreement. Even so, for so long as South Africa was the mandatory Power the way was still open for it to seek an arrangement. But that chapter came to an end with the termination of the Mandate. 86. To complete this brief summary of the events preceding the present request for advisory opinion, it must be recalled that in 1955 and 1956 the Court gave at the request of the General Assembly two further ad- visory opinions on matters concerning the Territory. Eventually the General Assembly adopted resolution 2145 (XXI) on the termination of the Mandate for South West Africa. Subsequently the Security Council adopted resolution 276 (1970), which declared the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia to be illegal and called upon States to act accordingly. 87. The Government of France in its written statement and the Government of South Africa throughout the present proceedings have raised the objection that the General Assembly, in adopting resolution 2145 (XXI), acted ultra vires. 88. Before considering this objection, it is necessary for the Court to examine the observations made and the contentions advanced as to whether the Court should go into this question. It was suggested that though the request was not directed to the question of the validity of the General Assembly resolution and of the related Security Council resolu- tions, this did not preclude the Court from making such an enquiry. On the other hand it was contended that the Court was not authorized by the terms of the request, in the light of the discussions preceding it, to go into the validity of these resolutions. It was argued that the Court should not assume powers of judicial review of the action taken by the other principal organs of the United Nations without specific request to that effect, nor act as a court of appeal from their decisions. 89. Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers ofjudicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned. The question of the validity or conformity with the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does not form the subject of the request for advisory opinion. However, in the exercise of its judicial function and since objections have been advanced the Court, in the course of its reasoning, will consider these objections before determining any legal consequences arising from those resolutions. 90. As indicated earlier, with the entry into force of the Charter of the United Nations a relationship was established between al1 Members of the United Nations on the one side, and each mandatory Power on the other. The mandatory Powers while retaining their mandates assumed,
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 45 (Sud-Ouest africain), ce stade a été manifestement atteint bien avant que les Nations Unies abandonnent finalement leurs efforts pour parvenir à un accord. Mais tant que l'Afrique du Sud restait la puissance manda- taire, il lui était toujours loisible de chercher un arrangement. Ce chapitre s'est clos avec la cessation du mandat. 86. Pour achever ce bref résumé des événements qui ont précédé la présente requête pour avis consultatif, il convient de rappeler qu'en 1955 et 1956 la Cour a rendu, à la demande de l'Assemblée générale, deux autres avis consultatifs sur des questions intéressant le territoire. L'Assem- blée générale a finalement adopté la résolution 2145 (XXI) sur la cessation du mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain. Ultérieurement le Conseil de sécurité a pris la résolution 276 (1970) qui déclarait illégale la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie et invitait les Etats à agir en conséquence. 87. Le Gouvernement français, dans son exposé écrit, et le Gouverne- ment sud-africain, tout au long de la procédure en la présente affaire, ont objecté qu'en adoptant la résolution 2 145 (XXI), l'Assemblée générale, avait excédé ses pouvoirs. 88. Avant d'examiner cette objection, la Cour doit considérer les observations et les arguments avancés sur le point de savoir si elle de- vrait aborder la question. On a dit que le fait que la demande d'avis ne portait pas sur la question de la validité de la résolution de l'Assemblée générale ou des résolutions connexes du Conseil de sécurité n'empêchait pas la Cour de procéder à cet examen. On a soutenu d'autre part que, vu les termes de la requête et compte tenu des débats qui l'ont précédée, la Cour n'était pas autorisée à étudier la validité de ces résolutions. On a fait valoir en ce sens que la Cour ne devait pas s'arroger des pouvoirs de contrôle judiciaire quant aux mesures prises par les autres organes principaux des Nations Unies sans y avoir été expressément invitée, ni jouer le rôle d'une cour d'appel à l'égard de leurs décisions. 89. Il est évident que la Cour n'a pas de pouvoirs de contrôle judiciaire ni d'appel en ce qui concerne les décisions prises par les organes des Nations Unies dont il s'agit. Ce n'est pas sur la validité de la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale ou des résolutions connexes du Conseil de sécurité ni sur leur conformité avec la Charte que porte la demande d'avis consultatif. Ce~endant. dans l'exercice de sa fonction judiciaire et puisque des objections ont été formulées, la Cour examinera ces objections dans son exposé des motifs, avant de se prononcer sur les conséquences juridiques découlant de ces résolutions. 90. Ainsi qu'il a été rappelé plus haut, l'entrée en vigueur de la Charte des Nations Unies a instauré un rapport entre tous les Membres des Nations Unies, d'une part, et chacune des puissances mandataires. d'autre part. Tout en conservant leurs mandats. les puissances mandataires
46 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) under Article 80 of the Charter, vis-à-vis al1 United Nations Members, the obligation to keep intact and preserve, until trusteeship agreements were executed, the rights of other States and of the peoples of mandated territories, which resulted from the existing mandate agreements and related instruments, such as Article 22 of the Covenant and the League Council's resolution of 31 'January 1923 concerning petitions. The man- datory Powers also bound themselves to exercise their functions of ad- ministration in conformity with the relevant obligations emanating from the United Nations Charter, which member States have undertaken to fulfil in good faith in al1 their international relations. 91. One of the fundamental principles governing the international relationship thus established is that a party which disowns or does not fulfil its own obligations cannot be recognized as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship. 92. The terms of the preamble and operative part of resolution 2145 (XXI) leave no doubt as to the character of the resolution. In the pre- amble the General Assembly declares itself "Convinced that the admin- istration of the Mandated Territory by South Africa has been conducted in a manner contrary" to the two basic international instruments directly imposing obligations upon South Africa, the Mandate and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Tn another paragraph of the preamble the conclusion is reached that, after having insisted with no avail upon performance for more than twenty years, the moment has arrived for the General Assembly to exercise the right to treat such violation as a ground for termination. 93. In paragraph 3 of the operative part of the resolution the General Assembly "Declares that South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous in- habitants of South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Man- date". Tn paragraph 4 the decision is reached, as a consequence of the previous declaration "that the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa is therefore terminated . . .". (Emphasis added.) It is this part of the resolution which is relevant in the present proceedings. 94. In examining this action of the General Assembly it is appropriate to have regard to the general principles of international law regulating termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach. For even if the mandate is viewed as having the character of an institution, as is maintained, it depends on those international agreements which created the system and regulated its application. As the Court indicated in 1962 "this Mandate, like practically al1 other similar Mandates" was "a special type of instrument composite in nature and instituting a novel inter- national régime. Tt incorporates a definite agreement . . ." (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 331). The Court stated conclusively in that Judgment that the
ont, en vertu de l'article 80 de la Charte, assumé à l'égard de tous les Membres des Nations Unies l'obligation de maintenir intacts et de sauvegarder. jusqu'à ce que des accords de tutelle aient été conclus, les droits des autres Etats et des pop~ilations des territoi~es sous mandat qui découlaient des accords de mandat en vigueur et des instruments connexes, notamment de I'aiticle 22 du Pacte et de la résolution du Conszil de la Société des Nations du 31 janvier 1923 relative aux pétitions. Les puissances mandataires s'engageaient aussi à s'acquitter de lews fonctions d'administration conformément aux obligations que la Charte des Nàtions Unies imposait à cet égard et que les Etats Membres sont tenus de remplir de bonne foi dans toutes leurs relations internationales. 91. L'un des principes fondamentaux régissant le rapport ainsi établi sur le plan international est qu'une partie qui renie ou ne remplit pas ses propres obligations ne saurait être considérée comme conservant les droits qu'elle prétend tirer de ce rapport. 92. Le libellé du préambule et du dispositif de la résolution 2145 (XXI) ne laisse aucun doute sur la nature de cette résolution. Dans le préambule l'Assemblée générale se déclare (1 Conilaincue que l'administration du Territoire sous mandat par l'Afrique du Sud a été assurée d'une manière contraire j) aux deux instruments internationaux fondamentaux imposant directement des obligations à l'Afrique du Sud, le mandat et la Charte des Nations Unies, ainsi qu'à la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme. Dans un autre alinéa du préambule, l'Assemblée générale arrive à la conclusion qu'après avoir insisté en vain pendant plus de vingt ans sur l'exécution le moment est venu pour elle d'exercer son droit de considérer une telle vioiztion comme un motif pour mettre fin au mandat. 93. Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution, l'Assemblée générale (( Déclare que ['Afrique du Sud a failli à ses obligations en ce qui concerne l'administration du Territoire sous mandat, n'a pas assuré le bien-être moral et matériel et la sécurité des autochtones du Sud-Ouest africain et a, en fait, dénoncé le Mandat. 1) Au paragraphe 4, elle décide, comme suite à la déclaration qi!i précède, ((que le Mandat confié à Sa Majesté britannique pour être exercé en son nom par le Gouvernement de l'Union sud-africaine est dotzc terminé (italiques a.joutées). C'est cette partie de la résolution qui est pertinente pour la présente procédure. 94. Pour examiner l'acte ainsi accompli par l'Assemblée générale, il convient de tenir compte des principes généraux de droit international qui régissent la cessation d'une relation conventionnelle comme consé- quence d'une violation. En effet, même étant admis que le mandat a le caractère d'une institution, ainsi qu'on le soutient, il n'en est pas moins issu des accords internationaux qui ont créé le système et en ont régle- menté l'application. La Cour a dit en 1962: ((comme presque tous les autres Mandats semblables, ce Mandat constitue un acte d'un type spécial, de ïiature composite, instituant un régime international nouveau. Il contient un accord précis )1 (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 331).
47 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) Mandate ". . . in fact and in law, is an international agreement having the character of a treaty or convention" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 330). The rules laid down by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach (adopted without a dissenting vote) may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law on the subject. In the light of these rules, only a material breach of a treaty justifies termination, such breach being defined as: "(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Con- vention; or (6) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty" (Art. 60, para. 3). 95. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) determines that both forms of material breach had occurred in this case. By stressing thatsouth Africa "has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate", the General Assembly declared in fact that it had repudiated it. The resolution in question is therefore to be viewed as the exercise of the right to terminate a relation- ship in case of a deliberate and persistent violation of obligations which destroys the very object and purpose of that relationship. 96. It has been contended that the Covenant of the League of Nations did not confer on the Council of the League power to terminate a man- date for misconduct of the mandatory and that no such power could therefore be exercised by the United Nations, since it could not derive from the League greater powers than the latter itself had. For this ob- jection to prevail it would be necessary to show that the mandates system. as established under the League, excluded the application of the general principle of law that a right of termination on account of breach must be presumed to exist in respect of al1 treaties, except as regards provisions relating to the protection of the human person con- tained in treaties of a humanitarian character (as indicated in Art. 60, para. 5, of the Vienna Convention). The silence of a treaty as to the existence of such a right cannot be interpreted as implying the exclusion of a right which has its source outside of the treaty, in general inter- national law, and is dependent on the occurrence of circumstances which are not normally envisaged when a treaty is concluded. 97. The Government of South Africa has contended that it was the intention of the drafters of the mandates that they should not be revocable even in cases of serious breach of obligation or gross misconduct on the part of the mandatory. This contention seeks to draw support from the fact that at the Paris Peace Confeience a resolution was adopted in which the proposal contained in President Wilson's draft of the Covenant regarding a right of appeal for the substitution of the mandatory was not
Elle a conclu dans son arrêt que le mandat (1 est en fait et en droit un engagement international ayant le caractère d'un traité ou d'une conven- tion » (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 330). Les règles de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités concernant la cessation d'un traité violé (qui ont été adoptées sans opposition), peuvent, à bien des égards, être considérées comme une codification du droit coutumier existant dans ce domaine. D'après ces règles, l'extinction d'un traité n'est justifiée qu'en cas de violation substantielle, définie comme étant constituée par: ((a) un rejet du traité non autorisé par la présente Convention; ou 6) la violation d'une disposition essentielle pour la réalisation de I'ob.iet ou du but duTraité 1) (art. 60, par. 3). 95. La résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale constate qu'il y a eu en l'occurrence violation substantielle sous l'une et l'autre forme. Quand elle souligne que l'Afrique du Sud (( a, en fait, dénoncé le Mandat 11, l'Assemblée générale déclare en réalité que l'Afrique du Sud l'a rejeté. II faut donc voir dans la résolution en question l'exercice du droit de mettre fin à un certain rapport à la suite d'une violation délibérée et persistante d'obligations, qui détruit l'objet même et le but de ce rapport. 96. On a soutenu que le Pacte de la Société des Nations ne conférait pas au Conseil de la Société le pouvoir de mettre fin à un mandat en raison d'une faute du mandataire et que les Nations Unies ne sauraient donc exercer un tel pouvoir puisqu'elles n'ont pu hériter de la SdN de pouvoirs plus étendus que celle-ci n'en avait. Pour que cette objection soit valable, il faudrait montrer que le système des mandats établi par la Société des Nations excluait l'application du principe juridique général selon lequel le droit de mettre fin à un traité comme conséquence de sa violation doit être présumé exister pour tous les traités, sauf en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives à la protection de la personne humaine contenues dans des traités de caractère humanitaire (convention de Vienne, art. 60, par. 5). Le silence d'un traité à ce sujet ne saurait être interprété comme impliquant I'exclusion d'un droit dont Ia source se trouve en dehors du traité, dans le droit international général, et qui dépend de circonstances que l'on n'envisage normalement pas au moment de conclure le traité. 97. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a soutenu que, dans l'intention des rédacteurs des mandats, ceux-ci ne devaient pas être révocables, même en cas de violation sérieuse des obligations du mandataire ou de faute grave de sa part. Cette thèse cherche à tirer parti du fait qu'à la conférence de la paix de Paris une résolution a été adoptée qui ne reprenait pas la proposition figurant dans le projet de Pacte présenté par le président Wilson et relative au droit de demander le remplacement du mandataire.
included. It should be recalled that the discussions at the Paris Peace Conference relied upon by South Africa were not directly addressed to an examination of President Wilson's proposals concerning the regulation of the mandates system in the League Covenant, and the participants were not contesting these particular proposals. What took place was a general exchange of views, on a political plane, regarding the questions of the disposal of the former German colonies and whether the principle of annexation or the mandatory principle should apply to them. 98. President Wilson's proposed draft did not include a specific provi- sion for revocation, on the assumption that mandates were revocable. What was proposed was a special procedure reserving "to the people of any such territory or governmental unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of any breach of the mandate by the mandatory State or agency or for the substitution of some other State or agency, as mandatory". That this special right of appeal was not in- serted in the Covenant cannot be interpreted as excluding the application of the general principle of law according to which a power of termina- tion on account of breach, even if unexpressed, must be presumed to exist as inherent in any mandate, as indeed in any agreement. 99. As indicated earlier, at the Paris Peace Conference there was op- position to the institution of the mandates since a mandate would be inherently revocable, so that there would be no guarantee of long-term continuance of administration by the mandatory Power. The difficulties thus arising were eventually resolved by the assurance that the Council of the League would not interfere with the day-to-day administration of the territories and that the Council would intervene only in case of a fundamental breach of its obligations by the mandatory Power. 100. The revocability of a mandate was envisaged by the first proposa1 which was made concerning a mandates system: "In case of any flagrant and prolonged abuse of this trust the population concerned should be able to appeal for redress to the League, who should in a proper case assert its authority to the full, even to the extent of removing the mandate and entrusting it to some other State if necessary." (J. C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, 19 18, pp. 21 -22.) Although this proposa1 referred to different territories, the principle remains the same. The possibility of revocation in the event of gross violation of the mandate was subsequently confirmed by authorities on international 1aw and members of the Permanent Mandates Commission
Il convient de rappeler que les débats de la conférence de la paix de Paris invoqués par l'Afrique du Sud n'ont pas directement porté sur les propo- sitions du président Wilson ayant trait à la réglementation du système des mandats dans le Pacte de la Société des Nations et les participants n'ont pas contesté ces propositions. Il y a eu un échange de vues général, de caractère politique, sur le sort des anciennes colonies allemandes et la question de savoir si l'on devait leur appliquer le principe de l'annexion ou celui du mandat. 98. Partant de l'idée que les mandats étaient révocables, le projet du président Wilson ne contenait pas de disposition expresse relative à la révocatiun. Ce qu'il proposait était une procédure spéciale réservant ((aux peuples de ces territoires ou circonscriptions administratives le droit de faire appel à la Société des Nations pour qu'elle remédie à toute violation du maudat qui serait commise par 1'Etat ou l'organisme manda- taire ou pour qu'elle lui substitue comme mandataire un autre Etat ou un autre organisme 1). Le fait que ce droit d'appel spécial n'ait pas été incorporé au Pacte ne saurait être interprété comme excluant l'application du principe général de droit d'après lequel il faut présumer que le pouvoir de mettre fin, comme conséquence d'une violation, à un mandat comme d'ailleurs à toute convention, existe de façon inhérente, même s'il n'est pas exprimé. 99. On a vu qu'à la conférence de la paix de Paris une opposition s'était manifestée contre l'institution des mandats, du fait qu'ils auraient été intrinsèquement révocables et que rien n'aurait donc garanti aux puissances mandataire la continuité à long terme de leur administration. Les difficultés ainsi soulevées ont été finalement résolues quand on a donné l'assurance que le Conseil de la Société des Nations ne s'immis- cerait pas dans l'administration courante des territoires et qu'il n'inter- viendrait qu'au cas où la puissance mandataire violerait fondamentale- ment ses obligations. 100. La proposition initiale relative au système des mandats envisa- geait la révocabilité: (( En cas d'abus flagrant et prolongé de cette mission, la population dont il s'agit devrait avoir le droit de s'adresser à la Société pour qu'il y soit remédié et celle-ci devrait, si le cas se présente, exercer pleinement son autorité, allant éventuellement jusqu'à enlever le mandat pour le confier à un autre Etat si c'est nécessaire. 11 (J. C. Smuts, La Société des Nations: une proposition pratique, 191 8, p. 21-22.) [Traduction du Grefe.] Certes cette proposition concernait d'autres territoires, mais le principe restait le même. La possibilité d'une révocation en cas de violation grave du mandat a été ultérieurement confirmée par des spécialistes du droit international faisant autorité ainsi que par les membres de la Commission
who interpreted and applied the mandates system under the League of Nations. 101. It has been suggested that, even if the Council of the League had possessed the power of revocatiori of the Mandate in an extreme case, it could not have been exercised unilaterally but only in CO-operation with the mandatory Power. However, revocation could only result from a situation in which the Mandatory had committed a serious breach of the obligations it had undertaken. To contend, on the basis of the prin- ciple of unanimity which applied in the League of Nations, that in this case revocation could only take place with the concurrence of the Man- datory, would not only run contrary to the general principle of law gov- erning termination on account of breach, but also postulate an im- possibility. For obvious reasons, the consent of the wrongdoer to such a form of termination cannot be required. 102. In a further objection to General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) it is contended that it made pronouncements which the Assembly, not being a judicial organ, and not having previously referred the matter to any such organ, was not competent to make. Without dwelling on the conclusions reached in the 1966 Judgment in the South West Africa contentious cases, it is worth recalling that in those cases the applicant States, which complained of material breaches of substantive provisions of the Mandate, were held not to "possess any separate self-contained right which they could assert.. . to require the due performance of the Mandate in discharge of the 'sacred trust' " (I.C.J. Reports 1966, pp. 29 and 51). On the other hand, the Court declared that: ". . . any diver- gences of view concerning the conduct of a mandate were regarded as being matters that had their place in the political field, the settlement of which lay between the mandatory and the competent organs of the League" (ibid., p. 45). To deny to a political organ of the United Nations which is a successor of the League in this respect the right to act, on the argument that it lacks cornpetence to render what is described as a judicial decision, would not only be inconsistent but would amount to a complete denial of the remedies available against fundamental breaches of an international undertaking. 103. The Court is unable to appreciate the view that the General Assembly acted unilaterally as party and judge in its own cause. In the 1966 Judgment in the South West Africa cases, referred to above, it was found that the function to cal1 for the due execution of the relevant provisions of the mandate instruments appertained to the League acting as an entity through its appropriate organs. The right of the League "in the pursuit of its collective, institutional activity, to require the due performance of the Mandate in discharge of the 'sacred trust' ", was specifically recognized (ibid., p. 29). Having regard to this finding, the United Nations as a successor to the League, acting through its com- petent organs, must be seen above al1 as the supervisory institution, competent to pronounce, in that capacity, on the conduct of the man-
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 49 permanente des mandats qui interprétaient et appliquaient le système des mandats à l'époque de la Société des Nations. 101. On a indiqué que, même si le Conseil de la Société des Nations avait eu le pouvoir de révoquer le mandat dans un cas extrême, il n'aurait pu en user qu'en coopération avec la puissance mandataire mais non unilatéralement. La révocation ne pouvait cependant résulter que d'une violation grave par le mandataire des obligations qu'il avait assumées. Tirer argument du principe de l'unanimité appliqué par la Société des Nations pour soutenir que la révocation ne pouvait intervenir dans ce cas au'avec l'accord du mandataire serait non seulement aller à l'encontre du principe général de droit régissant l'extinction comme conséquence d'une violation, mais aussi postuler une impossibilité. Pour des raisons évidentes, on ne saurait, s'agissant d'une extinction de ce genre, exiger le consentement du fautif. 102. On a objecté encore à la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale qu'elle contient des prononcés que l'Assemblée n'a pas compé- tence pour formuler, faute d'être un organe judiciaire et de n'avoir pas renvoyé la question à un tel organe. Sans insister sur les conclusions de l'arrêt rendu en 1966 dans les affaires contentieuses du Sud-Ouest africain, il convient de rappeler qu'en l'espèce on a considéré que les Etats deman- deurs, qui se plaignaient de violations substantielles de dispositions de fond du mandat, ((ne possédaient ... aucun droit propre et autonome pouvant être invoqué ... de réclamer ... la bonne exécution du Mandat conformément à la ((mission sacrée de civilisation 1) (C.I.J. Recueil 1966, p. 29 et 51). D'autre part la Cour a déclaré que «l'on considérait les différends relatifs à la gestion d'un Mandat comme relevant de l'ordre politique et comme devant être réglés entre le Mandataire et les organes compétents de la Société des Nations)) (ibid., p. 45). Refuser le droit d'agir à un organe politique de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, succes- seur de la Société des Nations à cet égard, parce qu'il n'aurait pas com- pétence pour prendre ce qui est qualifié de décision judiciaire, ce serait non seulement contradictoire mais encore cela reviendrait à un déni total des recours disponibles contre les violations fondamentales d'un engagement international. 103. La Cour ne peut souscrire à l'opinion selon laquelle l'Assemblée générale a agi unilatéralement, comme partie et juge en sa propre cause. Dans l'arrêt de 1966 sur le Sud-Ouest africain, mentionné plus haut, on a conclu que c'est à la Société des Nations, agissant en tant qu'entité par l'intermédiaire de ses organes compétents, que revenait la fonction d'exiger la bonne mise en œuvre des dispositions pertinentes du mandat. Le droit de la Société des Nations ((de réclamer, dans l'accomplissement de son activité collective et institutionnelle, la bonne exécution du Mandat conformément à la mission sacrée de civilisation 1) a été expressément reconnu (ibid., p. 29). Etant donné cette conclusion, il faut voir avant tout dans l'organisation des Nations Unies, successeur de la Société des Nations, agissant par l'intermédiaire de ses organes compétents, I'insti-
datory with respect to its international obligations, and competent to act accordingly. 104. It is argued on behalf of South Africa that the consideration set forth in paragraph 3 of resolution 2145 (XXI) of the General Assembly, relating to the failure of South Africa to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the mandated territory, called for a detailed factual investigation before the General Assembly could adopt resolu- tion 2145 (XX1) or the Court pronounce upon its validity. The failure of South Africa to com7ly with the obligation to submit to supervision and to render reports, an essential part of the Mandate, cannot be disputed in the light of determinations made by this Court on more occasions than one. In relying on these, as on other findings of the Court in previous proceedings concerning South West Africa, the Court adheres to its own jurisprudence. 105. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), after declaring the termination of the Mandate, added in operative paragraph 4 "that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory". This part of the resolution has been objected to as deciding a transfer of territory. That in fact is not so. The pronouncement made by the General Assembly is based on a conclusion, referred to earlier, reached by the Court in 1950: "The authority which the Union Government exercises over the Territory is based on the Mandate. If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Government contends, the latter's authority would equally have lapsed." (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 133.) This was confirmed by the Court in its Judgment of 21 December 1962 in the South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 333). Relying on these decisions of the Court, the General Assembly declared that the Mandate having been terminated "South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory". This is not a finding on facts, but the formulation of a legal situation. For it would not be correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative design.
tution de surveillance qui a compétence pour se prononcer, en cette qualité, sur le comportement du mandataire à l'égard de ses obligations internationales et pour agir en conséquence. 104. L'Afrique du Sud a fait valoir que, vu les considérations énoncées au paragraphe 3 de la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale, où il est dit que l'Afrique du Sud a failli à ses obligations en ce qui con- cerne l'administration du territoire sous mandat, un examen approfondi des faits était nécessaire avant que l'Assemblée générale puisse adopter la résolution 2145 (XXI) et la Cour se prononcer sur sa validité. L'inob- servation par l'Afrique du Sud de l'obligation de se soumettre à une surveillance et de présenter des rapports, ce qui constituait une partie essentielle du mandat, ne peut être contestée, compte tenu des prononcés formulés par la Cour à diverses reprises. En invoquant ces prononcés, ainsi que d'autres conclusions émises dans des procédures antérieures relatives au Sud-Ouest africain, la Cour s'en tient à sa propre juris- prudence. 105. Ayant déclaré le mandat terminé, la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale ajoute, au paragraphe 4 du dispositif, (1 que l'Afrique du Sud n'a aucun autre droit d'administrer le Territoire )). On a objecté que ce passage de la résolution décidait un transfert de territoire. Or tel n'est pas le cas. Ce qu'a dit l'Assemblée générale repose sur une conclu- sion de la Cour, déjà mentionnée, qui a été formulée en 1950: (( L'autorité que le Gouvernement de l'Union exerce sur le Terri- toire est fondée sur le Mandat. Si le Mandat avait cessé d'exister, comme le prétend le Gouvernement de l'Union, l'autorité de celle- ci aurait également cessé d'exister. )) (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 133.) Cette conclusion a été confirmée par la Cour dans son arrêt du 21 décem- bre 1962 dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud; Libéria c. Afrique du Sud) (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 333). S'appuyant sur ces décisions de la Cour, l'Assemblée générale a déclaré que, le mandat étant terminé, ((l'Afrique du Sud n'a aucun autre droit d'ad- ministrer le Territoire )). Elle n'a pas ainsi tranché des faits mais décrit une situation juridique. II serait en effet inexact de supposer que, parce qu'elle possède en principe le pouvoir de faire des recommandations, l'Assemblée générale est empêchée d'adopter, dans des cas déterminés relevant de sa compétence, des résolutions ayant le caractère de décisions ou procédant d'une intention d'exécution
5 1 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) 106. By resolution 2145 (XXI) the General Assembly terminated the Mandate. However, lacking the necessary powers to ensure the with- drawal of South Africa from the Territory, it enlisted the CO-operation of the Security Council by calling the latter's attention to the resolution, thus acting in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter. 107. The Security Council responded to the cal1 of the General Assem- bly. It "took note" of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XX1) in the preamble of its resolution 245 (1968); it took it "into account" in reso- lution 246 (1968); in resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969) it adopted certain measures directed towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and, finally, in resolution 276 (1970), it reaffirmed resolution 264 (1969) and recalled resolution 269 (1969). 108. Resolution 276 (1970) of the Security Council, specifically mentioned in the text of the request, is the one essential for the purposes of the present advisory opinion. Before analysing it, however, it is necessary to refer briefly to resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969), since these two resolutions have, together with resolution 276 (1970), a com- bined and a cumulative effect. Resolution 264 (1969), in paragraph 3 of its operative part, calls upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately. Resolution 269 (1969), in view of South Africa's lack of compliance, after recalling the obligations of Members under Article 25 of the Charter, calls upon the Government of South Africa, in paragraph 5 of its operative part, "to withdraw its administra- tion from the territory immediately and in any case before 4 October 1969". The preanble of resolution 276 (1970) reaffirms General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and espouses it, by referring to the decision, not merely of the General Assembly, but of the United Nations "that the Mandate of South-West Africa was terminated". on the operative part, after condemning the non-compliance by South Africa with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions pertaining to Narnibia, the Security Council declares, in paragraph 2, that "the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal" and that consequently al1 acts taken by the Government of South Africa "on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid". In paragraph 5 the Security Council "Calls upon al1 States, particularly those which have economic and other interests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with the Government of South Africa which are in- consistent with operative paragraph 2 of this resolution". 109. It emerges from the communications bringing the matter to the Security Council's attention, from the discussions held and particularly from the text of the resolutions themselves, that the Security Council, when it adopted these resolutions, was acting in the exercise of what it deemed to be its primary responsibility, the maintenance of peace and security, which, under the Charter, embraces situations which might 3 9
106. Par sa résolution 2145 (XXI) l'Assemblée générale a mis fin au mandat. Cependant, comme elle ne dispose pas des pouvoirs nécessaires pour obtenir que l'Afrique du Sud se retire du territoire, elle a fait appel au concours du Conseil de sécurité en attirant son attention sur la résolu- tion, conformément à l'article 11, paragraphe 2, de la Charte. 107. Le Conseil de sécurité a répondu à l'appel de l'Assemblée générale. 11 a pris note de la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée dans le préambule de sa résolution 245 (1968); il en a tenu compte dans sa résolu- tion 246 (1968); dans ses résolutions 264 (1969) et 269 (1969), il a adopté certaines mesures visant à la mettre en œuvre et, pour finir, dans sa résolu- tion 276 (1970), il a réaffirmé sa résolution 264 (1969) et rappelé sa résolu- tion 269 (1 969). 108. C'est la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité, expressé- ment visée dans le texte de la requête, qui est essentielle aux fins du présent avis consultatif. Avant d'en entreprendre l'analyse, il convient cependant de dire un mot des résolutions 264 (1969) et 269 (1969), dont l'effet se conjugue et s'ajoute à celui de la résolution 276 (1970). Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution 264 (1969), le Conseil de sécurité demande à l'Afrique du Sud de retirer immédiatement son ad- ministration de la Namibie. L'Afrique du Sud n'ayant pas obtempéré, dans la résolution 269 (1969), le Conseil, après avoir rappelé les obliga- tions des Etats Membres en vertu de l'article 25 de la Charte, demande au Gouvernement sud-africain, au paragraphe 5 du dispositif, ((de retirer son administration du territoire immédiatement, et en tout état de cause, avant le 4 octobre 1969 )). La résolution 276 (1970) réaffirme dans son préambule la résolution 2145 (XXI) de l'Assemblée générale, et même la fait sienne, dans la mesure où il y est dit que ce n'est pas seulement l'Assemblée générale, mais les Nations Unies qui ((ont décidé que le mandat sur le Sud-Ouest africain était terminé n. Dans le dispositif, après avoir condamné le refiis de l'Afrique du Sud de se conformer aux résolutions de l'Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité relatives à la Namibie, le Conseil de sécurité déclare, au paragraphe 2, que ((la présence continue des autorités sud-africaines en Namibie est illégale )) et qu'en conséquence toutes les mesures prises par le Gouvernement sud-africain ((au nom de la Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne après la cessation du mandat sont i!légales et invalides)). Au paragraphe 5, le Conseil de sécurité ((Demande à tous les Etats, en particulier ceux qui ont des intérêts économiques et autres en Namibie, de s'abstenir de toutes relations avec le Gouvernement sud-africain qui sont incompatibles avec le paragraphe 2 du dispositif de la présente résolution )). 109. 11 ressort des commun~cations par lesquelles la question a été portée à l'attention du Conseil de sécurité, des débats qui s'y sont déroulés et en particulier du texte même des résolutions, que le Conseil de sécurité, lorsqu'il a adopté ces résolutions, agissait dans l'exercice de ce qu'il estimait sa responsabilité principale - le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité - qui, en vertu de la Charte (art. 1, par. l), s'étend aux situations
lead to a breach of the peace. (Art. 1, para. 1 .) In the preamble of resolu- tion 264 (1969) the Security Council was "Mindful of the grave conse- quences of South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia" and in paragraph 4 of that resolution it declared "that the actions of the Govern- ment of South Africa designed to destroy the national unity and territo- rial integrity of Namibia through the establishment of Bantustans are contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter". In operative paragraph 3 of resolution 269 (1969) the Security Council decided "that the continued occupation of the territory of Namibia by the South Afri- can authorities constitutes an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations, . . .". In operative paragraph 3 of resolution 276 (1970) the Security Council declared further "that the defiant attitude of the Government of South Africa towards the Council's decisions under- mines the authority of the United Nations". 110. As to the legal basis of the resolution, Article 24 of the Charter vests in the Security Council the necessary authority to take action such as that taken in the present case. The reference in paragraph 2 of this Article to specific powers of the Security Council under certain chapters of the Charter does not exclude the existence of general powers to dis- charge the responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1. Reference may be made in this respect to the Secretary-General's Statement, presented to the Security Council on 10 January 1947, to the effect that "the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted to the specific grants of authority contained in Chapters VI, VET, VI11 and XII . . . the Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The only limitations are the fundamental principles and purposes found in Chapter 1 of the Charter." 11 1. As to the effect to be attributed to the declaration contained in paragraph 2 of resolution 276 (1970), the Court considers that the quali- fication of a situation as illegal does not by itself put an end to it. It can only be the first, necessary step in an endeavour to bring the illegal situ- ation to an end. 112. It would be an untenable interpretation to maintain that, once such a declaration had been made by the Security Council under Article 24 of the Charter, on behalf of a11 member States, those Members would be free to act in disregard of such illegality or even to recognize violations of law resulting from it. When confronted with such an internationally unlawful situation, Members of the United Nations would be expected to act in consequence of the declaration made on their behalf. The question therefore arises as to the effect of this decision of the Security Council for States Members of the United Nations in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter. 1 13. It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 52 susceptibles de mener à une rupture de la paix. Dans le préambule de la résolution 264 (1969), le Conseil de sécurité se disait a Conscient des graves conséquences de l'occupation continue de la Namibie par l'Afrique du Sud )) et, au paragraphe 4 de la même résolution, il déclarait ((que les actes du Gouvernement sud-africain visant à détruire l'unité nationale et l'intégrité territoriale de la Namibie par la création de Bantoustans sont contraires aux dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies )). Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution 269 (1969), le Conseil décidait ((que l'occupation continue du territoire de la Namibie par les autorités sud-africaines constitue une atteinte agressive à l'autorité de l'organisa- tion des Nations Unies ». Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution 276 (1970), le Conseil déclarait en outre ((que l'attitude de défi du Gou- vernement sud-africain envers les décisions du Conseil sape l'autorité des Nations Unies ». 110. Pour ce qui est du fondement juridique de la résolution, l'article 24 de la Charte confère au Conseil de sécurité les pouvoirs nécessaires pour prendre des mesures comme celle qu'il a adoptée dans le cas présent. Au paragraphe 2 de cet article, la mention des pouvoirs spécifiques accordés au Conseil de sécurité en vertu de certains chapitres de la Charte n'exclut pas l'existence de pouvoirs généraux destinés à lui permettre de s'acquitter des responsabilités conférées par le paragraphe 1. A cet égard, on peut se reporter à la déclaration du Secrétaire général, présentée Ie 10 janvier 1947 au Conseil de sécurité, où il est dit que e les pouvoirs du Conseil, découlant de I'article 24, ne se limitent pas aux attributions spécifiques d'autorité mentionnées aux chapitres VI, VII, VI11 et XII ... les Membres des Nations Unies ont reconnu au Conseil de sécurité des pouvoirs en rapport avec les responsabilités qui lui incombent relative- ment au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité. Les seules restrictions res- sortent des principes et buts fondamentaux qui figurent au chapitre premier de la Charte. )) 1 1 1. Quant à l'effet à attribuer à la déclaration figurant au paragraphe 2 de la résolution 276 (1970), la Cour estime qu'en qualifiant une situa- tion d'illégale on n'y met pas fin ipso facto. Ce ne peut être que la première mesure qui s'impose si l'on veut faire cesser la situation illégale. 112. Ce serait une interprétation insoutenable d'affirmer que, lorsque le Conseil de sécurité fait une telle déclaration en vertu de l'article 24 de la Charte au nom de tous les Etats Membres. ceux-ci sont libres de ne faire aucun cas de l'illégalité ni même des violations du droit qui en ré- sultent. En présence d'une situation internationalement illicite de cette nature, on doit pouvoir compter sur les Membres des Nations Unies pour tirer les conséquences de la déclaration faite en leur nom. La question est donc de savoir quel est l'effet de cette décision du Conseil de sécurité à l'égard des Etats Membres des Nations Unies conformément à l'ar- ticle 25 de la Charte. 113. On a soutenu que l'article 25 ne s'applique qu'aux mesures
to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VI1 of the Charter. It is not possible to find in the Charter any support for this view. Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but applies to "the decisions of the Security Council" adopted in accordance with the Charter. Moreover, that Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, but immediately after Article 24 in that part of the Charter which deals with the functions and powers of the Security Council. If Article 25 had refer- ence solely to decisions of the Security Council concerning enforcement action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, that is to say, if it were only such decisions which had binding effect, then Article 25 would be superfluous, since this effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter. 114. It has also been contended that the relevant Security Council resolutions are couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory language and that, therefore, they do not purport to impose any legal duty on any State nor to affect legally any right of any State. The language of a reso- lution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, al1 circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council. 115. Applying these tests, the Court recalls that in the preamble of resolution 269 (1969), the Security Council was "Mindful of its respon- sibility to take necessary action to secure strict compliance with the obligations entered into by States Members of the United Nations under the provisions of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations". The Court has therefore reached the conclusion that the decisions made by the Security Council in paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolutions 276 (1970), as related to paragraph 3 of resolution 264 (1969) and paragraph 5 of reso- lution 269 (1969), were adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 and 25. The decisions are consequently binding on al1 States Members of the United Nations, which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them out. 116. In pronouncing upon the binding nature of the Security Council decisions in question, the Court would recall the following passage in its Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949 on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations: "The Charter has not been content to make the Organization created by it merely a centre 'for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends' (Article 1, para. 4). It has equipped that centre with organs, and has given it special tasks. Tt has defined the position of the Members in relation to the Organization
coercitives prises en vertu du chapitre VI1 de la Charte. Rien dans la Charte ne vient appuyer cette Idée. L'article 25 ne se limite pas aux déci- sions concernant des mesures coercitives mais s'applique aux cc décisions du Conseil de sécurité » adoptées conformément à la Charte. En outre cet article est placé non pas au chapitre VI1 mais immédiatement après l'article 24, dans la partie de la Charte qui traite des fonctions et pouvoirs du Conseil de sécurité. Si l'article 25 ne visait que les décisions du Conseil de sécurité relatives à des mesures coercitives prises en vertu des articles 41 et 42 de la Charte, autrement dit si seules ces décisions avaient un effet obligatoire, l'article 25 serait superflu car cet effet résulte des ar- ticles 48 et 49 de la Charte. 114. On a soutenu aussi que les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité sont rédigées en des termes qui l&r confèrent plutôt le caractère d'une exhortation que celui d'une injonction et qu'en consé- quence elles ne prétendent ni imposer une obligation juridique à un Etat quelconque ni toucher sur le plan juridique à l'un quelconque de ses droits. Il faut soigneusement analyser le libellé d'une résolution du Conseil de sécurité avant de pouvoir conclure à son effet obligatoire. Etant donné le caractère des pouvoirs découlant de l'article 25, il convient de déter- miner dans chaque cas si ces pouvoirs ont été en fait exercés, compte tenu des termes de la résolution à interpréter, des débats qui ont précédé son adoption, des dispositions de la Charte invcquées et en général de tous les éléments qui pourraient aider à préciser les conséquences juri- diques de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité. 115. Appliquant ces critères, la Cour rappelle que, dans le préambule de la résolution 269 (1969), le Conseil de sécurité s'est déclaré ((Cons- cient qu'il a le devoir de prendre les mesures voulues pour que les Etats Membres des Nations Unies s'acquittent fidèlement des obligations qu'ils ont assumées conformément à l'article 25 de la Charte des Nations Unies 1). La Cour en conclut que les décisions prises par le Conseil de sécurité aux paragraphes 2 et 5 de la résolution 276 (1970), rapprochées du paragraphe 3 de la résolution 264 (1969) et du paragraphe 5 de la résolution 269 (1969), ont été adoptées conformément aux buts et prin- cipes de la Charte et à ses articles 24 et 25. Elles sont par conséquent obligatoires pour tous les Etats Membres des Nations Unies, qui sont ainsi tenus de les accepter et de les appliquer. 116. A propos du caractère obligatoire de ces décisions du Conseil de sécurité, la Cour rappellera le passage suivant tiré de l'avis consultatif qu'elle a rendu le 11 avril 1949 sur la Réparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies: 11 ka Charte ne s'est pas bornée à faire simplement de l'organisa- tion créée par elle un centre où s'harmoniseraient les efforts des nations vers les fins communes définies par elle (art. 1, par. 4). Elle lui a donné des organes; elle lui a assigné une mission propre. Elle a défini la position des Membres par rapport à l'organisation en
by requiring them to give it every assistance in any action undertaken by it (Article 2, para. 5), and to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council." (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 178.) Thus when the Security Council adopts a decision under Article 25 in accordance with the Charter, it is for member States to comply with that decision, including those members of the Security Council which voted against it and those Members of the United Nations who are not members of the Council. To hold otherwise would be to deprive this principal organ of its essential functions and powers under the Charter. 117. Having reached these conclusions, the Court will now address itself to the legal consequences arising for States from the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970). A binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence. Once the Court is faced with such a situ- ation, it would be failing in the discharge of its judicial functions if it did not declare that there is an obligation, especially upon Members of the United Nations, to bring that situation to an end. As this Court has held, referring to one of its decisions declaring a situation as contrary to a rule of international law: "This decision entails a legal consequence, namely that of putting an end to an illegal situation" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 82). 1 18. South Africa, being responsible for having created and maintained a situation which the Court has found to have been validly declared illegal, has the obligation to put an end to it. It is therefore under obliga- tion to withdraw its administration from the Territory of Namibia. By maintaining the present illegal situation, and occupying the Territory without title, South Africa incurs international responsibilities arising from a continuing violation of an international obligation. It also re- mains accountable for any violations of its international obligations, or of the rights of the people of Namibia. The fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law towards other States in respect of the exercise of its powers in relation to this Territory. Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States. 119. The member States of the United Nations are, for the reasons given in paragraph 115 above, under obligation to recognize the ille- gality and invalidity of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia. They are also under obligation to refrain from lending any support or any form of assistance to South Africa with reference to its occupation of Namibia, subject to paragraph 125 below.
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 54 leur prescrivant de lui donner pleine assistance dans toute action entreprise par elle (art. 2, par. 5), d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité. 1) (C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 178.) Ainsi, lorsque le Conseil de sécurité adopte une décision aux termes de l'article 25 conformément à la Charte, il incombe aux Etats Membres de se conformer à cette décision, notamment aux membres du Conseil de sécurité qui ont voté contre elle et aux Membres des Nations Unies qui ne siègent pas au Conseil. Ne pas l'admettre serait priver cet organe principal des fonctions et pouvoirs essentiels qu'il tient de la Charte. 117. Etant parvenue à ces conclusions, la Cour en vient maintenant aux conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de 1'Afriaue du Sud en Namibie. nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité. Qiiand un organe compétent des Nations Unies constate d'une manière obligatoire qu'une situation est illégale, cette constatation ne peut rester sans conséquence. Placée en face d'une telle situation, la Cour ne s'acquitterait pas de ses fonctions judiciaires si elle ne déclarait pas qu'il existe une obligation, pour les Membres des Nations Unies en particulier, de mettre fin à cette situation. A propos d'une de ses décisions, par laquelle elle avait déclaré qu'une situation était contraire à une règle de droit international, la Cour a dit: ((Cette décision entraîne une conséquence juridique, celle de mettre fin à une situation irrégulière 1) (C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 82). 118. L'Afrique du Sud, à laquelle incombe la responsabilité d'avoir créé et prolongé une situation qui, selon la Cour, a été valablement déclarée illégale, est tenue d'y mettre fin. Elle a donc l'obligation de retirer son administration du territoire de la Namibie. Tant qu'elle laisse subsister cette situation illégale et occupe le territoire sans titre, l'Afrique du Sud encourt des responsabilités internationales pour violation per- sistante d'une obligation internationale. Elle demeure aussi responsable de toute violation de ses obligations internationales ou des droits du peuple namibien. Le fait que l'Afrique du Sud n'a plus aucun titre juridique l'habilitant à administrer le territoire ne la libère pas des obligations et responsabilités que le droit international lui impose envers d'autres Etats et qui sont liées à l'exercice de ses pouvoirs dans ce ter- ritoire. C'est l'autorité effective sur un territoire. et non la souveraineté ou la légitimité du titre, qui constitue le fondement de la responsabilité de 1'Etat en raison d'actes concernant d'autres Etats. 119. Les Etats Membres des Nations Unies ont, pour les raisons indiquées au paragraphe 1 15 ci-dessus, l'obligation de reconnaître l'illé- galité et le défaut de validité du maintien de la présence sud-africaine en Namibie. Ils sont aussi tenus de n'accorder à l'Afrique du Sud, pour son occupation de la Namibie, aucune aide ou aucune assistance quelle qu'en soit la forme, sous réserve de ce qui est dit au paragraphe 125 ci-dessous.
5 5 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) 120. The precise determination of the acts permitted or allowed- what measures are available and practicable, which of them should be selectrd, what scope they should be given and by whom they shouid be applied-is a matter which lies within the competence of the appropriate political organs of the United Nations acting within their authority under the Charter. Thus it is for the Security Council to determine any further measures consequent upon the decisions already taken by it on the question of Namibia. In this context the Court notes that at the same meeting of the Security Council in which the request for advisory opinion was made, the Security Council also adopted resolution 283 (1970) which defined some of the steps to be taken. The Court has not been called upon to advise on the legal effects of that resolution. 121. The Court will in consequence confine itself to giving advice on those dealings with the Government of South Africa which, under the Charter of the United Nations and general international law, should be considered as inconsistent with the declaration of illegaliîy and in- validity made in paragraph 2 of resolution 276 (1970), because they may imply a recognition that South Africa's presence in Namibia Es legal. 122. For the reasons given above, and subject to the observations contained in paragraph 125 below, member States are under obligation to abstain frorn entering into treaty relations with South Africa in al1 cases in which the Government of South Africa purports to act on behalf of or concerning Namibia. With respect to existing bilateral treaties, inember States must abstain from invoking or applying those treaties or provisions of treaties concluded by South Africa on behalf of or con- cerning Namibia which involve active intergovernmental CO-operation. With respect to multilateral treaties, however, the same rule cannot be applied to certain general conventions such as those of a humanitarian character, the non-performance of which may adversely affect the people of Namibia. Tt will be for the competent international organs to take specific rneasures in this respect. 123. Member States, in compliance with the duty of non-recognition imposed by paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolution 276 (1970), are under obligation to abstain from sending diplomatic or special missions to South Africa including in their jurisdiction the Territory of Nâmibia, to abstain from sending consular agents to Namibia, and to withdraw any such agents already there. They should also make it clear to the South African authorities that the maintenance of diplomatic or consular relations with South Africa does not imply any recognition of its authority with regard to Namibia. 124. The restraints which are implicit in .the non-recognition of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the explicit provisions of paragraph 5 of resolution 276 (1970) impose upon mem.ber States the obligation to abstain from entering into economic and other forms of relationship
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 55 120. Quant à savoir exactement quels actes sont permis ou autorisés, quelles mesures sont possibles ou applicables, quelles sont celles qui devraient être retenues, quelle portée il faudrait leur donner et par qui elles devraient être appliquées, ce sont là des questions qui relèvent des organes politiques compétents des Nations Unies, agissant dans le cadre des pouvoirs conférés par la Charte. Ainsi, il appartient au Conseil de sécurité d'indiquer toutes autres mesures devant faire suite aux décisions qu'il a prises en ce qui concerne la question de la Namibie. A ce propos, la Cour note que, lors de la séance où il a formulé la présente requête pour avis consultatif, le Conseil de sécurité a aussi adopté la résolution 283 (1970) qui définit certaines des mesures à prendre. La Cour n'a pas été invitée à donner un avis sur les conséquences juridiques de cette résolution. 121. La Cour se bornera donc à exprimer un avis sur les rapports avec le Gouvernement sud-africain qui, en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies et du droit international général, doivent être considérés comme incompatibles avec la déclaration d'illégalité et d'invalidité formulée au paragraphe 2 de la résolution 276 (1970), parce qu'ils peuvent impliquer une reconnaissance du caractère Iégal de la présence sud-africaine en Namibie. 122. Pour les raisons indiauées c!us haut et sous réserve des obser- vations formulées plus loin au paragraphe 125, les Etats Membres sont tenus de ne Das établir avec l'Afrique du Sud des relations convention- nelles dans tous les cas où le Gouvernement sud-africain prétendrait agir au nom de la Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne. S'agissant des traités bilatéraux en yigueur, les Etats Membres doivent s'abstenir d'invoquer ou d'appliquer les traités ou dispositions des traités conclus par l'Afrique du Sud au nom de la Namibie ou en ce aui la concerne oui nécessitent ur.2 collaboration intergouvernementale active. Pour ce qui est des traités multilatéraux, la même règle ne peut s'appliquer à certaines conventions générales, comme les conventions de caractère humanitaire, dont l'inexécution pourrait porter préjudice au peuple namibien. Il appartiendra aux organes internationaux compétents de prendre des mesures précises à cet égard. 123. Conformément au devoir de non-reconnaissance imposé par les paragraphes 2 et 5 de la résolution 276 (1970), les Etats Membres doivent s'abstenir d'accréditer auprès de l'Afrique du Sud des missions diplo- matiques ou des missions spéciales dont la juridictioii s'étendrait au territoire de la Namibie; ils doivent en outre s'abstenir d'envoyer des agents consulaires en Namibie et rappeler ceux qui s'y trouvent déjà. Ils doivent également signifier aux autorités sud-africaines qu'en entre- tenant des relations diplomatiques ou consulaires avec l'Afrique du Sud ils n'entendent pas reconnaître par là son autorité sur la Namibie. 124. Les restrictions qu'implique la non-reconnaissance de la présence de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie et les dispositions expresses du para- graphe 5 de la résolution 276 (1970) imposent aux Etats Membres I'obli- gation de ne pas entretenir avec l'Afrique du Sud agissant au nom de la
56 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may entrench its authority over the Territory. 125. In general, the non-recognition of South Africa's administration of the Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from international CO-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhab- itants of the Territory. 126. As to non-member States, although not bound by Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter, they have been called upon in paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolution 276 (1970) to give assistance in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia. In the view of the Court, the termination of the Mandate and the declaration of the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia are opposable to al1 States in the sense of barring erga omnes the legality of a situation which is main- tained in violation of international law: in particular, no State which enters into relations with South Africa concerning Namibia may expect the United Nations or its Members to recognize the validity or effects of such relationship, or of the consequences thereof. The Mandate having been terminated by decision of the international organization in which the supervisory authority over its administration was vested, and South Afri- ca's continued presence in Namibia having been dec~aredille~al, it is for non-member States to act in occordance with those decisions. 127. As to the general consequences resulting from the illegal presence of South Africa in Narnibia, al1 States should bear in mind that the injured entity is a people which must look to the international cornmunity for assistance in its progress towards the goals for which the sacred trust was instituted. 128. In its oral statement and in written communications to the Court, the Government of South Africa expressed the desire to supply the Court with further factual information concerning the purposes and objectives of South Africa's policy of separate development or apartheid, contending that to establish a breach of South Africa's substantive international obligations under the Mandate it would be necessary to prove that a particular exercise of South Africa's legislative or administrative powers was not directed in good faith towards the purpose of promoting to the utmost the well-being and progress of the inhabitants. It is claimed by the Government of South Africa that no act or omission on its part would constitute a violation of its international obligations unless it is
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 56 Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne des rapports ou des relations de caractère économique ou autre qui seraient de nature à affermir l'autorité de 1'Afrique du Sud dans le territoire. 125. D'une manière générale, la non-recoiinaissance de l'administra- tion sud-africaine dans le territoire ne devrait pas avoir pour conséquence de priver le peuple namibien des avantages qu'il peut tirer de la coopéra- tion internationale. En particulier, alors que les mesures prises officielle- ment par le Gouvernement sud-africain au nom de la Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne après Ia cessation du mandat sont illégales ou nulles, cette nullité ne saurait s'étendre à des actes, comme l'inscription des naissances, mariages ou décès à l'état civil, dont on ne pourrait mécon- naître les effets qu'au détriment des habitants du territoire. 126. Pour ce qui est des Etats non membres, et bien que ces Etats ne soient pas liés par les articles 24 et 25 de la Charte, les paragraphes 2 et 5 de la résolution 276 (1970) les invitent à s'associer à l'action des Nations Unies concernant la Namibie. De l'avis de la Cour, la cessation du mandat et la déclaration de l'illégalité de la présence sud-africaine en Namibie sont opposables à tous les Etats, en ce sens qu'elles rendent illégale erga omnes une situation qui se prolonge en violation du droit international; en particulier aucun Etat qui établit avec l'Afrique du Sud des relations concernant la Namibie ne peut escompter que I'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies ou ses Membres reconnaîtront la validité ou les effets de ces relations ou les conséquences qui en découlent. Dès lors qu'il a été mis fin au mandat par décision de l'organisation inter- nationale chargée du pouvoir de surveillance à son égard et que le main- tien de la présence sud-africaine en Namibie a été déclaré illégal, il appartient aux Etats non membres d'agir conformément à ces décisions. 127. Quant aux conséquences générales de la présence illégale de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, tous les Etats doivent se souvenir qu'elle porte préjudice à un peuple qui doit compter sur l'assistance de la com- munauté internationale pour atteindre les objectifs auxquels correspond la mission sacrée de civilisation. 128. Dans ses exposés oraux et dans ses communications écrites à la Cour, le Gouvernement sud-africain a exprimé ie désir de fournir à la Cour des renseignements de fait supplémentaires touchant les buts et les objectifs de sa politique dc développement séparé ou apartheid; il soutient en effet que, pour établir l'existence d'une violation des obliga- tions internationales fondamentales imposées par le mandat à l'Afrique du Sud, il faudrait prouver que, sur tel ou tel point particulier, l'Afrique du Sud n'a pas exercé ses pouvoirs législatifs ou administratifs en vue d'accroitre de bonne foi, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, le bien-être et le progrès des habitants. Le Gouvernement sud-africain affirme qu'un acte ou une omission qui lui serait imputable ne constituerait une viola-
shown that such act or omission was actuated bv a motive. or directed towards a purpose other than one to promote the interests of the inhab- itants of the Territory. 129. The Government of South Africa having made this request, the Court finds that no factual evidence is needed for the purpose of deter- mining whether the policy of apartheid as applied by South Africa in Namibia is in conformity with the international obligations assumed by South Africa under the Charter of the United Nations. In order to deter- mine whether the laws and decrees applied by South Africa in Namibia, which are a matter of public record, constitute a violatinn of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the question of intent or governmental discretion is not relevant; nor is it necessary to investigate or determine the effects of those measures upon the welfare of the inhabitants. i30. It is undisputed, and is amply supported by documents annexed to South Africa's written statement in these proceedings, that the official governmental policy pursued by South Africa in Namibia is to achieve a complete physical separation of races and ethnic groiips in separate areas within the Territory. The application of this policy has required, as has been conceded by South Africa, restrictive measures of control officially adopted and enforced in the Territory by the coercive power of the former Mandatory. These measures establish limitations, exclusions or restrictions for the members of the indigenous population groups in respect of their participation in certain types of activities, fields of study or of training, labour or employment and also submit them to restrictions or exclusions of residence and movement in large parts of the Territory. 13 1. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the former Mandatory had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a territory having an inter- national status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for al1 without distinction as to race. To establish instead, and to enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter. 132. The Government of South Africa also submitted a request that a plebiscite should be held in the Territory of Namibia under the joint supervision of the Court and the Government of South Africa (para. 16 above). This proposal was presented in connection with the request to submit additional factual evidence and as a means of bringing evidence before the Court. The Court having concluded that no further evidence
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 57 tion de ses obligations internationales que s'il était démontré que cet acte ou cette omission a été inspiré par un autre motif ou a eu un autre but que de servir les intérêts des habitants du territoire. 129. Le Gouvernement sud-africain ayant formulé cette demande, la Cour estime qu'il n'est nul besoin de preuves sur les faits pour dire si la politique d'apartheid pratiquée par l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie est conforme aux obligations internationales que l'Afrique du Sud a assu- mées aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies. S'agissant de déter- miner si les lois et décrets appliqués par l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, qui sont de notoriété publique, violent les buts et principes de la Charte des Nations Unies, la question de l'intention ou du pouvoir discrétion- naire du gouvernement est sans pertinence; il n'est pas nécessaire non plus d'examiner ou d'apprécier les effets de ces mesures sur le bien-être des habitants. 130. C'est un fait incontesté, et d'ailleurs abondamment démontré par les documents joints à l'exposé écrit de l'Afrique du Sud, que la politique officielle du Gouvernement sud-africain en Namibie tend à une sépara- tion physique complète des races et des groupes ethniques, chacun étant installé dans une zone distincte du territoire. Ainsi que l'Afrique du Sud l'a reconnu, la mise en œuvre de cette politique nécessite des mesures restrictives de contrôle, adoptées et appliquées officiellement dans le territoire par le pouvoir coercitif de l'ancien mandataire. Ces mesures ont pour objet de limiter, d'exclure ou de restreindre la participation des membres des groupes de population a~tochtones à certains types d'activité, à certains domaines d'étude ou de formation et à certains travaux ou emplois, et d'imposer aux autochtones des restrictions ou des prohibitions en matière de résidence et de déplacement dans de vastes régions du territoire. 131. En vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies. l'ancien mandataire s'était engagé à observer et à respecter, dans un territoire ayant un statut international, les droits de l'homme et les libertés fondamentales pour tous sans distinction de race. Le fait d'établir et d'imposer, au contraire, des distinctions, exclusions, restrictions et limitations qui sont uniquement fondées sur la race, la couleur, l'ascendance ou l'origine nationale ou ethnique et qui constituent un déni des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine, est une violation flagrante des buts et principes de la Charte. 132. Le Gouvernement sud-africain a égaiement présenté une demande tendant à ce qu'un plébiscite soit organisé dans le territoire de la Namibie sous la surveillance conjointe de la Cour et du Gouvernement sud- africain (par. 16 ci-dessus). Cette proposition a été introduite dans le cadre de la demande de présentation de preuves supplémentaires sur les faits et afin d'éclairer la Cour. La Cour ayant conclu qu'un complément
5 8 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (ADVISORY OPINION) was required, that the Mandate was validly terminated and that in consequence South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal and its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia are illegal and invalid, it follows that it cannot entertain this proposal. * * * 133. For these reasons, in reply to the question: "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?" by 13 votes to 2. (1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory ; by 11 votes to 4, (2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administra- tion; (3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia. Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-first day of June, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-one, in two copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Signed) ZAFRULLA KHAN, President. (Signed) S. AQUARONE, Registrar.
de preuve n'était pas nécessaire, qu'il a été valablement mis fin au mandat, qu'en conséquence la présence de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie est illégale et que toutes les mesures prises par elle au nom de la Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne sont illégales et nulles, elle ne saurait retenir cette proposition. 133. Par ces motifs, En réponse à la question: (c Quelles sont les conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité? )), par treize voix contre deux, 1) que, la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie étant illégale, l'Afrique du Sud a l'obligation de retirer immédiatement son administration de la Namibie et de cesser ainsi d'occuper le territoire; par onze voix contre quatre, 2) que les Etats Membres des Nations Unies ont l'obligation de recon- naître l'illégalité de la présence de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie et le défaut de validité des mesures prises par elle au nom de la Namibie ou en ce qui la concerne, et de s'abstenir de tous actes et en particulier de toutes relations avec le Gouvernement sud-africain qui implique- raient la reconnaissance de la légalité de cette présence et de cette administration, ou qui constitueraient une aide ou une assistance à cet égard ; 3) qu'il incombe aux Etats qui ne sont pas membres des Nations Unies de prêter leur assistance, dans les limites du sous-paragraphe 2 ci- dessus, à l'action entreprise par les Nations Unies en ce qui concerne la Namibie. Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de la Paix, La Haye, le vingt et un juin mil neuf cent soixante et onze, en deux exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et dont l'autre sera transmis au Secrétaire général de l'organisation des Nations Unies. Le Président, (Signé) ZAFRULLA KHAN. Le Greffier, (Signé) S. AQUARONE.
President Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN makes the following declaration : 1 am in entire agreement with the Opinion of the Court but would wish to add some observations on two or three aspects of the presenta- tion made to the Court on behalf of South Africa. It was contended that under the supervisory system as devised in the Covenant of the League and the different mandate agreements, the mandatory could, in the last resort, flout the wishes of the Council of the League by casting its vote in opposition to the directions which the Council might propose to give to the mandatory. The argument runs that this system was deliberately so devised, with open eyes, as to leave the Council powerless in face of the veto of the mandatory if the latter chose to exercise it. Pn support of this contention reliance was placed on paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the Covenant of the League by virtue of which any Member of the League not represented on the Council was to be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member. This entitled the manda- tory to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council in which a matter affecting its interests as a mandatory came under consideration. Under paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Covenant decisions of the Council required the agreement of al1 the Members of the League represented at the meeting. This is known as the unanimity rule and by virtue thereof it was claimed that a mandatory possessed a right of veto when attend- ing a meeting of the Council in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Article 4 and consequently the last word on the manner and method of the administration of the mandate rested with the mandatory. This conten- tion is untenable. Were it well founded it would reduce the whole system of mandates to mockery. As the Court, in its Judgment of 1966, observed: "In practice, the unanimity rule was frequently not insisted upon, or its impact was mitigated by a process of give-and-take, and by various procedural devices to which both the Council and the mandatories lent themselves. So far a.s the Court's information goes, there never occurred any case in which a mandatory 'vetoed' what would otherwise have been a Council decision. Equally, how- ever, much trouble was taken to avoid situations in which the mandatory would have been forced to acquiesce in the views of the rest of the Council short of casting an adverse vote. The occa- sional deliberate absence of the mandatory from a meeting, enabled decisions to be taken that the mandatory might have felt obliged to vote against if it had been present. This was part of the above- mentioned process for arriving at generally acceptable conclusions." (I.C. J. Reports 1966, pp. 44-45.)
Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN, Président, fait la déclaration suivante : Je m'associe sans réserve à l'evis de la Cour mais je tiens à ajouter quelques observations sur deux ou trois aspects des thèses développées par l'Afrique du Sud devant la Cour. L'Afrique du Sud a fait valoir que, dans le système de surveillance prévu par le Pacte de la Société des Nations et les divers accords de mandat, un mandataire pouvait, en dernier ressort, déjouer la volonté du Conseil de la Société en votant contre les directives que le Conseil se proposait de lui donner. Sa thèse est que le système avait été conçu, de propos délibéré, pour que le Conseil reste désarmé devant le veto du mandataire si celui-ci décidait d'en user. Afin d'étayer cette affirmation, l'Afrique du Sud a invoqué l'article 4, paragraphe 5, du Pacte de la Société des Nations, en vertu duquel tout Membre de la Société qui n'était pas représenté au Conseil devait être invité à y envoyer siéger un représentant lorsqu'une question qui l'intéressait particulièrement était portée devant cet organe. Le mandataire pouvait donc se fzire représenter au Conseil quand celui-ci examinait une question touchant à ses intérêts de mandataire. Or, d'après l'article 5, paragraphe 1, du Pacte, les décisions du Conseil étaient prises à l'unanimité des Membres de la Société repré- sentés à la réunion. En raison de l'existence de cette règle, dite règle de l'unanimité, l'Afrique du Sud a soutenu qu'un mandataire aurait disposé d'un droit de veto lorsqu'il assistait à une réunion du Conseil en vertu de l'article 4, paragraphe 5, de sorte que le mandataire, et non le Conseil, aurait eu le dernier mot sur la façon d'administrer le mandat. Cette thèse est insoutenable. Si elle était fondée, le système des mandats tout entier n'eût été qu'un simulacre. Ainsi que la Cour l'a dit dans son arrêt de 1966: (( En pratique, il était fréquent que l'on n'insiste pas sur la règle de l'unanimité ou que l'on en atténue les effets au moyen de compromis et d'artifices de procédure auxquels le Conseil et le Mandataire se prêtaient. A la connaissance de la Cour, aucun Mandataire n'a jamais opposé son veto à une décision éventuelle du Conseii. On par ailleurs pris grand soin d'éviter de mettre les Mandataires dans l'obligation d'avoir à choisir entre l'adoption du point de vue des autres membres du Conseil et un vote contraire. En s'abstenant volontairement de siéger à telle ou telle séance, le Mandataire permettait au Conseil de prendre des décisions contre lesquelles il aurait cru devoir voter s'il avait été présent. Cela faisait partie des moyens d'aboutir à des conclusions généralement acceptables, qui viennent d'être mentionnées. » (C.Z.J. Recueil 1966, p. 44 et 45.)
The representative of South Africa, in answer to a question by a Member of the Court, confessed that there was not a single case on record in which the representative of a mandatory Power ever cast a negative vote in a meeting of the Council so as to block a decision of the Council. It is thus established that in practice the last word always rested with the Council of the League and not with the mandatory. The Covenant of the League made ample provision to secure the effectiveness of the Covenant and conformity to its provisions in respect of the obligations entailed by membership of the League. A Member of the League which had violated any covenant of the League could be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives of al1 the other Members of the League represented thereon (para. 4, Art. 16, of the Covenant). The representative of South Africa conceded that: ". . . if a conflict between a mandatory and the Council occurred and if al1 the Members of the Council were of the opinion that the mandatory had violated a covenant of the League, it would have been legally possible for the Council to expel the mandatory from the League and thereafter decisions of the Council could no longer be thwarted by the particular mandatory-for instance, a decision to revoke the mandate. The mandatory would then no longer be a Member of the League and would then accordingly no longer be entitled to attend and vote in Council meetings. . . . we agree that by expelling a mandatory the Council could have overcome the practical or mechanical difficulties created by the unanimity requirement." (Hearing of 15 March 1971 .) It was no doubt the consciousness of this position which prompted the deliberate absence of a mandatory from a meeting of the Council of the Le'ague which enabled the Council to take decisions that the mandatory might have felt obliged to vote against if it had been present. If a mandatory ceased to be a Member of the League and the Council felt that the presence of its representative in a meeting of the Council dealing with matters affecting the mandate would be helpful, it could still be invited to attend as happened in the case of Japan after it ceased to be a Member of the League. But it could not attend as of right under paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the Covenant. In addition, if need arose the Covenant could be amended under Article 26 of the Covenant. In fact no such need arose but the authority was provided in the Covenant. It would thus be idle to contend that the mandates system was deliberately devised, with open eyes, so as to leave the Council of the League powerless against the veto of the mandatory if the latter chose to exercise it. Those responsible for the Covenant were anxious and worked hard
Le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud, répondant à une question posée par un membre de la Cour, a admis qu'on n'avait pas connaissance d'un seul cas où le représentant d'une puissance mandataire eût émis un vote négatif à une réunion du Conseil, de manière à paralyser une décision. Il est donc établi qu'en pratique c'est toujours le Conseil de la Société et non le mandataire qui a eu le dernier mot. D'amples précautions étaient prises dans le Pacte de la Société des Nations pour garantir son application effective ainsi que le respect des clauses concernant l'exécution des obligations qui incombaient aux Membres. Un Membre de la Société qui se rendait coupable de la viola- tion d'un des engagements résultant du Pacte pouvait être exclu de la Société, l'exclusion étant prononcée par le vote de tous les autres Membres de la Société représentés au Conseil (art. 16, par. 4, du Pacte). Le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a reconnu que: ((si un confiit s'était élevé entre un mandataire et le Conseil et si tous les Membres du Conseil avaient été d'avis que le mandataire avait violé l'un des engagements résultant du Pacte, il aurait été juridi- quement possible que le Conseil exclue de la Société le mandataire, qui n'aurait plus alors été là pour faire opposition aux décisions du Conseil, par exemple à une décision de révoquer le mandat. Le mandataire n'aurait DIUS été Membre de la Société des Nations et n'aurait donc plus eu le droit de siéger et de voter aux séances du Conseil. ... nous admettons qu'en prononçant l'expulsion d'un mandataire le Conseil aurait pu surmonter les difficultés pratiques ou mécaniques créées par la règle de l'unanimité. » (Audience du 15 mars 1971.) C'est à coup sûr parce qu'on avait conscience de cette situation qu'il est arrivé qu'un mandataire s'abstienne volontairement d'assister à une réunion du Conseil de la Société des Nations, lui permettant ainsi d'adop- ter des décisions contre lesquelles ce mandataire aurait pu se sentir obligé de voter s'il avait été présent. Si, un mandataire ayant cessé d'être Membre de la Société des Nations, le Conseil estimait néanmoins utile que ce mandataire fût représenté à une réunion où des questions intéressant le mandat devaient être discu- tées, il pouvait encore l'inviter à y assister; il le fit dans le cas du Japon, après que cet Etat eut quitté la Société. Mais un mandataire se trouvant dans cette situation n'aurait pu se prévaloir de l'article 4, paragraphe 5, du Pacte pour siéger de plein droit. Au surplus, si le besoin s'en était fait sentir, le Pacte aurait pu être amendé conformément à son article 26. 11 n'en a pas été ainsi, mais la possibilité existait. Il serait donc vain d'àffirmer que le système des mandats a été conçu, de propos délibéré, pour que le Conseil de la Société soit désarmé si un mandataire décidait d'exercer son droit de veto. Les auteurs du Pacte ont voulu instituer un système qui permette de
6 1 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (DECL. ZAFRULLA KHAN) to institute a systern which would be effective in carrying out to the full the sacred trust of civilization. Had they deliberately devised a framework which rnight enable a mandatory so inclined to defy the systern with irnpunity, they would have been guilty of defeating the declared purpose of the mandates system and this is not to be thought of; nor is it to be irnagined that these wise statesrnen, despite al1 the care that they took and the reasoning and persuasion that they brought into play, were finally persuaded into accepting as reality that which could so easily be turned into a fiction. In my view the supervisory authority of the General Assembly of the United Nations in respect of the rnandated territory, being derived frorn the Covenant of the League and the Mandate Agreement, is not restricted by any provision of the Charter of the United Nations. The extent of that authority must be deterrnined by reference to the relevant provisions of the Covenant of the League and the Mandate Agreement. The General Assembly was entitled to exercise the sarne authority in respect of the administration of the Territory by the Mandatory as was possessed by the Council of the League and its decisions and determinations in that respect had the same force and effect as the decisions and determinations of the Council of the League. This was well illustrated in the case of General Assembly resolution 289 (IV), adopted on 21 Novernber 1949 recommending that Libya shall become indipendent as soon as possible and in any case not later than 1 January 1952. A detailed procedure for the achievernent of this objective was laid down, including the appointment by the General Assembly of a United Nations Comrnis- sioner in Libya and a Council to aid and advise hirn, etc. AI1 the recom- mendations contained in this resolution constituted binding decisions; decisionc which had been adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Charter but whose binding character was derived frorn Annex XI to the Treaty of Peace with Italy. The representative of South Africa, during the course of his oral sub- mission, refrained from using the expression "apartheid" but urged: ". . . South Africa is in the position that its conduct would be unlawful if the differentiation which it adrnittedly practises should be directed at, and have the result- of subordinating the interests of one or certain groups on a racial or ethnic basis to those of others, . . . If that can be established in fact, then South Africa would be guilty of violation of its obligations in that respect, other- wise not.'' (Hearing of 17 March 197 1 .)
remplir efficacement la mission sacrée de civilisation et ils n'ont pas mesuré leurs peines pour y parvenir. S'ils avaient sciemment créé un cadre dans lequel le mandataire qui y aurait été disposé aurait pu braver impunément le système, ils auraient été coupables d'aller à l'encontre de l'objet déclaré du système des mandats, hypothèse qui n'est pas à envisager; on ne saurait imaginer non plus que, malgré le mal qu'ils se sont donné, et malgré leur effort de réflexion et de persuasion, ces politiques avisés ont été en fin de compte convaincus d'accepter comme réel ce qu'on pouvait si facilement transformer en simple fiction. Du fait qu'ils découlent du Pacte de la Société des Nations et de l'accord de mandat, les pouvoirs de surveillance de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur le territoire sous mandat ne sont limités, selon moi, par aucune disposition de la Charte des Nations Unies. Pour déterminer l'étendue de ces pouvoirs, il faut se reporter aux dispositions pertinentes du Pacte et de l'accord de mandat. L'Assemblée générale peut, pour ce qui est de l'administration du territoire par le mandataire, exercer les pouvoirs que le Conseil de la Société des Nations possédait, et ses décisions et résolutions en ce domaine ont la même force et le même effet que les décisions et résolutions dudit Conseil. Je n'en veux pour preuve que la résolution 289 (IV), en date du 21 novembre 1949, par laquelle l'Assemblée générale recommandait que la Libye accède à l'indépendance le plus tôt possible et en tout cas au plus tard le Ierjanvier 1952. Toute une procédure était prévue pour parvenir à ce résultat, y compris la désignation par l'Assemblée générale d'un commissaire des Nations Unies pour la Libye et la constitution d'un conseil chargé de lui apporter son concours et ses avis. Toutes les recommandations figurant dans cette résolution consti- tuaient autant de décisions impératives, adoptées conformément aux dispositions de la Charte, mais qui tiraient leur force obligatoire de l'annexe XI du traité de paix avec l'Italie. Dans son exposé oral, le représentant de l'Afrique su Sud s'est gardé d'employer le mot d'apartheid. mais, selon ses déclarations, [( l'Afrique du Sud considère que son comportement serait illégal si la différenciation qu'elle pratique - elle ne s'en cache pas - visait et conduisait à subordonner pour des raisons raciales ou ethniques les intérêts d'un ou de certains groupes à ceux des autres ... Si cela pouvait être établi en fait, alors l'Afrique du Sud serait coupable d'avoir failli à ses obligations à cet égard, autrement pas. » (Audience du 17 mars 1971 .)
The policy of apartheid was initiated by Prime Minister Malan and was then vigorously put into effect by his successors, Strijdom and Verwoerd. It has been continuously proclaimed that the purpose and object of the policy are the maintenance of White domination. Speaking to the South African House of Assembly, as late as 1963, Dr. Verwoerd said : "Reduced to its simplest form the problem is nothing else than this: Vde want to keep South Africa White . . . Keeping it White can only mean one thing, namely, White domination, not leadership, not guidance, but control, supremacy. If we are agreed that it is the desire of the people that the White man should be able to continue to protect himself by White domination . . . we say that it can be achieved by separate development." (I.C.J. Pleadings, South West Africa, Vol. IV, p. 264.) South Africa's reply to this in its Rejoinder in the 1966 cases was in effect that these and other similar pronouncements were qualified by "the promise to provide separate homelands for the Bantu groups" wherein the Bantu would be free to develop his capacities to the same degree as the White could do in the rest of the country. But this promise itself was always subject to the qualification that the Bantu homelands would develop under the guardianship of the White. In this coiinection it was urged that in 1361 the "Prime Minister spoke of a greater degree of ultimate independence for Bantu homelands than he had rnentioned a decade earlier". This makes little difference in respect of the main purpose of the policy which continued to be the domination of the White. It needs to be remembered, however, that the Court is not concerned in these proceedings with conditions in South Africa. The Court is concerned with the administration of South West Africa as carried on by the Mandatory in discharge of his obligations under the Mandate which prescribed that the well-being and development of people who were not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world constituted a sacred trust of civilization and that the best method of giving effect to this principle was that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience and their geographical position could best undertake this responsibility (Art. 22, paras. 1 and 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations). The administration was to be carried on "in the interests of the indi- genous population" (para. 6, Art. 22). For the discharge of this obligation it is not enough that the administration should believe in good faith that the policy it proposes to follow is in the best interests of al1 sections of the population. The supervisory authority must be satisfied that it is in the
La politique d'apartheid a été inaugurée par M. Malan, alors premier ministre, et vigoureusement poursuivie par ses successeurs, MM. Strijdom et Verwoerd. Il a été constamment proclamé que le but et l'objet de cette politique étaient le maintien de la domination blanche. M. Verwoerd déclarait encore en 1963 devant l'Assemblée de l'Afrique du Sud : I( Réduit à sa forme la plus simple, le problème n'est autre que le suivant: nous voulons que l'Afrique du Sud reste blanche ... La garder blanche ne peut vouloir dire qu'une seule chose, à savoir assurer la domination des blancs, leur assurer non la (( direction )), non I'(( orientation )), mais le (( contrôle », la (( suprématie )). Si nous sommes d'accord pour dire que c'est le désir du peuple que les blancs soient en mesure de continuer à se protéger en maintenant la domination blanche ... nous disons que le moyen d'y parvenir est le développement séparé. » (C.I.J. Mémoires, Sud-Ouest africain, vol. IV, p. 264.) Dans les affaires de 1966, l'Afrique du Sud a expliqué en substance, dans sa duplique, que cette déclaration et d'autres propos analogues étaient tempérés par la «promesse de créer des foyers (homelands) distincts pour les groupes bantous 1) où les Bantous seraient libres de tirer parti de leurs aptitudes de la même façon que les blancs dans le reste du pays. Mais cette promesse elle-même était toujours sujette à cette restriction que les foyers bantous devraient se développer sous la tutelle des blancs. On a dit à ce propos qu'en 1961, (( le premier ministre a parlé d'accorder en définitive aux foyers bantous une plus grande indépendance qu'il ne l'avait fait dix ans auparavant )). Mais cela ne change guère le but essentiel de la politique suivie, qui reste l'hégémonie des blancs. Il convient toutefois de rappeler que, dans la présente procédure, la Cour n'a pas à se préoccuper de la situation en Afrique du Sud. Ce qui l'intéresse, c'est l'administration du Sud-Ouest africain, telle qu'elle a été assurée par le mandataire en exécution des obligations que lui imposait le mandat, lequel prévoyait que le bien-être et le développement des peuples non encore capables de se diriger eux-mêmes dans les conditions particulièrement difficiles du monde moderne formaient une mission sacrée de civilisation et que la meilleure méthode de réaliser pratique- ment ce principe était de confier la tutelle de ces peuples aux nations développées qui, en raison de leurs ressources, de leur expérience ou de leur position géographique, étaient le mieux à même d'assumer cette responsabilité (art. 22, par. 1 et 2, du Pacte de la Société des Na- tions). L'administration devait être exercée c( dans l'intérêt de la population indigène )) (art. 22, par. 6). Pour qu'une obligation semblable soit respec- tée, il ne suffit pas que l'administration croie de bonne foi que la politique qu'elle se propose de suivre est conforme à l'intérêt bien entendu de toutes les couches de la population: encore faut-il que l'autorité chargée
best interests of the indigenous population of the Territory. This follows from Article 6 of the Mandate Agreement for South West Africa, read with paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the Covenant. The representative of South Africa, while admitting the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination, urged in his oral statement that the exercise of that right must take into full account the limitations imposed, according to him, on such exercise by the tribal and cultural divisions in the Territory. He concluded that in the case of South West Africa self-determination "may well find itself practically restricted to some kind of autonomy and local self-government within a larger arrangement of CO-operation" (hearing of 17 March 1971). This in effect means a denial of self-determination as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. Whatever may have been the conditions in South Africa calling for special measures, those conditions did not exist in the case of South West Africa at the time when South Africa assumed the obligation of a manda- tory in respect of the Territory, nor have they come into existence since. In South West Africa the small White element was not and is not indi- genous to the Territory. There can be no excuse in the case of South West Africa for the application of the policy of apartheid so far as the interests of the White population are concerned. It is claimed, however, that the various indigenous groups of the population have reached different stages of development and that there are serious ethnic considerations which cal1 for the application of the policy of separate development of each group. The following observations of the Director of the Institute of Race Relations, London, are apposite in this context: ". . . White South African arguments are based on the different stages of development reached by various groups of people. It is undisputed fact that groups have developed at different paces in respect of the control of environment (although understanding of other aspects of life has not always grown at the same pace). But the aspect of South African thought which is widely questioned elsewhere is the assumption that an individual is permanently limited by the limitations of his group. His ties with it may be strong; indeed, when considering politics and national survival, the assumption that they will be stroi-ig is altogether reasonable. Again, as a matter of choice, people may prefer to mix socially with those of their own group, but to Say that by law people of one group must mix with no others can really only proceed from a conviction not only that the other groups are inferior but that every member of each of the other groups is permanently and irremediably inferior. It is this that rankles. 'Separate but equal' is possible so long as it is a matter of choice by both parties; legally imposed by one, it must be regarded by the other as a humiliation, and far more so if it applies not only
de la surveillance parvienne à la conviction que cette politique est con- forme à l'intérêt de la population indigène du territoire. C'est ce qui découle de l'article 6 du mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain et de l'article 22, paragraphe 6, du Pacte. Le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a reconnu, certes, le droit du peuple du Sud-Ouest africain à l'autodétermination, mais il a affirmé dans son exposé oral que, pour l'exercice de ce droit, il faIIait tenir pleine- ment compte des limites qu'imposeraient, selon lui, les divisions tribales et culturelles du territoire. Il a conclu que dans le cas du Sud-Ouest africain l'autodétermination (i peut fort bien, dans la pratique, se trouver réduite à une sorte d'autonomie locale dans le cadre d'un système de coopération plus large » (audience du 17 mars 1971). Cela revient en fait à nier le droit à l'autodétermination, tel que l'envisage la Charte des Nations Unies. Quelles qu'aient pu être les circonstances qui, en Afrique du Sud, ont amené à prendre des mesures spéciales, ces circonstances n'existaient pas dans le Sud-Ouest africain au moment où l'Afrique du Sud y a assumé les obligations de mandataire et elles n'ont pas non plus fait leur ap- parition depuis. Dans le Sud-Ouest africain, la petite minorité blanche n'a jamais constitué une population autochtone. Les intérêts de la popu- lation blanche ne sauraient donc y excuser l'application de la politique d'apartheid. On affirme cependant que les différents groupes de popula- tion indigènes sont à des niveaux de développement différents et que d'importantes considérations ethniques obligent à appliquer une politique de développement séparé à chacun de ces groupes. Les observations suivantes du directeur de l'Institut des relations interraciales de Londres méritent à ce propos d'être citées: Les Sud-Africains blancs tirent argument des différents niveaux de développement qu'auraient atteint les divers groupes de popu- lation. Il est de fait que ces groupes ont évolué plus ou moins vite pour ce qui touche la maîtrise de l'environnement (le rythme de l'évolution pouvant cependant être différent pour d'autres aspects de la vie). Mais l'aspect du raisonnement sud-africain le plus généra- lement critiqué est le postulat selon lequel les limitations du groupe s'imposent à jamais à l'individu. Les attaches de l'individu avec le groupe peuvent être fortes; sur le plan de la politique et de l'existence nationale, il est même parfaitement raisonnable de supposer qu'elles le sont. De même, s'ils ont le choix, les gens peuvent préférer fréquen- ter les membres de leur propre groupe, mais dire qu'en vertu de la loi les gens appartenant à un certain groupe ne doivent fréquenter personne d'autre procède forcément de la conviction, non seulement que les autres groupes sont inférieurs, mais encore que chaque membre de tout autre groupe l'est aussi, d'une façon permanente et irrémédiable. C'est cette idée qui révolte. ((Séparés mais égaux )), cela peut se concevoir s'il s'agit d'un libre choix des deux parties
64 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (DECL. ZAFRULLA KHAN) to the group as a whole but to individuals. In fact, of course, what separate developrnent has meant has been anything but equal. These are some reasons why it will be hard to find natives of Africa who believe that to extend the policy of separate development to South West Africa even more completely than at present is in the interest of any but the White inhabitants." (Quoted in I.C.J. Pleadings, South West Africa, Vol. IV, p. 339.) Towards the close of his oral presentation the representative of South Africa made a plea to the Court in the following terms : "In our submission, the general requirernent placed by the Charter on al1 United Nations activities is that they must further peace, friendly relations, and CO-operation between nations, and especially between member States. South Africa, as a member State, is under a duty to contribute towards those ends, and she desires to do so, although she has no intention of abdicating what she regards as her responsibilities on the sub-continent of southern Africa. If there are to be genuine efforts at achieving a peaceful solution, they will have to satisfy certain criteria. They will have to respect the will of the self-determining peoples of South West Africa. They will have to take into account the facts of geography, of economics, of budgetary requirements, of the ethnic conditions and of the state of development. If this Court, even in an opinion on legal questions, could indicate the road towards a peaceful and constructive solution along these lines, then the Court would have made a great contribution, in our respectful submission, to the cause of international peace and security and, more, to the cause of friendly relations amongst not only the nations but amongst al1 men." (Hearing of 5 March 197 1 .) The representative of the United States of America, in his oral presenta- tion, observed that : ". . . the question of holding a free and proper plebiscite under appropriate auspices and with conditions and arrangements which would ensure a fair and informed expression of the will of the people of Namibia deserves study. It is a matter which might be properly submitted to the competent political organs of the United Nations, which have consistently manifested their concern that the
intéressées; mais si c'est une solution imposée légalement par l'une des parties, l'autre ne peut qu'y voir une brimade, surtout si elle ne s'applique pas seulement au groupe en tant que tel, mais aussi aux individus. 11 est évident qu'en réalité rien n'est moins ((égal )) que le développement séparé. Voilà donc quelques-unes des raisons qui font qu'il se trouvera difficilement des Africains pour penser qu'une extension encore plus grande de la politique de développement séparé au Sud-Ouest afri- cain sert les intérêts d'autres habitants que les blancs. )) (Cité dans C.I.J. Mémoires, Sud-Ouest africain, vol. IV, p. 339.) Vers la fin de son exposé oral le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud a adressé à la Cour le plaidoyer suivant: 11 Selon nous, la condition générale à laquelle la Charte soumet toutes les activités des Nations Unies est qu'elles doivent favoriser la paix, les relations amicales et la coopération entre les nations, notamment entre les Etats Membres. En tant qu'Etat Membre, l'Afrique du Sud a le devoir de contribuer à ces fins, et elle en a le désir, bien qu'elle n'ait aucunement l'intention d'abdiquer ce qu'elle considère comme ses responsabilités dans le sous-continent de l'Afrique australe. Les efforts visant à une solution pacifique devront, pour être authentiques, répondre à certains critères. Ils devront respecter la volonté des populations du Sud-Ouest africain disposant de leur propre sort. Ils devront tenir compte des réalités géographiques, économiques et budgétaires, des conditions ethniques et du degré de développement. Si la Cour, même dans un avis sur des questions juridiques, pouvait montrer la voie vers une solution pacifique et constructive en ce sens, nous estimons qu'elle contribuerait grandement - nous le lui disons respectueusement - à la cause de la paix et de la sécurité internationales et, mieux encore, à celle des relations amicales non seulement entre les nations mais aussi entre tous les hommes. )) (Audience du 5 mars 1971 .) Le représentant des Etats-Unis d'Amérique a déclaré devant la Cour ((qu'il vaut la peine d'étudier la question de l'organisation d'un plébiscite loyal et régulier, sous des auspices appropriés, dans des conditions et selon des modalités qui garantiraient à la population de la Namibie la possibilité d'exprimer sa volonté librement et en connaissance de cause. Cette question pourrait fort bien être soumise aux organes politiques compétents des Nations Unies, qui ont cons-
Namibians achieve self-determination. The Court rnay wish to so indicate in its opinion to the Security Council." (Hearing of 9 March 1971.) The Court having arrived at the conclusion that the Mandate has been terminated and that the presence of South Africa in South West Africa is illegal, 1 would, in response to the plea made by the representative of South Africa, suggest that South Africa should offer to withdraw its administration from South West Africa in consultation with the United Nations so that a process of withdrawal and substitution in its place of United Nations' control rnay be agreed upon and carried into effect with the minimum disturbance of present administrative arrangements. It should also be agreed upon that, after the expiry of a certain period but not later than a reasonable time-limit thereafter, a plebiscite rnay be held under the supervision of the United Nations, which should ensure the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite, to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory with regard to their political future. If the result of the plebiscite should reveal a clear preponderance of views in support of a particular course and objective, that course should be adop- ted so that the desired objective rnay be achieved as early as possible. South Africa's insistence upon giving effect to the will of the peoples of South West Africa proceeds presumably from the conviction that an overwhelming majority of the peoples of the Territory desire closer political integration with the Republic of South Africa. Should that prove in fact to be the case the United Nations, being wholly committed to the principle of self-determination of peoples, would be expected to readily give effect to the clearly expressed wishes of the peoples of the Territory. Should the result of the plebiscite disclose their preference for a different solution, South Africa should equally readily accept and respect such manifestation of the will of the peoples concerned and should CO-operate with the United Nations in giving effect to it. The Government of South Africa, being convinced that an overwhelming majority of the peoples of South West Africa truly desire incorporation with the Republic, would run little risk of a contrary decision through the adoption of the procedure here suggested. If some such procedure is adopted and the conclusion that rnay emerge therefrom, whatever it rnay prove to be, is put into effect, South Africa would have vindicated itself in the eyes of the world and in the estimation of the peoples of South West Africa, whose freely expressed wishes must be supreme. There would still remain the possibility, and, if South Africa's estimation of the situa- tion is close enough to reality, the strong probability, that once the peoples of South West Africa have been put in a position to manage their own affairs without any outside influence or control and they have had greater experience of the difficulties and problems with which they would be confronted, they rnay freely decide, in the exercise of their sovereignty, to establish a closer political relationship with South Africa. The adoption
tamment manifesté leur souci de voir les Namibiens obtenir l'auto- détermination et la Cour voudra peut-être indiquer cela dans l'avis qu'elle adressera au Conseil de sécurité. )) (Audience du 9 mars 1971 .) La Cour étant parvenue à la conclusicn qu'il a été mis fin au mandat et que la présence de l'Afrique du Sud dans le Sud-Ouest africain est illégale, je me permets de répondre à l'appel adressé à la Cour par le représentant de l'Afrique du Sud et de suggérer que l'Afrique du Sud offre de retirer son administration du Sud-Ouest africain en consultation avec les Nations Unies, de façon qu'une opération de retrait, suivie d'une prise en charge par les Nations Unies, puisse être envisagée d'un commun accord et menée à bien avec le moins possible de bouleversement dans l'organisation administrative existante. Il devrait également être convenu que, à l'expiration d'une certaine période mais sans dépasser un délai raisonnable, un plébiscite destiné à permettre aux habitants du territoire de faire connaître leurs vœux sur leur avenir politique aurait lieu sous la surveillance des Nations Unies, qui assureraient la liberté et l'impartialité de la consultation. Si le plébiscite dégageait une nette majorité en faveur d'une solution et d'un objectif déterminé, c'est cette solution qui devrait être adoptée en vue d'atteindre dès que possible l'objectif en question. L'Afrique du Sud insiste pour que la volonté des peuples du Sud-Ouest africain soit respectée, sans doute parce qu'elle est convaincue qu'une majorité écrasante des populations du territoire se prononcerait en faveur d'une intégration politique plus étroite avec la République sud-africaine. S'il en était ainsi, l'Organisation des Nations Unies, qui est tout acquise au principe de l'autodétermination, s'inclinerait devant le vœu clairement exprimé par les populations du territoire. Si, au contraire, le plébiscite devait révéler que ces dernières préfèrent une autre solution, l'Afrique du Sud devrait de même accepter et respecter leur volonté et coopérer avec les Nations Unies pour qu'elle soit suivie d'effet. Le Gouvernement sud-africain est certain qu'une majorité écrasante de la population du Sud-Ouest africain désire véritablement s'intégrer à la République; dans ce cas, l'adoption de la méthode que je viens de décrire ne l'exposerait guère au risque d'une décision adverse. Si l'on a recours à une méthode semblable et si la conclusion qu'elle aura permis de dégager, quelle qu'elle soit, est effectivement appliquée, l'Afrique du Sud se sera justifiée aux yeux du monde et dans l'estime des peuples du Sud-Ouest africain, dont la volonté librement exprimée doit en tout cas l'emporter. Il resterait la possibilité et, si l'appréciation que l'Afrique du Sud porte sur la situation est suffisamment proche de la réalité, la forte probabilité que, quand les peuples du Sud-Ouest africain, une fois mis à même de diriger leurs propres destinées sans pression ni contrôle ex- térieurs, auront acquis une plus grande expérience des difficultés et des problèmes à surmonter, ils décident librement et souverainement de nouer des relations politiques plus étroites avec l'Afrique du Sud. En
66 NAMlBIA (S.W. AFRICA) (DECL. ZAFRULLA KHAN) of the course here suggested would indeed make a great contribution "to the cause of international peace and security and, more, to the cause of friendly relations amongst not only the nations but amongst al1 men". Vice-President A~~ou~and Judges PADILLA NERVO, PETRÉN, ONYEAMA, DILLARD and DE CASTRO append separate opinions to the Opinion of the Court. Judges Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE and GROS append dissenting opinions to the Opinion of the Court. (Initialled) Z.K. (Initialled) S. A.
NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (DÉCL. ZAFRULLA KHAN) 66 adoptant la ligne de conduite suggérée ici, l'Afrique du Sud contribuerait grandement ((à la cause de la paix et de la sécuriti internationales et, mieux encore, à celle des relations amicales non seulement entre les nations mais aussi entre tous les hommes ». M. AMMOUN, Vice-président, et M M. FADILLA KEKLO, iri~~f", ONYEAMA, DILLARD et DE CASTRO, jugr:~, joipnei-rt à I'avis consultatif les exposés de leur opinion individuelle. Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE et M. GRCS, j~ges, joignent à l'avis consultatif les exposés de leur opinion dissidente. (Paruphé) Z.K. (r"ùi-ûphé) S.A.

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General que nomeou delegado da Polícia Civil envolvido no caso Marielle é o novo chefe do Estado-Maior do Exército - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


O general Richard Nunes, que nomeou um dos envolvidos no caso Marielle, Rivaldo Barbosa, para a chefia da Polícia Civil em 2018, foi nomeado no dia 28 de março para o cargo de chefe do Estado-Maior do Exército. A indicação de Rivaldo, apontado como planejador da execução de Marielle, ocorreu um dia antes do assassinato da vereadora, quando o Rio de Janeiro passava pela intervenção militar comandada pelo general Braga Netto. A nova nomeação de Nunes foi indicada pelo comandante do Exército, Tomás Paiva, e aprovada por Luiz Inácio. 

O chefe do Estado-Maior do Exército (EME) é responsável por “estudar, planejar, orientar, coordenar, controlar e avaliar as atividades relativas à atuação do Comando do Exército, segundo as decisões e diretrizes do Comandante do Exército”. É um dos mais altos cargos da força terrestre.

Quatro dias antes da nomeação, o relatório da Polícia Federal sobre o caso Marielle havia apontado que Richard Nunes foi o responsável por nomear Rivaldo Barbosa para o chefe de Polícia Civil. Quem indicou Barbosa primeiramente foi o setor de inteligência do Comando Militar Leste (CML) do Exército, junto de outros quatro nomes. O CML era comandado por Braga Netto, interventor no Rio de Janeiro. No sentido contrário, Barbosa chegou a ser contraindicado pelo setor de inteligência da Polícia Civil. Mesmo assim, Nunes insistiu na indicação e “bancou” a nomeação final de Barbosa ao cargo. 

‘Ludibriado’ ou interessado?

Questionado pelo jornal monopolista Folha de São Paulo sobre a nomeação, Nunes afirmou que “naquela época, não havia nada que sinalizasse uma coisa dessas, uma coisa estapafúrdia” e que “pode ter sido ludibriado” por Barbosa na nomeação. Contudo, não explicou o porque insistiu na nomeação apesar da contraindicação clara. 

Depois, em resposta ao mesmo jornal, Nunes chegou a questionar o envolvimento de Barbosa, talvez em tentativa de “limpar a barra”: “é isso que está estranho para a minha cabeça até o momento. Se realmente houve essa procrastinação de cinco anos, não foi do Rivaldo e do Giniton. Porque eles, com um ano, prenderam os caras [os executores do crime]”. 

Independente se Nunes sabia ou não dos planos de Rivaldo de participar do assassinato de Marielle, a postura do general foi suspeita, e merece investigação. O que merece atenção agora, além disso, é a indicação de Nunes para o EME por parte de Tomás Paiva. Quais os interesses de blindar, com uma nomeação tão elevada, um general (já difícil de ser investigado) envolvido em condições tão suspeitas? 

Caso em aberto

A Polícia Federal diz que “encerrou o caso” e entregou o “relatório final”, mas ainda há lacunas a serem investigadas, como a própria negligência do Exército reacionário e também o envolvimento nítido da extrema-direita, destacadamente a família Bolsonaro, com diversos dos envolvidos no caso Marielle, a título de exemplo os motorista e executor, respectivamente Élcio de Queiroz e Ronnie Lessa, e os possíveis mandantes, Chiquinho e Domingos Brazão. 

A cada dia que passa, essas lacunas ficam ainda evidentes. A nomeação absurda, incoerente e absolutamente questionável de Tomás Miguel Miné Paiva não pode impedir que Nunes, bem como o general Braga Netto, sejam questionados sobre os eventos de 2018. Além da nomeação de Rivaldo, o porquê que o Exército, que interviu em tantos aspectos da “segurança pública” do Rio aqueles anos, se negou a ir a fundo no caso Marielle. 

E o governo? 

A reabertura e aprofundamento das investigações também dependem do governo. Porém, imediatamente após a divulgação dos nomes dos mandantes, o ministro da Justiça de Luiz Inácio comemorou o que chamou de “trabalhos encerrados” e “vitória do Estado sobre o crime organizado”. 

O próprio mandatário ficou em silêncio sobre o tema, mas parece que também considera o trabalho como encerrado: em um jantar mais reservado no dia 25/03, limitou-se a exaltar o trabalho da Polícia Federal e condenar o envolvimento de políticos no assassinato, além de falar que não faria caso da solução porque não é um evento que tenha algo a ser celebrado. 


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Em defensiva, Forças Armadas são alvo de votação no STF sobre ‘poder moderador’ - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


Os ministros Edson Fachin e André Mendonça votaram no dia 1° de abril contra a tese de “poder moderador” das Forças Armadas analisada no Supremo Tribunal Federal como parte de uma Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade (ADI) movida pelo PDT em 2020, que trata especificamente dos limites constitucionais das Forças Armadas e sua hierarquia em relação aos outros “poderes”. Além de Fachin e Mendonça, o relator Luiz Fux e os ministros Roberto Barroso e Flávio Dino já haviam votado da mesma forma na ação. O placar, agora, está de 5 a 0.

Na votação, o ministro Fux declarou que a missão das Forças Armadas “não acomoda o exercício de poder moderador entre os poderes Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário” e que “[as] Forças Armadas não são um Poder da República, mas uma instituição à disposição dos Poderes constituídos”. Já Dino declarou que a função militar é “subalterna” às outras instituições e que o “poder é apenas civil”. 

Ofensiva do STF

O julgamento faz parte da ofensiva do STF contra a extrema-direita e alguns militares após a quase ruptura institucional em 2022. Contrariados pela agitação de extrema-direita por um golpe de Estado que teve como conteúdo, dentre outras coisas, o discurso anti-STF, os ministros buscam aproveitar da desmoralização sofrida pelos galinhas verdes e militares da ala mais à extrema-direita para recuperar a iniciativa nas pugnas entre as instituições e preservar o seu bolsão de Poder. 

A operação Tempus Veritatis, deflagrada pela PF com apoio dos ministros, bem como a disponibilização na íntegra da decisão de Alexandre de Moraes, que expôs todo o plano golpista de extrema-direita e os nomes centrais envolvidos no núcleo-duro bolsonarista, são parte importante dessa ofensiva. 

Desmoralização 

Além da análise da ADI, há outros elementos que apontam para a defensiva das Forças Armadas. Um deles foi revelado pela jornalista Bela Megale, do jornal monopolista O Globo, que afirmou em sua coluna que o comandante do Exército, Tomás Miguel Miné Ribeiro Paiva, tem se reunido com Alexandre de Moraes para pedir informações de militares investigados e “tirar dúvidas em relação a cumprimentos de ordens judiciais”. O encontro mais recente, segundo Megale, tratou da indicação de Richard Nunes, general citado no caso Marielle, para o cargo de chefe do Estado Maior do Exército.

É certo que, apesar de não terem deixado de tutelar a Nação ou ameaçar o governo, as Forças Armadas estão em uma defensiva dentro dos seus planos de ofensiva contrarrevolucionária para o País. 

Também é sabido que, se assim estão, isso não se deve ao STF, apesar dos ministros aproveitarem a situação para promover sua ofensiva e demarcar claro que não vão aceitar o rompimento de determinados limites, como o planejamento de um golpe de extrema-direita que ousava minar o bolsão de Poder da corte. As ações do STF rondam acima de tudo a preservação desses interesses próprios, e não a preocupação séria com as liberdades democráticas no país. 

A defensiva das Forças Armadas se deve ao próprio escancaramento dos planos golpistas, da agitação de extrema-direita dos galinhas verdes, das ações promovidas em diversos cantos do país com apoio logístico e financeiro de militares de altos postos da ativa e agremiações da extrema-direita, tudo isso somado ao escancaro de casos de corrupção e supersalários revelados nos últimos poucos anos dentro das Forças Armadas, sobretudo o Exército. As informações mais profundas sobre a trama golpista reveladas posteriormente pelas investigações caíram como mais lama no já profundo e obscuro manguezal.

Por isso mesmo, o terreno segue favorável àqueles autênticos progressistas e democratas do povo que buscam se levantar contra o golpismo ainda em voga e a tutela militar sobre o povo e a Nação.


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Após 60 anos do golpe, a intervenção dos militares segue atrasando a Nação - A Nova Democracia (A Nova Democracia)


O marco do dia 1º de abril de 2024 não poderia deixar de expressar a condição do atraso nacional através das Forças Armadas, medula do velho Estado brasileiro especialistas em contrarrevolução. Uma série de ações nas vésperas do golpe completar 60 anos do golpe que envolvem declarações, eventos e posicionamentos de generais reservistas demonstram que o golpismo de sempre segue sendo a diretriz dos militares.

Em meio à ofensiva do STF contra o ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro e alguns generais, o Clube Militar escolheu destacar a posição de extrema-direita e realizou um almoço comemorativo que contou com discurso do general Maynard Marques de Santa Rosa, agitador golpista defensor da interpretação do artigo 142 segundo a qual as Forças Armadas reacionárias, frente a determinadas condições, tem o dever de intervir. Em sua fala, Santa Rosa afirmou que o ideário golpista “revivescia os anseios tenentistas”. Essa consciente distorção ideológica do que era o movimento democrático de tenentes é realizada no objetivo de dar legitimidade à intervenção política do Exército, de ontem e de hoje. Em sua exposição, ele também estampou que o prestígio da União Soviética tornou o Brasil “alvo da manobra geopolítica”, que no ambiente interno atuavam “integrantes do movimento comunista internacional, abrigados confortavelmente nos sindicatos, nas redações e nas legendas dos partidos políticos legais”, gerando, enfim, a “ameaça de caos [que] empurrava o país para o cenário da Guerra Civil Espanhola”. Eis aí as determinadas condições que, há 60 anos, exigiu a intervenção militar, exposta de modo a deixar aberta a possibilidade para paralelos atuais, a serem feitos pelos golpistas de hoje.

Os presidentes dos três Clubes (o Militar, o Naval e o da Aeronáutica) também se pronunciaram. Através de uma nota conjunta, relacionam o golpe de 1964 à participação da FEB na Segunda Guerra Mundial, apresentando a tese segundo a qual está comprovado o “posicionamento definitivo do Brasil em favor da democracia”. Em mais um descabido paralelo, a utilização do prestígio da FEB é também utilizada para dar legitimidade ao golpismo, uma vez que omite, com razão, determinados fatos, como que a entrada do Brasil na Segunda Guerra ocorreu por pressão do movimento democrático e revolucionário, que também atuou para impedir o envio de tropas para combater na Guerra da Coreia servindo aos propósitos da intervenção imperialista ianque.

Hamilton Mourão, que já defendeu uma nova constituição sem uma assembleia constituinte para o país, fez sua tradicional louvação ao golpe. Ele afirma o seguinte: “A história não se apaga e nem se reescreve, em 31 de março de 1964 a Nação se salvou a si mesma!”. Como um bom gorila, Mourão defende que o Exército é a essência da Nação e tem a outorga de intervir para manter a integridade nacional. Dessa forma, não se fala que o golpe de 1º de abril foi, de fato, contra a constituição vigente – ademais de ser responsável pelo assassinato de milhares de brasileiros, pelo desaparecimento de outros milhares, pela generalização da tortura nos quartéis das Forças Armadas e pelas polícias estaduais, além de ser o principal responsável do legado de esquadrões da morte que seguem aterrorizando em favelas e periferias de todo o País.

Todos esses posicionamentos são de generais reservistas, e portanto expressa somente parte do pensamento existente entre os militares da ativa. Ocorre que ainda hoje o golpismo segue guiando as diretrizes dos generais. Os militares ainda hoje assumem o papel de interventores, baseados no papel histórico de poder moderador da república – cuja concepção está estampada não apenas no lema “A casa da República” do Clube Militar, como também, e principalmente, na diretriz de “legalidade, legitimidade e estabilidade” de Villas-Bôas.

A diferença está na forma que se realiza a intervenção. Se ontem buscavam ser os promotores de golpes, agora atuam com cautela, escondendo sua intervenção através de atuações “legítimas” nas instituições, seja através da tutela, da chantagem ou até do constrangimento. A legitimidade que faltou em 1964, segue faltando hoje, quando menos de 1/3 dos brasileiros confiam nas Forças Armadas. Não fosse por esse pequeno detalhe, talvez fosse desnecessário que os figurões do golpismo nacional saíssem à público. Mas não: ainda é necessário justificar o golpismo das Forças Armadas, de modo a permitir a intervenção na conjuntura atual. Não há espaço para ilusões. Segue sendo necessário condenar o golpismo das Forças Armadas.


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Ireland: 108th anniversary of the Easter Rising – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


Featured image: Annual Easter Rising commemoration of AIA Ireland in Glasnevin Cemetery, Dublin: Source: AIA Ireland

On Easter Monday 1916 Irish republicans established the Army of the Irish Republic and proclaimed in arms the Irish Republic. For five days the Republican forces held out against British imperialism and relit the spark of revolution in Ireland.

Every year the Republican Movement, which continues their struggle against imperialism, commemorates these historic days. Anti Imperialist Action Ireland has already reported on some of the commemoration this year.

On the 30th of March there was an commemoration in Bray, County Wicklow, led by Socialist Republican Colour Party.

on the 31st Anti Imperialist Action Ireland held its annual Easter Rising commemoration in Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin.

We have previously reported on last year’s commemorations of the Easter Rising:


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More actions celebrating the 130th anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


Featured image: Posters celebrating the 130th anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao, Leipzig-Schönefeld, Germany. Source: Dem Volke Dienen

There are some more reports on actions celebrating the 130-year anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

In Oslo, Norway, graffiti was made with slogans of the international campaign of the ICL for the Birth of Chairman Mao.

In Leipzig, Germany posters celebrating the 130th anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao were put up in the working-class district of Leipzig-Schönefeld.


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Spanish imperialism gives up another port to NATO – The Red Herald (Red Herald)


Featured image: the frigateNavarra’, which carries out military actions in the framework of the NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. Source: Diario Menorca

As the newspaper from the Spanish State, Servir al Pueblo, reports, the Spanish State, tool of Spanish imperialism, has given up another port to the NATO, which will use it as military base.

This is the third port given up by the Spanish State to the NATO. In this case the port is located in Maó, Menorca, and it is being used since April of last year as a support base for the NATO operations and there are no limits or restrictions for using this port. Its main uses are “dissuasion and protection before terrorist attacks, knowledge of the sea surroundings or the development of regional abilities of security”. According to the bourgeois press, this base would serve as support in case of having attacks as the ones which the Ansar Allah, “the Houthis”, are carrying out in the Red Sea. This port is in short distance from ports that are in Africa and outside of NATO’s territory, as the Alger’s port, Algeria. Thus, Maó joins the other two Spanish State’s ports, Cádiz and Murcia, which currently are giving support tot the alliance dominated by Yankee imperialism.

Together with the port, this year it is expected that the Spanish State will provide with more resources to the Operation Sea Guardian, as a submarine, a maritime vigilance plane, a frigate, a supply ship and a patrol ship with special operations equipment to act in case of crisis. The amount provided by the Spanish State to this military mission is of 27 millions of euros, and the overall amount provided to the NATO is of 200 millions of euros.

The revolutionary newspaper Servir al Pueblo highlights social-democracy’s, which in 2023 was in the government which was defined by themselves as the “the most progressive government in the history”, bankruptcy. However, they did not hesitate to hide purposefully the giving of this base to the NATO even from the local bourgeois government, which now has heard the news. Now the same social-democrat Parties express their “disapproval” due to the militarization of the country. They are trying to avoid the fact that they were in the government when the whole operation was prepared. Servir al Pueblo also highlights the involvement of the false PCE (the so-called “Communist” Party of Spain) in the whole operation as was and is part of the government: “we must remember that the usurped and false PCE of Enrique Santiago is part of the coalition Unidas Podemos. If the General Secretary of the PCE shown his big hypocrisy when he declared that ‘we are against the NATO but Spain has international compromises’, now we see this increased.”

With these examples we see the militarization of the imperialist States. The Spanish State is not the only European State which increases its ties with NATO and Yankee imperialism. For example, we recently reported on the increase of US military bases in Norway and the Finland’s membership to the NATO:


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